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THE INTERPRETATION OF LIFE

THE INTERPRETATION OF LIFE

In which is shown the relation of

MODERN CULTURE

to

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

By

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TO
THE REVERED MEMORY
OF
MY FATHER AND MOTHER

*And chiefly Thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all temples th' upright heart and pure,
Instruct me, for Thou know'st; Thou from the first
Wast present, and, with mighty wings outspread,
Dove-like, sat'st brooding on the vast Abyss,
And mad'st it pregnant: What in me is dark,
Illumine; what is low, raise and support;
That, to the highth of this great argument,
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.*

(PARADISE LOST, BOOK I.)

PREFACE

THERE are doubtless many intelligent men, in the professional and business worlds, who are deeply interested in the things of the mind, and who would gladly familiarize themselves with the spiritual treasures of the best philosophical thought, were not such treasures so obscurely hidden in the depths of technical phraseology and recondite utterance as to render them practically non-existent for the general reader.

This volume attempts the ambitious and hazardous task of gathering up the best that has been thought and said by the noblest minds, in the past or present, and of putting it forth in such terms and within such limits as will render it appreciable to the popular intelligence.

The attempt, however, aims at more than a mere summation of ideas, or an eclectic, philosophical anthology, for there is presented, as the title of the volume indicates, an interpretation of life; but an interpretation made in the light of the highest and best thoughts of man. Everyone, in his way and measure, necessarily interprets life; for the mere fact of self-conscious intelligence involves some rational account of things. That is, the life of man, as a rational being, is always in itself an interpretation of some kind, no matter how humble and inadequate. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to familiarize ourselves, so far as possible, with the noblest thoughts, feelings, and purposes of those men who have lived most and best, or who have more largely, broadly, and deeply comprehended within themselves the meaning of life.

II.

The endeavor here will be made to deal with the entire subject in the spirit of rational freedom and detachment from all special interests, for the sake of those interests; and the ultimate appeal will always be carried up to that reason alone which dwells in

every man, as the supreme court of final decision. Special interests obscure thought and render man a mere advocate for some fixed idea; reason frees man and enables him to behold the Idea itself in its fullness.

By reason, however, is not meant *reasoning*, or discursive logic which may be employed, at any given time, only as a means for the advocacy of the accepted or acquired prejudice. By reason, is meant the entire man, in his threefold capacity of thought, feeling, and will; reason, therefore, taken so comprehensively as to overcome all rational tribalism and immaturity by rational totality and maturity.

That is, if man, as an intelligent being, is to interpret life in anything like an adequate way, he is to do so not merely as a scientist, with his exclusive theoretical or intellectual interests; or as an artist, with his exclusive æsthetical or practical interests; or as a saint, with his exclusive ethical or religious interests; but he is to interpret life in the *totality* of his reason as scientist and artist and saint.

Nor must he pause, in pursuing any one of these three, great, rational interests, at any stage of immaturity. As scientist, he necessarily rises above common-sense by rationalizing it under the forms of logic; but then he must push on to philosophy, in order to view all things in the light of rational intuition.

As an artist, his search for the beautiful lifts him above the mere pleasures, derived from sense, to their more subtle, rationalized refinements in emotion; but then he must pass beyond emotion, in order to seek those felicities which lie in pure happiness alone.

As a saint, he perforce renounces the crude impulses of egoism, as the motives of will, for the lofty and sacred demands of the moral law; but then he must finally rise above law into the realms of universal love where at last his ethical nature comes to full expression.

And it is only when reason thus attains its maturity, in the regions of spiritual Truth, spiritual Beauty, and spiritual Goodness, that it also attains its totality in the unity of thought and will, as the Beauty of Truth, manifesting Goodness.

III.

If an attempt to attain such a rational maturity and totality is regarded as ambitious and hazardous, it must not be supposed to lie altogether beyond the reach of any man who is serious enough to lift himself above absorption in worldly gain, and earnestly pursue after the unsearchable riches of the mind. For in every man there lie the potencies and possibilities of that Supreme Reason which inhabits and imbues the Universe, with the absolute Unity of its harmonious order (Beauty), the infinite omnipresence of its Thought (Truth), and the eternal omnipotence of its Will (Goodness). Even the little child, until perverted by human conventions, can with direct simplicity behold the beauty of its life secure in the all-enfolding Truth and Goodness of God; for to unspoiled childhood, everything is beautiful and true and good.

It is not left to learning or worldly wisdom to fathom the deep mysteries of the Cosmic Mind; for learning often obfuscates, by the cloud of its traditional prejudices, and worldly wisdom more often wholly darkens, by its egoistic sophistications, the mind and heart. It is the simple mind and the upright heart, in the learned as well as in the unlearned, that is ever open to the incoming of the light and warmth of Truth and Goodness that shines down from God upon the life of man.

IV.

As a clue to the better understanding of this volume, it may be well to anticipate, in a word, its general course. To begin with, the universe presents itself to intelligence as a unity of things, under the dominance of rational law, and unfolding toward some great end. The first and most striking object of observation is the outer, natural world-order in its evolution, through inorganic forms, until life appears; and then, through organic forms, until man appears. And here we rise above the natural to the new and higher supra-natural or rational world-order; for man, in his self-conscious rationality, asserts himself as an *other* in the Cosmos, with his own interests which he freely pursues toward his own ends. (Book I.)

There thus begins the evolution of the rational world-order. As

a theoretical being, man is a scientist and comes to know the object before him; and, as an æsthetico-practical being, he is an artist seeking to appreciate and appropriate the values of the object which he has come to know. But, as others besides himself have the same knowledge and make the same claims upon the object and its values, he must, as an ethical being, establish some moral law, according to which he may share those values with his fellow men.

Hence, as a scientist, artist, and saint, he comes to discover that, in order to attain freedom and self-realization, his reason must unfold toward a complete, harmonious unity with the Cosmic Life, in thinking the Cosmic Thought and willing the Cosmic Will. (Book II.)

In this rational evolution, there is clearly revealed the threefold nature of reason in its unity of thought, feeling, and will. But, unfortunately in actual experience, the interests of science, art, and ethics fall into seemingly inextricable confusion and conflict. Fortunately, however, it is a confusion and conflict which proves to be due to no radical defect in reason itself, but to the self-imposed limitations of rational tribalism and rational immaturity.

Let reason but unfold to its totality and maturity, and it will be found that the object, made known by science, offers to art all its possible values, which ethics, with its outstreaming will of good, ever seeks to confer upon others. (Book III.)

It then devolves upon the rational subject, with his threefold capacity for science, art, and ethics, to make a corresponding, threefold interpretation of the object before him. The weariness of the discussion, as a preliminary necessity, concerning the entire process of knowing and its validity, the reader is asked patiently to endure; for it is by means of such a discussion alone that it is possible to reach the clearly rational and final outcome which presents the object, in its entirety, as the Absolute Beauty (the Cosmic Unity) of Infinite Truth (the Cosmic Thought), manifesting Eternal Goodness (the Cosmic Will).

It is in the unfolding, rational process of reaching this outcome that man comes to know, through nature, his *true relation* to the

World, in its reality; through history, his *right relation* to Man, in his reality; and through both nature and history, his *absolute relation* to God, the Ultimate Ground of Reality. And it is his *total relation* to Reality that constitutes the entire meaning of religion. (Book IV.)

But in man's rational evolution toward the Beauty of Truth and Goodness, he is disturbed by the mystery of suffering which not only needs to be explained but escaped. And he finds the explanation of the mystery to be that suffering is a divine pedagogy of pain which, rebuking error and sin, as departures from the Cosmic Thought and the Cosmic Will, serves, on the one hand, as a *warning against* error and sin, and, on the other hand, as a *call* to the attainment of Truth and Goodness.

Although error and sin—subjective, human mistakes in thought and perversities of will—are, as departures from the Cosmic Thought and Will, necessarily unreal, they are nevertheless actual in man's experience, and remain actual until their illusions are exposed and destroyed in the light of Reality. But unreal as error and sin may be, they subserve the interests of Truth and Goodness; for the pedagogy of pain, which they necessarily involve, arouses and develops man, in his progressive advance toward his final goal.

Man's rational evolution in the world of experience is a flight and a return. Like the prodigal, he leaves the naive happiness of his Father's house, in his youth, to plunge headlong, with all the confident assertion of his self-conceit and self-will, into the struggles of his manhood. But instead of finding the happiness he sought, he finds only hunger and sorrow; until, aroused to himself by the pedagogy of pain, he returns in humility and contrition to his Father's house; but returns developed, ennobled, and enriched by the wandering experiences of life. (Book V.)

Then it is he comes to know that the only Reality is the Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness; and that, therefore, his supreme vocation, in his earthly existence, is, in overcoming the subjective, discordant illusions of error and sin, to realize himself as a son of God, who reflects in himself the Life,

the Truth, and the Love of God. And in this self-realization, there is revealed to him that ultimate Science of Being which, as the final attainment of the Christian consciousness, enables him to understand, not only the rational meaning of his flight, but also the divine way of his return to Reality. (Book VI.)

v.

How imperfectly the whole plan has been carried out, and how inadequate are the forms of expression, no one can be more painfully aware than the author himself. And yet the substance of the thought is urged upon every intelligent man, as not unworthy of his most serious attention. If any possible academic reader should complain that he finds nothing new, or nothing which is not better said elsewhere, though unacknowledged here, let his judgment be softened by the consideration that originality is neither a claim nor an aim in the present endeavor; and that the sources of information and inspiration are too general and varied for due acknowledgment within reasonable limits.

On the other hand, it would be the merest affectation to depreciate an interpretation of life which is the fruit of more than twenty years of reading, observation, and thought; and which, in its attempt to harmonize all the interests of reason, through intuition within the rational self, is new.

This volume has been written with the single aim of ascertaining, so far as possible, the objective Truth; and is sent forth with the confident hope that it will contribute, in some measure at least, to all those forces in the world that go to make men wiser, better, and happier.

GERHARDT C. MARS.

New York City,
June 1, 1908.

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BOOK I.

THE NATURAL WORLD-ORDER.

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

MAN, as a rational being, recognizes himself to be an intelligent subject in the midst of an objective world. His supreme concern is to interpret that world under the forms of intellect, estimate its values in terms of feeling, and subdue it to the dominance of his will. In the long history of the race, he has made but slow progress in this three-fold endeavor and, at times, has fallen into such despair that, renouncing all further attempts to dominate, he has sought to abandon it as, either a degrading illusion, or a dark prison house of pain.

Modern science, however, by its rapid progress and brilliant successes, has given man to believe that the world may be known, mastered and enjoyed by him, at any rate so far as its outer forms are concerned, whatever doubt may exist regarding the ultimate, underlying reality.

There are two great words with which science has made us familiar, in the modern era, and which express the very core of her meaning, namely, *law* and *evolution*. Law stands for a rational permanence of relation among things, and is something not only which we can understand but upon which we can rely. Evolution, simply expressed, is a rational, purposive progress toward a definite end.

Natural Law and the Eighteenth Century.

It was the eighteenth century, especially, that, in a large way, gave to us the word law, as expressing a regular, permanent and demonstrable process in the course of nature. Perhaps the most significant name connected with it is that of Newton (d. 1727) who, having the splendid results of Galileo, with his laws of motion, and of Kepler, with his paths of the planets, before him, was looking for some simple and inclusive formula for all inter-planetary reactions. As we know, he found it in the law of gravitation which he could state in exact, mathematical terms. Considering how few were the facts

at his command, we may almost regard his discovery as a revelation. It was the leap of mind to the truth of things.

This great conception of law, including everything, controlling everything, in a vast unitary system of cosmic order, without loss and without accident, took possession of the century. Pope put it into poetry, and the English Deists and French Encyclopedists put it into philosophy.

This comprehensive notion of a harmonious cosmos, whose order of going is changeless law, was of incalculable value for an enlightened progress, because it not only furnished the mind with a sublime outlook on the world, and gave inspiration and method for new discoveries, but also banished from the troubled spirit of man many base superstitions and fears that had made him cringe before intrusive, supernatural powers of evil.

Evolution and the Nineteenth Century.

With the nineteenth century, a new problem of scientific investigation came more and more into view. Heretofore, attention had been successfully and fruitfully fixed on physical or inorganic nature; now attention was beginning to be centered more and more, and with flattering results, on living or organic nature.

Numerous tendencies all pointed in one direction, that is, evolution; so that when Darwin's great book appeared just after the mid-century, with its vast array of facts and its clear, careful inductions, the word came to be accepted as standing for an important truth in the orderly procedure of nature.

Law and Mechanism: Evolution and Organism.

This new idea has proved of the greatest advantage to thought. The universe of things, conceived merely as a system of law and order, remains simply a mechanism in which there is no progress, no life. It is just a system of self-inclosed, legalized inter-action. But once transfuse that system with the movement of an evolution, and immediately life and progress appear. Nature ceases to be a mechanism, describable in exact, mathematical terms, and becomes an organism which rises above mathematical description into the higher realms of art and ethics.

As a great mechanism of law and order, nature, it is true, reveals intelligence, a certain harmonious beauty, and the permanence of

ethical integrity; and yet, in this form it remains for us scarcely more than an objective fact with little meaning. But viewed as an organism, nature reveals not only the intelligence of an objective, rational plan, the harmony of order, and the integrity of law but an unfolding purpose, moving toward some great end. Regarded merely in terms of law, the cosmos presents itself as static, that is, as a balanced permanence among things; in terms of evolution, however, it presents itself more as a kinetic progress, shaping things. In the one case, we view the world as it *is*, in the other, as it *is to be*.

Thus it is that evolution introduces into the natural world-order the forward-looking purpose of an artistic and moral ideal. Therefore, we should never be content to stop at any given point with the conclusion that this is nature or this is man, for we can not know what nature and what man really are until we know the total outcome, or the ideal aimed at.

Hence, we see that however important it may be to get clearly before us the conception of law, as expressing a permanent unity of rational relations, it is still more important to get the conception of evolution, as the idea of a rational, purposive progress. Law, in itself, does not involve evolution, but evolution necessarily involves law and takes it up, as the method of its procedure, into itself. If then we find a series of laws, we may expect to find them as a hierarchy of rationalized forces working together toward one all-inclusive end.

Evolution, an Implicit Idea, Becoming Explicit.

Setting aside the various, particular forms which the conception of evolution may have taken on, as a description of its method, we find the general meaning of evolution to be an unfoldment of being in a living progress, according to law, toward some definite end. We must not allow ourselves to be confused or misled by abstract, philosophical formulas which are supposed to define evolution, such as that it is a mere passing from the simple to the complex by a quantitative grouping of simples, or as a mere passing from an undifferentiated homogeneity to a differentiated heterogeneity by a shifting of matter and motion. Such expressions, in a measure, may *describe*, in abstract terms, something of what goes on, as it might appear to the imagination, but they do not tell us what evolution really is.

We are nearer the truth when we say: Evolution is the gradual unfolding of a rational plan in time, or the becoming explicit of an implicit idea. Whether that idea lies potentially in the individual or in the environment, or in both—as it must, since action and reaction are always equal—the outcome is the *infolded* plan, or idea, *unfolded*. In other words, the evolution of the cosmos presents itself as a vast inner, purposive idealism coming to outer realization.

An Ideal, Being Realized.

We see inorganic nature evolving to that point where life appears. Then the first forms of life press forward, throwing their efforts, as it were, beyond themselves, as if seeking some ideal of which, nevertheless, they themselves are incapable. The ideal is reached in some succeeding generation, which again strains forward to its unattainable, realized, in turn, by its successors; and so the rising process goes on until man is reached, a self-conscious intelligence who, waking from the slumber of the cosmic unity, in which all things below him were wrapped, consciously takes up the inherent ideal and strives forward with his science, his art, and his ethics toward the perfections of truth, beauty, and goodness.

Nothing less than this is the significance of evolution, and if this is what Mr. Tyndall saw in the atom, that day at Belfast, when he saw in it "the promise and potency of all forms of life," then he saw true. The erroneous implication of such words, however, usually is that the atom is a simple, undifferentiated, material thing which by various divisions and groupings, finally comes out as the cosmos with its infinite variety of life and mind. Whereas, if we really see in the atom the promise and potency of all forms of life, we must find implicit in it, not only an amœba and a mammal, but also a Homer and a Dante, an Alexander and a Napoleon, an Orpheus and a Beethoven, a Plato and a Hegel, a Buddha and a Christ. Or else we must give up evolution altogether, as a process of continuous change from simple to more complex forms, and recognize the continual introduction of new forms along the way, in a discontinuous series of discrete things. But we shall here frankly adopt the doctrine of evolution, in its main features, as expressing the gradual and continuous unfolding in time of an implicit, rational plan, toward its full, explicit outcome in the total, realized idea of the cosmos.

Description and Explanation.

In endeavoring to outline the course of evolution, we must carefully guard ourselves against confusing *description* with *explanation* or supposing we *explain* when we only *describe*. So far as any given doctrine of evolution undertakes to set forth the objective course of change among things, it remains description. It shows us *that* an orderly process goes on and *how* it goes on, but not until it reveals to us *why* it goes on, that is, makes clear the purposed end, can it be said to *explain*.

In examining a mechanical contrivance, we note that a regularly recurring series of changes runs along among the various parts, and we observe *how* those parts are related so as to bring about the changes, but all this is only preliminary to the explanation which reveals *why* the machine was constructed, to what purpose, to accomplish what useful end. It is true, in the case of the machine, we know to begin with why it was made, and so regard the detailed description of its inter-related parts and actions as its explanation. But with nature, we have no such advantage and must find out, from the descriptive *that* and *how*, the explanatory *why*. Perhaps we can never gain such an explanation. Science declares that we can only know nature as a fact and can in no way discover its meaning or purpose; but, nevertheless, the mind, under the form of this philosophy or that, persistently demands to know the meaning, and at times claims to find it. And for that matter, science itself is compelled constantly to throw out great, provisional guesses or hypotheses which are nothing but explanatory reasons for the course of things.

In any case, we shall know where to look for explanation, viz.: in rational purpose and not in the method by which that purpose is carried out. But, on the other hand, so far as evolution is concerned, even if we are not permitted, in the first instance, to regard it as a causal idea or explanation, but only as a fact or method, we shall be greatly furthered, in getting at the cause of things or underlying, purposive idea, if such in the end there after all prove to be, by knowing that fact and method.

Strife between Religion and Science, Needless.

Much of the bitter controversy between religion and science, a generation ago, might have been spared if this distinction between description and explanation, between method and causal purpose

or, what is the same thing, between the thought and the will of the cosmos, had been clearly understood. For it would have saved many a philosophical scientist from attacking religion on the basis of evolution, and many a theologian from denouncing evolution on the supposition that it denied the values of religion. What could have been seen is that the values of religion lay in the realm of ultimate cause, or rational purpose, and that whether God is conceived as having directly created, in a supernatural way, type after type in its order and after its kind, or willed the process of emerging plastic forms in what we call the natural order, the interests of religion are in no way touched. In fact, it could have been seen that the method of evolution gives to religion a much nobler and more sublime doctrine of creative unity, in the purposes of the Divine Will, than could any notion of special, arbitrary creation. It could have been seen, on both sides of the dispute, that evolution, instead of being a threat and a danger to religion, is its ally and support.

Value of Evolution to Religion.

Indeed, and we must never forget the fact, in the calm depth below the stormy surface of controversy, there were always minds that saw and urged the profound significance of evolution as being just that missing link between nature, as a lifeless, mechanical system of legalized inter-actions, and nature, as a unitary cosmic organism, transfused, directed, and sustained by the omnipotent ever-present, living purpose of the all-inclusive Deity.

These more enlightened observers saw that not only nature, including man as a physical organism, has evolved, but that human nature consisting of all its rational interests, develops manifold degrees of civilization, in their various, rising phases of custom, moral code, law, government, literature, art, science, philosophy, and religion from the lowliest and simplest to the highest and most elaborate forms. On behalf of religion, it came in time to be seen that the entire Gospel and the teachings of Paul gained a larger, more penetrating, and comprehensive meaning in the light of evolution. They thus become more natural to our human interests and make a more intimate and profound appeal to reason. Paul, clearly enough, conceived the Gospel as the culmination of all the historic tendencies in Israel, and Jesus describes the Gospel as spreading, naturally in the world, like leaven in the meal, or growing, like the plant, from the

kernel in the ground to the ear, and then to the full maturity of the corn in the ear.

So far, then, as religion is concerned, we shall not be disturbed by any doctrine of evolution, as a description or statement of the *how* of nature. We shall feel justified in protesting only when it goes further and, encroaching on the explanatory *why*, denies any rational meaning or purpose in nature, or dogmatically asserts that none can be found. Even in this last instance, we might still remain undisturbed if we were convinced by certain philosophers and saints, who hold that nature has no significance for religion, either to approve or disprove. But, unable to avoid the conviction that nature is the handiwork of God, and that human nature, in its historic development, is under the Divine Providence, we can not but be deeply concerned in securing, if possible, a true interpretation of the real course of nature and of history, in order to win those lessons that will aid us in the better understanding and conduct of life.

Since, in the light of evolution, which is usually thought of only in connection with the vital processes in plant and animal, the inorganic world loses much of the hard fixity of its non-vital mechanism, we must begin by tracing briefly inorganic evolution, introductory to the history of life and mind on the earth.

CHAPTER II.

INORGANIC EVOLUTION.

WHEN we rise from the mechanical system of the physical world, to the realm of living evolution in plant and animal, we are inclined to believe that we have passed from the inorganic to the organic, from a region where things are indifferent to the forces that play in and around them, to one in which the entire action centers around the preservation and propagation of individual organisms. This distinction, in the main, is valid, but must not be carried to the extent of denying organism altogether to the inorganic world. Viewed in detail, the inorganic world, it is true, does present only inchoate molar, molecular, and atomic masses, indifferent to all organic form and subject only to physical and chemical forces. But, if we take the physical universe as a whole, we shall find not only that it presents a definite form, but that its form is the outcome of a gradual evolution, according to a definite, rational plan.

Existing as an infinitesimal atom in the midst of the physical masses and forces about him, it is not unnatural that man should regard the world as inorganic. In so doing, he is not unlike an imaginary corpuscle in the human blood, which, while it found many living, organic forms, vegetal and animal, about it, should take the rushing blood currents, the retaining walls of artery, vein and capillary, the various forms of tissue, muscular, nervous, and calcareous, and the physical and chemical changes going on, as constituting an orderly but, nevertheless, an essentially non-vital and inorganic world. Enlarge the mental vision of the corpuscle, and it will see in the whole human body, in which it lives, a great organism that has come to its present form through years—to it ages—of slow development. In like manner, when man widens his view, he beholds in the cosmos a mighty organism which has reached its present form through æons of evolution.

A Scientific Titan and the Nebular Hypothesis.

Let us imagine some cosmic Titan, stalking to and fro the universe, bent on scientific investigation. His attention may be arrested by, to

him, a little cloud of meteoric dust, some petty billions or trillions of miles in diameter, because he observes in it certain faint beginnings of inner activity. At first, all he can make out is confused and meaningless eddyings, attractions and repulsions, here and there, throughout the mass. In due time, his patience is rewarded by discovering a distinct, general tendency of motion towards, and of swirling about, the center. His interest thoroughly aroused, he sets himself to watch, with the aid of his great microscope, these changes, very much as one of our human biologists would watch a chick's development in the egg.

With the contraction and rotation now fully established, he makes the significant observation that there is not only a generation of heat at the center, presumably because of the pressure of the particles one upon the other, but at the same time a loss of heat by radiation from the circumference.

As time goes on, the contraction and rotation show a marked increase. And while under the influence of contraction the whole mass reveals a tendency to form a sphere, the accelerating rotation, which finds a common axis, tends to flatten the sphere into a disc. It is further observed that, as the center increases in density, it not only revolves more rapidly but, in doing so, slowly draws away from the outer edge, leaving at last a great ring, revolving about, but slower than, the central mass. All this makes way for an astonishing change in the cosmic process to appear in due time.

Rings and Satellites.

The gravitative influence of the great center upon the ring urges it to a more rapid motion, but in so doing breaks it up and shoves it forward upon itself, until the once beautiful ring is heaped up into a confused, irregular spheroid which continues its movement around the center, but also gains an individual rotation around its own axis. Thus the first satellite or planet is born; and thus the central mass goes on contracting, throwing off rings, and piling them up into satellites until the titanic scientist catches sight, in the center of all, of the great glowing sphere which we call our sun. He also sees that the satellites follow the general history of the whole mass, by throwing off rings and forming them into sub-satellites of their own, until our entire solar system moves before him, like a living thing. So that what seemed at first to be an incoherent, homogeneous, undifferentiated

cloud mist has now evolved into a coherent, heterogeneous, differentiated cosmic system, full of harmonious beauty and power.

Evidences of Law: Gravitation.

Perhaps that which impresses our observer most of all is the regular orderly procedure of the whole, seemingly under the guidance of some to him as yet unknown, rational law, binding all into a consistent unity. And being of a mathematical turn of mind, he resolves to discover if possible, this law of matter in motion. So he proceeds to weigh the various masses, trace the paths they take, and calculate the energy of their movements. He discovers, in short, that any mass left to itself either remains where it is or moves forward in a straight line but he finds that no mass is motionless nor does it move in a straight line, because, through some mystic power, it is being acted upon by other masses and in turn is acting upon them, and that, mass for mass action and reaction are equal. As a result of all his observations, the final, all-inclusive law breaks upon his mind. It is that these masses mutually attract each other directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance between them.

Osmosis, Adhesion and Cohesion.

But illuminating and universal as the great law of gravitation is, to express the attractive force that holds things together in a perfect mechanical order, it by no means covers all the observed facts of attraction between bodies. There is seen, in the first place, a general osmotic tendency among gases and liquids, and even among solids, to invade or "push" into each other, revealing a sort of friendly but compulsory interchange of constituent parts, by which things seem to seek a balanced intermixture, or we might say, a social leveling down or up. And this instance of matter in motion, our observer can not bring under the law of gravitation, but must allow it to declare a law of its own.

Then he remarks two forces of attraction which seem to stop all motion and lock matter in a fixed embrace, that is, adhesion and cohesion; the one superficial and operative between solids of a different nature, and the other more intimate and profound, operative between the constituent particles or molecules of the same mass. So far as adhesion is concerned, he must content himself by recognizing various

degrees of tenacity. What principle lies at the basis of this adhesive tenacity he can not discover.

To learn what he can of cohesion, he breaks down many different solids into their molecules; and, equipped with the finest instruments of investigation, perhaps is able to discover that the diameter of one of these molecules is not more than one five-hundred-millionth of an inch, and that, instead of being fixed in place by cohesion as they seem, they really move about very much as the planets do in the solar system. If he could only find *their* law of gravitation! But he must leave the matter here and be satisfied with indicating the various degrees of cohesive force by naming solids hard, soft, brittle, malleable, or ductile.

Heat and Light.

But in the course of these investigations, another form of energy appears, directly opposed to the attractive forces, and which, therefore, tends to separate particles. Gases have been seen to condense into liquids and liquids into solids, thus forming an increasingly closer, cohesive union; and, wishing to learn the secret, our observer cleverly guesses that he can reverse the process. His first crude attempt is literally to smash down, by main force, some given solid into impalpable dust. But a subtler method soon suggests itself to him. As he has seen the condensation of gas into liquid and of liquid into solid accompanied by the loss of heat, he conjectures that, perhaps, the application of heat will in some way produce the reverse process of expansion. His attempt in this direction is crowned with success. Heat does overcome the cohesive force. Under its influence, solid bodies, with a self-subsistent figure, break down into a viscid and then into a fluent state, in which the attractive force of cohesion and the repellent force of heat are so nearly balanced that the particles or molecules freely move among themselves. With more heat, the fluid is transformed into a gas in which cohesion is quite suspended or overcome, all self-subsistent figure lost, and the molecules actively repel each other. He thus finds various forces at work tending to influence bodies in opposite directions.

Along with heat, and indissolubly bound up with it, is light which opens up a whole world of interest to the investigator. That, however, in light which concerns our observer for the moment is not its inconceivably rapid, undulatory motion through the ether, its

laws of refraction, or its divisibility into many beautiful colors, but the simple and significant fact that it reveals itself as a form of energy which, like heat, exerts a repellent push on things.

Electricity and Magnetism.

Intimately connected with this inseparable pair, which seem only to repel, his attention is called to another pair of dynamic forces that both combine and separate molecules, that is, electricity and magnetism. And these are observed on the largest scale. About the various satellites of the great solar system and about the sun itself, electric currents are observed to circle which, in turn, excite or induce, at the opposite poles, vast fields of magnetic force; and their intimate connection with heat and light becomes evident from the fact that their activity produces heat and light.

Chemism.

While absorbed with these inter-molecular, attractive and repellent forces, our Titan is becoming aware of a new form of energy little observed heretofore but, nevertheless, always present, viz.: chemism.

He has supposed, hitherto, that the only repellent power heat had was, first, to break down solids into liquids and, then, drive the molecules apart into diffused gases; but he now discovers that heat can break down the molecules themselves and, like a magic analyst, lay bare the subtle elements that compose them. The larger mass is made up of minute molecules, in quality like itself; but the molecule, he finds, is made up of still more minute particles, in quality wholly unlike it, and called by him atoms because it seems impossible that they can be further divided. Investigation shows that the many thousands of molecular forms which, in their aggregates, constitute the various molar masses in the cosmos, can be broken down into some fourscore varieties of these simple, irreducible atoms.

While heat is the great analyst to rend the molecule into its atoms, it proves to be, however, by no means the only one. Those other repellent forces, light and electricity, will also do the same. But the most curious fact is that, at times, the atoms themselves will, of their own accord under favorable circumstances, reject their one-time companions to seek out more congenial affinities in the common environment.

Natural Affinity and the Law of Valence.

It is this natural affinity among atoms that constitutes chemism. When, for any reason, the repellent forces of heat, or light, or electricity are lowered, atoms, hitherto held apart, will rush together in all the imaginable compounds of molecular matter, scattered throughout the universe; and the readiness with which they do so is inversely proportioned to the energy of the repellent forces present. And these affinities declare themselves with such regularity and in such exact proportions, that our observer can establish a law of atomic valence.

In the presence of this striking fact of chemism, it does not escape his alert attention that he here finds himself in quite a new order of things. Heretofore, he has found merely molar and molecular masses, influenced in their inter-actions by physical forces, attractive and repellent, such as gravitation, osmosis, adhesion, cohesion, heat, light, and electricity, resulting in the great cosmic order. But with chemism, there is the introduction of a constructive power which seems to make possible an infinite variety of new forms, as if in preparation for, and in anticipation of, some great forward step in the order of things. What that step is we shall in time discover.

Success, Dashed with Disappointment.

In the meantime, let us pause for a moment to note the mixed feelings of satisfaction and disappointment which our hero experiences. He expresses great satisfaction in having been able to reduce the action of nearly all of the natural forces to a definitely expressed law. In consequence of which, he can manipulate them with the nicest exactitude and state his results in precise, mathematical terms.

But he is deeply disappointed in not being able to find what they all suggest, viz.: a common underlying formula of which they all seem to be variants. They are constantly pointing to such a unity. Gravitation, by its mere impact and pressure, generates heat and light. Heat and light are able to pass over into electricity, and electricity turns into heat and light, while all these induce chemical action and are in turn produced by it. There seems clearly to be a Conservation of Energy throughout the cosmos, by reason of which, while this or that particular form of energy may disappear, it is really never lost but simply transmuted into another form. Nothing could be more evident, in view of this transmutability, than that some fundamental

unity underlies all the specific forms of energy. So that the great desideratum is a formula, or unitary Law of Motion, for that one Infinite Energy of which these specific forces are individual manifestations.

And he is not shaken in his hope of finding such a law because these forces fall into two great antagonistic classes, attractive and repellent—showing love and hate among things, as Empedocles said—and seem to nullify each other, as heat does chemism or as osmotic pressure does gravitation; for to him, this very strife indicates relationship, based on an essential unity which is clearly evident from the harmonious order of the world, as the total outcome of all the contending actions and reactions in it. He is sure that when one force does antagonize or overcome another, there is indicated not the contradiction of strife but the opposition of an inter-action, under the guidance of a deeper and subtler unity than he has yet been able to discover. And, hence, it is that he is so desirous of knowing what that one, fundamental, living Energy is which manifests itself in so many specific forms.

The Search for One Substance.

And now, since he has been compelled to believe in the unity of energy, from the fact that, first, numberless apparently unrelated activities have been reduced to a half dozen simple forms and, secondly, these have proved to be akin and transmutable, he can but expect to find some underlying unity in the varied forms of matter in which the forces supposedly inhere.

He found, at first, thousands upon thousands of seemingly self-subsistent, molar masses, quite different in constitution and quality, one from the other, and held in relation by a mutually exerted, gravitative energy. The case was very little changed when solids dissolved into fluids and fluids into gases for, while this revealed a new energy, an inter-molecular cohesion in addition to an inter-molar gravitation, the number of substances remained the same. But when the process of disintegration attacked the molecules, a remarkable simplification appeared. What before showed thousands of differences now fell to tens and, since these tens show continually a grasping and rejecting of one another, the conclusion can not be avoided that they too must in some way be reducible in number, by reason of a fundamental unity underlying them. His investigations give proof, in an astonishing

way, of the correctness of this surmise, for he finds the supposedly indivisible atoms disintegrating into simpler elements or ions, as he chooses to call them. And these, indeed, have the appearance at last of being the one common stuff out of which the various classes of atoms are formed and, hence, the molecules and molar masses. The most striking feature of these ions is their tremendous activity within the atom which, instead of being a little, solid, unchanging lump of matter, as he had always supposed, is in effect a sort of miniature solar system or rather universe, with thousands and even tens of thousands of suns and satellites.

But fancy his astonishment, when further investigation suggests that, perhaps, the ions are not minute, solid particles of matter, any more than atoms are, but electrons or infinitesimal charges of negative electricity, one of the forms of energy with which he has otherwise become acquainted.

The Relation of Identity: Matter is Motion.

He cannot, therefore, avoid the conclusion that the underlying unity of matter or substance, which he was led to seek, is not, after all, a something in which energy inheres but *is* itself energy. He is thus confronted by a deeper unity than he had expected. For, at best, he had only hoped to find a unity for all the varied forces, revealed by his investigations, in some one fundamental, underived energy or cause; and a unity for all the varied forms of matter, in some one fundamental, underived, material stuff or substance; and the relation between these two grand unities, he fancied, would be that of inherence, that is, energy *in* matter or cause *in* substance, or, to use an old expression, the activity and multiplicity of Becoming *in* the passivity and oneness of Being. But what now forces itself on his attention is that, while something is always fixed and changeless, as matter or substance, and something always active and changing, as energy or cause, the relation between them ceases to be that of *inherence* and becomes that of *identity*. Energy is matter in motion, matter is energy at rest; cause is substance in action, substance is cause in potency; becoming is being explicit or evolved, being is becoming implicit or involved. And the basal cosmic unity becomes an Infinite Substance or Being, forever fixed and changeless in its essential nature, which, nevertheless, manifests itself as an Eternal Cause or Energy

of Becoming, forever active and mutable, according to law, in myriads of forms of matter and motion, throughout the visible universe.*

The Evolving Earth.

But our Titan scientist, having been drawn aside for a moment, by his interest in the physical and chemical forces at play in the cosmos now returns to the general movement of evolution in the solar system spread out before him.

Sweeping his eye from center to circumference, his attention is caught by a satellite in which definite changes of its own seem to be going on. These changes are evidently due, in the first instance, to a loss of heat and the consequent possibility of the chemical combination of atoms into molecules and of the mechanical aggregation of molecules into gases, liquids, and solids. A point has been reached where the internal heat, generated by the impact and pressure of the centripetal, gravitative force, is overcome by radiation; the satellite has begun to cool and the free elements, hitherto held apart by intense heat now begin to rush into unions, according to their several affinities. The heavier elements, having found their congeners, sink, in proportion to their mass, toward the center, liquefying and stiffening into solids as they go; while above, the free oxygen almost fiercely seizes upon the free hydrogen and vaporous carbon, producing vast heavy mists of watery vapor and carbon dioxide, which envelop the sphere as in a dense pall. As the cooling continues, the solidified surface begins to bend and wrinkle into immense corrugations forming mountain chains, valleys, and ocean beds. The watery vapor, condensing into rain, pours down in torrential floods upon the mountains and through the valleys, tearing out great channels as it goes, and filling the deepest depressions; while the carbon dioxide settles down heavily upon the cooling surface. In time, the general form of our present earth slowly emerges from the waste of waters, wild and deep, as something won from the "void and formless infinite."

The Crystal, a Rebel to the General Order.

In all this, however, there would be nothing more than our observer might expect from what he already knew of the physical and chemical forces at work. But, on closer view, he finds one thing which, while

* See chapter on The Unity of Substance and Cause, Book IV.

in itself apparently insignificant enough, does arouse his interest and awaken strange surmisings, by its wholly unexpected appearance. As liquids stiffen into solids, he is struck by the astonishingly sudden appearance of a great variety of beautiful forms, showing a stubborn tenacity of maintaining certain regular, well-defined, geometrical outlines. If he seeks to break these down, as he can by the application of heat, he finds that, after due cooling, they spring back into their original forms. "What" we can fancy his saying to himself, "What have we here! Is this rebellion against the cosmic order!" And his surprise is quite natural. Hitherto, all matter and motion have been subject to the general law; all things and changes have submitted to the whole plan, without protest or apparent disobedience; but here is self-assertion, independence, individuality, in these little crystals, as if each one of them would say: "I shall withdraw from the universal, sovereign rule and become a little cosmos of my own." And true to their protest, let things and forces be and do as they will, these crystals tenaciously maintain themselves in the face of the whole combined world—in which simple fact there is much prophetic meaning.

And now, since our Titan has brought us safely to the earth, we shall dismiss him, with due thanks, and continue our own way alone; not, however, without sharing his wonder at these crystal forms which seem to assert the possibility of little worlds within the great world. But we must not fail to remark, in dismissing him that, after all, he was only one of our own everyday scientists, forgetful for the moment of his body and grown to the proportions of his mind.

The Littleness and the Greatness of Man.

Nor will it be amiss, in passing, to lay some stress upon this vast contrast presented in man as a mere physical organism and as mind. As a physical organism, he rests but a day, an infinitesimal atom on the face of the earth, which itself lasts but a moment in the eternal cosmic years, an indistinguishable speck of dust, amid the infinitudes of space.

And yet as mind, man speeds through the universe on wings, fleetlier than the pinions of light, pauses to view her endless æons roll on in their course, counts her stars and weighs her planets, delves into her most secret mysteries, dallies with her forces and, unabashed, defies

her power to baffle or overwhelm him. This striking contrast in man has been nobly expressed by the Hebrew Psalmist:

“When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers,
The moon and stars, which thou hast ordained,

What is man that thou art mindful of him?
And the son of man, that thou visitest him?

For thou hast made him but little lower than God,
And crownest him with glory and honor.

Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands;
Thou hast put all things under his feet.”

(Ps. viii, 3-6.)

CHAPTER III.

ORGANIC EVOLUTION.

UP to the present, the evolutionary process has given us a grand cosmic organism which we have, nevertheless, called inorganic, because thus far it has not shown within itself any individual living forms; while, on the other hand, all the elements and forces composing it are strictly subordinated to the whole plan.

There have been seen, however, two striking forms of activity which have the appearance of being anticipatory, or prophetic, of a radical advance in the plan. There is, first chemism, in which certain affinities and repulsions appear to reveal in matter an inclination to rise above unquestioning obedience to the whole, and to express distinct choices and preferences. Then, secondly, there is crystallization, in which individual forms are definitely asserted, as if there were an attempt at freedom from the general thrall, and toward a claim for a special and independent existence. But we can not regard this as life. If only the crystal could give up its fixity of form, and, by using the selective activities of chemism, maintain itself upon its environment, through a cycle of change, we should have clear evidence of organism and life. Perhaps, some day we shall find, as scientific experiment already suggests, such a transitional form, between the crystal and the living cell.

Entrance of Life, in the Cell.

But, at present, we must simply recognize the sudden and inexplicable appearance of vital organisms, in the midst of inorganic nature. It was long before the dense carbon dioxide mists had cleared from the surface of the earth, that the warm waters of the paleozoic seas began to teem with minute living cells. These cells were but loose protoplasmic compounds of the simplest imaginable structure, and of the most indefinite form. But they had life, which revealed itself in maintaining some sort of structure and some sort of form, by a double effort of union with the environment, and of struggle against it. The living cell, like the crystal, asserts a form;

but, unlike the crystal, it grows, maintains itself, and passes through a cycle of definite, purposive changes, by a chemical selection and assimilation of elements in the, to it, seemingly indifferent, or even antagonistic environment.

Its ground character is self-assertion, and a consequent declaration of independence. With its individual interests to maintain, the living cell both seizes upon the lower, inorganic forces of gravitation, cohesion, heat, light, chemism, subordinates and uses them for its own ends, and at the same time defies them.

The Appearance of Self-asserted Individuality.

Here, for the first time in the universal process of evolution, there emerges the individual, determined to set up, within the larger cosmic order, a little cosmic order of its own. It is a drawing away from an entire absorption in the total, the whole, in order to assert the self. There seems to be a clear protest against the universal rule of the monistic world-order, as if another were arising to claim his individual interests against the supreme control, like some defiant Prometheus who, seizing the fire of life from the gods, asserts, in spite of the chains that bind him, his sacred rights of freedom.

An irrepressible dualism has broken the harmonious monism of nature, a microcosmos has arisen within the macrocosmos, and the tragic conflict has begun which moves toward a strangely significant world-drama. The great inorganic cosmos, evolved from the primal star-mists, has now, within itself, opened the gates of life out of which issue the beginnings of a new and higher evolution of organic forms, to reach its culmination in man.

Self-sacrifice, the Way of Progress: Organism, a Community of Interests.

When it is said that the ground character of the organic cell is an assertion of individual interests, manifested in growth and self-maintenance through a cycle of definite purposive changes, it is meant that only the rudiments of its marvelous possibilities have been suggested. For as intimate and fundamental to the nature of the cell as self-preservation is, so also are its powers of self-propagation and self-progression.

The individual cell, seemingly not content to dwell in isolation,

exercises a curious capacity of indefinite self-division, resulting in a cell-group. This raises individual to social or communal interests, through and by which individual efforts are not only protected and conserved, but handed on and lifted up into a progressive development. By the self-sacrifice, involved in the irresistible impulse to self-propagation, is gained the reward of self-progression.

It is, indeed, in the group of mutually related cells that organic evolution really begins. For it is this grouping of individuals into a community that gives rise to a sort of division of labor by which special organs, with their respective functions, develop and work together in harmonious correlation for the welfare of the whole. In the case of the single cell, with only a sort of sensitiveness diffused throughout the entire organism, there could be but one kind of response to the environment. But with the formation of cell-groups and their increase in size, sensitiveness and response gradually develop into a greater and greater complexity of cognition, feeling, and volition, passing through all the stages of plant and animal evolution until, in man, very elaborate organs are developed for the discharge of these functions.

Two Great Lines of Organic Development.

From the very beginning of life, there seem to be two distinct and divergent lines of development but, nevertheless, intimately related in the whole plan, viz.: plant and animal. Plant cells group themselves and develop a certain complexity of organic function in individual forms, and these show sensitiveness and intelligent volitional response to the environment in self-preservation, propagation, and progression; but the plant seems to have swerved from the main path of advance and so reaches, as it were, only a certain stage of slumbering existence.

The animal, on the other hand, having struck out along the true path, soon leaps far in advance of its lowly rival, and reveals the most astonishing inventiveness of progressive development, so that we are amazed by the bewildering variety and countless number of rising forms.

Main Differences between Plant and Animal.

There are certain fundamental differences, between plant and animal, which reveal the advance made by the animal over the plant,

and which open up to it further possibilities of development. These differences are largely matters of *locomotion* and *nutrition*, with a consequently enlarged individual self-interest which ultimately comes out in the wonders of consciousness.

Along the vague borderland between plant and animal, it is true, there are many forms which, as yet, the biologist finds difficult to distinguish: what are seemingly plants, acting like animals, in free movement and the assimilation of organic food; and what are seemingly animals, acting like plants, in the fixity of abode and the assimilation of inorganic elements. But when plant and animal, in the evolving process, come to their characteristic expression, they show a wide and clearly marked distinction in regard to locomotion and nutrition.

While the plant remains rooted to a fixed place, thus depending entirely upon what the environment brings to it, the animal begins to move about, guided by its instinct of self-preservation, to avoid its enemy or to seek its prey. Even such animals as corals and sponges, where the plant-world seems to have just merely burst over into the animal realm, there is a ciliary motion to lure the needed supplies, or a retraction to avoid danger. Humble as the beginning may be, it is at any rate, a beginning of all those varied activities in the animal world that culminate in the pursuit of the lion and the flight of the deer.

Significance of Self-motion and of Food.

The significance of this voluntary power of locomotion is at once evident. By reason of it, the animal comes into an increasingly larger and more varied contact with his environment. He is thereby driven to the development of new powers of perception, new means of securing his growing wants, and new organs of attack and defense. In thus meeting his increasing demands on nature, he acquires experience, skill and habits that not only prove useful to him but will also prove so to his successors, to whom he hands his accomplishments on. From all such development, the plant, even if it had the native ability to develop, is shut out by its incapacity of free motion.

In the second place, the difference between plant and animal in the matter of nutrition is, if possible, more striking. Both, indeed, use the inorganic compound, water, and assimilate various elements

in the air, but here the similarity ends. While both breathe in the atmospheric oxygen and, in so doing, compose and give out carbon dioxide; the plant feeds and flourishes upon carbon dioxide, which is not only useless but injurious to the animal; and then, decomposing it for the sake of the carbon, sets free the oxygen, without which the animal can not live. In this particular they seem to reverse their attitude toward the inorganic world. But what is more fundamentally significant is that the plant finds little or no sustenance in the organic world, while the animal can feed no where else. The inorganic elements, water and air, are for him not so much foods as vehicle and reagent, respectively, for the more essentially nutritive and constructive processes. While, then, the plant, fixed and rooted in the earth, feeds directly on such inorganic elements as oxygen, carbon dioxide, ammonia, water, and soluble mineral salts; the freely moving animal must wait for nature to raise her inorganic to organic forms before he can find food. And for this purpose, the instrumentality nature employs is the plant.

The Plant, the Purveyor of Food to the Animal.

It would seem, then, that the plant is the link between inorganic nature, on the one hand, and animal life, on the other. It is the producer and go-between, or middle-man, of the evolutionary economy. It is the purveyor of food to his majesty, the animal. Or, to state it otherwise, while the plant has asserted its individuality in the cosmos, by self-preservation, propagation, and progression, it yet does so as one enslaved and subjected to the larger purpose of nature above its head. It is life, but life in servitude, which meets the great purpose of making possible the liberated life of the animal organism, a life that detaches itself more and more from nature and, in consequence, must assume the heavy responsibility of its freedom in seeking its own fortune.

Freedom, Responsibility, and Progress.

This free responsibility, hard as it is sometimes to bear, is, as it were, the making of the animal. Dependent as he now is on organic food, he can not pick up a livelihood anywhere, but is compelled both to go in search of it and learn to utilize it, when found. He can not directly absorb his food as the plant does, but must decompose it before it can be appropriated to his use. Hence a whole

new set of organs to masticate, digest, and assimilate are required by the animal. While the plant, as it were, simply assimilates its food all over, or directly through rootlet and leaf, the animal is compelled to set up special organs and divide the processes of his growth and development into many functions; thus, not only advancing the complexity of his structure, but widening the possibility of conjunction with nature at more points, and of utilizing a greater variety of foods.

The Search for Food, a Means of Culture.

Furthermore, this necessary activity in searching out and assimilating food, involves, we may say, an inspiring and uplifting influence on the animal's development, a fact which seems to depend on a cruel paradox that, nevertheless, "comforts while it mocks." That is, the animal is thrown into a bitter struggle which seems to mean ruin and death, whereas it really means life and progress. The search for food, it is true, works against him; but it works, at the same time, very much more for him. As the animal does not discriminate in his search for food between plant and other animal, if it is what he wants, he finds the other animal, as ready as he, to seize and devour whatever in his line, presents itself. Consequently, he must be prepared not only to search out and attack but to flee and defend. Therefore, when he starts out on his commendably selfish, food-searching expedition, he soon learns that, since others are making the same selfish demands as himself, he must have all his wits about him, or come to a sad end.

Psychology clearly Enters the Field.

The two-fold primitive capacity in him, sensitiveness and volition, now begins to differentiate and evolve into a greater and greater complexity of forms. The first mere sensitiveness to environment becomes an indefinite sort of cognition, to effectuate which sense organs come into being. The general sense of touch differentiates into the primitive senses of taste, odor, hearing, and sight, accompanied always by the ever-present undertone of feeling, which gives to the animal a vague impression of value in things. The general and, at first, incoherent, volitional responsive activities become, with the development of the cognitions, more and more specific

and coherent volitions. Thus there is a growing understanding and intelligence in him.

Development of the Neuro-muscular Tissues.

As the medium of this advance, and making it possible, the sensitive or nervous tissue in him, by which he comes to know and feel, and the contractile or muscular tissue, by which he comes to act, increasingly grow and interblend into a more and more elaborate neuro-muscular apparatus, by means of which he is enabled the better to know and feel his environment, and react upon it for his good.

In this way, the process of individualization and of winning independence is advancing, so that, while the first animal, struggling out of the cosmic unity, freed himself by leaping far beyond the plant's bondage, the later animal has now quite detached himself from slavish dependence upon his immediate environment and its superficial resources, and leads a free, wandering life upon the surface of the earth.

And yet his liberty is, after all, relative and restricted. For while subordinating and utilizing for his uses the physical, chemical, and vital forces in the environment below him, and growing strong and capable in his contest with others, he, at the same time, lives wholly within, and dependent upon, the natural cosmic order, inorganic and organic, which includes him and carries on its purposes far above his power of comprehension and control.

The Paradox of Self-assertion and Submission.

The inter-play of dependence and independence, between the animal and his environment, presents a striking paradox. In a way, the freer he becomes in his voluntary movements, the more complex and varied his functions, the greater the number of contacts with his surroundings which he can cognize and react upon; so much the more he becomes dependent upon his environment. For every new organ of sense or function of volition he develops, he gives, as it were, another hostage to fortune. He runs more risks and confronts more dangers. In order now to secure his self-preservation, propagation, and progression, he must assume a very much heavier individual responsibility.

A curious feature of the animal's evolutionary struggle now appears, quite confusing, at first, to the critical observer. For in all the

worry and pother of his life, he seems to be describing a circle and trying to get back to the very point from which he started. He began in a complete harmonious unity with nature, where all his instinctive or reflex actions fell into complete accord with her plans. As if dissatisfied with this edenic happiness, he seems to feel his restrictions and would be free in order to lead a larger and more self-willed life. He eats of the tree of knowledge; by the development of his senses, his eyes are opened, and he confronts the struggle of evil and pain.

But with this condition he is still more dissatisfied, and now bends every effort to overcome the struggle and pain, by getting back into perfect accord with nature again. Only this reunion with nature is accompanied by an extended and varied consciousness of his acquired harmony. Before, when he started out, he had but a simple, vague, general sensitiveness to his surroundings, and the capacity of response in a simple, vague, general instinctive reflex quiver. Now, however, that sensitiveness has differentiated into a complex variety of conscious cognitions and feelings, and the reflex quiver has developed into numberless specific volitions.

Opposition Develops Individuality.

But if this enlarged conscious contact of knowing, feeling, and doing has brought with it the struggle and pain of greater danger and heavier responsibility, because it brings to view many more opposing forces against him, it, on the other hand, is just that which develops, refines, and raises him into a higher organic unity, gives him a larger participation in life, and draws him out as a more real and independent individual. It is thus that he withdraws himself more and more from the mere general flow of things; and, becoming a more complex and perfect organism, stands over against the grand order and system of nature as a harmonious, unitary order and system of his own.

What seems so contradictory about this whole procedure is that, while the organism must struggle against the general control, if he would assert and win his individual freedom, he can in the end secure that individual freedom only, by submitting himself to the general control. If he would be his own and do as he pleases, he must belong to the other and do as the other pleases. And it is in

this going out from, and coming back to, the cosmic order that he really comes to be himself.

The Neural Advance.

If now we look more closely into these evolving organisms, to seek out the medium of this growing contact with nature, this complex development of the correlated functions of knowing, feeling, and doing, with the consequent entrance upon a larger, freer and more responsible individual life, we shall find it to be, or accompanied by, an unfolding elaboration of the neuro-muscular system. Or, perhaps we should rather say, the sensitive nervous system alone. For while the muscles may be necessary as a means for free movement, they can be only *means*, whereas the nerves, sensitive to impressions from without and the seat of impulses from within, are alone able to give innervation or stimulus to reflex, spontaneous or voluntary action upon the environment.

Tracing the development of this nervous system, we see that, beginning with a mere general sensitiveness throughout the cell mass, it at first differentiates into well-defined fibers which in time develop, at certain points, knots or ganglionic centers. These ganglia seem to have the power of storing up energy for later discharge throughout the organism. As this ganglionic nervous system grows more elaborate and complex, there is rendered possible a larger and ever larger field of activity, and there is a corresponding division of labor in the formation of separate organs with their respective functions. That is, the anatomy and physiology of the muscular system follow, *pari passu*, the development of the nervous or psychological system.

Protection Provided.

And while there is a growing complexity and differentiation of parts, the whole organism, as if driven by some mysterious unity, seems to bend all its efforts to perfect itself in such a way as to guard and protect this precious nervous tissue, by making a safe retreat for it where it can, undisturbed, receive messages from without, and whence it can send its energizing impulses outward to action. This structural fact is illustrated in a very striking way, on the introduction of the vertebrate into the rising animal scale of development. Here is a reversal of the morphological type, according to which animal

organisms have hitherto been built. And it is all in the interests of the nervous tissues.

The Invertebrate Exo-skeleton.

The invertebrate, in time, develops a hard outer protective covering either as a shell into which the animal can withdraw, or in which it can remain safely guarded; or as an exo-skeleton, serving as a supporting frame for the organism, and an integral part of it.

In this morphological type, the ganglionic nervous system, a mere chain of nerve centers, shares the general body cavity, indifferently with the vascular and visceral systems. If later there comes to be an axial division into a cephalic, thoracic, and abdominal tract, the nervous system, while grown much more intricate, still retains its simple relation of immediacy toward the circulatory and digestive systems.

The Vertebral Endo-skeleton.

With the emergence of the vertebrate out of the advancing process however, there is a marked change, we might say, almost a revolution in the plan. It is the uprising of the nervous system to demand its rights and privileges. The exo-skeleton now becomes an endo-skeleton, and the main nerve centers are brought together and housed in a strong, impenetrable, bony, vertebral column, whence the body is supplied with nerve branches. The vascular and visceral systems are now provided for within protecting, bony processes, the ribs extending from the central column; to which are also attached the two pairs of limbs. Within this body cavity, there still remains the survival of the old invertebrate ganglionic system, in the form of the so-called sympathetic system, which seems largely to retain its control over the reflex organic vital processes; but it also has intimate connections with the new vertebral system.

The Brain safely Housed.

The crowning work of this great change is the expansion of the upper sections of the vertebral column into a strong cranial cavity where is to be stored and protected the finest and most precious outcome of nerve development, the brain. Here the sensitive and reflexive apparatus, the basis of subsequent cognitive, æsthetic and volitional capacities, culminates. And we observe that, as the vertebrate rises in the evolutionary scale, the brain increases in size

and refines in quality, until it reaches its highest development in man.

The brain seems to be the end at which the rising development of organic forms has been aiming. The higher sub-vertebrates, it is true, have cephalic nervous centers, as already intimated, but these are only an adumbration of the true brain. Indeed, the organic type on which the invertebrates are constructed seems to be quite inadequate for the development of this refined product. Hence, nature shifts the organic plan, adapting it for the fullest play of the nervous tissues, especially providing for its culminating work in the fully developed brain.

The One and the Many.

If now we pause, for a moment, and ask for the largest generalization which we can make, in viewing thus far the whole, evolutionary, cosmic order, we shall find that it presents to us the *one* and the *many*. In Greek antiquity, each of these terms formed the basis of a separate philosophical school. But as we see it now, they are both necessarily involved in the whole system of things. This whole system of things is in itself the *one*, while at the same time, the things of which it is composed are infinitely *many*. Viewed under an aspect, before suggested, the one and the many present themselves as being and becoming, that is, a substantial something, changeless and fixed, which, nevertheless manifests itself, as a causal something, ever fluent and changing. As it is in this constant becoming of the many and its relation to the being of the one that our problem of evolution lies, we shall, as we proceed, be reminded again and again, that it is because of the being of the one, that the becoming of the many, or the whole process of evolution, is not a fortuitous flow of things, but an orderly procedure, according to immutable law. It follows, as Heraclitus taught long ago, a *logos* or rational plan.

Thus, in the concrete instance of vital evolution, regarded merely on the physical side, one dynamic, purposive idea guided the manifold changes in the whole ascending process, and that was the creation of the vertebral brain.

Function of the Neural Tissues.

Well, then, what is the peculiar nature of this nervous tissue and its culmination in the brain, so essential and ultimate in the evolu-

tionary process? The answer is suggested in what has already been said, and we need but expand it a little more fully.

Its first fundamental quality, we have observed, is mere sensitiveness to external impressions, and the capacity to react. All material objects act and react upon each other, but the peculiarity of nervous action and reaction is that they always occur in the interests of some definite organism. It is, we might say, the gravitative law of the new little cosmoses, asserting themselves within the great cosmos. As this also occurs in the plant, we must regard the plant as having in some sense, nervous tissues. Not anything, it must be admitted like definitely developed nerve fibers but certainly latent, rudimentary neural possibilities. The plant, indeed, acts as if it had an inner intelligence. The Hindus declare that it has. It shrinks from the unfavorable and reaches out toward the favorable. We can almost fancy it rejoicing in the sunshine and in the rain. It stubbornly maintains itself, propagates itself, and struggles to perfect itself. It acts, in short, like an intelligent thing.

But while this leads us to believe that it has some sort of nervous tissue, yet by the same considerations, we can not believe it to feel and act on the same plane with the animal, where the nervous tissue has declared itself in a very definite and palpable form. That in the appearance of nerve fiber and ganglion marks a real psychological advance. It is, at any rate, a passage from profound sleep to dreaming.

When, in the process of evolving life on the earth, the animal finally liberates himself from the plant's bondage to nature, the coincident appearance of a definite nervous system has, we must believe, a tremendous significance, because of its inseparable connection, or rather identity with, an evolving psychology. For with the presence of nerve fiber and ganglion, there is freer motion, and with freer motion there is an increasingly wider range of contact with surrounding objects, out of all which there appears, rising from mere undifferentiated feeling of environment, some evidence of direct cognition and power of volition. The earthworm, for example, does not appear, on first view, to be much more than a rootlet growing in the ground. Both will shrink up and withdraw from an unfavorable spot, both will climb over or go round an obstruction and, in various ways, act very much alike. But in addition to the marked differences in the matter of free motion and food, the sen-

sitiveness of the worm shows a vague cognitive ability which the rootlet does not possess. For when he meets an obstruction, he does not persist in going straight ahead, or in following along the line of least resistance, as the rootlet invariably does, but feels about here and there until he finds just the right path of advance. This feeling about before deciding on action is what gives the appearance of cognition, at any rate, in a rudimentary form, such as the plant does not show. It is, indeed, the germ of rational criticism, or the beginning of that judgment which reason passes on things.

Consciousness of the Object.

The fundamental character of cognition is consciousness of the object which, being always accompanied by a certain feeling that gives the object value to the percipient, determines action.

To the lowest animals, we can attribute only the vaguest and dimmest consciousness, and it is a long time before animal cognition can be said to mean a *clear* consciousness of *distinct* objects. As the psychic development runs along with that of the neural system, a safe guess would perhaps be that, first, with the appearance of the cephalic brain, as in the higher invertebrates, *clear* consciousness of objects arises. Then to carry the Leibnitzian scale further, we may be justified in saying that with the vertebral brain first arises the clear consciousness of *distinct* objects.

In any case, the matter of chief concern with us is not the exact chronology of psychic development but the main fact that, with the appearance and development of the nervous system, appears and develops the consciousness of objects, first only vague, then clear, and finally distinct. So that when we come to the higher vertebrates, such as the dog, the elephant, or the ape, all of them greatly susceptible of development by contact with man, we find a display of the highest forms of animal objective consciousness. There is not only the clear cognition and memory of distinct objects, but at times the semblance of deliberation and choice, far above mere reflex instinct.

These animals also seem to show shame and pride, as if half self-conscious, and they are capable of great affection and faithfulness. It almost appears as if nature, in her evolutionary plan, were trying to burst over into the realm of rational knowledge and conscious morality.

Yet, in interpreting the actions of the higher sub-human animals,

we must avoid anthropomorphism, to which Goethe assures us we are ever prone. If we must guard against carrying our anthropomorphism upward, we must also guard against carrying it downward. One error is as misleading as the other. In the one case we are apt to draw the lofty too much down, in the other, to raise the lowly too much up, to our own level. What we may be sure of, however, is that in the evolution of the vertebrates, the larger the cranial cavity, or more accurately, the finer and more infolded the nervous tissue of the brain, the more intelligent the animal becomes the more varied and numerous his conscious reactions upon nature the larger and more independent the life he leads, and the more is he a distinct individual, with interests and worth of his own. His power of locomotion has become highly developed and varied, his senses greatly refined and enlarged, and his ability to cognize, feel and act upon things widely extended in range. He is an intelligent conscious being, able to know much, feel much, and do much and within the natural limits of his environment, quite a free individual

Self-consciousness and Man.

One step, however, the animal has not taken and does not seem able to take. He does not rise to *self-consciousness*. He has risen above the fixity of the plant's enslavement to nature into a realm of free activity, he has become an individual, widely and keenly conscious of his surroundings, but he has not become *conscious of himself*. This is the peculiar characteristic of man alone. Man has gathered up and resumed, in himself, all the physical and chemical forces of the so-called material world, and all the vegetal and animal principles of life below him; and then emerges beyond the utmost of inorganic and organic evolution into the consciousness of self, the center about which, for him, the whole process turns. He thus frees himself utterly from the thralldom of nature and rises into supranature on the plane of reason, as the first real individual a true rational self, an *other*, over against the objective world.

All Points upward toward Man.

Nature has first evolved, through her physical and chemical forces to her utmost inorganic form. Then, building upon this, the plant has risen to the capacity of sensitive reaction in the interest of individual living organism. Above this stage of advance and

resting upon it, the animal has developed into individual consciousness of objects; when man, summing up the whole, steps beyond into the free individuality of self-consciousness. To adopt a fine figure of Leibnitz's, physical nature, as it were, being dead, comes to life in the plant, but life in a profound slumber and conscious of nothing. In the animal, life enters upon a conscious state, as in a dream. But in man, life awakes into full consciousness, and man becomes a *rational person*. He is no longer wrapped in the slumber of the cosmic unity, subject, unconsulted, to the laws of its interactions; but, for the first time in the whole order of progressive evolution, becomes an *other*, and faces the universe as the object of his cognitions, feelings, and will. The original cosmic one has become two, a dualism has emerged from the primal monism—already foreshadowed in the crystal, and pushed toward realization by plant and animal—and now the individual reason of man confronts the individual reason of the world.

The Supra-natural or Rational.

Indeed, this seems to have been the end at which nature all along was aiming, a consummation toward which she was slowly struggling. In other words, we have presented a world-drama, wherein the cosmic unity is broken by the appearance of an other, a self-conscious personality, able to know both himself and the evolving process of nature out of which he seems to have arisen, and to set himself over against it, as an object of his thought, feeling, and will, in friendly or in hostile attitude. And the quintessential significance of this entire unfolding process, as has been observed, is that the development of life, from the simplest cell up to man, has been accompanied by, if not identical with, the psychological development, which has raised man above the natural into the supra-natural or rational order.

Sensitiveness in the plant has made way for consciousness of the object in the animal, and consciousness of the object in the animal, has given place to self-consciousness in man. So that, while the plant is only sensitive, and the animal sensitive and conscious, man, taken in the whole range of his psychology, is sensitive, conscious, and self-conscious. He is thus an epitome, or resumé, of the whole evolutionary process; and, in consequence, we might conjecture that, if he could raise the sensitive and conscious processes that go on in him up into the full light of rational, self-conscious knowledge, he would

know the entire cosmos. He would not only have, in the law of his own evolution, a *description* of the orderly inter-action among the ever-changing many, that is, the process of becoming; but, in having this, would also have an *explanation* of the whole process, in coming to know the one changeless rational plan or idea, as the permanent, underlying ground of all, and the reason why it unfolds or manifests itself in the many and the becoming of cosmic change.

In fact, it is just the conscious endeavor to find out what the law of this evolutionary process is, what the underlying idea upon which it is based, what he himself is, the world and God, and their theoretical and practical relations, and why things are as they are; that is, the endeavor to fathom the problems of the one and the many, being and becoming, substance and cause, and to realize himself in it all, that constitutes the free, self-conscious, rational life of man. As this endeavor evolves from the simplest and crudest beginnings, through the greatest variety of change, to the most elaborate and complex sciences, philosophies, and religious beliefs (intellectual development); takes on numberless forms of invention and art (æsthetic development); and manifests itself in all manner of adjustments in the social order (moral development); we have before us, rising above, although through and out of, the order of *natural* development, the order of *supra-natural* or, rational development, in the higher evolution of reason.

Before taking up the history of this rational development, we must note two fallacies which always tend to thrust themselves into every theory of natural evolution, viz.: the fallacy of continuity and the fallacy of generality. It is because continuity and generality have a real significance, in the process of evolution, that their misunderstanding proves to be so pernicious.

The Fallacy of Continuity.

It is too often thought that the process of development has been in a straight line, or that each advance has begun where the preceeding one left off. But this idea does not correspond to the observed fact. The lowest animal does not start from the highest plant, nor the lowest vertebrate from the highest invertebrate, nor the lowest man from the highest mammal; for while each inherits the acquirements of its predecessors or rests upon them as the condition of further development, it stands for a difference in quality and not simply for

a continuous, quantitative advance in degree. The animal is all the plant is, and in that sense continues it, but it is something other and more; and man is all the plant and animal are, and in that sense continues them, but he is something other and more.

The plant could not carry out the whole design of nature, which was the production of a free self-conscious individual; nor could the invertebrate form of life do so, for here only a dim state of consciousness was attained; hence, the vertebral plan was adopted. This, indeed, brought the goal nearer, for it gave clear and distinct consciousness of objects. But as this was still inadequate for the purpose, nature took the last step by lifting man upright upon his feet, that he might look upwards toward the starry heavens; and by endowing him with a brain, capable of self-conscious reason, that he might come to know her purposes concerning him.

Subordination by Transcendence.

In so doing, however, nature does not discard the lower types, but maintains them as integral parts of her entire economy. They are made subservient to the whole plan, according to which she has been working from the beginning. The continuity in the rising forms is the continuity of a rational plan, in which there have been no failures and no losses, and in which every element has been subordinated to the intelligent purpose of the whole.

This ascending progress throws much light on our previous surmise (p. 16) to the effect that the apparent antagonism among contending forces in nature is not the contradiction of strife, but the opposition of an inter-action in a larger unity.

Thus when chemism overcomes various mechanical forces below it, such as cohesion or gravitation, it does not destroy them but makes use of them in its service. So the forces of organic life, rising above chemism, in no way nullify it, but subject it to their own purposes. In like manner, conscious intelligence, in the pursuit of its aims, takes advantage of whatever organic life can supply. And finally self-consciousness, or reason, abolishes nothing below it but, transcending all, subordinates all to its higher ends, which merge into the attainment of some grand, ideal purpose. And it is this ideal purpose that gives continuity to the whole evolving plan.

The scheme of vital evolution has been likened, not inaptly, to a tree, such as the elm or oak, which sends out great branches, while

it advances with the main trunk to higher levels. In some such way, evolution presents a series of branchings from the great phylogenetic stock, as it grows upward toward man. There is a never broken continuity here, but its significance is not in the mere juxtaposition of parts, but in the relation of those parts within the entire rational idea.

The Fallacy of Generality.

At the same time, we see the fallacy of generality which vaguely merges the distinctions of individuality in the general scheme. A vertebrate, it is said, is only a developed invertebrate; man is only a developed ape. And the all-sufficient, luminous explanation given is the word evolution. In reality, we are told, it makes little difference whether we call an invertebrate, a vertebrate of arrested development, or a vertebrate, an invertebrate evolved; whether we call an ape, an arrested man or a man, a developed ape.

But our phylogenetic life-tree shows us that the great branches maintain distinct individuality; do not evolve by imperceptible gradations, the one into the other; and, though belonging *to*, and arising *out of*, are not lost *in* the general evolutionary scheme. Each does not evolve out of the other, except only in the sense that it evolves out of the idea. Man does not develop from the ape, but from the whole rational plan of evolution.

We can go further with our claim for individuality. As the main living stock sends out individual branches, these branches send out individual generic offshoots, and these, in turn, bear individual species which part into individual varieties, made up of individual animals. The true meaning of generality is the relatedness of each of these distinct individuals to the whole.

In using the word individual, however, it must be understood strictly in a relative sense, for there is only one absolute Individual so far as vital evolution is concerned, and that is the grand rational Idea of evolution itself. But it is the very nature of this one Absolute Idea to unfold itself in a series of subordinate, individual ideas by gradations which diminish in extent and increase in content until the last particular is reached. Each has its distinct individuality while, at the same time, it is related to all others by its relation and subservience to the whole. They all bear in common the one great central character of organic evolution, very vaguely expressed; the

each family branch, generic offshoot, and specific twig has its own distinct characteristics which, in succession, more and more fully and clearly express the Idea. But down to the last individual creature, each, though subordinate *to*, preserves its own identity *in* the whole plan, and does not merge into another. It is always the mystery of the one and the many, being and becoming; the one being of the Idea, becoming many in its manifold manifestations. The character, therefore, of each individual is determined by its relation to the Idea, so that the amount of its individuality, so to speak, is in direct proportion to its expression of the Idea. A blade of grass expresses very meagerly the Idea and, in consequence its individuality is exceedingly limited. Man, on the other hand, expresses very fully the Idea, and therefore his individuality may be said to be complete.

A Prevalent False Belief Corrected.

There seems to be a prevalent belief that the whole process, beginning with some simple, specific element, develops through such forces as heredity and environment, by means of natural and sexual selection, into the complex whole. Whereas the reverse is the true order. The tree does not, for example, evolve from the seed any more than the seed evolves from the tree. The tree evolves from the seed only in the sense that it lies indefinitely and vaguely—to our view—wrapped up and potential in the seed. The real seed of the entire process is the rational dynamic idea of the whole, infolded and implicit from the beginning. Heredity, selection, natural and sexual, and environment, of which so much is heard, are not causal forces, effectuating the process, but methods which the process reveals in moving toward its end. And that end, so far as we can see at present, is the evolution of man.

The reason we feel justified in saying that man is the end of the natural order of evolution is because that, being the last, specific, particular individual, in whom is summed up and resumed most fully and clearly the evolutionary Idea, he becomes thus not only most truly an individual, correspondent to the evolutionary Idea itself, but rises as a free individual, above the natural order into the rational order, where that evolutionary Idea has its origin. The implicit Idea, from the beginning, moving out through the inorganic and organic evolution, comes to explicit expression in the self-con-

scious reason of man, the aim of whose rational development, which it is now our business to trace, is to possess himself completely of the Idea.

Evolution of the Natural World-order Defined.

We may, therefore, define the evolution of the natural world-order as the unfolding of an idea in time, from its implicit to its explicit form, during which organic life, emerging from the inorganic cosmos, rises, first as plant, to the assertion of mere *sensitive vitality*, in the interests of individual existence; then, as animal, to a *conscious* and consequently, more intelligent and enlarged reaction upon the object; and, finally in man, to a *self-conscious* knowledge of subject and object, in virtue of which, life, rising to the supra-natural or rational order, comes to be a free and progressive unfoldment of the individual, self-conscious knowing, feeling, and willing reason toward an understanding of the unity of subject and object, in the totality of the Absolute Reason.

BOOK II.

THE SUPRA-NATURAL OR RATIONAL
WORLD-ORDER.



CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

NATURE, as a pure earthly maiden, overshadowed by the Divine Spirit, has at last brought forth man; who, after his childhood of security and happiness upon the bosom of his nourishing mother, finds himself in dread loneliness, at strife with his fellows and standing over against the whole world, while the fateful responsibility of his own career is peremptorily thrust upon him. What is that career? What the goal, and how shall he attain it?

The Goal.

We found the plant and animal first struggling to be free, as individuals, from the general control of nature; and then, to perfect themselves, struggling, even more eagerly, to get back into harmony with nature again.

Shall we also find this same paradox in man who, after he has once become a free individual, seeks harmony and reconciliation with that source whence he sprung? If so his endeavor will not simply end in coming back into accord with nature again, but with that supreme supra-natural realm of Reason, above and back of nature, into which his rational self-consciousness has ushered him.

The Self, One and Permanent.

The fundamental and characteristic fact of man's emergence upon the scene of cosmic evolution, as already indicated, is his becoming aware of self, in which consciously center all his interests. The animal clearly and distinctly enough knows the object, feels its value, and wills to avoid or to appropriate it, but he does not know that it is *he* who knows the object, nor why he acts toward it as he does. Man, however, not only knows the object, but knows that it is *he* who knows it and, feeling its value for his self, acts accordingly in his own conscious interests. The animal is wholly lost in the consciousness of

the object, while man, in being conscious of the object, is, at the same time, conscious of himself and of its relation to him as the subject.

It is the very nature of self-conscious reason, as a knowing, feeling and willing subject, to recognize, throughout the whole range of experience, its own permanent, substantial, causal unity, amid, not only the infinite variety of forms which the object takes on, but also amid the infinite variety of its own psychic states. Except as a self-conscious, self-identical ego; except as the same, unitary, rational being, amid all change, man, as such, would and could not exist.

The Sub-conscious and Unconscious Self.

Psychologists sometimes become rather confused regarding the permanency and validity of the self, in observing what is a very common experience, viz.: that in our various states of consciousness, the immediate sense of self is often absent.

In considering this psychological fact, we must remember how very wide the range of man's psychic life really is. It includes, first, the profound, vegetative, slumbering sensitiveness of the plant, then, the vague sense of outer things, possessed by the lower animals, and finally, the alert objective consciousness of the higher vertebrates, as well as the characteristically human consciousness of the self among its objects, which is the peculiar mark of man alone, as a supra-natural rational being. It is, therefore, quite inevitable that many psychic states in him should fall not only below the luminous point of self-consciousness, into a sub-conscious realm, but also below the threshold of *consciousness altogether*, into an unconscious region; so that a large psychic life may go on in the mind, without consciously involving the immediate awareness of the self. All forgotten or unrecalled past, conscious experiences, fancies, impressions, feelings, volitions, ideals are stored in the sub-conscious realm, likely at any moment to emerge into consciousness; while all the digestive, assimilative, circulatory, and metabolic activities of the physical organism belong to the unconscious region of the same living self, and make themselves known only in case of abnormal disturbance.

The point at issue, however, does not concern those sub-conscious or unconscious states of the subject, where we do not expect to find present a sense of the self, but refers, it may be said, to just those highest, rational efforts when man, wholly absorbed in some profound problem or experience, and most nearly in a state of pure reason

loses his sense of self altogether. This statement, while conveying a great truth, is ambiguous and needs explanation.

When, for example, an Archimedes is sunk in deep scientific speculation, or a Paul is caught up into the third heaven of religious ecstasy, he indeed, loses all sense of the outer physical self or of the narrow, egoistic, personal self, but not of the true self. Otherwise, he could never tell afterwards of his thoughts, relate his unutterable experiences or even refer to them as his own. If he were not conscious of himself, in some way, the experience would be wholly indifferent to him; and it could never be ascertained, whether it was Archimedes who had the heavenly vision, or Paul who was deeply engrossed in geometrical calculations when the brutal Roman soldier gave him his quietus. Descartes, it is said, often lost himself on the quays of Amsterdam, wholly oblivious to his surroundings and had to be led back to his lodgings, but he never lost his rational self, as his *Discourses* and *Metaphysical Meditations* will amply attest.

The great truth involved in such experiences is that a certain narrow, personal or egoistic sense of the self is lost while the larger, supra-personal self has become universalized; has, as it were, become one with its object. The deeply significant meaning of this supra-conscious mind in man, will appear in the sequel.

The Abnormal Self.

A prolific source of confusion about the substantial and causal unity of the self-identical subject lies in certain abnormal states, such as hallucination and multiple personality, which are supposed to invalidate anything like the continuity and self-identity of the self. But all these experiences only bring to light that unexpectedly large range of consciousness of which the mind is capable; and sooner or later there is found some link that binds them to the one self-identical subject.

If it were possible at all for the sense of self to be really lost, so that a man could say: "I am not myself but another," with the meaning that he was really another, there would be absolutely no way of finding it out, for he could not relate the circumstance and no observer certainly would be able to do so. For to say: "I am another," is simply to become conscious of being other than I was, of having undergone a transformation or change; and in knowing myself as changed or changing, I necessarily know something in myself as un-

changed and unchanging, and that unchanged and unchanging something is just the permanent identity of the self. As to the observer, his sole dependence rests upon the outer physical form, for he can never penetrate the self-consciousness of the subject observed.

It is, however, not in the abnormal but always in the normal that we are to seek the interpretation of man's true nature, and here we invariably find the self present, identical with itself, and the center about which all thoughts, all feelings of value, and all actions turn.

The Self always a Subject.

Much of the confusion about the self has arisen from looking for it where it does not belong. The Upanishads, the highest inspirational product of the Hindu mind, perhaps more than any other writings emphasize the central value of the self, and they make it plain enough that by its very nature, the self is forever the perceiving subject. If it is ever made an object of thought, it is never an object among its objects.

In the Upanishads, where is revealed the *brahmavidya*, or knowledge of the one, true Self, with which every knowing self is identified, Ushasta is taught that "the Self which is thine is the Self within all living things," and when he insists on knowing what that Self is which is in all things, his teacher Yajnavalkya makes reply: "I can not point it out. Thou canst not see the seer of the sight, thou canst not hear that that hears the hearing, thou canst not think the thinker of the thought, thou canst not know the knower of all knowledge. This is thy Self, that is in all things that are, and everything else is misery."*

Whether or not we go as far as the Vedentins and regard the individual self as ultimately identical with the Supreme Cosmic Self, we must recognize the truth here clearly stated that the knowing self is not to be looked for among the objects which it knows. Much misunderstanding has been due to the oversight of this simple and unique psychological fact.

The attempt has again and again been made, by the investigator, of putting the subject, as it were, *out there* to examine it as an object; whereas, all the time, the subtle, ever present subject has drawn itself back from being the examined to constitute itself the examiner.

* Brihadaranyaka-Up., III, 4/ 2. Gough's translation preferred to Mueller's, in S. B. E., see p. 659, note.

In its very worthy and commendable attempt to investigate everything in the heavens above, the earth beneath and the waters under the earth, inductive science has seemed unwilling to admit that there is any one thing that could refuse to submit to objective investigation. But when the self has been subjected to this treatment, all that can be found, as Hume discovered, is its various moods and activities. Hence, because he could not find the self among these moods and activities, it became for him little better than an uncertain figment of the imagination. And a large body of modern psychologists have followed his lead in this particular. While they regard the ego as the subject matter of psychology, the ego is for them but a string or group of sense-impressions, held together by some unknown associative attraction. Such a procedure really reduces psychology to mere psychics, for it leaves out that alone which gives psychology any meaning, the self.

Kant did better than Hume. In examining the problem of knowledge and its validity, more profoundly than it had ever been done, he made it perfectly clear that the knowing subject is not only not an uncertain figment of the imagination but the most certain of realities. In fact, he showed how the "synthetic apperception of the ego," that is, the perception of the subject along with its object, is the very ground of the rational life, and the one necessary precondition making it possible. Unfortunately, deterred by some timidity or hindered by an overfondness for abstract formulas, he did not carry out to the end his own thought, but left it for his successors to do. As certain as he was of the central reality of the self, his certainty was still that of belief rather than that of knowledge.

The Centrality of the Self.

It was especially Hegel who fully recognized the peculiarly unique character of the self-conscious, rational subject as being an intelligence that, while it does not know itself as an object, nevertheless knows itself in knowing its object. Whenever thought endeavors to make the self an object, as such an object, it always reveals itself really to be the subject, knowing its object.

The word unique applies with especial force to this self-knowledge, for it stands quite alone, having absolutely nothing else whatever like it. In all our investigations and in all the knowledge we can ever gain, this uniqueness will always declare itself. It reaches its abso-

lute term in God who, as the Ultimate Reason, has no object to know but himself and his thoughts, activities, and joys.

If, then, we are going to have any rational development at all, the self must stand fast as the center to which all things are referred and by which they are interpreted.

Suppose we were really to abolish it, with its permanent sense of self-identity and self-worth, its profound feeling of substantial, causal unity, what meaning for man would truth, beauty, and goodness have, those supreme ideals which his thought, feeling, and will are ever striving to realize? They would simply vanish into nothingness. There would be no means of knowing and estimating them or acting with rational purpose. That is, if the self-conscious subject vanishes, then so far as man is concerned, the world vanishes with it. This is what lies at the bottom of Jesus's saying: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" Whatever happens to the self, right or wrong, good or bad, involves for every man the whole of existence for him. Unless truth, beauty, and goodness exist for me, then they do not exist at all; for, even if I prize them for others, I can do so only in so far as their values first declare themselves in and to me.

Therefore, that was the supreme moment, in the cosmic evolution, when the knowing, feeling, and willing subjective intelligence emerged into the clear consciousness of self. Then it was that man rose above nature into the realm of supra-nature, and the whole world of reason opened before him. He at once recognized in the inner ego, with its insistent and insatiable claims, something other and far greater than his outer form, or than the entire outer world visible to sense. To the world of sense and a vague instinctive logic of association, the animal is restricted, because he can only perceive objects, and has no capacity to distinguish rationally between himself as subject *and* his objects; but man, having this capacity and, consequently, a power of rational synthesis by which he apperceives, or we might better say *comperceives*, himself *together with* his objects, rises to the world of thought and reason.

The Threefold Power in the Self.

Once arrived here, man becomes conscious of possessing within himself three simple, primitive, underived, rational capacities which, inseparably related, inter-blended in all their activities, and one in the unity of self-conscious reason, are, at the same time, unmistakably and

persistently distinct, in their own inalienable right and integrity. These capacities are knowing, feeling, and willing. If we would understand man's rational development, we must neither identify them nor separate them. They exist as a rational unity in trinity, or as a triune unity. The one is three and the three are one—a mathematical paradox which alone is made possible by the peculiar nature of self-conscious reason. But since these capacities of reason, though one and inseparable, are at the same time distinct in function, we may undertake, so far as possible, to treat them separately for the sake of clearness. When we say, "knowing, feeling, and willing" it is not meant that these capacities emerge in this order into human consciousness, but that their logical relation is thus expressed. The reason we can say of men that they feel after they know, and will after they feel, is because of their rational limitations. In the Divine consciousness we can only think of these capacities as necessarily simultaneous. It is this simultaneity that has erroneously led some philosophers to confuse their distinctness.

As simply recognizing its objects, thinking out their relations, and intuiting them in a coherent, unitary system of objective truth, the mind is satisfied as pure intellect, and we may call it the *speculative* or *theoretical reason*.

As simply sensing, estimating or judging the value of cognized objects and their relations, the mind functions as pure feeling, and we may call it the *æsthetical reason*.

These felt values, however, are always responded to in acts of the will, with the purpose of securing some use, good or enjoyment for the self; and, as exercising this capacity, we may designate the mind as *practical reason*. But as there is an especially intimate relation between the felt values of known objects and all practical activities, we may be justified in using the unsightly, yet descriptive term, *æsthetico-practical reason*, to express that relation of feeling and willing.

As the self invariably comes into relation with other selves, there is necessarily thrust upon it the moral problem, that is, whether, in its use and enjoyment of the values of the known object, it freely wills to share or not to share those values with others. In this aspect, we regard the self as *ethical reason*. In other words, the simple problem of the ethical reason is the direction of the will, either as love for self, or love for others.

The inter-relation between these phases of reason and their neces-

sary inter-dependence is immediately evident. If there is no known object, there can be no felt value and no motive to act. With a known object, but no felt value in it, there is no reason for the object to be and no end to be reached by any volition. While with the presence of others, who also know and feel, the will is compelled to take some attitude toward them. Indeed, without the presence of others, any discussion of the subject at all becomes utterly void.

Drop any element of reason out, and reason disappears. Even while the Absolute transcends all human distinctions of subject and object, and has no other than himself, we must think of Him, nevertheless, as an object to himself, and as other than himself in man begotten in his likeness and image.

It now devolves upon us to trace the development of this threefold capacity of reason in the unfolding self-consciousness of man.

CHAPTER II.

EVOLUTION OF THE THEORETICAL REASON.

THE fundamental characteristic of the synthetic, apperceiving self, as a knowing subject, is the power to *conceive* its object, that is, to take or lay hold of things together, and form out of them a one thing. In due time, we shall learn that this rational power of conceiving its object, rests directly upon the threefold capacity in reason, of knowing, feeling, and willing; or, more exactly, is the reason itself acting. But, at present, we wish to regard the nature of the product, the concept itself, and its meaning in the development of the theoretical reason.

The Simplest Elements of Knowledge.

Were we asked, what are the simplest elements of our knowledge, we should at first be inclined to say, the single objects of sense or the percepts, such as a blade of grass, a dew drop, a pebble, a tree, a horse, and so on. But if we are to trust the physiologist and the psychologist, all of these objects, so far from being simple data of sense cognition, are very complex and elaborate products. It is true, they are the first and simplest we are *self-consciously* aware of; but, as a matter of fact, they prove, on analysis, to be elaborate constructs of the conceiving power of reason, far back of the self-conscious stage.

The first and simplest sense cognition we can trace is the single impression of a single sense, such as a color, a sound, a taste, a touch, and the like. These are doubtless also complex, but we can not analyze them as yet into simpler elements, nor would it be of any essential interest to us now to do so.

Sense-impresses, the Percept, and the Concept.

These simple sense-impresses are constantly pouring, in multitudes through all the senses, into the brain; and, that too, in the utmost confusion. But they do not appear in consciousness in confusion. They seem to have been sorted out, classified, and grouped into various more or less clearly distinct objects of sense perception, which we, at

first, take to be our simplest elements of knowledge. And not unnaturally so for, in fact, they are the simplest elements of our *self-conscious* knowledge. But, if we would be serious with the origin of knowledge, we must go back of the self-conscious percepts or objects to their constituent elements in the sense-impresses.

So that such an insignificant thing as a blade of grass is a real acquirement of knowledge, won after considerable experience. At first, it was only a thin streak of green color. We saw it grow, then, take on a different size and form; found it to have a certain taste, odor, and touch; and then saw it cut down, change color, and turn into something else, to which another name must be applied. All these simple and distinct sense-impresses came in time, without any conscious effort on our part, to be put together by the knowing mind, into the single percept of the blade of grass. But there was more being done *for*, rather than *by*, us. While all this was going on, that is, while the mind was *perceiving* the blade of grass, it was, in that very act, also *conceiving* it. All these simple elements were being *taken together* and constructed into the unity of a substance, with its qualities, and a cause, with its effects, and there was formed out of it what we call a *concept*. It is in virtue of this concept that the blade of grass really first becomes a perceptual object, known *as* an object by a knowing subject; for it is only through it, as a rational form, that we can now group, recognize, and name all blades of grass of like species. And this process of forming concepts goes on for ever, for every simple sense object we know.

A single sense object or percept, then, is a group of elements or sense-impresses, brought together and rationally organized under the control of the concept. So that, ever after, in our future experience when we get one or two sense-impresses from any object, the concept enables us to throw in all the other allied sense-impresses, and thus immediately recognize a single object of sense perception.

The Concept, an Object of Thought.

It is evident that the concept is not a composite image of all the objects of a given class, like a composite photograph, which is only another object of the same kind; but is qualitatively different from any one in particular of the percepts concerned, or all of them combined. And yet, at the same time, it stands for each and all of them; not however, as another object of sense, among them, but as a

object of reason, dominating them. Its real nature is that of a rational intuition, following upon a logical generalization, formed by induction.

But, while the concept is thus a logical construct, what must be particularly observed is that it is not the product of any *conscious* logic of the mind, but is elaborated in the sub-conscious depths of reason; for, on the very threshold of self-consciousness, it appears full fledged as a simple, underived intuition of reason, immediately given, along with the perceived object of sense whose knowledge it makes possible.

No man ever found himself consciously constructing these primitive concepts of the various sense objects before him, such as a tree, a mountain, or a star. He may afterwards analyze them, restrict or enlarge their content, but he is as innocent of forming the original concepts, by any consciously intelligent act of his own, as is the newborn babe.

The Natural History of the Concept.

But this free gift of reason, on which we begin our self-conscious knowledge, has its origin further back than the sub-conscious logic of man, for it reveals its inchoate beginnings deep down in the consciousness of evolving life.

In fact, far back beyond life, in the evolution of the inorganic world, we found the unity of the concept. Substances, with their qualities, and causes, with their effects, were so related in juxtaposition and in succession as to form one harmonious whole. The unmistakable impression made upon us was that a rational idea was working itself out in nature into visible expression.

With the appearance of life, however, the impression is clear and irresistible that every cell, every plant, and every animal is but an embodied concept. But it is not until consciousness enters that we can conceive how the individual could, in any way, know even the simplest elements of the concept, much less the finished product.

Beginnings in the Animal Mind.

The animal seems to offer the first possibility of such knowledge. He evidently has distinct sense cognitions, and then, with his further development, clear percepts of sense objects, according to which he regulates his responses to the environment. While in the lower

animals these responses to the appeal of sense percepts are immediate we see in the higher animals a pause, an apparent weighing of evidence, a deliberation and, then, voluntary choice. But it can not be regarded as a *consciously rational* act, in the human sense of that term.

The Logic of Association.

It is rather the result of a dim, instinctive, sub-conscious logic of association, according to which various sense-impressions and percepts are struggling for the mastery in the simple consciousness of the animal's mind. He is unconscious of what is going on in him, and is driven fatally by the result.

Thus, for example, Miss Pussie does not immediately spring for the bird, the moment she sees it; but, while stealthily creeping nearer repeatedly "feels" her muscles and adjusts them for the successful leap. This is not conscious rational deliberation, however, but the playing back and forth in her sense consciousness of past associative impressions, in conflict and comparison with present ones, all marshalled and guided by her fundamental instincts, in virtue of which she finally gets just the right visual clearness of the object, the "look" of the distance, and the proper "feel" of her muscles for the fatal leap. The only thing in the whole process the cat is conscious of is the outer sense percepts; the logic of the thing is all carried out for her by the laws of association, directed by instinct, and is entirely beyond her control. The only event that could have turned her from the fatal process would have been Master Jack Terrier's obstreperous fancy for her, as she had a fancy for the bird. The higher animals with their wide range of sense perception often reveal, in experience varied and complex attainments in this instinctive, associative logic.

Indeed, some human beings never seem to rise much above their ordinary activity; and all of us are subject to it more than we suppose. Persons of shallow or feeble mind whose mentality is largely, if not entirely, dependent upon the immediate sense impressions of the moment, or the fugitive memories of them, are almost wholly guided by the accidental objects they meet. Prizing the true human capacity for rational concentration, an old Hindu philosopher has contemptuously likened the consciousness of such people to that of a drunken monkey, stung by a scorpion.

Instinct, a Dynamic, Typal Idea.

But although the mere associational logic of the animal mind is unworthy of man, capable as he is of conscious reasoning, it, nevertheless, plays a very important and indispensable part in the evolution of self-consciousness. It would be gravely erroneous to regard the animal's acts as mere, mechanically related accidents, arising out of contact with the environment. For the animal is constantly driven by instincts which are dynamic ideas or concepts of the cosmic reason, impelling him to fulfill his racial type. Consequently, in the animal's reactions upon surrounding sense objects, his instincts seize upon and associate them according to the logic of his needs, those instincts being volitional cosmic ideas, working through him and pressing toward realization.

The higher the animal rises, that is, the wider his conscious contact with the environment, the farther is he removed from non-intelligent, necessitated, mechanical reactions, the larger the number of possible choices, the more incalculable his acts, and the nearer does he approach the free, spontaneous volition of man, based, as it is, on consciously recognized values in the object for the self.

Human Associational Logic.

If we care, we can catch at play, in our own minds, certain phases of this same instinctive, associational logic which is always going on within us below, as well as above, the threshold of self-consciousness, and which in time will come out in the form of concepts, in the rational activities of the subject.

In addition to the numberless sense impressions, constantly beating upon the attention, every one is aware of the great crowd of revived images of past sense impressions, as constantly trooping through his mind, as in thoughtless reverie. One is inclined, at first, to say that they come pell-mell, in confused, fortuitous disorder. But a little attention will soon reveal to us that they have an order, and that not one image comes without a reason. But it will be an order and reason of its own, without any interference or direction on the part of the self-conscious subject. He is a mere spectator, and the stream of ideas persists in flowing on, unless he steps in to check it by firmly fixing his attention upon some one object of thought. Even then, it will constantly press to the surface and, as it were, "slop over."

Laws of Association.

But, if let alone and, so far as possible, observed, it will be found to follow some rule of association, formed in previous experience: such as contiguity, similarity near or remote, strong contrast, frequency; which will show the reason why any particular image or group of images appear.

All this is simply the logic of association, the first reasoning process of the consciousness of sense objects as such, and is a survival in us of what goes on in the mind of the animal. Only in us, the range of association is greatly widened by rational ideas, while the animal is restricted to sense objects.

At the same time, this instinctive associational logic in the animal while not absolutely inerrant—for in that case the animal could make no progress from the lessons of experience—it is much more trustworthy than in man. And reasonably so, for the animal must trust wholly to it, in the solution of his life's problems; while man is forced to rise above it and depend upon reason for the conscious attainment of those ideals which reason itself sets up as the goal of his life.

Below the point of self-consciousness in the scale of life, associational logic is the guide and, in following it, the animal always acts with a certain consistency and worthiness of himself. Above that point, man must be guided by reason or else, sinking to the level of mere association of ideas, he becomes irrational, loses self-respect and dignity, and deserves the old Hindu's contempt, who likened him to a drunken monkey, stung by a scorpion.

The Cosmic Reason in All Things.

But so far as the animal is concerned, we must fully recognize the entire rationality of his actions, based as it is, upon the associational logic. For he follows a specific idea or type, deeply imbedded in his mind, or which is itself his mind. It is this typical idea that the fundamental and irresistible instincts of self-preservation, propagation and progression are constantly striving to carry out, or bring to realization. So that when the innumerable sense impressions from without beat upon the animal's consciousness, he adjusts himself at once according to the requirements of this inner, instinctive, dynamic idea that is, his own individual specific life idea or concept. Thus it is that this inter-action, between typical instinct and sense impressions

results in a great variety of acquired associations and habits which, following the logic of the animal's interests, comes out in a fine adjustment of himself to his environment.

This logic, we must emphasize, is not the animal's conscious effort—he is conscious only of the sense objects—but is that of the evolutionary process as a whole. It is the reasoning that runs throughout the entire cosmos in all its parts, which, except in the individual self-conscious man, do not consciously share in this reasoning but, nevertheless, everywhere reveal it; a reasoning, as we have found, running throughout the physical world, and shown in its mathematically exact mechanical and chemical laws of attraction and repulsion, valence and periodicity. The inorganic world is imbued with intelligence, though for the convenience of distinguishing it from the specific organisms which it contains, we may call it non-intelligent. It reveals a mind, at any rate, up to the level of mathematics. God geometrizes, said Pythagoras. If we do not care to go so far, we must at least say, the Planetary System geometrizes.

But when the Cosmic Reason rises above the physico-chemical mechanism of the inorganic world, it not only shows individual living forms, carried out on a definite conceptual plan, but an ascending order of life which, as a whole, reveals one grand progressive Idea. And in the midst of this cosmic reasoning, consciousness and, then, an instinctive, associational logic arises in the animal's mind—a rationality *in* him but not *of* him.

The Accept.

It is at this point that, in the evolution of the animal mind, we come into view of the vague beginnings of the concept, which emerges clearly in the human mind.

By reason of his psychic, associational capacity, the animal, in his higher stages of mental development, rises above disconnected sense percepts and, while he does not attain to the concept, reaches what we may call the *accept*, a vague logical form of classification, between the individual percept and the general concept.

It is more than the percept, because the animal can loosely classify objects; and less than the concept, because he never goes beyond sense objects to deal with their rational relations—an act which the concept alone makes possible. Thus the dog, for example, while he does not know, by a universal sense experience, all the individual trees, or

horses, or cats in the world, yet would never mistake any hitherto unseen tree for a horse, or any hitherto unseen horse for a cat. He has *accepts* of these various objects in his mind, or vague classified groupings, and by reason of this fact he sometimes shows a dim sort of reasoning or self-consciousness.

If, on the other hand, he could form clear concepts of any objects he would be able to reach the distinction of subject and object, in general, and thus come to a clear consciousness of himself, as the subject, distinguished from all other objects. Perhaps we might liken the difference between the *accept*, in animal consciousness, and the concept in the human mind, to that with which we are familiar in the words apprehension and comprehension. In the one case, it is a mere touching the object as such, in the other, it is going all around it in complete mastery.

The Concept Emerges.

We are now prepared, as well as may be, to see the concept clearly emerge, in self-consciousness, which makes it possible for man, with this conceptual power, to become a partaker in the Divine Cosmic Reason. The newly acquired sense of self, as subject, enables him now, not only to distinguish all objects from himself, but to see them under their typical forms or concepts. The Cosmic Reason, working in all things, has, through the *accepts* of the animal mind, come at last to reveal its secrets to the reason of man, in those clear conceptual ideas, which, according to Plato, are the pure dynamic forms, after which nature copies all her creations. Man, thus rising to the realm of reason and recognizing himself as other than the Cosmos, is able to know its thoughts and interpret its meaning. So that, in one aspect a part of the Cosmos, he is yet *other* than the Cosmos, and begins to live and reason for himself.

It would seem, then, that man's rational development, up to the point where he enters upon his own proper career, had its origin far back in the evolution of life. The mere *sensitiveness* of the plan according to which it responds to the environment in the interests of individual forms, differentiates into the cognition and feeling of the animal's consciousness of objects. This psychological stage of *conscious perception*, then rises, under the guidance of an associative logic, working among those numberless inter-actions, between inner dynamic, typical instinct and outer experience, to the *accept*—a vague

form of rational classification in the animal mind—and finally emerges as the *concept* in human self-consciousness.

Or, carrying the genesis of the process still farther back, we may say: The *mechanical logic* of the non-intelligent world has been raised to the *sensitive logic* of the unconscious plant; the sensitive logic of the unconscious plant has been raised to the *associational logic* of the conscious animal; and the associational logic of the conscious animal has, at last, been raised to the *self-conscious logic* of the rational man; who, as a spiritual individual, must now assume the responsibility of shaping his own destiny in the world.

The Cosmic Reason has now imparted its power of rational thought to an *other*; and man, thus liberated from the monistic unity of nature, conscious of himself and of his worth over against all objects, turns back upon the cosmic order whence he arose, to know if possible, its truth and meaning for him.

The Power of the Concept.

And this knowledge is only possible by the power of the concept which, while not a product of man's own conscious thought—it is not of works but of grace in nature—nevertheless, enters into and guides his entire rational development, racial and individual, in all its stages. From the beginning to the end of his knowing, he necessarily employs it. It is the potent, constructive organon of reason in him, by which he names objects, develops language, and forms, either his naively primitive notions about himself, the world, and the gods, or rationally constructs his final philosophy.

We can not overestimate the concept and its power, in the development of the theoretical reason. Without it, we should never be able to refer to an object, as other than the self. We could not form classes of objects, and give them names. We could only describe individual things, as isolated objects. Indeed, we could not do even that, without using concepts. For to call a tree, "that-thing-which-grows-out-of-the-ground-straight-up-in-the-air-covered-with-bark-having-branches-twigs-leaves-and-fruit," is to use a whole crowd of concepts, or general terms, each of which includes many particular percepts and sense-impresses. In fact, without the concept, we could not utter one, single, simple name and give it any meaning. But with it, the whole world of rational development opens before us. So much is this true, that we may be justified in saying that, when the

little infant can call his father *dada*, he is worlds above the might king of beasts; and although the least and most helpless among living things, amid the vast physical environment that sweeps about him is already, in virtue of that single incoherent utterance, far greater than the greatest in the kingdom of animals.

Equipped with this wonderful rational form, the concept, man will from now on, undertake to lift up the whole sub-conscious process of its formation into conscious reason. That is, as sense-impressions were *sub-consciously* gathered up, grouped and organized in his mind, as one individual percept, which then became a conceptual word, applicable to an entire class of similar percepts; he will now *consciously* gather up separate facts of his experience, group and classify them under one general idea, which he can apply back to all like objects of thought. He will follow a constant process of induction and deduction, of synthesis and analysis, inseparably interactive and mutually necessary to attain the result. His aim will never be to *create* concepts, general ideas or conceptions, for that would be a futile effort of the mere subjective imagination; but to discover, interpret or realize the objective thoughts of nature, or reflect them in his mind. The sole business of his theoretical reason will be to rethink the thought of the Cosmos.

Naïve Logic: Common-sense.

At the beginning of his self-conscious life, man is little aware of the greatness of the concept and its dynamic activities. Nevertheless he must needs constantly use it, in all his crude reasonings about the objects before him. He is always forming some sort of logical generalizations, based upon the notions of unity, substance, and cause, but *how* he does it, or even *that* he does it, he is no more conscious than is the animal of his logic of association; or, at best, is only vaguely half-conscious of it. It does itself. He must be a scientist or philosopher, but also must be a very primitive one. This, however, is only the primary grade of his rational development, the child stage of *naïve logic*. When this naïve logic has reached its highest point where men have acquired much useful knowledge for the daily conduct of life, we may call it the *logic of common-sense*.

The Logic of Reflection: Science.

In time this naïve, primitive reasoning and this logic of common sense give way before the full conscious *logic of reflection*, and the hea

and burden of man's rational day is upon him. Now begin his wanderings in the desert of analysis and synthesis, of deduction and induction, of doubts, opinions, beliefs, and convictions. It is his way to the Land of Promise, or to that city which hath (not sensible but intelligible) foundations, whose builder and maker is Truth.

This wandering in the desert is due to the fact that man has caught some glimpses of rational possessions beyond. He becomes certain that what the Cosmic Reason did for him sub-consciously, in grouping sense-impresses into percepts and percepts into distinct conceptual objects of sense, he can now self-consciously repeat for himself. And so he seeks to gather these given particular concepts under general heads or conceptions, as if aiming at the formation of one grand concept or Idea of the universe.

He ascends from smaller to larger groupings until he classifies all objects under such general concepts as mineral, vegetal, and animal things. Then, driven on by this same power of generalization, he reduces these to matter and its laws or, more definitely, he reduces all substances to one fundamental substance, and all causes to one fundamental cause, and is finally compelled to regard these as forming one objective order of nature.

Then he must needs turn back upon the thinking self, to which all these objects in their variety and unity are presented, and generalize it; a procedure which he carries out by classifying all psychological processes under the heads of thought, feeling, and volition, finally reducing these to phases of the one order of mind.

Rational Intuition or the Logic of Logic: Philosophy.

But he has already risen above the mere classificatory, relational, discursive, activity of logic to the direct, synthetic, rational intuition of a substantial causal unity, or to the ultimate fulness of the concept, which all the time lay concealed, an implicit potentiality, in the ascending process from the beginning. In other words, he finds that as his scientific, reflective logic has guided his naive and common-sense logic, from a sensible to a higher intelligible level, so there is a still deeper logic of rational intuition, guiding his scientific reflection to the philosophical level of the ultimate unity of objective Truth. It is this logic of logic, or rational intuition, that prevents him from stopping at any grouping or classification, until he brings the order of nature and the order of mind, the matter-world and the mind-world

under the one grand concept of an all-inclusive cosmic unity, which he is necessarily compelled to regard as the ultimate and only Individual Reality, the underived, uncreate, absolute One, besides which there is nothing else, and of which and in which all things are that are the one fundamental Substance and Cause, manifested in all things and thoughts that constitute the visible and invisible universe.

And this total, all-inclusive Cosmic Idea, presented as the only real object to the rational, interpretative subject, is but the acceptance of associational logic in the animal mind, raised to the rational concept of logical reflection, in the human mind, and then, through the progressive unfoldment of the theoretical reason in intuition, brought out into full, explicit realization in the clear light of self-consciousness.

Because man's evolution is on the plane of self-conscious reason above nature, we call it a free, rational or supra-natural development. But if because of this self-consciousness, man finds himself alone, another in the universe, a free rational being to choose his own ends and make his own destiny, he is not, therefore, free to think as he pleases. For just as he finds, at the beginning of his rational life, the concept of individual sense objects a pure gift to him of the Cosmic Reason, so he finds that the conscious conceptual power, driving him to form the infinitude of objects and their relations into one grand concept of substantial unity, is the universal reason working in him and through him for its own end; and those ends seem to be no other than to put the individual, rational man in conscious possession of the Cosmic Idea. So that man's freedom, or sense of otherness in the universe, is not to think as he likes or as he chooses, but to become conscious, *in* himself, and thus possess *for* himself, the thought of the Cosmic Reason, the reflection of which, therefore, in his own unfolded consciousness, is the supreme goal of his theoretical development, or self-realization.

So far as man does not think the cosmic thought, he is in error, he is theoretically lost; so far as he does think the cosmic thought, he is in the truth, he is theoretically saved; and the whole endeavor of his intellectual life—his investigations and reasonings, his analyses and syntheses, his inferences, his logic, his sciences and philosophies—is bent toward the one end of knowing the Truth and, knowing it, becoming one with it.

If, as we have seen, the plant and the animal, who struggle toward the assertion of individual freedom from nature and as earnest

struggle to get back into accord with nature, do so unconsciously or sub-consciously, sunk as they are in the monistic, cosmic unity; man, who makes the same endeavor toward freedom and return, does so consciously on the supra-natural plane of reason, as a free rational being, seeking self-realization, which he conceives to be the harmony of his thought with the thought of the universe. To know thus the objective truth, is for him one of the supreme ends of his self-conscious, rational development; it is intellectual atonement; it is the reconciliation and redemption of the theoretical reason.

The Advance from Matter to Mind; from Nature to Spirit.

But now, while the self-conscious man is thus seeking reconciliation with the truth, a procedure which we may characterize as a *quantitative* enlargement of the subjective, implicit concept within him, into a full explicit correspondence to the objective Cosmic Idea or Reality; he becomes more and more clearly aware of a broad *qualitative* distinction, emerging from the process of development.

In becoming conscious of self, as a knowing subject and rising thus to the world of rational concepts, man recognizes, of necessity, that he has withdrawn from the animal's visible sense-world of nature into an intelligible, rational, supra-natural world of thought. Here, as a personal intelligence capable of perception, logic, and intuition, he knows himself to be other than his body—for that belongs among the objects of sense, a spatial part of nature—and so finds, in his conscious self, the only concrete, living representative of that permanent, substantial-causal unity, by which alone he can reduce the manifold objects of sense experience to concepts, logical generalizations, and finally to the total, unitary Cosmic Idea.

But if back of the visible, outer man, appreciable by sense, there lies this one inner, real man, appreciable by the intuition of reason alone, what can he conclude but that back of the great outer, manifold universe, with its infinitude of objects and events, known to sense, there is the one invisible, real Intelligence, akin to his own inner, rational self?

Looking back in the history of man's rational progress, we shall find that this is just the conclusion he has invariably drawn, a conclusion in no way affected by the specific conception of the backlying reality, which is always on the level of the current, intellectual development.

It seems as if the instinctive Cosmic Reason, at work in man, were seeking to come to conscious expression. No matter how primitive and humble man's thoughts have been, he has always seen something beyond what he sees, and has ever discovered behind the outer show of things, invisible spirits like himself, having intelligent powers similar to his own. And as the rational faculty in him gradually reduces the world of experience to a coherent order, the numerous, unrelated, supernatural spirits of his primitive thought develop, first, perhaps into some beautiful, artistic pantheon of Hellenic gods, and then, finally, when reason sees in the visible world one vast, harmonious, cosmic unity, into the One Absolute Intelligence and Power, present in all things.

Mind in but above Nature.

As man's body manifests him to sense, so nature manifests God. And just as man, although immanent in his body, nevertheless transcends it as rational, self-conscious mind; so God, although immanent in nature, transcends it as Infinite Spirit.

Man's rational evolution, or the unfoldment of his consciousness to self-realization in knowing the objective Truth, is extensive and intensive or, as we have called it, quantitative and qualitative. It is extensive or quantitative so far as the implicit, rational concept unfolds, under the stress of experience, into the full envisagement of the Cosmic Idea; and it is intensive or qualitative so far as sense becomes reason, matter is transmuted into mind, or nature rises to Spirit.

In due time, we shall see that this quantitative and qualitative rational development represents but two inseparable phases of the one fundamental, progressive movement in reason, from sense through logic to intuition, by which the formation of the concept is affected while, at the same time, its true nature as Spiritual Reality becomes known.

We may, therefore, say that, since man's body is but an individualized part of the outer sense world, and his mind but an individualized phase of the Absolute Spirit, then the meaning of his sciences and philosophies, the goal of his theoretical development which is his reconciliation with the Cosmic Reason, is to think the Thought of the Cosmos, or to know God and his manifestations in the universe, and the ultimate, objective Truth.

This lofty aim, which man sets up as the end of his theoretical development, seems like an ironical mockery, amid his actual weaknesses, errors, and limitations. Poet, saint, and philosopher have vied with each other in bewailing the frailty and transience of man who, like a floating mist, a passing dream, a fading flower, or a weaver's shuttle, tarries but a moment, and then is gone forever.

A Defeat that Promises Triumph.

But the philosopher sees more than the fleeting things of sense, and finds in Reason the abiding place of man's rest; and the same sacred bard who, looking down, saw man carried away as with a flood, looked up and beheld in the Eternal "our dwelling place in all generations."

The consciousness of defeat has in it the promise of triumph. The mind that has become aware of error and limitation, has of necessity already conceived the possibility of truth and freedom, in which there is no error and restriction but a knowledge of the total Reality.

"For thence, a paradox
Which comforts while it mocks—
Shall life succeed in that it seems to fail:
What I aspired to be,
And was not, comforts me:
A brute I might have been, but would not sink i'
the scale."

(Browning: Rabbi ben Ezra, vii.)

At any rate, it is toward a comprehensive ideal knowledge of the Truth that man stubbornly bends his most earnest efforts. With as much fervor as the saint, who yearns for a vision of God, the scientist and philosopher pursue the Truth. Like errant knights, amid privation and struggle, they follow the gleam, in search of some Holy Grail, the sight of which will banish all error and doubt, and fill the mind with healing light.

The Ideal not Found in the Actual.

But whence arose this unattained, perhaps, alas! unattainable ideal of Truth? No man has, nor have all men combined, ever seen this Truth in the actual. Nowhere, in experience, along the whole line of evolution, has it revealed itself. It is always something beyond and before, a theory and not a concrete condition or fact; and yet, it is the one thing reason demands as having the seal of value stamped upon it.

In India and Greece, where the mind has reached the highest stage of its theoretical effort, Truth is recognized to be nothing less than perfect and infinite Reality, and for that perfect and infinite Reality man looks to his worldly experience in vain. And yet, though not in experience, it is constantly condemning the error, of which it shows experience to be full, as intellectual sin and hence destruction. It forever stands over against the mere appearance of truth as illusion which, either leads us nowhere, or else back to the confusion and darkness of error.

To turn aside from the star of this ideal Truth, is as fatal for man in his development in the world, as for the mariner, amid the storms upon the seas, to lose his compass.

If then this ideal, so indispensable for man's progress, is not to be found in experience, it must be that, from the beginning, it lies as a germ in reason itself—the kingdom of Truth is within you—and the value of experience consists in being a means to unfold that unfolded Truth, for its conscious understanding and acceptance by the free rational self.

Indeed, we may go so far as to say that when the Cosmic Reason working as a sub-conscious associational logic in the animal mind first comes to expression as the rational concept in the self-conscious mind of man, there is already asserted the ideal of Truth. Because when man becomes aware of the simplest concept in his mind, he has already before him the power and potency of that all-inclusive Idea according to which the worlds are framed. For every concept has within it that inclusive unity of substance and cause which brings all particulars of quality and effect under a harmonious whole. And if reason has this conceptual power at all, it can not stop short, in its progressive evolution, until it reaches that ultimate, comprehensive conception or Idea which, being the Absolute Unity, includes coherently within itself all individual things and thoughts.

The great psychological fact of an inner, latent, ideal truth was involved in the Socratic question as to whether a man could really be taught anything; and Socrates used to regard himself as following his mother's humble profession, in that he did not undertake to teach men ideas, but simply enabled them to give birth to ideas.

Descartes repeated the doctrine for modern philosophy, in his *innate ideas*, which Locke only formally and not really invalidated. And Kant, in the "Critique," gave it the clearest and most cogent ex-

pression, in setting forth those *a priori*, constructive and regulative principles of reason, which not only transcend experience but which alone make experience possible.

Revelation and the Fall of Man.

It is this same rational fact that accounts for the origin of the claim of revelation and renders it subsequently intelligible. Those great geniuses, who have led humanity, have always been more fully developed than their contemporaries, while the value and cogency of their appeal has depended upon the latent, rational possibilities in those minds whom they addressed. Recognizing that the truth, which they set forth, did not come from the worldly wisdom of experience but from some higher source, they regarded it as supernatural revelation, and their followers accounted it as nothing less than miraculous. It was, indeed, *supra*-natural, as being above nature, but it was natural to reason. To the multitude it was miraculous in the sense that the discovery of such lofty truth was above their present rational development and power of insight.

This presence of the ideal truth in the mind, before its actual realization, also accounts for those deep and universal convictions among culture peoples, about the fall of man. Man, it is conceived, was once in Paradise, perfect and good—perhaps he lived in some Golden Age, free from strife, misery and want, or it may be, he was once an unfallen soul, among the gods, gazing enraptured upon the beautiful vision of Truth. But all this changed when, for some reason variously given, man plunged into the experiences of sense, which either stained his moral purity or obscured his intellectual vision. Once fallen, the confusion and misery of his condition drive him to seek a return to his former happy estate.

The Power of the Ideal in the Concept.

We prefer, however, to regard such allegories not as setting forth some historic fall but rather as the rise, under the stress of disciplinary experience, of the rational concept in man, which was present as the essential function of his reason from the beginning, and which it is the purpose of his rational evolution to bring out.

That is to say, in brief review, man's theoretical evolution rests upon the Cosmic Reason which, after coming to otherness in the free, individual, self-conscious man, presents to him, in objective

concepts, its own dynamic forms, according to which, all things are made, and which, in their unity, constitute the objective Truth of Reality.

The rational concept is the cosmos in germ, and, once possessed of it and its power, man has, first, set before him the ideal of Truth, and is, then, compelled to go on until his reason unfolds to a knowledge of that Truth, a knowledge which, for his theoretical reason, constitutes redemption from error, reconciliation with the Thought of God and the freedom of a conscious self-realization.

CHAPTER III.

EVOLUTION OF THE ÆSTHETICO-PRACTICAL REASON.

OF what advantage would it be to us, to understand all mysteries and to have all knowledge, if we could not *feel the value* of what we had come to know!

"The truth must be sought for the truth's sake," replies the philosopher, implying that our pursuit is the purest devotion without motive of reward. But, if we get down to the bottom of the philosopher's consciousness, we shall find that he is taking the utmost pleasure in pursuing the truth, and that when he finds it, or even only thinks he has found it, he rejoices as a man who has discovered the pearl of great price. That is, he can not help *feeling* the truth, for he is as much an æsthetic, as he is a theoretical, being.

Primary Devotion must be Given to the Truth.

His primary devotion is to the truth, however; and what leads him to regard it as his supreme concern, is based on the profoundest wisdom, for the truth is the state of objective Reality. It *is what it is*—we can not change that, we can only discover it—and, therefore, the first, absolutely essential thing for us is to know it as it is. But, after all, how do we know that what we know *is* the truth; what is our criterion? The object? But what object, sense? That can not be, for not only must the sense object be interpreted by reason, but universal experience shows it to be so changeable and illusive, so full of contradiction and uncertainty, that it requires constant revision and correction.

Our philosopher settles the question easily enough by saying that the criterion for the objective truth must be rational consistency and an intuitive certainty that what is known is correspondent to Reality. Things and thoughts must be so related as to form a coherent whole in which there is no confusion or logical contradiction, and which constitutes a perfect, rational unity, appealing to the intuitions of reason.

But, while the theoretical reason may thus speak for itself, it is,

at the same time, so inseparably bound up with the æsthetical reason that feeling always approves or disapproves knowing. Ultimate we *feel* logical consistency and *feel* the certainty of knowing Reality. This æsthetic confirmation assures us that we have reached the unity of objective truth. And experience shows this to be so. That which keeps the scientist, or philosopher, in a constant state of progressive activity is, on the one hand, a painful disturbance in his mind, arising from the inconsistency and logical contradiction between things and thoughts; and, on the other, the hope of the pleasure to be gained alone by the knowledge of truth.

Huxley on the Joys of Science.

On this last point, Mr. Huxley, who was always regarded as a very severe scientist, and never given over to a sentimental indulgence of his feelings, may, with profit, be quoted.

In discussing the motive that has inspired scientific advance, Huxley resents the insinuation that it was for the rewards of utility. "The disciples of science were guided, he asserts, by no search for practical fruits, 'during the great period of its growth,' and he adds, 'reached adolescence without being stimulated by any rewards of that nature.'" A great company of distinguished names, belonging to the latter part of the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century, are mentioned to support his contention, such as, Herschel, Laplace, Young, Fresnel, Oersted, Cavendish, Lavoisier, Davy, Lamarck, Cuvier, Jussieu, deCandolle, Werner, and Hutton, who were connected with no invention of practical utility—except Davy with his safety lamp.

Now, if Professor Huxley had carried his examination a little further, he would have come upon the fact that all practical advantages are but appeals to feeling; but aside from this fact, it is interesting to know what one of the great scientists of the nineteenth century, the century of practical science *par excellence*—regarded as the leading motive of progress. And we find that he centered it in the feeling of value, pure and simple, in the known truth.

"In fact," he says, "the history of physical science teaches (and we can not too carefully take the lesson to heart) that the practical advantages, attainable through its agency, never have been, and never will be sufficiently attractive to men, inspired by the innate genius for the interpretation of nature, to give them courage to un-

go the toils and make the sacrifices which that calling requires from its votaries." But is it just a matter of the pure theoretical reason? This is what he adds:

"That which stirs their pulses is the love of knowledge and the joy of the discovery of the causes of things, sung by the old poet—the supreme delight of extending the realm of law and order ever farther towards the unattainable goals of the infinitely great and the infinitely small, between which our little race of life is run." ("Methods and Results." p. 53.)

Professor Huxley would not be understood as saying that the theorist and the practical man in science are not mutually helpful. "Nevertheless," he continues, "that which is true of the infancy of physical science in the Greek world [where he has shown before that his thesis holds good] and of its adolescence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, remains as true, in the riper days of the last half of the nineteenth century. The great steps in its progress have been made and will be made by men who seek knowledge simply because they crave it Nothing great in science has ever been done by men, whatever their powers, in whom the divine afflatus of the truth-seeker was wanting. Men of moderate capacity have done great things because it animated them; and men of great natural gifts have failed, absolutely or relatively, because they lacked this one thing needful." And he gives as a brilliant example, Fresnel (dead at the age of thirty-nine) who writes to Young, "All the compliments which I have received from MM. Arago, deLaplace, Biot [the great French scientists of his day] never gave me so much pleasure as the discovery of a theoretical truth or the confirmation of a calculation by experiment." (Ib. pp. 56-7.)

Such statements are highly significant, because they reveal the deep, inspiring feelings of distinguished men who devoted their entire lives to pure science, irrespective of worldly gain. And therefrom we see clearly that it is not merely *knowing* that is concerned; it is the "*love of knowledge*," the "*joy of discovery*," the "*supreme delight* in extending the realm of law and order," and the "*divine afflatus of the truth-seeker*," all of which are emotions, or the higher pleasures of happiness, that have given motives to the will. The scientist runs "for the joy that is set before him, despising the cross and enduring the shame."

Professor Huxley might not want to be called a Platonist, but

he was a Platonist, pure and simple, in that his one endeavor always was to set aside the confused, fragmentary and inadequate view of things, for the supreme happiness of gazing enraptured upon the truth.

Feeling the Truth.

Well, then, if it were not for the painful disturbance among incoherent ideas, on the one hand, and the craving for the joy of knowledge, on the other, we fear the scientist would not be so much concerned as he ought to be about the harmonious unity of objective truth. The whole business of science might go by default. But we are reassured, because the scientist can not help being æsthetic as well as theoretical, so that error, which is logical incoherence and contradiction among ideas, pains reason and drives him on toward the pleasures of truth. Or, still better, it is, positively stated, the conscious ideal of a happiness, growing out of the possession of the objective truth, which is the deep, underlying motive and inspiration of all scientific and philosophical effort. It is, we might say, the dynamic impulse of the theoretical reason, to find its salvation in the joy of knowledge.

So that, while the intellect may directly intuit the truth, as being an agreement between the subjective thought and the object, the ultimate confirmation that this agreement is established is not found merely in the knowledge of the object as such, but in the rational *feeling* that reason is in possession of the objective truth. It is the feeling of having the truth that confirms thought in its validity, and gives to it value and objective rationality.

If feeling deceives man in his search for the truth by making him at times happy in error, it is because, for the time being, he takes error to be the truth. But it is always feeling that afterwards corrects him by convincing him, in terms of pain, that his supposed truth was error.

This playing back and forth between knowing and feeling makes man's rational development possible, because, having before him the theoretical intuition, as we have seen, of the ideal truth, that is, the knowledge of the object in its reality, as the goal of his intellectual endeavor, he also has the æsthetical intuition that that truth has an infinite value for him.

This was the final conclusion of the noblest minds in Greece and

India. Plato longed for the supreme felicity of beholding the truth; and Sankaracharya, who may be regarded as the noblest representative of Hindu thought, esteemed perfect knowledge, as perfect bliss.

Therefore, although the truth must be first sought, because the object to be known is what it is, and nothing we can wish, or think, or say, or do can change it; at the same time, we must recognize that the truth meets the requirements of the æsthetic reason and presents itself as an all-satisfying beauty. Our pure philosopher was right when he said: "Seek ye first the kingdom of Truth and its truthfulness," but he failed to add: "and all the values of feeling shall be added therunto." This is not the mercenary offering of a reward for the service of the truth, but a simple declaration of the inseparable unity of reason.

Every Known Object has Æsthetic Value.

At any rate, this inseparable unity of knowing and feeling in reason is settled for us in every event of conscious experience. For, every known object, however simple or complex, be it a pebble or a constellation, a mere impression of sense, a percept, an idea, or a world-view, whether it be the smile of an infant or a vision of God, arouses in the knowing subject its appropriate tone of feeling. Without it, nothing would have value, and life would sink into a meaningless, indistinguishable indifference. The burning of a hair or the breaking of a heart, the crushing of a gnat or the destruction of a world, would all be one. Without feeling, life would not be life—feeling *is* life.

There is something profoundly true in Gotama's reduction of salvation or eternal life to feeling, the blessedness of Nirvana. Only Gotama's Nirvana is but partly true, because feeling can not exist by itself, any more than knowing can exist by itself. In reality, feeling is always the feeling of value in the known object. There could, in fact, be no subject to feel, were there no object to be felt, as there could be no subject to know, were there no object to be known. So that if after all our efforts to find the truth, it should turn out to be misery or even have no value at all in terms of feeling, just what would be the significance of pursuing the ideal of truth?

Feeling less Definable than Knowing.

As infinite then as is the range and variety of the objects known, so infinite in range and variety are the feelings.

But they can not be given the clear definition and classification to which the objects are capable; not, however, because they are not there to be defined but because, from their very nature, they are often so subtle, evanescent, interfused. Besides, the objects known are not always as clear and definite as we sometimes suppose. Of the innumerable objects, things of sense and thoughts of the mind, that confront us every day, not one in a thousand can be defined with accuracy or exactitude.

Moreover, on the point of definition, the objects known have the advantage over their correlate feelings, in that they are common to all; they are, as it were, the current coin which we handle and exchange among ourselves, so that we must come to some agreement as to the names, terms and designations which are to pass as legal tender in every realm. There could be no other basis on which we could have dealings with each other, no common points of reference, no possible society. Hence, we have come to a more or less clear and distinct definition of our objects, both sensible and intellectual. But the feelings, which are not in the objects but in the perceiving subjects, must depend for their statement upon each individual. It is true that what each knows depends also upon his own individual knowing of it, but there is always the common object or thought to refer to, and in the mouth of two or three witnesses the thing shall be established. But as feeling is entirely subjective, there is nothing to refer to except the account which the individual can give of it himself. His capacity in that direction is often limited, in fact, is almost always very much limited; for it is only the great dramatist, poet, orator, composer, or scientist who can with any degree of adequacy express or define his feelings. And it is just these who are most ready to confess their inability to do so. Besides, the individual may have reason to conceal or suppress his feelings even if he could express them.

So it comes to pass that infinite and varied as are the feelings, they do not compare in point of definition and classification with the object felt. Yet, since the feelings are never anything by themselves, but always correspondent to the objects known, their classification must in some degree at least, be possible. And as they are always our æsthetic responses to the objects known, their classification must follow the classification of knowledge. Now our knowledge, in its broad outlines, may be classified on the basis of its *validity*, and of

its *nature*. That is, what we know, or claim to know, may be true or false, valid or invalid; and, so far as its nature is concerned, it may stand for an *object of sense*, an intelligible *logical thought*, or an *intuition of reason*.

Knowledge and Opinion: Real and Unreal Knowledge.

We can not content ourselves by simply saying that knowledge stands for all we know of the object; what we claim to know of the object often proves to be either very defective or false, or both, in the light of subsequent intellectual acquirement. More strictly, then, we must define knowledge as that state of the theoretical reason which exactly corresponds to the object, or it is the truth of things as they really are, and not as, for the moment, we suppose or think they are. In other words, we must always raise the question as to whether our knowledge is real or unreal.

Knowledge therefore, taken in its proper sense, is not necessarily what *we* know, but is that subjective, theoretical state of the mind which exactly corresponds to the objective truth. All else that we hold as knowledge is mere conjecture, opinion, belief, fancy. Socrates, and Plato after him, made a valid distinction in our knowing, between knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*, what is really known) and opinion (*δόξα*, what seems): and we can not differ from either of them in regarding genuine knowledge as the one thing needful.

Our coldness toward opinion or belief is not due to its being all false, for it may contain much truth. It is its uncertain, mixed character that makes us suspicious. What vitiates, or ought to vitiate it, for our acceptance is that it contains error, and error is not only worthless, because it is a defect and illusion of knowledge, but is also, for that very reason, misleading, baneful and destructive. We can not, it is true, suspend our judgment until we come to know the truth, but we can harbor suspicion against possible error in our thought, and never be satisfied until our knowing ceases to be mere opinion or belief and becomes knowledge of the objective truth. This spirit has given value to modern science, when not carried to the point of an unwarranted agnosticism which dogmatically denies what may be known.

For the sake of clearness, we must distinguish between ignorance and error. Ignorance is the simple absence of all knowledge; error is the defect or falsity of knowledge. In the one case, we know

nothing whatever of the object; in the other, we know something of the object but know it erroneously. Thus the Hottentot knows the sun, moon and stars, and has some sort of astronomical knowledge though it is exceedingly crude, fragmentary, and erroneous. But he has absolutely no knowledge at all of the Copernican theory and can form no opinion or belief about it whatever, right or wrong. In like manner, we can say that the animal is absolutely ignorant of the world of reason, while man knows the world of reason although for the most part, his opinions and beliefs about it may be filled with error. The failure to recognize this distinction is the error of dogmatic agnosticism, for it asserts our absolute ignorance about the spiritual world, instead of admitting the possibility of truth in our opinions and beliefs concerning it.

But if we may regard error as something positive, when compared with ignorance, which is merely a blank nothing, so that, while we *correct* the one, we *enlighten* the other; error, when compared with the truth, is also a negative state, correspondent to nothing in objective reality. As a subjective condition of mind, it is a false interpretation of the object and is therefore pure illusion, but gains the appearance of truth, because, taking it to be true, we objectify, project, and superimpose it upon reality, as if it were real.

Since man can not, in general, be said to be absolutely ignorant for he always has some beliefs about himself, the world, and God the outstanding objects of his thought, his supreme theoretical concern is the opposition between truth and error, the one meaning objective reality, the other, subjective illusion. We are now prepared to understand the classification of the feelings, based on the validity of knowledge.

Pleasure and Pain, the Correlates of Truth and Error.

Running exactly parallel with the opposition between truth and error, in our knowing or theoretical reason, is, of necessity, the opposition between pleasure and pain, in our feelings or æsthetical reason. Pleasure is the æsthetical correlate of theoretical truth, and pain is the æsthetical correlate of theoretical error.

It is evident that the terms pleasure and pain are used here not in their narrow conventional sense, as applying to bodily feelings, but as broadly descriptive of the two antithetical and contradictory classes into which all feelings may be divided; pleasure, on the one

hand, covering such widely varied feelings as simple sensations of bodily welfare, physical and mental enjoyments, quiescent content, gaity, elation, rapture, ecstasy, and the calmer states of pure happiness; pain, on the other, including such diverse æsthetical conditions as discomfort, malaise, physical and mental sufferings, mild discontent, depression, melancholy, sorrow, grief, agony, and despair.

A more extended treatment of pleasure and pain as the correlates of truth and error will be found on a later page (Book V. *passim*). Our present concern is simply the classification based on the validity of knowledge. A common-place illustration may serve to make clearer the relation of pleasure to truth, and of pain to error.

The Mere Joy of Living.

Other things being equal, there is no pleasure, so far as it goes, more genuine and solid than that arising from sound health. There was much downright honesty and good sense in the reply of the pious old Englishwoman who, being asked, on her one hundred and third birthday, what she had most to be thankful for, said: "Because I have always enjoyed my vittles." As humble a blessing as it may be to the exalted saint, good health would solve many a problem of morals for the average man. He would not only be saved from much fear and worry, but would be more placable and easily entreated in his dealings with others. The value and delight of it has perhaps nowhere been so exquisitely set forth as in Mr. Browning's "Saul," where the gifted young shepherd lad, David, is represented as trying to beguile the mad king with his sweet songs, and where among other things he celebrates the "wild joy of living."

'Oh, our manhood's prime vigour! No spirit feels waste,
Not a muscle is stopped in its playing nor sinew unbraced.
Oh, the wild joy of living! the leaping from rock up to rock,
The strong rending of boughs from the fir-tree, the cool silver shock
Of the plunge in a pool's living water, the hunt of the bear,
And the sultriness showing the lion is couched in his lair.
And the meal, the rich dates yellowed over with gold dust divine,
And the locust-flesh steeped in the pitcher, the full draught of wine,
And the sleep in the dried river channel where bulrushes tell
That the water was wont to go warbling so softly and well.
How good is man's life, the mere living! how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses forever in joy!"

Here the purity, simplicity, and strength of a sound, harmonious bodily condition is portrayed. There are no perverted tastes to be satisfied, no sophisticated pleasures sought. It is man in his prime as a perfect, unspoiled, animal organism. In health the body is a symphony of pleasing sensations—the mere play of the muscles which gives a delightful sense of power, only increased by resistance; the deep breathing of pure life-giving air; the frugal meal, sauced by an unvitiated appetite; the draught of cool, refreshing water; the exquisite languor of relaxation and rest after happy toil; and the resilient joy, on waking, of renewal and abounding life. And what a gamut of pleasure is run, up and down this delicate, complex organism of the body, from the almost imperceptible, pervasive sense of well-being, through every variety of ascending change, to the passionate ecstasies of its great procreative powers!

We feel with our own American poet, Whitman, that there is something divine about a sound, healthy body. It is, indeed, as Paul said of it, a temple of the Holy Ghost, a dwelling place of God. Alas how man desecrates it with his sacrilegious vices!

Suddenly transform the life-long invalid into a well man, and it is a question whether he could survive the joy of it. To him it would be nothing less than a divine miracle and, like one born again, he would begin a new life of freedom and happiness, such as he never dreamed of before. He would feel himself transported to a better and a higher world. He would live in a new heaven and a new earth.

Health, a State of Truth.

Now if we ask ourselves whence arises all this pleasure, where lies the secret of this strength and joy, the answer is simple and unambiguous. It is all the natural and inevitable outcome of the objective fact that the body is true. In other words, the body, as a harmonious instrument, with all its parts finely adjusted, is in a state exactly accordant with the real, objective order of things. It is in tune with itself and its environment and, in consequence, can only give forth the symphonic strains of joy.

Disease, a State of Error.

But suppose, into this exquisite, intricate and complex organism, the most elaborate and perfect in the world, the subtle workmanship of æons of cosmic art, we strike discord. That moment the body is

false, it is in error, and pain appears. Then through all the long range of hateful cacophonies, defects, deformations, restless discomforts, massive aches, miseries, and agonies, disease ravens. The very word bears well its double meaning of a disturbed, discordant condition of the objective organism, and a painful, subjective state of feeling—*dis-ease*.

And what a pitiful picture the invalid presents! The drawn face, the unsteady step, the trembling hand, the infirm mind, with its fear of air, its fear of water, its fear of food, its fear of everything; and the whole condition condemning itself by its disgusting secretions and nauseating effluvia. The unreality and falseness of such a state we indicate by the negative terms we use to describe it. Of the man in an *ab-normal* physical condition we say, he is *de-formed*, *de-fective*, *in-valid*, *in-firm*, *in-sane*, *dis-eased*, all indicating the absence of the true condition, or a state that is unreal. However great he may be in his mentality or force of character, such a man himself feels that his disordered body is a drag upon him and is in a false condition, representing only an unreality, which he would give more than half his kingdom to change.

So far then as the body is concerned, pain, in all its forms, is the æsthetic correlate of error which is discord, abnormality, unsoundness, or absence of the true condition; while pleasure, in all its forms, is the æsthetic correlate of truth, which is reality, manifested in accord, normality, harmonious soundness, the true objective condition.

And this opposition in the feelings between pleasure and pain, as exactly correspondent to our knowledge of truth in the object or our holding error about the object, runs through our entire æsthetic life, as parallel with our theoretical life, from beginning to end. The body with its pleasure of health and its pain of disease is but an outer symbol of the whole spiritual man.

The reader is besought to reserve his objections about pleasure arising from error, and pain from truth, until we reach the discussion on the pedagogy of pain.

Feelings Correspond to the Nature of the Object Known.

If thus far we have been dividing the feelings into two opposing classes, based upon the validity of knowledge, that is, upon their relation to truth and error, or to reality and unreality, we are now

prepared to classify the feelings broadly with reference to the *nature* of the object known.

In discussing the development of the theoretical reason, we have seen that the self-conscious man's primitive knowledge, consisting of sense percepts with their corresponding concepts, is a free gift of nature, or of the reason in nature. Then, with this start, man begins, on his own account, a discursive, logical process—at first, naively and half-consciously, and then reflectively and consciously—of analyzing, classifying, and generalizing his concepts into something like scientific form. Finally, he grasps the whole, in a philosophical way, by means of rational intuition, as a harmonious, substantial-causal unity which constitutes for him the objective Truth or Reality. In the first stage, man has simply such knowledge as arises from sense. Kant termed this knowledge *æsthetik*, using the word, not with our modern but with the ancient Greek meaning. In the second stage, man has the knowledge which Kant attributed to the Understanding. This is our knowledge of sense reduced to abstract logical, scientific form. In the third stage, man has the knowledge of Reason, won through intuition. This knowledge Kant brought under the designation of *the ideals of the Pure Reason*. Unfortunately as we shall subsequently learn, Kant regarded man as incapable of *knowing* these ideals, as *objective truth*; he can only *believe* them.

Now, we ask ourselves: How is our knowledge of Sense, of the Understanding, and of Reason or—to name the function instead of the organ—our knowledge derived through the Perception of sense the Logic of the understanding, and the Intuition of reason, related to feeling? In broad outlines, we may indicate the æsthetical correlates of this threefold attitude of the theoretical reason to the object as *sensation*, *emotion*, and *happiness* or *blessedness*.

Sensation.

All our sense cognitions and percepts, singly and combined, carry with them various sensations. The sum total of our feelings, arising from physical contact with the world, that is, the sum total of our bodily sensations belong here. How varied and complex they are has been sufficiently indicated. Their classification can hardly be more definitely indicated than by referring each to the particular sense in which it arises. Owing to much confusion in the popular use of language, the reader is asked always to distinguish carefully

between the cognition and the sensation, in perception. The first is a matter of knowledge; the second, a matter of feeling. In actual experience, it is often almost impossible to distinguish between them, but we must nevertheless recognize that they are both always there. Thus when I see a flower, hear the song of a bird, or taste a fruit, it never occurs to me to keep apart the cognition and the sensation, because they are so indissolubly blended; but, at the same time, I must never forget that it is *cognition* which has given me some *knowledge* of the object, and *sensation* which has given me some *feeling* of value in the object.

Emotion.

When now our knowledge of the object rises from mere perceptions of sense to the logic of the understanding, that is, when we bring our individual perceptions into logical relations, have coherent ideas and thoughts, argue, infer, become scientific, the æsthetic correlates of all these more elaborate mental processes we call emotions. In so far as logic is a rationalizing of perception, or a making coherent of our sense knowledge, emotion is an intricate and complex elaboration of sensation. The interminable discussion, we sometimes hear, as to whether emotion should be regarded as mental or only physical, arises from a confused understanding of the whole process of knowledge. All perception, so far as we consciously perceive anything, is mental and the corresponding sensation is necessarily mental. And, in like manner, logic, which rationalizes perception, is mental and the corresponding emotion necessarily mental. So that the question between sensation and emotion is not that of the one being physical and the other mental, but that of arising, either from simple sense data, or from the elaborated, logicalized forms of such data. The same intelligent reason that responds to the object in forms of sense perception responds also to these in forms of concepts, ideas, thoughts, generalizations, which are the proper products of the logic of the understanding.

To these elaborate forms in the understanding, then, as their true æsthetic correlates, correspond the emotions. It is not strange, therefore, that to the numberless ideas and thoughts, arising out of the discursive logic of the understanding, there should answer numberless emotions, infinite in their variety, range, and interfused complexity. So much is this the case that we are often in doubt whether

at any moment our emotions—again and again confused by the inroad of mere sensation—are agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or painful, sweet or bitter.

On the other hand, we are often all too painfully conscious of being tossed helplessly here and there by a storm of furious emotions, like the shipwrecked mariner upon an angry sea, or perhaps bound and baffled by them as a prisoner in his dungeon chains. In such stress, we too often allow the emotions to absorb us, and too little regard the wisdom of Spinoza* who would direct us back to the wise, calm, and adequate ideas and thoughts of which they are the natural outcome. Make steady and clear the ideas and thoughts, and the emotions will take care of themselves, in accordance with the great, general law: Seek ye first the kingdom of Truth and its truthfulness, and all the values of feeling will be added thereunto. This is the Gospel of the æsthetic, as well as, of the theoretical reason.

Moods, Emotions Proper, and Passions.

While it is not within the present need to attempt a complete classification of the emotions—that may be found in a score of treatises on the subject—it may be pointed out that, in general, they fall into three grades, viz.: moods, emotions proper, and passions. By moods, we may understand such gentle feelings as contentment or melancholy, so pervasive and unobtrusive as to afford no clear account of their ideal source, that is, of the ideas out of which they arise.

By emotions proper, we may understand those feelings, such as fear, hope, joy, sorrow, which are the evident correlates of clearly recognized objective ideas and thoughts.

By passions, we may understand those feelings, such as anger, hatred, revenge, jealousy, frenzied grief and joy, and ecstasy, which the occasioning objects are indeed recognized, but in which the æsthetic storm is so turbulent as to carry away the patient as a passive victim, having in himself no longer rational control. We often hear it said that a man is beside himself with rage or grief. He knows very well the cause of his emotion, but it masters him, and he is not, as it should be, he it.

These three grades of emotion, moods, emotions proper, and passions, may be either agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or painful.

* See "Ethics," Part V, Prop's 1-4.

ful. As we have learned, it is evident that whether these emotions are right or wrong can not be determined by regarding the emotions in themselves, but by going back to the occasioning objective ideas and thoughts. The emotion is right if the idea is true, and wrong if the idea is false. And although in the confused rush of experience, men often take pleasure in error and find pain in truth, it will ultimately be found that pain is the inevitable correlate of error and pleasure the rational correlate of truth.

A simple illustration of the three stages of emotion may be found in the universal experience of man's love for woman. The normal young man feels a mild, instinctive sense of attraction to all women. He pays them, in general, a courteous deference. He loves them all, in a way; no particular one arouses his romantic fancy, and he may be said to be in a *mood* of love. But the time comes when his romantic fancy *is* aroused, and some fair maiden, more than all others, proves to be the center of his thoughts, and the shrine before which rises the incense and orisons of his gentleness and courtesy. He has now experienced the *emotion* of love. But he is yet, let us suppose, in rational control of himself. Emotion has invaded but reason holds sway. "Is this charmer" he coolly asks himself, "after all real, or only the outer semblance of what she seems to be." And subtle reason plies a thousand questions as to her intelligence, character, accomplishments, and dispositions. If reason is satisfied, then he can let his magic emotions go and build about her fairy palaces of unexampled splendor.

But, as is most often the case, the course of his "true" love does not run so smooth. He does not begin with a mood of love, or an emotion of love, but falls headlong into a very passion of love; and, as a mere passive victim, he is helplessly borne away upon a raging uncontrollable sea. Reason is no longer in charge, nor even tries to be in charge; it no longer stands at the wheel to do what it can to weather the storm. The passionate mariner has cast his rudder, has thrown overboard his compass, and rejoices in the roaring hurricane about him. Fortunately, the gods are usually favorable, and he at last, rides safely, under clear skies, into a calm and secure harbor.

He may, however, make shipwreck. And he does so because his passion blinds him to the truth, and weaves about him an illusory, fantastic dream of errors. His friends can give him no advice, and the voices of reason can not be heard above the storm.

Sooner or later, he wakes from his illusions and dreams, wove of passion, to the painful but wholesome truth; and then it is fortunate if his passion of love does not become a passion of hate. We can only hope that it will in time rather sink to a rational emotion and then to a gentle mood of love; or, better still, rise to its highest attainment in the happiness of love.

Thus, in response to our knowledge arising from sense perception and the logic of the understanding, our æsthetic nature experiences sensations and emotions of all variety, grades, and complexity. As the perception and the logic are true or false, so will the sensation and emotions be. Fortunately, however, as our logic may rise to intuition, so our emotion may rise to happiness.

Happiness.

When, in our theoretical development, intuition begins its work of bringing into unity our abstract logical thoughts, it reveals to us more and more the harmonious beauty of the objective Idea, or Reality, whereupon feeling passes beyond emotion into the region of happiness, which is the æsthetic correlate of the Truth.

The word happiness, which is employed to express this ultimate state of feeling, is somewhat unfortunate, because it has been so loosely and generally applied to all agreeable states of feeling, from the most trivial sensations of a healthy child to the most lofty and noble feelings of the soul. And, in a way, the usage is justified, in so far as it describes feelings that are related to objective truth. Thus, we may call the little child happy, in so far as its feelings are the result of its health and innocence; and we may call the lover happy, in so far as his emotions rest upon a perfectly worthy object. But more strictly we wish always to indicate by happiness that state of æsthetical felicity which only comes from a possession or contemplation of the ultimate Truth. It is the happiness of Plato, when he beholds the ideal world (to him the real world) in all its harmonious beauty, resting upon goodness. It is the happiness of the Vedantist who knows himself one with Brahman and his eternal joy. It is the happiness of a Paul, who describes it as the peace of God which passeth all understanding. We might also liken it to Gotama's Nirvana, so far as the mere feeling itself is concerned, but for Gotama there was no objective truth to give rise to happiness. His Nirvana was rather a simple cessation of, or release from, suffering.

Whereas with us, as already indicated, happiness must always stand for that supreme æsthetic state which is the correlate of knowing the objective Truth.

Unlike sensation and emotion, within happiness, there is no opposition of pleasure and pain, because it is pure pleasure itself; and that for the very good reason that it corresponds to Truth, in which there can be no error. Since we are liable, while in the regions of sense perception and logic, to be tossed between truth and error, we are consequently subject to the correlate æsthetic experiences of pleasure and pain. But when the intuition of reason gives us Truth, which is ultimate Reality, there is no error and consequently there is no pain, but happiness only.

With all due respect for the profundity of Professor Bradley, we can not admit, since feeling is always the subjective correlate of the object known, that pain can be an element of Reality any more than error can. If he insists that the theoretical reason necessarily excludes error from Reality which is the rational, coherent, harmonious, objective Truth, we must insist that its correlate in the æsthetical reason necessarily excludes pain (p. 488).

It has been deemed necessary to go thus at some length into the nature and kinds of feeling and its relation to knowing, in order better to understand its course of development in the rational life of man.

Remote Origin of the Æsthetic Reason.

Just as the sources of man's theoretical reason go far back along the line of evolution, so also is it with his æsthetical reason. The great inorganic world, as a whole, gives plain evidence of thought; why should we not also regard it as having the power to feel? But as to its individual parts, it is only when we come to living things that we find evident signs of feeling. The simplest cell, borne along by its instinctive typical idea to activities of self-preservation, self-propagation, and self-progression, apparently shows feeling in its contact with the environment by withdrawal, in seeming pain, from the unfavorable, or joyous advance toward the favorable. It would be hard to tell whether this should be called incipient knowing or feeling; perhaps it is both. It looks as if the great Cosmic Idea were coming to the beginnings of both knowing and feeling in individual forms. We have contented ourselves, however, by calling

this simple psychic state of things, in the plant world, sensitiveness. This most primitive psychic stage is carried over into the lower ranges of animal life. But, at some point in the evolution, doubtless where a nerve system begins to appear, there begins to be evidence of feeling, as we understand it, although it can not be said to indicate pleasure and pain, except in the dullest and vaguest way. When, however, the animal has come to a clear consciousness of objects, as we see in our domestic pets, the character of feeling becomes very plain.

It is due to our recognition of this æsthetic capacity in the higher animals that brings them within our moral field, and determines our attitude toward them. We have no right, we are convinced, to inflict needless pain upon any creature that can feel. If we were Cartesians and regarded animals as automata, we might with Malebranche ruthlessly give our pet dog a fatal kick, because, for the moment the poor creature troubled us with its affectionate fawnings. But knowing that they are not automata, animals gain certain rights to our consideration; and if we may not share the hypersensitive Cowper's reluctance to set foot upon a worm, we should "renounce" or at any rate, denounce a friend who should needlessly injure or ill-treat a dog or horse. It is a deep and growing sentiment of our age that to inflict pain upon any creature, except for some greater good is a sin; as, conversely, to secure the welfare of every creature, when not attended by the denial of some greater good, is a duty. The lesson of the Ancient Mariner, won by bitter experience, is ours gained by persuasion.

"He liveth best who loveth best
All things both great and small;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all."

The Values in Self-consciousness.

But it is only when, in the evolution of life, the self-conscious rational subject appears, that the vast significance of the æsthetic reason is fully seen. For it not only gives an infinite sense of worth to the self, and meaning to every percept, thought, and truth; but it is the source from which spring all those impulsive motives or volitions, toward both the intellectual and practical ideals.

That subjective ego, which comes to light in the theoretical reason

as the supreme center to which all knowledge is referred and by which it is harmonized, comes to have, by reason of its capacity to feel, a value in itself as infinite as the truth it conceives. And because of that sense of self-value, and in the light of it, every object, no matter how trivial, as well as every thought, however great, comes to have its meaning.

Art Rests upon Science.

The correlation of the perceived object, or the conceived thought, and the corresponding feeling is never lost. Hence it is that the development of the æsthetic reason, while a distinct process, never takes place as a thing by itself. It must follow the development of the theoretical reason.

Taste, for example, can not be cultivated just as taste *per se*. Its fine discriminations and estimates, its appreciation of subtle values, can only be gained by a refining perception and knowledge of the object. No mere knowledge of the object, however detailed or profound, can, it is true, create taste; for the capacity to feel, as has been said, is an original, underived datum of reason; but it is never separable from knowledge and can, therefore, be cultivated only by cultivating knowledge.

Given a natural liking for painting and music, how shall I cultivate my taste for these arts? First, by seeing all the canvases and hearing all the music which are regarded as the best in the world; then by learning everything possible about the work of the painter and composer, how it is done, all its technical means, and the great difficulties of its execution. But, more especially, if I can penetrate the artist's mind, get all the refined forms of thought, fancy, and emotion, the subtle intentions and meanings, and the great, leading motive that played in his consciousness as he dreamed and worked, I shall be in some fair way of refining my artistic judgments and appreciations.

The value of art criticism depends upon the balance of these two inseparable elements of knowing and feeling. One critic may impress us with his knowledge and thus reveal a developed intelligence; but he has so emphasized that element as to leave us cold to the real beauty of the work. Another may lay his emphasis more upon æsthetic appreciation, but fail to give us any clear understanding of the work. The critic, however, who alone lets us into the true

secret of the great artist not only instructs but also inspires us with what all true art necessarily contains, both thought and feeling.

Feeling Follows Knowledge and Volition Follows Feeling.

But now that the word art is mentioned, we are at once carried over, beyond mere knowing and feeling, to willing. Reason is not only theoretical and æsthetical, but also practical. Since the known object has value for us in terms of feeling, we act upon it, seize and make use of it for our good. That is, the feeling of value in things furnishes us with all our motives of volition, from which follows all those modifications on the surface of the earth which we call civilization. The sense of an ideal value in himself drives man, in reciprocal contact with nature and his fellows, toward self-realization manifested in all forms of culture which are meant to conserve his welfare. Every simple contrivance, every invention, every work of art, and all the means of education are results of willing, impelled by the values of feeling, and guided by the light of knowing.

The Primacy of the Will.

While we thus speak of knowing, feeling and willing, as if willing came last in order, it really shows itself first to our observation, in the whole scheme of development. The first thing we can be sure of in the living cell is action. We may *infer* that it knows, because it follows a definite, rational cycle and that it feels because it seems to show feeling, but we need not infer that it acts, for we see it act that is, *will* to do something. Indeed, the inorganic world reveals the power of volition on every hand. So that whatever else we may deny to the cosmos, we must recognize, at any rate, that it wills. We may doubt its intelligence and its capacity to feel, but we can not doubt its power to act, or its energy.

How fundamentally primary is this power to will is evident when we consider that mere *being* can not be known to *be*, unless it is more than being, that is, unless it *acts*, or *becomes*. The simplest object of our knowledge, as a pebble or withered leaf, could not be known to us unless it acted, or manifested itself to us, in its qualities. In gaining knowledge, the mind does not go out and seize these passive objects, for they give themselves up to be seized; it is an action and reaction between the known object and the knowing mind of the subject.

What that action of the object may be, we must ultimately conceive as some form of will, for will is the only power we know. Whether it be the rush of a comet, the falling of a stone, the waving of tree tops, or the emanations of color from a rose petal; at last analysis, the display of power, titanically irresistible, or gentle beyond the appreciation of our crude senses, can only be conceived in terms of will, because there are no other terms in which it can be conceived. Only, as we shall see in due time, will is not limited to the movement of ponderable bodies through space, during a lapse of time. We shall find that it is something more profound and inclusive than such superficial display of power. But if we say that the inorganic world reveals will, it does not necessarily mean that the world is conscious of willing. We must mean, however, that *something* moves and wills in and through it. Nor when the cell is said to will is it meant that it consciously wills, but only that *something* wills in and through it.

Will, a Self-conscious Volition to an End.

We must advance far, in the whole rising line of evolution, before we find anything like *conscious* will in the animal. And it is only at a certain stage in the life of the human child, when self-consciousness appears, that we can speak of will in its full sense. It is the power of carrying out a conscious purpose to some desired end for the self. And this stage can only be reached when knowing and feeling have been so far developed that an idea and its value can be formed as a goal of action. Thus the little child plays with its toys, not as the kitten or puppy, merely to let off the instinctive energies of future useful habits, but consciously to carry out plans, theoretically conceived and æsthetically evaluated, for some desired good. In like manner, the primitive man goes on the chase, invents his stone hatchet, his javelin, his bow; builds his wattled hut, and discovers and uses fire.

So that while will is the first datum of being, it is the last to come clearly into consciousness, and then into self-consciousness. It is, as it were, the will of the cosmos coming to individual, rational expression. Therefore, we may say, will is reason, will is the man. Man *is* what he wills. But this does not mean that will is some independent, isolated faculty or entity in him, by which he arbitrarily does anything or acts irrationally as he pleases. Such a will would have no rational meaning at all. But self-consciously knowing the

object and feeling its value for him, he wills to use it for his good. If he *is* what he wills, he also *wills* what he is, or what he self-consciously knows and feels.

Identity and Diversity.

Here again comes into view the inseparable unity of the theoretical, æsthetical, and practical reason, but at the same time its distinct trinal diversity. Will is not identical with knowing and feeling, but it is the distinct consciousness of self, *active in* knowing and feeling. In fact, without this power to will, it is a question whether we should be conscious of the self at all, for knowing and feeling would run along in the consciousness of the subject as something received but not responded to by the subject. It is the going out of the subject to meet the known and felt object, and to use it for the self, that constitutes the primal meaning of the will.

Development of Invention and Art.

At any rate, when the self-conscious man emerges from the process of living evolution and finds that his inherited instincts of self-preservation, self-propagation, and self-progression meet with pleasurable gratification, why should he not repeat that pleasure again? Moreover, since he can form concepts, why should he not in order to enhance the values of life, set up such ideals as he is capable of and pursue them? As good fortune would have it, nature proves plastic to his touch, and hence, he lays a universal demand on all things, to fill his wants, contribute to his welfare and meet his insatiable claims for happiness. Behind nature, he sees a power ever at work, a will, modifying and constructing; within him, too, is a power to work, a will, to modify and to construct. Why should he not imitate nature in his own interests, since the responsibility of his own fortune is forced upon him? So catching her secrets of operation, he not only meets the necessities of food, raiment and shelter, which refine with his growing tastes; but endeavors to express his expanding ideas and ideals in the symbolic forms of language, poetry, music, painting, sculpture and architecture.

Shall he not take the tree which has been his first shelter, as the support for a new and more commodious abode, which he shall construct for himself; and shall he not throw over it a dome such as he sees above his head? Shall he not adorn it with the rude or

refined carvings and colored portrayals of figures and events that have pleased him?

If he hears the song of the bird, the rustle of the leaves, the murmur of the brook, or the roar of the lion, the dread voice of the thunder, or the sublime monody of the sea, why shall he not make a music of his own, more coherent, significant, and expressive of his varying moods and emotions?

The language which at first communicates his simple needs or gives utterance to his primitive feelings, why should it not set forth his thoughts of truth, or rise to eloquence and poetry in giving expression to his hopes and fears, loves and hates, joys and sorrows, and to his infinite aspirations for perfection and happiness?

Thus, as the theoretical reason reads the thoughts of nature, her rational order, and harmonious unity of truth, in science and philosophy; and as the æsthetical reason estimates her infinitude of values, the practical reason seeks to imitate her creative power and beauty. In a way the great creative artist comes nearer to God than all other men; for, catching the secret of his workmanship in nature, he seeks to imitate him by becoming a creator himself. The æsthetical reason, then, evaluates not only what we know now, but also those ideals which the theoretical reason conceives; while the practical reason urges us on to the attainment of some beauteous harmony of life.

The Cosmic Idea within Drives Us On.

At the very beginning of vital evolution, we found not only the volitional instincts of self-preservation and self-propagation but of *self-progression* as well. The simplest living cell strains to do its best against all odds, and every plant and animal struggles toward its attainment. But most clearly, in the whole range of evolution, we see a steady, purposive, irresistible push onward toward some great end. And when this progressive cosmic will comes to self-consciousness in man, man discovers the truth of it, estimates, for himself, the value of it, and rationally pushes forward to his goal, thus determined, which is nothing less than the freedom of self-realization in the perfect welfare of a harmonious beauty.

If man would, as a theoretical reason, unfold the rational concept in consciousness, until it comes into intellectual unity with the Cosmic Idea, as the reality of objective Truth; so he, as an æsthetical

and practical reason, looks forward to the outcome of his development, in an æsthetico-practical reconciliation with Reality, as the Cosmic Beauty and Power. Thus to find himself at one with nature and the Thought and Will back of nature, is life; and man knows that life in its culmination is a supreme welfare in terms of happiness arising from that harmonious, objective beauty which art, in all its ideal forms, seeks to portray.

Nature, a Masterwork of Art.

The truth about nature, man surmises, is not that it is simply a great mechanism of power with its legal and mathematical exactitudes, but rather a sublime, cosmic poem, a glorious work of art, product of the Infinite Poet and Artificer, who is the one Supreme-Maker and Creator of all.

When, therefore, man seeks practically to apply his knowledge of the objects around him, and wills, according to the evaluations of the æsthetic reason, to construct a world of his own for his welfare and happiness, he is but imitating or reflecting that Infinite Thought and Eternal Will of the Cosmos, in which he lives and moves and has his being.

The Moral Question Enters.

But when man thus wills to use the value of the known object for his good, the necessary association with his fellow men, forces the ultimate question upon him as to whether he will claim that good for himself alone or share it with others. The entire burden of this question rests upon the ethical reason, the development of which must now be considered.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ETHICAL REASON.

WHILE man, by reason of his theoretical and æsthetico-practical nature, is able to understand the cosmos, feel and estimate its values, and use it for his welfare and enjoyment, and thus, through his long development, bring his life into harmonious reconciliation with objective Truth and Beauty, he has all the time been compelled to deal with another object, in his environment, of a wholly peculiar and unique character, viz.: his fellow-man. He may, and indeed often does, regard him merely as an object of scientific interest to be understood, or of convenience to be used for his æsthetic advantage.

Necessity and Advantage of Ethical Relations.

But he is compelled to assume an altogether different and higher relation toward him. For that fellow man makes precisely the same demands which he himself does upon nature and her uses. Him he must meet, whether as friend or foe, and come to some sort of composition with him. He can not escape the obligation, for he can not monopolize the objective values of life, which science and art have placed in his hands, to his own individual advantage, but must share them with others, whether he will or no. His will to use and enjoy the objects around him is met by another's will to use and enjoy the same things; and it is out of the clash of these wills that all the moral relations of life spring, and all of man's ethical development. In fact, he soon learns that it is only in conjunction with others that he can live at all. By cooperation with them alone, can he learn to know and use to his highest good the vast resources of nature that lie about him. It is in society that man's life is possible, and in the development of the social, moral relations lies the whole meaning of history. In reality, history is the ethical development of man on the earth, and this, as we shall see, involves and ultimately includes science and art, or the theoretical and æsthetico-practical interests.

The Germs of Ethics in Nature.

When primitive man begins his ethical development, nature has already provided him with the fundamental conditions for it. Just as from the beginning of vital evolution we have seen a gradual movement toward self-conscious, theoretical knowledge of the object, and the corresponding æsthetical evolution and purposive activity toward use and enjoyment of the object; so we find the elements of a moral development, slowly rising to a clearer and more evident expression.

To begin with, there is the clash of individual wills, in the egoistic struggle among plants and animals, arising out of the profound instinct of self-preservation; and, at the same time, there is as evidence the altruistic renunciation of life to give life to others, seen in the instinct of self-propagation. Then as if the instinct of self-progression recognized the necessity of cooperation, there is the formation of communities in the mutual interests of individuals for purposes of defence and aggression; out of which, finally, there appear those deeper affections for others which constitute the core of the moral nature.

When all these come to self-consciousness in man, there arises the sacred obligation of repeating the non-conscious moral process below him, and of carrying it forward to ideal fulfilment in the light of consciously intelligent will.

Three Phases of Volitional Instinct.

Before tracing the moral evolution of man, it will help us to consider for a moment certain phases of volition as such. We have before said that a man is what he wills and wills what he is; meaning thereby in still more general terms, that the will is being, acting or manifesting itself to be what it is; it is being, becoming. To state it in still another form, it is static substance showing itself to be dynamic cause.

When this being and becoming, or substance-cause, appears in the cosmic evolution, as distinct, individual, living forms, we find in each that that will manifests itself in those fundamental instincts, always present, of self-preservation, self-propagation and self-progression.

Self-preservation is that form of instinctive will that compels the individual to assert himself, or to live out the cycle of his typical idea to seize and use, therefore, the object for himself. In so far, the will is wholly egoistic.

Self-propagation, on the other hand, is that instinctive will which

compels the individual to go beyond himself to another and for another. He now can no longer seize and use all for himself alone; he also gives. He is not sufficient in himself, but must needs seek out and cooperate with another. The will thus becomes altruistic.

But this instinctive will of self-propagation, which seems but self-preservation seeking to extend itself, culminates in the still deeper volitional instinct of self-progression, by which the individual seeks to advance himself, through and by means of his relations to all others. Because of this social condition, the will, in the end, necessarily becomes universal. So that if the individual's primitive, fundamental, volitional egoism is viewed, in the larger light of his self-propagation and self-progression, as a complete self-realization; it will expand not only into an altruism, as a cooperation with others, but into a universalism, as an inclusion of all others with himself. The old selfishness or egoism has given way to altruism, which finally passes over into universalism. In other words, the moral will first centers about the self, then about others for the sake of the self, and finally includes all others in the self. The self has not disappeared but has evolved from an egoistic self-reference, through law, to love, as an ultimate expression of self-realization.

The attentive reader will at once have been struck by the fact that here in the ethical reason there are, as well as in the theoretical and æsthetical reason, three distinct stages of advance. Just as in his knowledge, man must pass from sense, through logic, to intuition, and in his feelings advance from sensation, through emotion, to happiness; so in his moral nature he must rise from self, through law, to love, if he would come to rational self-realization.

As we might expect, since knowing, feeling, and willing are so inseparably related, we shall find that the three stages of the moral will have varied and intimate connections with the three stages of knowing and feeling.

Relation of the Moral Will to Knowing.

The simplest term we can use for the volition of self-preservation is *appetite*, a seeking after something for the self. On the plane of sense, it is the primitive instinct for food and drink. Raised to the level of the discursive understanding, appetite is rationalized and takes on the most varied forms, which concerns not only food and drink, but all other objects of sense. Still restricted to food and

drink, it may be a reasonable demand for wholesome and dainty fare or become the gluttony of the gourmand or the pampered, sybaritic taste of the gourmet.

But carried beyond mere food and drink, this idealized appetite becomes a *desire* for all objects of sense, such as wealth, pleasure and power. Man's hunger for these things is, we may say, an egoistic self-assertion, growing out of the primitive, volitional instinct of self-preservation. The highest form this material appetite, as rationalized by logic, takes on is worldly ambition, in which man may still remain wholly egoistic. It can be relieved of this charge only when it is guided by some high moral purpose. In so far as these appetites are perverted we call them *lusts*, in so far as they are reasonable we call them *desires*.

But in its dealing with material objects, logic has raised appetite from a desire for sensible to a desire for intelligible things. In other words, the appetite of self-preservation becomes the *curiosity* or science, which is the animal's instinctive curiosity to know things for its welfare, transformed into a rational, self-conscious desire for knowledge. Knowledge is the food for which the scientist hungers, and without which he, as a scientist, can not live. Although this desire for knowledge is, in itself, wholly egoistic, it necessarily tends to become altruistic, because knowledge is always general in its reference.

When, finally, rational intuition affords man a glimpse of the all-inclusive truth, then the appetite for knowledge, in the theoretical reason, becomes an insatiable longing for the Ideal Truth, and will not be stilled until the truth is known. This longing for the truth which is the theoretical reason's instinct of self-preservation, or its reaching after self-realization, is not in itself altruism or universalism for it is primarily a self-regarding interest, but it has ceased to be egoism, and thus opens the way for altruism and universalism when the moral will rises to its higher stages.

See the Origin of Affection.

When self-preservation gives place to self-propagation in the rising order of evolution, there is introduced a new and tremendous possibility, which is nothing less than regard for another than the self—the beginning of the true moral life. This instinctive volition, involving another, we call *affection*, that is, a *doing toward* another. The

word affection is sometimes used to represent both malevolent and benevolent will. But the malevolent attitude toward others is to be taken as growing out of an intense, exclusive affection for the self, rather than out of a direct, positive malevolence toward them. When affection is rendered possible, with the appearance of sex in the evolutionary plan, it takes on a lower and a higher phase, according as it develops out of the instinct of self-propagation or that of self-progression. In the first case, it becomes a doing good to another for the sake of the self; in the second, it rises to a doing good to another for his sake. Balzac has given us in his "Eugenie Grandet," a perfect illustration of these two phases of affection, when the father, in all his words and actions, plainly says to his daughter: "I love you for *my* sake;" while the mother, in all her words and actions, as plainly says: "I love you for *your* sake."

The Affection of Altruism: Law.

Taken upon the plane of sense, the self-propagative instinct is purely a sex-impulse; and, in so far as it is simply an impulse to individual gratification, it is a mere egoistic appetite, and is to be classed as *concupiscence* or *lust*. Among the vulgar, this sex-appetite is too often confused with love.

But in its essential nature, it is a reproduction of the self in others, with whom, therefore, some moral relations must be established. The relation, at first, is one of struggle in which the affection toward others may be called malevolent, because the effort is wholly in the interest of the self.

Brought to the level of the discursive understanding, however, it loses its malevolent character, though it can not be said to be, as yet, benevolent (*bene-volens*, willing good to others). It ceases to be egoistic and becomes altruistic, only in the sense of willing good to *others* for the sake of the *self*. This is the stage *père Grandet* had reached. It first reveals itself in the family and tribe, and comes to formal expression in various customs, moral codes, and tribal laws. It is the ethical stage of utility, calculation, and opportunism. Its spirit is bodied forth in such maxims as: "Honesty is the best policy" or: "It pays to be good."

Finally, when the discursive understanding gives way to the intuition of truth, this altruistic affection for the sake of the self becomes a general law of justice, by which self-interests are wholly protected,

in protecting the interests of others. Here the "categorical imperative" becomes the principle of the moral will, and man does good to others, not because it is a privilege or because he loves to, but because it is a duty, and he has to. The stern command, Ought, *must* be obeyed. Although this is a very desirable and high moral attainment, it yet falls far short of the goal set before the ethical reason for its self-realization.

The Affection of Universalism: Love.

For this noble end, we must turn to that higher phase of affection to which we have referred, as being a going-out toward another, for his sake. Here, too, we begin on the plane of sense, in the simple affection of the sex-impulse, which, in its fundamental character, is necessarily an outgoing, an impartation of the self to another. However humble the level of its primitive manifestation may be, it is nevertheless the inchoate beginnings of that supreme law of universal goodness.

Rising to the plane of the discursive understanding, this affection is, at first, more discriminating and then becomes more inclusive revealing many degrees of development. However much it may be vitiated by the instinctive impulses of sense, it must, as rational, be clearly distinguished therefrom, as above sense and on its way to a higher goal.

For reasons, known to itself, it responds, first, to the claims of some particular object, and then includes in its benevolent outgoings offspring, and members of the family and tribe. Here belong all tribal fealties, not compelled but struck out of a willing heart, all brotherhoods, all patriotisms, all friendships; in fine, all associations or groups of men, bound together by a sincere and unselfish affection.

But when reason rises above its logical stage of evolution to the intuition of universal truth, all tribalisms give way to humanity, and in every man is seen a friend and brother. Self-progression, going beyond self-propagation, comes to be seen as a self-realization which can alone be attained when the simple affection, originating in the family, is raised into a universal, outstreaming will of good that enfolds all other selves within the self. The ethical reason, as an attitude of will toward others, has thus, with the culmination of the theoretical reason, itself culminated in the all-inclusive, universal will of goodness.

Relation of the Moral Will to Feeling.

We have said that the moral will, in all its stages from egoistic selfishness, through altruistic law and justice, to universal love, has also an intimate connection with feeling.

So long as the will remains purely egoistic, the feeling correlate to the volition is identical with the feeling, correlate to the known object. Thus the pleasures of appetite and desire are the sensations arising out of the immediate possession of material things. So, likewise, the enjoyments of scientific curiosity and philosophical longing for truth are accompanied by an emotion or a happiness, arising out of the actual or anticipated possession of the things of the mind.

But when we come to affection, either as the narrower altruistic, or the broader universal, moral will, the correlate feelings belong to the exercise of the will itself, and does not arise from the mere enjoyment of the object toward which the will is directed.

So long as I love a friend simply because he pleases *me*, my moral will remains egoistic and the pleasure lasts as long as I possess him. It is only the pleasure I take in a work of art. When, however, I love my fellow men, although they are despicable and unworthy—when they do not benefit or please but injure or displease me—my moral will becomes altruistic or universal. I either do them right on a principle of justice and glow with an emotion of deep satisfaction, because I have altruistically done my *duty* toward them; or I will them good from the center of my heart, and consequently feel the profound happiness of a pure, outstreaming, all-inclusive love.

It is this universal love for others, with its correlate happiness, that peculiarly expresses the nature of the pure moral will. It is the ethical reason declaring itself to be what it is, an all-inclusive will of good, upon which is set the approving seal of an unalloyed sense of blessedness.

The Anger of Love.

But it would be a grave error, based on a confusion of thought, if we supposed that the universal love for all meant the *approval* of all. As we have distinguished between the knowledge of an object and the correlate feeling of value in the object, so we must carefully distinguish between volition and its correlate feeling. Inseparable they always are, but not indistinguishable.

Thus, while appetite, desire, or affection, altruistic or universal,

is in itself an impulsive volition, it is not the sensation or emotion of happiness that accompany it. Indissoluble as the union of volition and feeling may be, the real distinction is there.

Hence, while we can speak of love, on the æsthetic side among the *feelings*, as a sensation, an emotion, or a happiness; we must recognize its primary character as *ethical*, and speak of it as an outgoing will toward others—on the plane of sense, a mere sex-impulse, on the plane of the discursive understanding, a just discharge of duty, and on the plane of rational intuition, a universal will of good, when love attains its ultimate, volitional meaning and its consequent æsthetic meaning, in a serene, undisturbed happiness.

So that, good-will to all does not necessarily mean the approval, admiration, or enjoyment of all; much less, that indiscriminating amiability with which it is so often confused. It may mean the very contrary. Good-will to others may demand disapproval and unflinching condemnation. The love of God is a consuming fire of wrath against sin. Love can make no compromises, it can not grow weary or turn back, because it is the ultimate law of the Creative Will, and the ultimate ground of existence. And it is only when the moral reason wills that Will, that it really wills the good of all.

Gotama's Scientific Discovery.

That the æsthetic reason, in its highest expression of felicity, stamp its approval upon the ethical reason, in its noblest manifestation as an outstreaming will of good, was the great scientific discovery of Gotama, the illustrious founder of Buddhism.

Gotama was not interested in the laws of phenomenal nature because to him nature was but so much illusion. Recognizing that all life is suffering and the desire of life, therefore, the root of suffering, he would know the scientific principle that leads to release and happiness. He found it in a universal, all-inclusive love for things both great and small. He sat himself down and sent out his love, compassion and pity to the first quarter of the universe, then to the second and third and fourth quarters of the universe, until the whole was penetrated and filled, above, below, around, with his all-enfolding love. And behold! that was release from suffering, that was peace, blessedness, Nirvana. And this discovery was all the more valuable because it eliminated every other consideration but the pure moral will, and showed that that pure moral will, as an outstreaming

ing love to all, brings supreme happiness. It is, in fact, a profound scientific demonstration of the doctrine of Jesus who taught the same universal love, though from a different motive, but who never gave scientific explanations.*

Jesus and Gotama.

Gotama made use of his discovery as a means to an æsthetic end, viz.: release from suffering and the attainment of Nirvana or perfect happiness. Jesus on the other hand, saw in the universal will of good a supreme end in itself, because it is the fundamental law of Reality. Entrance into life for him, as for Gotama, meant complete happiness, but that happiness for Jesus was the æsthetic correlate of perfect volitional accord with the Absolute Will of Divine Love. This higher attitude of Jesus was due to the fact that he based his teachings upon objective Reality, and not upon a motive of escape from suffering. To Gotama, God, man, and the world are illusions. To Jesus, God is the Supreme Reality, and therefore man and the world are real. And this is the conviction of Jesus because as a Hebrew, unlike the Aryan Gotama, with his intellectual or æsthetical interests, his genius is predominantly ethical. He therefore understands the real meaning of the moral will, which is not a means to an end but an outstreaming of good toward another, really existent. The moral will must have an object or cease to be, as moral will. For this reason, to Jesus, God, man, and the world are real objects of the will. God manifests, *through* the world, toward man his outstreaming will of good; man, therefore, must manifest *in* the world an outstreaming will of good toward God and his fellow men, or love God supremely and his neighbor as himself, as revealed in all his objective activities.

Hence, Jesus says in effect to his disciples: If you love your friends who love, that is, benefit you, what reward have you? Anybody can do that, you are still egoistic, you only æsthetically appreciate the value of a known object. But if you love your enemies, those that hate and despitely use you, you will thus become your true selves, rise to the dignity and worthiness of your own inner moral nature, and so become the children of God, the supreme Father of Love whose rain falls on the evil and the good, and whose sunshine gladdens the just and unjust. It can not, however, be supposed, for a moment,

* See note at end of chapter.

that Jesus would teach indifference to the evil and the good; that the despicable, unworthy, false man is as good as the admirable, worthy and true man; that the one is to receive the same theoretical evaluation as the other. For he drew the sharpest and clearest distinction in life and teaching, between them. His theoretical understanding of character was the nicest and most discriminating. His evident meaning is that the divine, universal will of good, as the true expression of the moral reason, is the one dynamic force that can alone ultimately transform and save the sinful. So that in our human relations, the way to treat an enemy is not to hate him, for that only makes him more of an enemy. Love him rather and he becomes a friend; and your reward will be not only the happiness of the benevolent will, but the joy of a new object of regard, who has become admirable and worthy.

Well then, running along with the development of the ethical reason from its incipency in mere instinctive impulses of sense, through the multiform choices of the understanding, to the all-inclusive will of intuition, we have the correlate feelings of sensation, emotion, and happiness which is the felicity arising out of the universal will of good.

Ethics Comprehends Science and Art.

Since will is the man, it becomes evident that the universal will of good, which as the activity of the ethical reason constitutes ethics necessarily includes the theoretical and æsthetico-practical reason. For if I am rationally to will the good of another at all (ethics), I must know the object (science), appreciate its values and master its use (art); because the will of good is not a mere abstract or formal volition but must be a concrete, practical sharing of the goods of life with others. Emphasize as I may my science and art, unless I can fancy myself alone in the universe, they must, in some way or other, be brought under the dominance of ethics—a necessity which lies in the indissoluble unity of the threefold reason.

The reader is asked to pardon this somewhat dry, abstract treatment of the moral will. The only apology is that it has been a preliminary necessity for the better understanding of ethical evolution as it concretely reveals itself in nature and history, an evolution which we may now attempt to outline.

To anticipate, the entire course of moral development may be forecast by saying that, as an instinct of self-preservation, the function of the will is that of saving the individual; as an instinct of self-prop

agation, its function is that of producing or saving the species or family; as an instinct of self-progression, its function is to produce and save the genus or race, that is, to bring the whole evolutionary process to self-realization. We begin with the egoism of self-preservation.

The Egoistic Struggle.

Beneath the seeming peace of nature, there is waged a fierce struggle for existence, which Mr. Darwin has so learnedly portrayed. Everywhere we turn, from the lowest to the highest forms of life, the battle rages between individual and individual for what the appetites and desires of each demand. So much are we impressed with this that, at times, we are overwhelmed by the poet's sense of a universal, unrelenting cruelty in nature, "red in tooth and claw." And, especially, are we oppressed when we turn to the history of man on the earth, which seems to show a never-ceasing record of warfare and bloodshed. Even in more advanced epochs, when peace reigns, there is everywhere this fierce, selfish struggle among men for what is regarded as the goods of life. Covetousness, or the "accursed greed of gold," makes man the natural enemy of man. The bitter competitions of industry, commerce, finance, only seem like another form of a brutal animalism. And sometimes with sorrowful reluctance, sometimes with a ready cynicism, we admit or declare that the evolutionary maxim: "the strongest survive, the weakest go to the wall" is a triumphant proclamation that might is right. But if we thus sometimes allow our sentiments to bewail, or our egoism to celebrate, this cruel struggle for existence in nature and history, we must also remember that it is not a comprehensive formula, as some seem to suppose, for the whole meaning of evolution.

Value of the Struggle.

The individual must exist and realize himself; and to do so he must struggle with his fellows. This not only develops intelligence, but makes possible future progress, and opens the way for moral development.

If we regard human history, we shall be led to believe that no lesson was more illuminating and beneficent to the primitive cave-man than the sharp blow he got on his thick skull from his fellow cave-man. He could appreciate nothing less refined or less heroic than that.

The first avenue of approach to his glimmering intelligence could only be by way of his integument. Such is the way, indeed, all living experience began, and it is still the pedagogical method nature has of awaking the child-man to intelligible ideas. Nor is the method restricted to the child-man; for most men have to learn their highest lessons through painful, external experiences, as their reason is not yet sufficiently developed to accept ideas on their rational merit.

At any rate, for the edification of our cave-man, a strange new light was driven into his dull brain by the blow of his antagonist. He learned, for the first time, that, in his egoistic claim upon the whole world for himself, there was another who also demanded a cave, a mate, or the captured prey; and hereafter, if he did not *willingly* respect the other's claims, he must *unwillingly* come to terms with his club. Thus the first law is enacted, administered, and executed, and man is forced to acknowledge the rights of others, as equal to the assertion of his own. "First force then reason" is the order of progress. Out of the storm and stress of injustice and wrong, justice is born into the world, the foundation stone of a universal order.

It takes little reflection to see that two are better than one, and three better than two, in opposing the common enemies that range through the forest, or in securing the simple needs of life. Thus, in time, the natural groups of family and tribe are formed into leagues and nations with common interests and aims, to express and guarantee which customs, moral codes, laws, and the state arise, based on justice to all as the highest form of moral consciousness.

A Stage beyond Justice.

But, to suppose that justice is the highest form of the moral consciousness, would be the gravest of errors; for it leaves out the deepest and, what constitutes, the peculiarly characteristic element in ethical development. Mere justice, as such, secures at best but a state of balanced selfishness, in which the individual is compelled to grant the rights of others. But true ethics demands that he *freely will* the rights of others, and so become as desirous of granting those rights as he is of securing his own. The highest law of human society is not the strict righteousness of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," but the law of goodness: "Love thy neighbor as thyself." So that as the self grows in value, the other will also rise in esteem.

Let those evolutionists who will, if they can, get out of the selfish

clash of individual wills, in the struggle for existence, the highest development of our moral nature; we shall be compelled to look for it in a far deeper note, struck in the cosmic order, at the very beginning of life; and we shall find it, not in the egoistic self-assertion, but in the altruistic self-renunciation of life. The struggle of egoistic interests, besides developing the individual, has its value in arousing that self-sacrifice which denies and overcomes selfishness.

Self-renunciation in Nature.

Just as deep and persistent, in the struggle for existence, as is the individual instinct of self-preservation, is also the instinct of self-propagation, a sort of sense of family preservation, manifesting itself through the individual. And in it lies all the promise and potency of both individual and racial progression.

As far back as we can go, we find the living cell, after first egoistically asserting itself along the line of its own growth, then, by an altruistic self-renunciation, dividing itself or budding, in order to give others life. Thus at the beginning of vital evolution, nature does not reveal merely a selfish struggle for individual existence, but an unselfish bestowal of living energy upon others. And we shall be convinced as we proceed that this giving up of self to others is the deepest secret of nature and the very source and ground-cause of evolution.

Little advance is made in the plant and animal worlds before that remarkable event we call sex occurs, when the solitary diremption of the individual gives place to a mutual duality. Indeed, if we look deep enough into the beginnings of life, we shall discover that the fission and gemmation of individual cells in time demand renewal from other energies of life. But with the clear definition of sex, far back in the scale of living existence, the genesis of new life now becomes possible only through cooperation. In this momentous fact, there is nothing less adumbrated than the whole structure of the grand social organism, based, as it is, on the family, growing into the tribe, expanding into the nation, and ultimately covering humanity, involving all rights and privileges, customs, laws, duties and obligations.

No longer sufficient in himself for the preservation of the species, the individual must depend upon another; and while this may seem to curtail his egoistic independence, it really enriches him with a new and wider living relation. He must now view life as an altruist, however

stubborn the primitive egoism in him may be. For, from now on, he *and another* are forever involved in the onward march of evolution. It is the reciprocal and interdependent relation in sex that makes ethical development toward its highest outcome possible. Laws and moral codes, arising out of the selfish struggle of individuals, are but the outer form of a true morality, the inner life of which they can not express. Only in the cooperative unity of the family, does the necessity of going beyond the self to another become a self-sacrificing service and a true affection which can then expand, with the unfolding of the moral nature, to a more general application.

As we can not suppose that in plants and the lowest animals, there is conscious knowing and feeling, neither can we regard the volitional instinct of self-propagation, in them, with its involved cooperation and protection, as conscious willing.

Unselfish Love among the Animals.

But when the principle rises, in the more advanced animals, to a point where they become conscious of their objects, we begin to see clearly the self-sacrifice and devotion of affection toward others. How faithful and patient the little robin with her brood! What could be finer than the self-forgetfulness and courage of the otherwise timid doe, when her fawn is in danger; or who would be fool enough to trifle with the whelp of the lioness?

Besides, cock robin, with all the fussiness and fluttering of his grave responsibility, hovers over to serve and protect his mate and her young; the buck, who is not always the bravest fellow in the world, does not hesitate to try consequences, when the safety of the mother doe and her offspring is in question, be the intruder who he may; and every path to the lion's lair is guarded securely enough from all marauders when the king of beasts stands awatch to protect the loved of his heart within. The patience, care, devotion, watchfulness, self-sacrifice, and quick courage in the face of danger, displayed among the animals, is often touching and beautiful. Nature is not full of a bitter, unrelenting, selfish struggle, but reveals the lavish outpouring of self for others.

When, in time, this instinctive altruism of the animal rises into the self-consciousness of man, who recognizes the values of life for himself, we are at the beginning of that toilsome human rational, ethical development which bears its ripest fruit in the home—highest

symbol in man's experience of God's heaven, a symbol from which Jesus drew his interpretation of God, and his ideal of the kingdom of Heaven on earth.

The Family Expands into the Nation.

But this clearly marked altruistic affection, which begins in the duality of sex, far down in the order of life, passes in time far out beyond the family, to which it is at first restricted. The volitional impulse of self-progression pushes the principle of mutual sacrifice and service beyond family and tribal limits of the species to include the wider interests of the genus or race. This expanding process, in the ethico-social consciousness, from the smaller to the larger groups, in which wider communal interests are secured, we see clearly anticipated among the animals.

What could be more admirable than those wonderful little nations of ants and bees, their division of labor, their just distribution of the products of toil, their industry, frugality, thrift, social law! And among the higher animals, while we do not find them as perfect in organization, based on an inerrant instinct, we do find a sort of half-free community, based on a seeming sense of fellowship, as in flocks of birds, packs of wolves, and herds of kine.

The Patriarchal Autocracy.

This whole process, as an ethical development in the proper sense, only begins with self-conscious man. Here the simple instinctive affection, existing between man and wife and between parents and children, expands over a larger range, as the family grows into the tribe; and takes the form of customs and moral precepts, applicable to all. The father of the chief family, who distinguishes himself by wisdom or valor, becomes the patriarchal head of the tribe. He is at once ruler and priest, leading against the common foe, or standing at the altar to invoke the blessing of the gods.

Then the tribes unite into a league, on the basis of a mutual liking, or of some common interest, which has most often arisen out of struggle. The inner expansion of these larger groups necessarily leads to migrations, war, conquest, and the subjugation or absorption of other peoples; whereupon the leagued tribes become a nation and the patriarchal chief becomes a king. But although such a king is regarded as the father of his people and is looked up to, adored, and

obeyed, as a sort of heavenly progenitor, there is, in one sense, a certain falling off in the ethical development, begun in the family; because that mutual affection, dominant therein, now no longer suffice to cover all moral relations, so that the social bond, ceasing to be an inner good-will, becomes the external compulsion of might and supreme force. The absolute will of the patriarchal ruler is the law to bind men together.

Nevertheless, while this sort of externalism has rendered the moral quality less intensive, it has, at the same time, made it more extensive, a fact which results in a great ethical advance. The combination of men in larger groups is, in itself, a movement toward an enlargement of the ethical life. Wider and more varied are the relations into which men are now forced; more complex and universal in their scope become the customs and laws; and there is the corresponding practical gain of safety and prosperity. We find such great nations, in antiquity, as those of Egypt, Assyria, Persia, ruling the world for centuries, on this patriarchal principle of absolute autocracy. In our own day, somewhat modified by modern conditions we have Russia, but more especially China, illustrating this form of human government.

The Sovereignty of Law and Justice.

Then, out of this order, there emerges a new and higher form of government. Men see, below the superficial stability and welfare of absolute rule, the great principles of justice, as the real forces that make human relations secure. It is the discovery, below the outer sensible form, of the inner, intelligible reason of things. In consequence, governments come to be based upon the authority of universal law. Now, no longer is the law the power of the king, but the power of the king is the law. Rome affords us the most splendid example of this stage of moral development in antiquity. And, at first, it would seem that here the moral life of man had reached its climax. For if, as we have claimed, the meaning of ethics is an out-streaming good-will, a giving up of self to others, we see in the Roman State, that men willingly, even joyously, gave themselves up to the service of the Republic. In fact, in antiquity generally, the individual merged his life completely in the state. To die for the country was a religion.

But while this was a noble acquirement of the moral consciousness,

revealing a larger reference than the self, in determining action, the principle had not yet worked itself out to its full rational expression. For, we must ask: What is the state? Is it made up of self-effaced individuals? Is it just a body of abstract laws of universal justice which have some sort of sanctity in themselves, to be maintained at all hazard? Such, indeed, seemed to be the profound conviction of classical antiquity; the individual nothing, the state all. It is evident that this view is one-sided, because it does not recognize the true relation between the individual and the state, a relation which, while it demands the entire devotion of the individual to the state, does so that the state may fully safeguard the interests of the individual.

Rome, as we have said, settled the great problem of a universal law of justice, applicable alike to all, that is, to all who could gain the privilege of citizenship; but she did not settle the problem of what the law was really for, viz.: the protection and development of the individual man, as man. As in Judaism, man was made for the Sabbath, so, in Roman Law, man was made for the State.

The New Principle of the Gospel for Human History.

That, on the contrary, the State—as well as the Sabbath—is made for man, was the great principle which Christianity brought into the decaying Roman World.

There certainly was no one who so clearly taught and so completely illustrated in his life, as Jesus, the absolute obligation of self-abnegation. “Die to your self” is a fundamental demand of his teachings. But it was “Die in order that you may live;” and nowhere else, as in the Gospel, is the infinite value of the self so clearly asserted. Vedantism, it is true, goes farther and asserts the self to be God. But, in so doing, it is constantly in danger of losing both the self and God, in the fathomless abyss of an abstract and undifferentiated Infinite. The self ceases to have any meaning as a moral entity in human society on the earth. But Jesus presented the concrete, objective self, as the son of the concrete, objective God. There could be no identity and no confusion, in consequence of which, the individual comes face to face with his moral obligation and destiny, as that of the highest self-realization.

It becomes clearly evident that this must be the center of a true moral development; for, if the self is abolished in the service of

others, what principle shall establish and protect the selves of others. If I renounce *my* self, I set up a principle that permits, or rather demands, that *other* selves also be renounced. But when all selves are thus renounced, where is a true society of moral persons, or a real state? We have over again the old Roman archocentric socialism.

It is just the peculiar greatness of Jesus that he introduced the dispensation of the Divine Son and, thus, gave to the individual the unique and undeniable value of a sacred moral personality, which instead of being suppressed and renounced, is to be asserted and maintained. To love the neighbor *as* the self, can have no meaning if the self is annihilated, but only when the rights and privileges of the neighbor expand with the expanding value of the self. Thus the Kingdom of God is the real order of a true human society, as a divine brotherhood, wherein the universal law of good-will prevails which, while it renounces the self for others, at the same time, brings out and secures the dignity and worth of the true self of every individual.

The Leaven at Work in Christian History.

This great idea, thrown into the Roman world of a universal law of justice, became the germ of, or a new point of departure for, the moral development of man. It became and still is, the fundamental principle of evolution in history. The development of society, from now on, began to center in man and not in the state. It ceased to be archocentric and became anthropocentric. This distinction must be firmly held in mind, in order to get the vast revolutionary significance of Christianity for history. A distinction rendered possible by the essential fact that man is raised above nature, where the individual's value is subordinated to the whole plan, to the supra-natural realm of rational self-consciousness, where the individual has value in and for himself, and subjects the whole to himself; or, in other words, resumes the whole cosmic order in himself.

When the Pagan Roman Empire became the Christian Roman Empire, in the Papacy, the fundamental meaning of its entire history lay in the struggle waged by the conception of man's individual sanctity, against the all-inclusive demands of a universal law, as such. The great mission of the church was to bring out in men the sense of their sacred, moral value, as individual children of God. Slaves became serfs, because they were men; serfs became freemen, and free-

men became citizens, because they were men. Although the Church finally became autocratic, with its supreme head in the person of the Pope, and with its descending hierarchical orders, it had, nevertheless, aroused the spirit of individualism; so that all through the Middle Ages, the feeling, though often vague and inarticulate, was growing that man—to adopt again the great saying of Jesus—was not made for the state or church, but that the state and church were made for man. When the guild or commune claimed its rights from king or baron or bishop, it was no longer guided by its sense of duty to either church or state, but inspired by a conviction, becoming more and more widely prevalent, of the dignity and worth of its individual members. Besides, there were many striking personalities, such as Frederick II and Dante, who openly protested against a centralization which invaded the sacred rights of the individual. But, more than all else, the Germanic peoples, who were slowly being imbued with the spirit of Christianity, had a native genius for personal liberty; and it was among them that the true meaning of individuality in the state was to find expression.

The Reformation Frees the Individual.

It was in the Reformation, an assertion of the Germanic genius, that this characteristic principle gained its first clear statement. Hence, this epoch may be truly regarded as the beginning of modern history. While the Middle Ages developed the consciousness of individuality, it was the Reformation that brought it to free expression.

Luther set aside all ecclesiastical authority, all traditional rites, all external commands and brought each individual soul face to face with his God. This was evidently the meaning of Jesus. By a parity of reasoning, it would become evident that man, in his relations with his fellows, must act not from the authority of divinely anointed—though very unjust—rulers, but from the authority of the truly divine, moral nature, seated upon the throne of his own conscience.

But it was really not until the close of the eighteenth century that this great principle came to anything like adequate embodiment, as a fundamental basis of human government.

The True State, a Government of Free People.

In the French and American Republics, government, it was declared, must be based on the consent of the governed, and must mean

liberty, equality, and fraternity for all; and, since men are born free and equal, they possess those inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, in accordance with which doctrine, the character of all laws must be determined.

The state organized on this basis, in its formal claims, at any rate approaches for the first time in history, the ideal of the Kingdom of God on earth, in which the sacred rights of every individual man, a man, is acknowledged and made the ground of all laws, which themselves express the moral life of the whole social body. The individual's obligation to the state is as absolute as of old, but the state now is based on the individual. The individual is no longer suppressed by the state, but realized *in* the state; and the state thus ceasing to be a mere mechanism of law, becomes a living organism of ethical principles in which every individual finds his place of service, and his own highest personal realization. St. Paul symbolized this noble conception for the church, in the body of Christ. For the state this symbol means a social condition in which the individual no longer stands over against the state, as a subject, but becomes an integral part of it, and thus one with it; or in which the state no longer dominates the individual, but expresses itself in and through him.

Nor is this principle of individual right restricted to the citizens in a state, but is slowly being applied to the nations. Since the days of Grotius, and with the developments of rapid communication, international law has become more definite and universal in its application. In spite of the natural and deep-seated national selfishness, which unfortunately obtains, the great nations unite variously in concerted action not only to protect themselves, but to support some fundamental principle of right which is meant to secure justice for all; and, indeed, their interests have come into such close contact, the world over, that no nation, however weak and insignificant or however strong and aggressive, can now be said to be without the bounds of a moral protection or control. Such protection and control by no means reaches the ideal, but it grows with a growing world-opinion, in favor of international justice and peace, and toward the solidarity of the race.

A Higher Aim than the Freedom of Democracy.

But, while this principle of universal justice among individual citizens of the nation and between individual nations of the world is

generally recognized, it by no means stands for the end of moral development in history. It is but a transitional stage in man's moral evolution that moves toward the supreme and ultimate goal. It is the acceptance, but not the fulfilment, of the Kingdom of God on earth. It has, indeed, risen above the primitive, external, patriarchal authority on the plane of sense, to the intelligible realm of the understanding where, by rational codes of law and civil constitutions, all are justly to fare alike; it has made the individual rather than the state the center of human government, and has transformed the last figment of sovereignty, in the divine authority of kings, into the divine authority of the sovereign people; but it has not yet worked out the germinant principle that lies implicit in it, because its fraternity, liberty, and equality are still effectuated by the external instruments of law and justice. Justice, as we have already seen, however desirable and necessary as a stage of progress, is, after all, only an equilibrium of selfish interests, and represents only an external form of moral development. It is that altruism that does good to others for the sake of the self. To bring moral development to its full outcome, already foreshadowed in the primitive affection of the family, it must be transformed into the deeper law of goodness within. And this transformation is rendered possible by reason of the freedom secured to the individual, through a universal justice. For it is now wholly within the individual that the transformation is to take place. The primitive affection of the family, as an outstreaming good-will to others, must be widened to include all men, and the self must thus find its realization, by enfolding within its interests, the interests of all other selves. The ethical consciousness can only thus reach its final goal, upon the plane of rational intuition, where it recognizes that the true nature of the moral will is universal love.

The Law of Justice and the Law of Love.

In his search for the ultimate ground of ethics, the great Kant, by reason of his pause upon the plane of the understanding, just failed to make clear the distinction between the law of justice and the law of love. His "categorical imperative," as an objective law of moral action, was universal enough: Let every act be such as to follow a rule, capable of universal application—but it missed the true intuitional motive of the will. It made the moral life a hard bond-service, the more meritorious, the harder it became; and remained external

to the real meaning of goodness. Schiller deeply felt and resented this impossible view of the moral nature.

Though, by the utmost care, I should reduce all my actions to universal rules, I might still remain morally dead. For true morality is not any specific set of actions, according to rules, but the simple, inner impulse of good-will. "Without love I am nothing," so far as my true moral life is concerned. The supreme moral question for me is always Shall I, as a scientist, knowing nature, and, as an artist appreciating and mastering her values, will to appropriate the goods of life for myself or, with an outstreaming will of good, share them with others?

The universal moral law then is not the "categorical imperative," or even the Golden Rule, of which it is an abstract statement, but that deeper and more inclusive law: "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Deeper and more inclusive, because, while in the former I look to the condition or act of another for my standard of duty; in the latter, I look simply to the universal obligation of good-will within my own heart. Such is the ultimate law of the ethical reason, for it is, to use St. Paul's fine expression, that love which "is the fulfilling of the law."

Its all-sufficient and final character becomes at once evident. For, in it, the balanced selfishness of an altruistic justice, the terminus both of the egoistic struggle for existence and of the restricted affection of the family, is transcended or, rather, taken up and transformed into the universal good-will of mutual service. Justice is not thereby condemned, for it is a great acquirement of the moral consciousness, and it were, indeed, a happy consummation if justice were really done the world over; but, nevertheless, at its best, it fails to attain to the ideal of the ethical reason. If I secure or defend my rights from or against others; or if I am constrained to yield their rights to others by some general law, justice may be secured and a most worthy end attained; but, evidently, the moral nature has not therein fully expressed itself. For it is only when justice enters my heart and becomes the law of the whole inner man, or, in other words, becomes identical with my will, which is myself; only when I really want others to have their rights as much as I want my own, that justice becomes love distributed, and the moral nature is finally realized.

Utilitarianism and Intuitionism.

In the light of this distinction between the attitude of justice and the attitude of the inner good-will, we see the insufficiency and the

inefficiency of that ethical doctrine that would base moral development simply upon the struggle for existence. At bottom, this is the doctrine of an empirical utilitarianism, which is the product of the discursive understanding, endeavoring to solve the problems of life from the outside, and is nothing else than a rationalized egoism. The result it aims at, viz.: the good of all, is identical, it is true, with the aim of intuitionism, or the inner will of good; but it misses entirely the very essence of the ethical reason, by making the self the primary point of reference, whereas the essential nature of the moral will is an outstreaming of good to others. The objective rationality of intuitionism is confirmed by the fact that it assimilates and transforms utilitarianism. While the universal egoistic struggle for existence has its necessary function in the development of the individual and of the altruistic moral attitude, that function is raised up by the will of good into the universal struggle of all for all. In this highest form, as represented in human society, it is, to use Lincoln's memorable words: A government of the people, for the people, and by the people. And when tribal and national barriers and prejudices are transcended, it becomes the Kingdom of God on earth, or the sovereignty of the Divine Son, which Jesus revealed and embodied. Such a consummation, devoutly to be wished, seems little likely of realization in this intensely selfish world; and yet, in the slow unfoldment of history, the deeper tendency of a universal goodness has been revealing itself.

Signs of Moral Progress in History.

We can not regard the status of the individual man and his rights in the Roman world, at the birth of Christ, and the status of the individual and his rights in the great modern Republics, without seeing that, in the evolution of the moral consciousness, there has been effected a veritable revolution. And we can find no other sufficient cause for that revolution than the presence of Jesus in history. That sympathy and service of good-will, at first restricted to the children of the family or tribe, Jesus raised into a principle of universal brotherhood and cast it as a dynamic leaven into history. And no one would deny that a certain feeling of common interest and fellowship is, as an accomplished fact, shown among the many and varied tribes that compose the modern nation, as never before, in the experience of mankind; nor that this good-will is more and more crossing the barriers of the nations, breaking down prejudice, creating mutual respect,

between them, and tending to bind them into the unity of one common purpose which pushes toward the solidarity of man, the oneness of humanity. The mere thought of the poet about "the parliament of nations and the federation of the world" is possible because its actual realization is not impossible. The hope is a guarantee of its own fulfilment.

Nor does it remain as an abstract thought or an ideal hope in the mind of the poet. It is taking on in the world a concrete, visible and growing form, inevitable and irresistible, because it is the expression of the ultimate intuition of the moral reason in terms of a universal good-will. What a century ago was but an iridescent dream, has now a concrete beginning in an international Peace Tribunal; and grave legislators are talking seriously of a possible World-Congress where laws for the government of the nations may be enacted.

But deeper and more significant still, and inter-penetrating all the advanced peoples of the earth, is a social unrest, based on a growing sense of injustice in the distribution of wealth which, although produced by the effort of the whole community, gets to be congested under our present economic system, into uselessly great and anti-social fortunes, in the hands of the few.

The French have a saying that, in the Revolution, the Third Estate won its rights, but now the Fourth Estate demands *its* rights. That is to say, while political freedom has been attained, the Proletariat, the Laborers of the World, are still in economic bondage; and their economic bondage means economic confusion and injustice for all. It is either the oppressed or oppressor, and both stand for the irrational distribution of those material values which all, in cooperation, have produced, and upon which all in common depend. In the fierce competitive struggle of life, in which there is an egoistic attempt, generally successful, to juggle with justice, one has too much and another too little; and the moral absurdity of the social state becomes clear to the point of demonstration. Nature is the common gift of God to man. Science reveals her secrets, and art gives us mastery over her inexhaustible resources. Is the old superstition of an unrestrained and irrational, because selfish, competition to repeat the wrongs of the past, by piling into the lap of the few fortunate or strong a needless plenitude, while feeding the many unfortunate or weak upon the wants of penury? The moral reason enters a denial and demands in the place of individualistic competition, the socialistic mutualit

of cooperation. It can no longer be man *against* man, but man *with* man, the world over. All the tendencies of the present age, political, financial, and industrial are rationally and irresistibly toward combination; and that combination can not reach its ultimate term until it ceases to be a combination of the *few* against *all*, and becomes a combination of *all* with *all*. These tendencies are the outcome of no concerted human effort, but of the World-Spirit that guides history; and their meaning lies in no known remedy, but in the fact that a remedy is felt to be needed.

This great world-movement, the largest and most significant of our era, has, on its economic side, regarded as the basis of man's material life, taken on the general form of socialism, to be understood not in the sense of any particular theoretical programme, but as that broad, progressive tendency which, transcending all national barriers and expressing itself among all advanced races, moves steadily toward the kingdom of universal good-will, when man renders mutual service to man throughout the earth.

History Reveals the Realization of the Impossible.

If experience is the lamp by which our feet are to be guided, then perhaps we may find in history, the experience of the race, lessons on the realization of such impossibilities.

The assurance of that Supreme Idealist to his humble disciples: "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world," and the prayer he taught them to offer to the Eternal Father: "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven," have not altogether remained in the realm of unrealized dreams, but show some palpable evidence of realization. The great changes which he has effected in the world, are best seen in the changed attitude of men's minds toward him, which history has brought about.

Before the power of the Imperial legions, amid the splendors of Imperial glory, and in comparison with the irresistible sway of Imperial law, nothing could be more painfully weak and insignificant than his gentleness, humility, and love; and yet, today, his name has a magic and potency in the hearts of men such as no Cæsar, upon his gold and ivory throne of world-power, ever dreamed of. The very oaths of the gamin and gamblers on the street are an unintended deference to his greatness.

There has been more personal effort and self-sacrifice, more gifts

of learning and splendid fruits of art lavishly poured out in the service of the carpenter's son of Nazareth than for any individual that ever lived. Even in worldly wealth, he whose material wants, for thirty years, could be covered by a thousand American dollars, has amassed more treasure in the shrines, devoted to his service, than have the mightiest kings. And yet it was done with the ease of an unobtrusive simplicity, like the coming dawn, or the falling of the dew. He made no noise, he did not cry aloud or lift up his voice in the street, he made no strained efforts; he just went about, for a few months, with his gracious tidings of good-will and joy, and then bravely met ignominy and death, not only because he would not desert the truth, but because he would die for his fellow men. And now the saying of the Apostle is being fulfilled: "God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame them that are wise; and God chose the weak things of the world, that he might put to shame the things that are strong; and the base things of the world, and the things that are despised, did God choose, yea and the things that are not, that he might bring to naught the things that are" (I Cor. i, 27-28). As if in confirmation of Jesus' own words: "For the meek shall inherit the earth" (Matt. v, 5).

And what is this magic and potency which Jesus has wielded, and still wields, over the lives of men? In a word, the answer is: he embodied Truth and Goodness. The Fourth Evangelist, imbued with the Hebrew and Hellenic spirit, the two supreme forces of his age, understood the mystery when he said: "He was full of grace and truth" (John i, 14)—grace (*χάρις*, that exquisite Greek word!) meaning the Beauty of an outstreaming Goodness, as the ultimate Truth of God. And it is the irresistible power of the beauty of an outstreaming goodness, with which the life and teachings of Jesus are filling the world. Before it, legions and laws, however potent to the purblind vision of selfish men, must go down, for it is the secret of the moral will, the heart of man; it is the cosmic secret of the Eternal Will, the heart of God.

Man's Greatness and Meanness.

There is something strangely great about man, and something as strangely petty and small. He is indeed greater than he is, and has possibilities in him which his actual meanness seems to belie.

On the one hand, we see a great forward march of events which

somehow is the product of the clearest thought and the noblest motive of the best men; while, on the other hand, there are great masses of individuals who retain their narrow egoisms, deep tribal prejudices, and irrational animosities, opposed to all advance. Yet, in spite of their petty mistakes, mean perversities, and absorption in sordid, selfish interests, the grand world-movement sweeps on, above their heads, to a consummation which they have not furthered, but the benefits of which, nevertheless, they will share. Thus there is a Divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them as we will.

We find then, in general, that the concrete, historical development of man reveals the same striking parallelism between it and the theoretical and æsthetical development which our abstract treatment premised. Just as reason, in its capacity to know, unfolds from sense to logic and from logic to intuition; and, in its capacity to feel, refines from sensation to emotion and from emotion to happiness; so, in its power to will, it evolves from the egoism of self to the altruism of law and from the altruism of law to the universalism of love.

The Individual Man Repeats the Historic Order.

As we have seen how this holds good in the history of the race, so we shall find that it holds good in the history of the normal individual; for, it is in the individual that the history of the race is reflected. He begins with the thoughtless selfishness of childhood and youth. As a mature man, he enters upon those severe struggles in life, which develop in him the sense of law and justice. With age, the struggle is past, and, in the mellowness of his wide experience, he has learned to look with kindlier eye upon his fellows. He passes a milder sentence upon them; to know all, he feels, would be to forgive all; and over their foibles, weaknesses, and sins he is inclined to cast the mantel of a deep compassion and a broad charity. That is, he has at last come to regard his fellow men, no longer as contestants in the bitter struggle for rights and privileges, but as brothers, from the standpoint of an all-inclusive love.

The Cosmic Will of Goodness, the Ground of Progress.

But, now, whatever part man may have in the moral progress of the world, the ethical development, in general, is not an invention or creation of his own, for it lies deep in the cosmic order itself.

It is *implied* in the mere inter-action of inorganic things, by which all

are brought into a harmonious unity and maintained therein by immutable, rational laws. It has come to unmistakable expression, in the development of life, when the duality of sex makes affection possible. At last, when man is thrust out into self-conscious, moral responsibility, it leads him from a selfish struggle with his fellow men, and pushes him forward through a rational adjustment of law and justice to the reconciliation and peace of a universal brotherhood, based on the law of goodness.

But since self-consciousness has raised him above nature into the realm of reason, his final reconciliation must be with the ultimate Reason back of nature. So that, just as in his theoretical development, he must come to know the cosmic Thought; and in his æsthetic and practical development, he must come to evaluate and imitate the cosmic Beauty and Power; he can not regard the development of his ethical reason complete, until he has come to a reconciliation with the cosmic Will of Goodness.

Summation and Outlook.

We have thus traced in outline the development of the world-order. Beginning as the evolution of an inorganic, non-vital, mechanico-chemical system, it passes over into the assertion of individual, organic, vital forms, with the instincts of self-preservation, self-propagation, and self-progression; first, as sensitive, non-conscious plants; then, as sensitive, conscious animals, endowed with the psychic powers of knowing, feeling, and willing. Above these, as supra-natural, emerges self-conscious, rational man, who includes and sums up in himself all the processes, instincts, and psychic powers below him; and who, recognizing his subjective self-worth over against the world as his object, begins his free, rational development. Roused, by the unfolding purpose of the Divine Intent, from the peace and happiness of the cosmic dream, he goes forth into a struggle with nature and with his fellow men, only to return if possible, to the harmony which he has lost. And in this return, he sets up as the goal of his endeavor the freedom of self-realization, which takes the threefold form of a reconciliation of his theoretical reason with the Truth of the Cosmic Intelligence (Science and Philosophy); of his æsthetico-practical reason with the Beauty of the creative Cosmic Power and Life (Invention and Art); and of his ethical reason with the Cosmic Will of Goodness (Ethics and Religion).

We may call the attainment of this freedom of self-realization, redemption or salvation or atonement or reconciliation, as we choose; in the end, it is the ultimate outcome of those deep cosmic instincts of self-preservation, self-propagation, and self-progression which run through and guide the entire rational, self-conscious, as well as sub-conscious and unconscious, evolution of man, who can find the ideal of his thought, feeling, and will, alone, in coming to know, enjoy, and love God.


It now devolves upon us, in the following pages, to show, first, the unity of man's threefold reason, as a self-conscious subject; and, secondly, the threefold interpretation which this subjective reason puts upon the objective cosmos, spread out before it.

NOTE:—On Buddhism, the reader can do no better than to consult "Sacred Books of the East," Vol. X, containing the "Dhammapada," translated by Max Mueller; and the "Sutta-Nipata," translated by V. Fausboell: and Vol. XI, containing various great Suttas, translated by T. W. Rhys Davids. Also see "The Sacred Books of the Buddhists," 2 vol's, edited by Mueller and translated by J. B. Speyer and Rhys Davids. As expository, "Buddhism, Its History and Literature" by Rhys Davids; and "Buddhism" by H. Oldenberg are highly commendable.



BOOK III.

THE THREEFOLD UNITY OF REASON.



CHAPTER I.

THE AIM OF SCIENCE, ART, AND ETHICS.

SINCE the culmination of man's evolution, as a self-conscious, rational being, is his reconciliation with the objective order of things, the aim of science is the knowing of Truth, the aim of art is the use and enjoyment of Beauty, and the aim of ethics is the universal will of Goodness, to share that objective Truth and Beauty with others.

Inasmuch as science, art, and ethics, so far as they are *ours*, must be subjective, the great, essential question concerns their validity. That is, do they correspond to the object, as it really is? Does our scientific knowledge stand for the truth? Do the uses and enjoyments, in all our artistic appreciations and efforts, agree with the real objective beauty of things? Are our actions toward others accordant with a universal good-will? In so far as they do correspond to the object, we live in a world of reality; in so far as they do not, we are only suspended in the mists of our own subjective confusion, ignorance, error, and perversity. So that reason, by its deepest instinct, is always making an effort to dispossess itself of subjective illusions, and to bring itself into true relations, intellectual, æsthetic and moral, with objective reality.

Science, a Constant Reinterpretation.

Science has a long record of inadequate or false views of nature, and is still correcting and enlarging our interpretation of the objective world. About the only thing that remains pretty well fixed, in modern science, is the accurate method it employs, and certain general doctrines or presuppositions which belong to the inner nature of the inquiring reason itself. The conclusions as to fact are very fluent.

Yet, in our pride over the advance we have made, both in the accuracy and range of our scientific knowledge, beyond ancient times, we are constantly in danger of overlooking the possible discrepancy between what we *claim* to know, or *believe* we know, and the objective truth. Men in every generation have always regarded their knowl-

edge, now discarded by us, as scientific, just as we regard our knowledge scientific. It is not impossible that future generations may discard much of what we now "know."

We learn accurately enough some narrow range of facts, in physics, chemistry, or biology, and the laws that govern them; and then, calling this truth, there is a tendency in us to make it a measure by which to interpret the universe. But advancing knowledge may bring—often has brought—us into a new and larger view of things, that requires a reinterpretation of the same facts, which now take on an altogether different aspect.

Science, in its broadest import as covering all we know, should be synonymous with philosophy, the aim of which is the total view of truth; but, in its narrower meaning, it restricts itself to rationalizing the world of sense. Within this narrower field, the individual scientist is compelled to be a specialist, an "expert," in some still narrower region of observation, so that he can not be said to get the truth in any wide significance of that term; in fact, he may become so *lost* in details as to *lose* the truth altogether. At best, he gets but glimpses of truth, for it is only when all fields of knowledge are surveyed in their relations, one to the other, that anything like the truth can be approached. It is not a matter of covering all fields of knowledge, in the sense of knowing in detail everything that is to be known—no one can do that—but of learning the principles at work in all knowledge, and of understanding their inter-relations and meaning. In other words, the seeker after truth must rise above the plane of logic, where science rationalizes the data of sense, to the plane of intuition, where philosophy deals with the final and unitizing principles of spirit. Every great scientific discoverer, whether he is conscious of it or not, is always thus a philosopher.

Scientific Narrowness.

Because this deeper meaning, ever present in science, is not grasped, it not infrequently happens that a physicist or biologist may know a great body of rationally grouped facts and yet quite miss the spirit of truth. He is strongly tempted to force every thing under his formulas and, failing in that, either to become indifferent to whatever lies beyond his field, or to deny dogmatically the validity of all that refuses to fit his "explanation." In this attitude of mind, he differs in no essential particular from the dogmatic theologian whom he

often severely and justly condemns. He is illustrating the same human weakness for narrow and hasty generalization, or the dogmatism of opinion. He is within his rights in defining science as the logic of sense, and in setting its possible limits as a special discipline; but he is not justified in rejecting all that lies outside as invalid, or incapable of being known. In so doing, he becomes, like the theologian, simply a special pleader for a preconceived theory. The theologian, Catholic or Protestant, may have a great store of knowledge and, in that sense, be very learned, but he too seldom asks: Is my doctrine really true? He rather makes his doctrine the criterion of truth and brings to bear all he knows upon its "proof." Originally all such doctrines were rationally thought out as truth; then they became an ultimate, traditional authority, for succeeding generations, guaranteed by a historical church or a sacred book. The value and, indeed, necessity of such an authority and guarantee, for human nature, such as it is, can not be denied. But the advantage is more than outweighed by disadvantage, when it is considered that human nature, being such as it is, capable of a progressive unfoldment of reason, can never rest upon the interpretations of one generation as final. The impossibility of so doing is a common lesson of history, and the irrationality of it has again and again been illustrated.

When Galileo said there was evidence to show that the earth moves, the Catholic theologians were not concerned in knowing whether or not it was true, but whether or not it agreed with their doctrine. So with Luther, who was not yet wholly freed from the old dogmatic attitude, the final question was not the rationality of what Zwingli said, but whether it agreed with what he (Luther) understood the Bible to say. When Catholic and Protestant alike say: "This is what we hold" and reject all non-conformity, they are concerned only *nominally*, not *really*, in the truth. Well, it is this dogmatic spirit that scientists—not science as such—have too often shown. But this is not the spirit of truth, for it does not meet with the demands of reason, and is no more respectable or justified in the scientist than in the theologian. One of the most disappointing features about human nature, as thus far developed, is that the vast majority of men are not interested at all in knowing the truth. Their chief concern is to get on in the world. And of those who nominally pursue after knowledge, many mistake the pride of opinion, or personal belief, for devotion to the truth.

If then we would follow science in its largest sense, and not scientists merely, we must not allow ourselves to be confused simply by knowledge or learning, but set our aim on a much higher goal. Science, as an organon of the theoretical reason, seeking to rationalize the data of sense, must in the end, in order to realize itself in the higher knowledge of spirit, merge into philosophy, the supreme function of which is to know things as they really are, or to know objective spiritual Reality. Upon this plane must all opinions, beliefs, and convictions, which may or may not be true, be ultimately brought to book; for no thought in our minds can have any real value to us, except in so far as it agrees with the Objective Truth.

False Estimates of Beauty.

In the same way, when we turn to the æsthetico-practical reason which appreciates and uses the object, we can not rest satisfied with any and every estimate of value, enjoyment, pleasure, or amusement which the object may, for the moment, yield. For, just as we may mistake our opinion or belief for truth, so we may mistake our subjective pleasure for a sign of real, objective beauty in the thing we enjoy.

In fact, between our subjective pleasure and objective beauty that is, the true harmonious relation of things, there is nearly always a discrepancy. It is only real, or objective, beauty that should please or make us happy. But how often is it that the musician, painter, or architect tells us, not without fine scorn, that the music, the picture, the palace, we chose for our pleasure is not music, or painting, or architecture at all. We are informed that we do not know, that we are not refined enough to appreciate true art. All of which we might resent and claim ability to judge what is truly beautiful, were it not that we ourselves also employ the same sweeping criticism against others. Making of candor a virtue, we say to a friend: "That novel, that poem, that play you so much admire is the sorriest drivel," meaning that he is so naive and unrefined, as to be pleased with what is not really artistic.

The Mexican or Spaniard falls into an ecstasy over a bull-fight, as the American does over a foot-ball contest. The exquisite tang of pleasure, in either participant or spectator, arises from the exercise of skill and the sense of power in the struggle, the emotional tension

in the presence of danger, and the joy of triumph in the humiliating fall of the opponent. But however much pleasure these sights of contest give us, that is, however beautiful we may esteem them—for in the end it is only the beautiful, or what we take to be the beautiful that pleases—the basal question does not concern their relative merits but their objective nature; are they really beautiful? ought we to be pleased?

In the case of the sensualist, the glutton, the drunkard, the debauchee, either in their openly confessed, crude, brutal form, or in their more concealed, refined, epicurean form, all of whom find pleasure or what they call pleasure, in the gratification of the appetites, the question is easy to decide. We can hardly bring ourselves to the admission that the objects which they pursue are really beautiful, and their pleasure in them really justified.

And just as men often take pleasure, or find happiness, in what is not truly beautiful, so they are blind to what really is beautiful, or perhaps they even find it repellent. Nature is filled with the most exquisite beauties that constantly address the senses or rational thought, but like moles, burrowing in the earth, we are blind to them. Or like the man in Bunyan's allegory, we have eyes only for the muck heap, while angels hover unseen above our heads. (Pilgrim's Progress, Part II.) "We Sinners climb and know it not." (Lowell's Vision of Sir Launfal.)

In all such instances, which are coming to our notice every day, we are sufficiently warned against taking pleasure in what is really ugly, or overlooking what is really beautiful.

The Subjective and Objective Side of Taste.

But the objection will at once arise: Is not the appreciation of beauty subjective to such a degree that there can be no dispute over questions of taste? Most assuredly; and there is to be granted the widest range of choice in individual preference. But the preference indicated is, nevertheless, always an appreciation or judgment of *something* which is an *object*, having in itself beauty or not having beauty, and is in no way affected by our individual judgment. When the artist condemns our taste, or we condemn our friend's taste, or we all condemn the sensualist's taste, the condemnation is not an affair of individual subjective preference, but rests upon reasons

that can be given; because they find their validity in the object itself about the beauty of which there may be dispute. If I prefer Homer to Vergil, I must make clear to others why the naive simplicity earnestness, directness and rapidity of the one are more appealing to me than the elaborate, artificial, stately, turgid measures of the other.

Just as our knowledge of truth is subjective, so far as its being *our* knowledge is concerned, but corresponds to an object other than the knowing subject; so our pleasure or happiness, while it is subjective so far as *our* judgment or appreciation is concerned, corresponds to a real beauty in the object, other than the feeling in the subject. We are, therefore, not left in a world where everyone is allowed to offer his opinion on beauty as a final test of *his* individual appreciation and action, but where beauty rests upon an objective reality, as the only source and ground of all real pleasure and happiness. As we must not be content with what we *think* or *suppose* to be knowledge, but must press on until our subjective thought corresponds to the objective Truth; so we must not be content with what we judge to be, or appreciate as, beautiful, but must press on until our subjective pleasure or happiness corresponds to objective Beauty. The underlying aim of this volume is to show that the Truth is the only thing in the world that is really beautiful, and the reason the Truth is the Beauty of the world is because it is the objective manifestation of Goodness. The supreme aim of art and that upon which its honor and greatness rests, is to bring us face to face with that objective Beauty, and so afford us our highest and noblest pleasures.

The Moral Will Has a Real Object.

The same distinction, between the subjective and objective, we have to make in dealing with the ethical reason. Every volition towards others, which I deem right, may only be right, according to my subjective interests, but these evidently can establish no final objective criterion. Is my act in accord with the objective, universal law of good-will?, is the ultimate question.

Here the objective standard, it will be seen, is not, as in the case of the theoretical or æsthetical reason, the object known or felt, but a moral law which transcends every individual preference and is to dominate my will.

Whether I, as egoist, will some good wholly for myself, or, as an altruist, for another, or, as a universalist, for all, there is nothing in the object itself, as would be the case with science and art, that determines the nature of the moral act. That act derives its character entirely from the subjective direction of my will. The known object itself is only true or false to my thought, or has in it only the æsthetic value of "goodness" or "badness" according to my judgment of it. Regarded morally, the object is wholly indifferent. Thus, in a spirit of revenge, I sow my neighbor's field with salt. It turns out to be just what his field needed; for him it was a "good," but my act remains bad just the same.

While the theoretical reason aims at the objective Truth, and the æsthetical reason aims at objective Beauty, the moral reason aims at the universal will of Good, which would share with all the use and enjoyment of the objective Beauty, the reality of which lies in its being the objective Truth. So that, while the character of *my* moral will is wholly determined by *my* subjective, volitional attitude, the character of *the* moral will, as such, is ultimately determined by the objective Will of Goodness, to which I ought, and in the end, when I know the Truth and its inherent Beauty, shall will to conform. And the objective nature of this Will of Goodness, by which it comes to have an imperative dominance over me, does not lie in its mere universality, as some seem to suppose, but, as we have seen (p. 120), in the fact that it expresses the objective causal order of the Cosmos. This then is the Reality which presents itself as objective to the individual, moral will of man, the final aim of which is to come, by its own freely chosen act, into accord with the Will of the Cosmos.

We can not, therefore, too often remind ourselves of the supreme and fundamental nature of the moral will. It is the sum total of all willing; it is the will itself; it is the beginning of all things; it is the first creative act. It is the self's self, going forth out of itself, it is the living subject, expressing its basal character. It is the very life of man. It is the Eternal Power of God.

For this reason it is that, universally, the nature of every act is centered in the will. We finally estimate a man not by what he does but by what he *would* do. His intention decides his fate before the courts of law, and the court of Reason. An injury, not intended, we readily forgive. An injury, intended, rankles into hatred and revenge. Or a good, not intended, however great, we do not prize—

“rich gifts are poor when givers prove unkind;” while a good intended however small, we regard as priceless.

The Subjective Self Realized in the Objective Universal Self.

The objectivity of the universal good-will establishes our previous conclusion that the self is not abolished, but only first realized by including in its will the good of all (p. 114). This is the profound meaning Jesus gave to the Old Testament command: “Love thy neighbor as thyself” (Lev. xix, 18)—originally restricted to fellow Israelites; for he universalized it—in the parable of the Good Samaritan and in the Sermon on the Mount—by showing how it necessarily, includes the most despised and hateful enemy.

This comprehensive, objective good-will, we must warn ourselves, is not a mere amiability or kindness, which it naturally includes, such as most men reveal, if they are not crossed, or everything goes their way. Qualities of this sort only show a kind of congenital, instinctive impulse of humanity, as such, and are shared by many of the animals. By good-will, on the contrary, Jesus means a profound and unvarying bent of the whole ethical reason, as a conscious principle of life, based on rational grounds, which is not turned back or abolished by injustice or slander or persecution or spiteful usage. And the grounds he gives is that you may be what you really are, or come to the realization of your true selves as the “children of your Father which is in heaven” who, as the Eternal Creative Will of Good, comprehends in his intent the welfare of all.

Well, then, the aim of science, art, and ethics, which are the interpretative expressions of the theoretical, the æsthetico-practical, and the ethical self-conscious, rational subject, is, first, by avoiding error, to know the objective Truth; then, by shunning illusory pleasures, to use and enjoy objective Beauty; and, finally, by renouncing egoistic self-will, to will the Universal Good. And, since reason, in its threefold capacity of knowing, feeling, and willing, is one, the subjective aim and the objective goal must be one. As feeling is the subjective correlate of the known Truth, Beauty is the objective, correlate form of the Truth, known and felt, or *is* the Truth; while willing is the irresistible, subjective effort of the whole reason to realize the self, as good-will to all, by conferring Beauty upon others, through the manifested Truth.

There is no fact, we have been led to believe, so profound and significant, in the rational subject's life, as his aim at an objective ideal of perfect Truth, Beauty, and Goodness which, in actuality, he has never experienced (p. 65); and yet which he conceives to be the only outcome worthy of himself. And what is so significant in this fact is that the ideal man is recognized as alone the real man, while the actual man is somehow regarded as unreal; for the actual man is all the time holding opinions and beliefs instead of the Truth, is enjoying pleasures not correlate with Beauty, and is acting out of accord with the will of Goodness.

The Ideal in and beyond Man.

It matters not whether, with Plato, we account for this painful discrepancy in man, between the real and the unreal, and this earnest, never-ceasing endeavor to attain the real, by regarding him as fallen from a primitive state of blessedness with the gods, where in rapture he gazed upon the Truth, into the entanglements of sense, where he is still vaguely reminiscent of the glory whence he came, and discontent until he return; or whether, with the sacred historian, we regard man as fallen from an original state of perfect harmony with the Divine Will, into the painful wanderings of disobedience; in a word, whether with the Greek, we regard the errors of sense as the source of all our miseries, and the barrier to the Truth; or whether, with the Hebrew, we recognize in the sins of self-will, the origin of all our woe, and the bar to Goodness, the conclusion is essentially the same, that man, in his actuality, is not what he is in his reality; and that whatever endeavors he may make, one aim must be supreme, viz.: to renounce the illusions of error and sin for the priceless realities of Truth and Goodness. He must sell all he has and go in search of the pearl of great price. And in that renunciation and pursuit, perchance, he may come to behold the Beauty of God!

Nor does it make any material difference, if as before suggested (p. 67), we set aside these ancient ideals as fanciful, and content ourselves with what we regard as the modern, enlightened view of man's evolution, from humble beginnings, to rationality. There remains the same painful discrepancy between what man is and what he is to be, and the same insistent demand of reason, laid upon him, to think the Thought of the Cosmos, and to will the Will of the

Cosmos, if haply, he may enter into and enjoy the Harmony of the Cosmos.

Alas! man's troubles do not end with his mistakes and errors, his ugliness and suffering, his perversities and sins. To all these he might oppose a brave front with his science, his art, and his ethics. Nothing could seem more natural and inevitable than that science, art, and ethics should work together against the common foe of illusion for the manifestation of reality; because they center in the same rational self and, while forever distinct in their functions, have their unity in the same reason.

A Conflict within Reason.

But unfortunately, in experience, this is not so, and to the burden of our errors, sins, and sufferings, there is yet added a bitter and what sometimes seems to be, an irreconcilable conflict within the reason itself, between our intellectual, our æsthetic, and our moral interests. The scientist, the artist, and the saint too often make poor company and separate in anger, whereas we have a deep instinctive feeling that they should be the best of friends. How futile would be our success in knowing the Truth, or in enjoying Beauty, or in willing the Good, if, after all we should find reason itself forever in a state of internecine strife?

Our best plan, we take it, will be, first, to face, squarely, this strife as it appears in actual experience, with the hope that, then, out of the confusion there may reveal themselves the deeper relations which science, art, and ethics reciprocally bear, and which ultimately constitute them one, in the threefold unity of reason.

CHAPTER II.

CONFLICT AND CONFUSION.

It is because knowing, feeling, and willing, though constituting a unity in reason, are distinct, that it becomes possible for each to assert its independence and thus, in experience, to be found very often indifferent, or even hostile, the one to the others. We may find the scientist quite oblivious to artistic appreciation or even to the practical uses of invention, and in no way noted for the "sweet reasonableness" of his moral character. The artist may be quite innocent of the scientific spirit, and we hardly dare expect of him anything like devotion to the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule. As to the saint, he has often enough shown a fine disregard of science and art, or has expressed an open hostility toward them as so much worldly wisdom and pleasure.

Suppose, in the order indicated, we take a look at each, as seen in concrete actuality.

The Scientist's Attitude toward Art and Ethics.

The scientist or philosopher, with his exclusive theoretical interests, deliberately sets aside the prejudices that may arise out of his feelings, his desire for enjoyment, or the practical uses of nature, because they might divert his attention from his one ultimate goal, the objective truth. He truly conceives it to be his sacred obligation to search for the truth, untrammelled by considerations of personal preference or gain. His business is not to seek out inventions or produce works of art for his own or other people's benefit. So far as he is concerned, the whole world and all of life may turn out to be a chaos, a barren waste of inanity, or a hell of suffering. That is not his affair. His entire aim is simply to discover what they really are as they stand. Hence, the scientist and artist are often, if not antagonistic, at least antipathetic, the one toward the other. The scientist would scorn the artist's, the poet's, the orator's appeal to sensibility, taste, feeling for beauty, as unworthy of that stern, uncompromising Mistress of

actual fact and cold logic whom he serves. He has, at times, even a mild contempt for the inventor, that most practical sort of man who would hitch science to the plow, the machine, the engine, to make her a useful bread-winner or a purveyor of creature comfort and luxury. "Thank God," John Tyndall, the eminent physicist, is once reported to have said of a certain scientific discovery: "Thank God! no one can make bread and butter out of that."

Then, as to morality, the scientist carries his devotion to objective truth even to the point of indifference toward goodness. He never asks whether his discovery will make men morally better or not; the theoretical reason in him makes no such demands. If he finds that the mechanism of nature thrusts man into an unbreakable chain of necessitated action, he is content to let moral responsibility take its chances. For this reason, some of the bitterest feuds have broken out between science and religion. After religion has exhausted her doctrinal ammunition on advancing science in vain, she falls back upon her citadel stronghold, ethics. "You shall not" she cries, "undermine moral freedom, the corner stone of duty." But science is inexorable and irresistibly moves on.

With perfect indifference science puts into the hands of the evil man, as well as the good, a two-edged sword of power, to be used against as well as for the right. Chemistry, with equal concern, drives the bullet of the assassin or cleanses the wound of his victim. The wise teacher recognizes the danger that lies in educating the vicious boy, because the more he knows, the more evil he can do.

The Attitude of the Artist toward Science and Ethics.

Turning to art, we find not only indifference but often a strongly expressed dislike for science, on the one hand, and for ethics, on the other. The peculiar function of the artist is to make life pleasant, to beautify it; and the prerogative which he claims is freedom to do so, unhindered by the deadening restrictions of either science or ethics. Subject the Divine Muses to scientific analysis, or to the restraints of moral precept! That were a sacrilege which would plunge us into Bœotian dulness! Their sacred right is the untrammelled freedom of life, the joy of creative invention, the wide and unlimited possession of beauty, with its infinite variety and irresistible charm.

We could not imagine the young Byron or Shelley bending with enthusiasm over problems in the Differential Calculus and inditing

odes to them, as some mathematicians do, or devoting his energies to city missions. Matthew Arnold fancies the incongruity of Shakespeare's sitting in the cabin of the Mayflower, with the solemn, psalm-singing Puritans around him. And even the many-sided Goethe, we could only think of, with difficulty, as listening, altogether patiently, to the sermons of his highly esteemed Herder.

Heine's sarcastic humor—strange, contradictory term which the rare Heine could alone justify—scourges the mathematical professor who was met by chance in the Berliner café. The dry, rational speculation of the scientist was so much phantasmal mist and the scientist himself a dusty skeleton to Heine, who thrilled with ecstasy at the reddening dawn, fell into poetry over the eyebrows of a peasant lassie, or burst into tears and prayer before the Venus of Milo.

The ardent temperament of artist or poet allows him to breathe only on one side of his nature. He seems to have no patience for the petty details of science, or obedience for the chilling voice of ethics. His whole horizon is filled with light and the happiness of a living, creative beauty. For this reason he is always the most interesting, though perhaps not always the truest or best, man in the world. If he vaunts of truth, it is not in the scientist's strict sense, but only as grist for his mill; and the very necessities of his art seem to demand conditions of uncleanness, squalor, sensuality, and the conflict of clashing, selfish wills.

The Saint's Attitude toward Science and Art.

But if the scientist is indifferent to all but truth, and the artist to all but beauty, so also the moralist is often indifferent to all but goodness.

Who could find it possible to get Thomas à Kempis or John Wesley to act as trustees for a Seminary, devoted to the furtherance of the Higher Criticism; and, by what stretch of the imagination, could Savonarola be found on a jury of award over Boticelli's "Primavera," or "Birth of Venus," in Lorenzo's palace at Careggi? It would be unjust to say that these men did not believe in art or scientific education, especially in education, but it would always be an art and an education, moralized according to their ethical preconceptions. There would not be that free swing of detached investigation and of constructive genius which science and art always demand in order to attain their ends.

The Conflict is Racial as well as Individual.

Nor does this antipathy and strife among our rational interests end with individuals. It shows itself in whole nations or epochs of history.

Nothing is more striking, in the annals of mankind, than the racial genius of Israel for ethics and religion, with no genius for science and art; or than the racial genius of Hellas for science and art, with no genius for ethics and religion.

We must not be taken to mean that Israel had no theoretical or artistic sense whatever. The Hebrew had his sublime poetry, but it was the natural, instinctive form that the inner ethical and religious thought compelled, rather than being the product of a conscious æsthetic interest. It was grander and nobler, but it was not poetry in the sense that Pindar's odes or Sophocles's dramas were poetry. When the Hebrew got to be consciously artistic, he became artificial. He could arrange the generations of the heavens and the earth in cycles, write anagrams, or compose acrostic psalms, but this only showed that he had what is to a certain extent in every man, some artistic sense of order and proportion.

The antagonism, which the ethical spirit often shows toward art, is seen in a miserably pathetic way in the triumphs of early Christianity, imbued, as it was, with the profound moral sense of Israel. Aside from the natural hatred against false and degrading worship, the early Christians were blind to the most exquisite art and literature the world ever produced and, in their narrow infatuation, they again and again committed the crime of destroying the noblest temples and of burning or defacing the most precious manuscripts, under the impression that they were doing God's service. Whatever was saved was entirely due to those exceptional minds that had a keen sense of artistic values.

Or what shall we say of the sin of that same Semitic genius, when the Saracens destroyed the incomparable library of Alexandria! Do these books support the Koran? then they are superfluous; are they silent of the Koran? then they are worthless; do they oppose the Koran? then they are pernicious; in any case, cast them to the flames.

This tribalism of a strong moral conviction has too often been deaf to the voice of the fair earth, forever proclaiming: O worship the

Lord in the holiness of Beauty! If art has ever shown itself hostile to ethics, ethics has paid it back in her own coin.

Hebrew and Greek Theoretical Interests.

On the theoretical side, Israel showed some sense for philosophy in its wisdom literature, which involved reflection. But it was always moral reflection and did not involve that philosophical detachment or pure love of truth that would see things as they really are. The Hebrew must also be credited with some sense for the records of history, but he never submits them to a logical analysis and a scientific confirmation as a Thucydides would. He always has an ulterior ethical motive. He would not inform, but edify. For example, an Ezra would account for the flight of Sennacherib's host, by an angel of the Lord, to show the necessity of absolute dependence upon the Divine Providence; while a Thucydides, wholly interested in the occurrence as such, would tell of the innumerable army of field mice that fell upon the camp, while the soldiers slept, and gnawed their quivers and bows into useless rubbish, or take this tradition as a symbol of some bubonic plague that suddenly devastated the enemy.

The town infidel, in passing the cottage of a poor and pious Quaker, heard him praying for bread. Hastening to a bake shop, he secured a loaf, and returning, threw it in at the Quaker's open window. The consequent, fervent expressions of gratitude to God from the pious man gave the infidel his coveted opportunity and, thrusting his head in at the window, he sneered: "That shows the falsity of your religion. It was I who was the providence that heard your prayer and gave the bread." To which the Quaker replied: "Ah, friend, thou art wrong. The devil may have *brought* the bread, it is true, but it was the Lord who *sent* it." The infidel represents the way the Greek deals with history, the Quaker, the Hebrew's way. Perhaps both views are right, if they are taken together, and only wrong when taken in isolation.

The Greek's Want of Moral Earnestness.

Nor do we wish to be understood, when it is said that Greece had a genius for science and art but no genius for religion and ethics, as meaning that Greece had no ethics and religion at all. In a way, as St. Paul saw, it had too much, but it did not have the right kind.

When it did develop a pure utilitarian morality and a pure monotheism, they were entirely the outcome of the theoretical, and not the ethical reason. In consequence, their religion and ethics fell short in two main particulars, of what true religion and ethics really are. First, their religion was necessarily confined to the favored few who had both the leisure and the inclination for speculative philosophy, and, secondly, their ethics in no way stood for an outstreaming of good-will, either to God or to man.

It is impossible to think of Greece, with all its philosophy and art, or perhaps we should say, *because* of its philosophy and art, as producing the simple Deuteronomic command: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," or the Levitical command: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." No Hellene can be imagined as saying: "O how *love* I thy *law*, it is my meditation all the day." (Ps. cxix, 97.) "Thy *word* is a *lamp* unto my feet, and *light* unto my path." (Ps. cxix, 105.) "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the *ungodly*, Nor standeth in the way of *sinnners*, Nor sitteth in the seat of the *scornful*, But his *delight* is in the *law* of the Lord; And in his law doth he *meditate* day and night." (Ps. i, 1-2.) "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord, And who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath *clean hands* and a *pure heart*, Who hath not lifted his soul unto *vanity*, And hath not sworn *deceitfully*. He shall receive a *blessing* from the Lord, And *righteousness* from the God of his salvation." (Ps. xxiv, 3-5.) When the penitent psalmist exclaims: "Behold thou desirest *truth* in the inward parts" (Ps. li, 6), he has no such meaning for truth as Plato had—an exact theoretical knowledge of the object. This would bring only a certain intellectual or æsthetic satisfaction. He meant the sincerity and simplicity of a morally pure heart, and indicated clearly enough his meaning when he exclaimed: "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be *clean*, Wash me, and I shall be *whiter than snow*."* (Ps. li, 7.) This devotion to moral law, this passion for inner goodness, Hellas never produced and never could produce; she did not have the ethical genius. The Greek saw in ethics a series of rational moral relations, but did not see that it is the outstreaming of the self in good-will to others, nor that its grounds lie in the Creative Energy

*The *italics* do not indicate anything in the original text, but simply emphasize the interests that were precious to the Hebrew mind.

of the Universe. But this is just what Israel saw more clearly than any other people saw it. So that the great gift of the Hebrew genius, culminating in Jesus, to mankind is the priceless truth that the Creative Will is Eternal Love, and that, therefore, the supreme law which God lays upon man is love to his neighbor.

The Service to Us of Hebraism and Hellenism.

If, then, we want religion and ethics, we shall not find them in Greece. There we shall find only speculation about them. But we shall find them in Israel in their plenitude.

If, however, we have need of science and art, we should never think of going to Israel, for there they are not to be found; but we shall go to Greece for there, in all their truth and beauty, they dwell.

If we want a philosophical theology, written with all its reasoned inferences and rational unity, we must look to Greece. But if we want a living content for that theology, there is nowhere else to look but Israel.

Or if we desire a fitting temple, perfect in its symbolic form for the worship of the living God, we should have to put its execution into the hands of the Hellene. But if we want a living God to worship, whose power is the creative, sustaining energy, and whose righteous will is the law of the universe, we can find Him nowhere else but in Israel.

It may be of interest to note in passing that these great historical examples of specialization in which man's ethical reason, on the one hand, and his theoretical and æsthetico-practical reason, on the other, work themselves out in total indifference, illustrate a certain uneven relation that shows itself again and again, both in individuals and societies. That is, ethics will frequently be found in isolation, while science and art will always show a tendency to fraternize. Thus, the ethics of Israel was the one absorbing interest of his genius, that seemed to exclude all else; while in Greece, science and art dwelt together in a sort of friendly and reciprocal commerce. It is true, in men like Plato and Aristotle, we find vague evidences of inner conflict. Plato in the interests of science, or philosophy which, in a large way, to his mind was the same thing, came to look with some contempt upon poetry as such, although he himself was a supreme poet; and Aristotle, while dealing theoretically with poetry, was, in his dry and barren style, the farthest removed from being a

poet; nevertheless, science and art, in Greece, went together inseparably as forming Hellenic culture as a whole.

Now this fact of comity between science and art found in Hellas, and of the isolation of ethics in Israel is not a historical accident, but easily grows out of the very nature of reason itself. Inasmuch as the known object, presented by science, always has some value in terms of feeling, there inevitably develops an art in one form or another. Given the speculative refinement of the Greek, and a highly developed art necessarily follows; because, in general, theoretical interests and æsthetical interests are in common egoistic. The satisfaction found in truth and in beauty alike terminate in the self; it means a receptivity, and is not primarily concerned with the interests of another. On the other hand, since the satisfaction of the ethical reason is necessarily altruistic, that is, means bestowal, and terminates in another, it is often observed that the genuinely good man is not at all distinguished for keenness of intelligence or æsthetic refinement, or for his interest in science and art. Perhaps it were better to say that the man, defective in theoretical and artistic ability, is only thrown with the more energy into expressing himself through his moral nature. At any rate, whether we regard Israel and Hellas, or individual men, we find the tendency of science and art to form a close union which we call culture, and the tendency of ethics to center itself in a sort of isolation about the grand interests of morality and religion.

The Conflict in Historical Epochs.

If we were to choose a modern historical epoch in which the Greek genius for science and art found embodiment, it would be the Renaissance; indeed, so-called just because it was regarded as a rebirth, or, at any rate, a revival of the Greek spirit. Here, there was a brilliant outburst of passion for truth and beauty, the inspiring power of which is seen in the fact that it has been the source of our modern culture. Goodness, which had so long meant self-repression and self-immolation for a future, supernatural world, fell into neglect; and men, preferring to be *human* rather than *superhuman*, plunged with such unwonted ardor into the seizure and enjoyment of the present visible world, that the very name of humanist got to be nearly synonymous with sensualist, or, at least, with worldliness, as distinguished from all the ideality of religion. A virtuous man, or a

virtuoso, no longer stood for moral purity and integrity, but for the refinements of intellectual and artistic capacity and culture.

Even the Church was carried away by this tendency, and, not to speak of the lower phases of the movement in a relaxation of Christian ethics among the official supporters of religion, we find Bishops and Popes coming to take more interest in a manuscript of Aristophanes or Plautus, or a marble of Praxitiles, than in the Sermon on the Mount, or "the legend of Christ." Browning's "Good Bishop of St. Praxed's," even *in articulo mortis*, thinks more of his past worldly pleasures, and cares more for his artistic tomb, rich in precious marbles, than for the future welfare of his immortal soul.

There could be no question about Lorenzo de Medici's keen appreciation of intellectual and artistic values. He was himself no mean scholar, poet, musician, and an intelligent and lavish patron of learning and all the arts, to such an extent that he justly deserved to be called the Magnificent. But he was blind to moral values, and for that reason and because of his splendid intellectual and artistic endowments, Villari, in his "Savonarola," is fully justified in concluding that he, more than any other man, corrupted the youth of his age.* When his mortal hour at last came, there at Careggi, he did think it time to square his account with the moral law, and so sent for that uncompromising Prior of St. Mark's, to shrive him of his sins; but at the last moment, he chose to turn his face to the wall and die, impenitent and unabsolved, rather than yield to the stern moral demand of Savonarola, to restore to the people of Florence the liberties of which he had despoiled them. Such a glamor of worldly success, brilliant achievement, and fame surrounded him that young men were content to choose his ideals of science and art, and turn their backs, as he had done, on the dull, crabbed and unlovely form of goodness.

A wholly different picture presents itself to us, if we turn to the England of Cromwell and the Puritan Commonwealth. Here we find ourselves plunged back into a Hebrew Theocracy, gathered about Zion Hill; while the greatest poet of the age quenches his early Hellenic inspirations, to write the epic of sin and redemption, in which Satan and God figure as chief protagonists, delivering discourses in systematic theology.

An Italian, imbued with Petrarch and Boccaccio and the spirit of

*Vol. I, pp. 39-40. Eng. trans., by Linda Villari; London, Unwin.

the Renaissance, and compelled to live in the London of that day, with its ugliness and gloom, and amid the groanings of sinners and the wailings of saints, would have considered himself exiled to a desert waste, without water and food. He would have found no brightness, no variety, no joy of life, no beauty.

A score of years, however, and he would have found his proper *milieu*, in the Restoration, when the Gallicized Charles returned, with his French ladies and French manners; and when even the once Puritan Dryden debauched his genius to awkward, plantegrade, maunderings in the nastiness of sybaritic comedy. Goodness was as foreign to the court of the second Charles, as the culture of art was to the councils of Cromwell.

Is the Conflict Inherent or Superficial ?

Such illustrations seem to show that the nature of reason itself forever plunges us into the dilemma of choosing between culture, with its science and art, on the one hand, and religion, the central concern of which for us is ethics, on the other. But does the dilemma at bottom really exist? Does it not rather lie upon the surface amid the superficialities of error and misunderstanding? We trust that we shall discover grounds for harmony in reason itself, and instead of finding our science, art, and ethics in a relation of independence or antagonism, they shall prove to be necessarily one.

If we should surmise from the start that whatever discord or difference there may arise in our theoretical, æsthetic, and moral interests, lies merely on the surface, our surmise would be strengthened by the intruding suspicion that, perhaps after all, our science may, in part, be a false science and not correspond throughout to objective Truth; or our art, in a measure, be a false art, with its illusory happiness, not accordant with objective Beauty; or our morality, vitiated by a false morality, not taking the true direction of the Will of Good. We could fancy our science to be true as far as it goes, but not true enough; or our art to be beautiful, but not beautiful enough; or our ethics to be good, but not good enough. Or we might say that the trouble is with the scientist, artist, and moralist, rather than with science, art, and ethics; for they are so inclined to fill their whole mind with one all-absorbing interest, as to fall a prey to a narrow tribalism, which directly combats the ultimate demand of reason for totality. The falsities and inadequacies that

arise out of misunderstanding, misuse, and limitation, we must be assured, necessarily clash, and we should be short-sighted, indeed, to rest in them as in any way representing Reality.

At any rate, the æsthetic reason performs for us this great service. It forever holds before us the alluring ideal of its one supreme value set upon life, viz.: the accordant happiness, arising out of a perfect harmony among things; that is, an objective Beauty which is founded in the unity of an omnipotent and omnipresent Reality.

In spite then, of the actual conflict and confusion in experience, we shall hope to find our scientific, artistic, and moral interests revealing such intimate and constant inter-relations as to point to, and indeed necessitate, an inseparable unity in the fully developed, rational life of man.

CHAPTER III.

THE RECONCILIATION.

SUPPOSE we now endeavor to see how the claims of the æsthetic reason, for a harmonious unity of all our rational interests, is met by the relation, one to another, of those conscious capacities of intelligence that reveal their activity in science, art, and ethics.

There is something radically wrong in any conflict and confusion, because, in the first place, the self-conscious subject that knows in science, feels in art, and wills in ethics, is indissolubly one; and because, in the second place, knowing, feeling, and willing are never isolated psychic events in experience but, however varied, always coetaneous and correlated (pp. 48-49).

Nothing, then, could be more rational than the æsthetic ideal of a harmonious unity, and nothing more irrational than discord among the activities of reason. And, since it is the *same, one*, self-identical subject that thinks, feels, and wills; and always thinks, feels, and wills at *one* and the *same* time, we can never be rationally content, until confusion and conflict give way to reconciliation.

The reader will have already anticipated, from what has been said, the causes of the trouble, which it is necessary to remove before we can attain the rational unity demanded. In the main, he will surmise these causes to be two.

Rational Tribalism.

He will see, in the first place, that, among science, art, and ethics, there is not necessarily a mutual indifference or antagonism, but that such does naturally grow up among individual scientists, artists, and saints. The reason is not far to seek. Limited as men are, they must, in order to accomplish specific results, specialize along certain narrow lines of activity, and, becoming absorbed in their efforts, always tend to magnify *their* office and minify that of *others*. They confine themselves, as it were, to a quart mug, and are prone to identify the rim of their individual quart mug with the horizon of the universe. This grave fallacy, prolific source of much confusion and

conflict, we may call the *fallacy of rational tribalism*, and set it over against the truth of *totality*.

But, in view of his limitations, how is man to overcome this fallacy? Are we going to compel St. Paul to be a Phidias and an Archimedes, at the same time he is bearing a new religion to the world? Must Newton be a Buonarrotti and a Wesley, while teaching mankind the laws of the material universe? Shall we demand that Bach become a Luther and a Galileo, while lifting us, on the pinions of divine melody, to the ideal? Without doubt, this were impossible and unreasonable. But we can easily see that each of these could have been even a better saint, scientist, or artist, if he had understood more of what the others meant. We will allow each to concentrate his entire effort upon his vocation, but we must, in order that he most rationally fulfill his vocation, expect of him an intelligent appreciation of his relation to the efforts of other men.

Let the scientist search for the truth, but let him keep his eye on the beautiful and the good; give the artist freedom in his devotion to beauty, but ask of him a regard for truth and goodness; and further the saint in his struggle toward moral perfection, but permit no forgetfulness of whatsoever things are true and beautiful. And this is not impossible, for it lies in the totality of reason itself. Else we shall fall back into a rational tribalism again, with all its confusions and conflicts; and the æsthetic ideal of a harmonious unity will elude our grasp.

The Fallacy of Immaturity.

In the second place, the reader will see how impossible and unreasonable it would be to seek the real relation existing among the true, the beautiful, and the good, if what we *hold* to be true and beautiful and good were not *altogether* true, beautiful, and good. But that is just what our human limitations are constantly tending to plunge us into—a species of incompleteness that is taken to be complete. Our scientist *intends* to reveal to us the truth, but *his* truth is not always *the* Truth. In like manner, our artist and our saint intend to show us the beautiful and manifest the good, but *their* beauty and goodness are not always *the* Beautiful and *the* Good.

We shall, therefore, renounce all attempts to harmonize a half-true truth, and a half-beautiful beauty, and a half-good goodness as utterly irrational; for they would rest upon what we may call the

fallacy of rational immaturity, which is set over against the rational completeness of *self-realization*

It is not hard to see how this fallacy keeps intruding itself. Since the threefold reason develops from the knowledge of sense, through logic, to the knowledge of intuition, where alone Truth is attained; and from the feelings of sensation, through emotion, to happiness, where alone Beauty is enjoyed; and from volitions of egoism, through an altruistic justice, to love, where alone Goodness is willed, it is natural that, pausing short of the goal of self-realization, there can be found no rational harmony among our theoretical, æsthetic, and moral interests. A knowledge which stops with sense, or with the logic of sense (natural science), can be brought into no final relation with Beauty or Goodness in the realm of rational intuition. The æsthetic appreciations of sensation, or of emotion (applicable to most of our human works of art), have no ultimate fellowship with Truth and Goodness, again in the realm of intuition. And the morality of egoism, or of altruistic justice (the spirit of our moral codes and laws generally), will never square with Truth, or with the supreme harmony of Beauty, always within the realm of intuition.

The *fallacy of immaturity*, then, must be overcome by *self-realization*, before the question of the real relation among science, art, and ethics can be made possible of answer. If we are asked: Can science, taken in its restricted meaning as the logic of sense, be harmonized with art and ethics? we must answer positively and finally, no. Not until science rises to philosophy, or passes from its logical stage, on the plane of sense-phenomena, to its intuitional stage, on the plane of spiritual Reality, can there be any rational attempt to reconcile Truth with Beauty and Goodness. And then the attempt will be needless, for the reconciliation will have already been effected. The same must be said of art and ethics. Not until art rises above an appeal to sensation and emotion, in all their myriad varieties, and appeals to happiness as the supreme feeling, correlate to objective Beauty, can there be any prospect of reconciliation with Truth and Goodness. And not until ethics reaches far beyond altruistic justice and the satisfaction of duty done, into the realm of a universal, outstreaming will of good, can we ever hope to find it in harmony with Truth and Beauty.

It is only from such a standpoint that we understand the great sayings of Socrates and Jesus, who looked at the same Reality, from

two different sides. Socrates said: "Know the truth, and you will be good." Jesus said: "Be good, and you will know the truth."

It is evident that a man might know all the scientific truth in the world and still be selfish and bad. But Socrates meant *all* the truth, as Plato afterwards made clear—not simply sense-phenomena, reduced to logic. Then he would see that the Truth belongs to the intelligible world of spiritual Reality, and is the Beauty of all things, resting upon the ultimate Idea of the Good.

Again, it is evident that a man might be very upright and just, faithfully performing all his duties, and yet be quite ignorant and stupid. But Jesus meant by being good far more than that. He meant willing the will of God from the bottom of the heart, and that is to act toward others with an outstreaming, all-inclusive love. Than goodness, in this sense, there is nothing more illuminating; for it not only removes all obscuring prejudices and fills the heart with a sympathetic understanding; but far better than anything else, enables a man to know himself, other men, the world, and God. It was this inner goodness that gave to Jesus his penetrating insight into the thoughts and motives of others. It will not help us, it is true, to learn the chemical reactions of gun-powder; but it will teach us the far greater truth that the use of gun-powder to injure our fellow men, or to deface the fair earth, is a sin against God which does not make us happier and better but plunges us into discord and misery.

Thus it is only when our truth is true enough, and our goodness good enough, and that is when, in rational intuition, we behold spiritual Reality, that we may expect to find the æsthetic ideal of a harmonious unity realized. We shall then discover that the Truth is the only Beauty, because it is the objective manifestation of Goodness.

But if we take science, art, and ethics, just as they are, with all the limitations of their tribalism and immaturity, we shall be interested in finding how each is always involving and implying the other two. To understand this better, we must set aside, so far as possible, the peculiarities of the individual scientist, artist, and saint, and observe rather the spirit of science, art, and ethics at work in them, and ever pushing them out of and beyond their chosen fields.

Science Involves the Grounds of Art.

The pure scientist, having no direct interest in art, is supposed to be wholly occupied, as his name indicates, with knowledge. Truth is

his single aim and he has no ulterior purpose. But *why*, we at once ask, does he want knowledge? Because, primarily, he can not help wanting it. The purposive, instinctive curiosity of the animal to examine the object in its possible uses for him, has become, in the scientist, a conscious effort of the theoretical reason to realize itself in the knowledge of objective truth. But this, as we have seen (p. 96), is of the nature of an appetite and, in reality, is a deep-seated volition of reason, to meet its needs. Then, when these needs are met, by finding the truth, or only what is thought to be the truth, there arises a profound pleasure in the mind, which leads to further efforts after knowledge (p. 72). So that, although knowing in itself is a mere receptivity, or a cognitive response to what is given, so closely is it bound together with volitional and æsthetic elements that we may be justified in saying that our knowledge is *pushed on* by the will, and *led on* by the feelings. In other words, our science inevitably carries us beyond the pure theoretical reason over into the regions of the æsthetico-practical reason, which sets up a goal of happiness and wills to pursue it. The scientist himself may be the farthest possible removed from being an artist but, in spite of himself, all his efforts involve the rational grounds upon which art rests.

Truth Rebukes Error.

When it is said that the feeling which follows upon the recognition of truth is happiness, because the truth, in its coherent, rational unity, is at once seen to be beautiful, it may be objected that the truth is also often painful, dispels happy illusions, and brings suffering. This objection is exceedingly significant, because it compels the question: What is the truth? and arouses the wholesome suspicion that perhaps what we have taken to be the truth may not be the truth at all, or at best only partly true.

To begin with, we must always understand that the truth is knowledge of the *object*. It is therefore something which I can not *subjectively* create, or modify. It *is* what it *is*, and while I may obscure and misunderstand it, my sole business as a scientist, is to discover and interpret it. We always need to keep a strict watch against the easy and intrusive *jallacy of subjectivity*, in order to avoid those by-paths and blind alleys that lead us from the straight road into error and illusion.

Then in addition to its being *objective*, truth must be defined as

being both *total* and *spiritual*. In applying the term totality to the truth, we mean that it is not constituted by a mere series or group of objective facts. Facts are meaningless unless they are brought into rational relations, by ridding them of incoherence and contradiction, under the aspect of a complete, harmonious unity. Until a fact or group of facts is thus related it is for our knowledge simply nothing. In so far as we do see a fact in its relations to the sum of things, we may be said to have a glimpse of the truth. It is only in this sense that we human beings can claim to know the truth at all. To know the whole truth is for us utterly impossible; but we can, and must, view things, more and more, as constituting a rational, coherent unity which meets the demands of the entire reason that is always thus holding out the alluring ideal of Truth as a totality of harmonious Beauty. It is by a constant reference to such a totality that we can ever hope to overcome the pernicious fallacy of rational tribalism.

In applying the term spirituality to the truth, we mean that it does not lie in the knowledge of sense, or in the knowledge of rationalized sense, but in the spiritual realities of intuition. The history of thought makes this clear to us. The scientist flatly tells the man of common-sense that his knowledge of sense objects is not the truth at all, but assures him that if he hopes to know the truth, he must subject his facts of sense observation to logic and reduce them to rational laws. But now the philosopher appears—say Kant—and somewhat embarrasses the scientist by informing him that even *he* has not yet got the truth; that, in fact, *his* scientific *truth* is only a knowledge of phenomena or appearance; and that if he really wants to know *the* Truth, he must penetrate beyond phenomena to the Thing-as-it-is-in-itself, or to Reality. And that Reality, is not found in the regions of sense, whether naively or scientifically interpreted, but in the realms of Spirit.

So that when we talk about such an infinitely important subject as the Truth, we must not, like thoughtless children, suppose that the first knowledge we may happen to pick up, through sense perception, is truth; no more must we, like conceited, shallow youth, suppose that our knowledge, gathered up by rationalizing the data of sense, through logic, is the truth. These are fallacies of rational immaturity. We can only be justified in taking the sacred name of Truth upon our lips, when we begin to get glimpses of Spiritual

Reality, through rational intuition. We must be sure of more than objectivity and logical coherence, on the plane of sense phenomena, and press beyond into the regions of rational noumena. The real object we are in search of and to know which is the Truth, is not to be found in matter but in mind, not in nature but in spirit, not in Plato's *sensible* but in Plato's *intelligible* world.

It becomes very evident, how it is that the Truth disturbs and pains us. It is because that, as our minds open to it, it attacks and lays bare all sorts of subjective, narrow, tribal, and immature fallacies, to which we have become attached and of which we have become very fond, on account of their appeal to our half-developed minds, or to our personal interests. But this does not make the Truth in itself any less beautiful and happyfying; it rather reveals to reason the impossibility of being content with error, or, in our rational development, of stopping short of the full Beauty of the Truth.

For example, we get ourselves comfortably adjusted to some definite view of life, involving our religious, political, economic convictions, or our ethical standards, and these all settle down and solidify, in our minds, into a fixed system. Then a great discovery is made, there is a progressive movement of thought, political and economic changes occur, because of which, it seems to us that, the foundations of the deep have been broken up, and that we are carried away upon an irresistible and destructive flood. We have been disillusioned. Our conceptions and standards of life made us happy because we identified them with the truth of things, whereas we found our supposed science to be nescience, and so we were cast out of our comfortable adjustments into painful confusions and wanderings. It was a case in which we discovered our knowledge to be false because vitiated by all sorts of subjective illusions, and obscured by rational tribalisms and immaturities; and not a trustworthy knowledge of objective truth, in its totality and spiritual perfection.

Hence, under the stimulus of pain and the expectancy of pleasure, there follows a correction of the false, by reinterpreting the object, in order to gain a larger and better knowledge, which always announces its truthfulness by its coherent Beauty.

All this is the pain of growth, constantly attending the evolution of the mind toward self-realization. It is the inescapable and sacred call of the æsthetical reason, forever proclaiming that we have not

found the Truth, until it reveals itself to be the final and supreme Beauty of Reality.

Science Involves Ethical Principles.

If knowledge is thus intimately related to happiness, or if science is being constantly guided and corrected by certain great underlying principles of art, no less does an inherently intimate relation exist between science and ethics.

Inasmuch as science can never be content with the superficial data of sense, but presses beyond into the realm of intelligible ideas and spiritual Reality, it adopts for the ideal of Truth the æsthetic ideal of an ultimate, harmonious, rational unity among all individual things. But in seeking this ideal the scientist reveals two distinct phases of the moral reason. In his devotion to the truth, he first shows an unquestioning self-abnegation; and, secondly, he is driven far beyond himself into the realm of the universal which, as such, is equally applicable to all.

One of the noblest features of modern science is not the specific intellectual results it has reached, for these have constantly to be modified and enlarged, but that conscientious devotion which, at all hazard, will not be turned aside from seeking the truth, by any tempting considerations of ease or personal preference. Having put his hand to the plow of science, the scientist does not turn back. Forgetting the things which are behind and reaching forward to the things before, he presses toward the mark for the prize of his high calling, which is the Truth. There is here the consecration of religion, an incorruptible faithfulness that endures to the end. This high moral tone, which a true science involves, has been to the modern consciousness a *catharsis*, and an energizing inspiration of the greatest value. It has, indeed, often been a painful discipline for prejudice and individual fancy, but it has cleansed and uplifted. The outcome has always been a larger outlook and a deeper and more secure hold on life.

The moral tone, for example, of a man like Charles Darwin, his humility, his faithfulness and impersonal devotion to the truth, might well be imitated by many a bishop or theologian—no double dealing, no inner reservations, no compromises with popular convention, no straddling of issues, no concessions to personal preference, or the resources of intrenched power, but a single eye and a pure

heart for that path which leads to the light. This sense of downright honesty has been, if we see and feel the deepest and subtlest influence of science, the great moral spirit involved in, and compelled by, its pursuit. The earnest endeavor to find the truth inevitably lifts a man to higher moral levels.

In the second place, the scientist's love of the truth is a disguised love of goodness, for the truth which is the objective basis of beauty, has this fundamental character: its benefits exist impartially for all. Like God, it is no respecter of persons, it favors none because it favors all, and offers its uses and blessings to every being, capable of receiving them. So that, in a very deep sense, to love the truth is to love the good; and to love the good is to will the good.

This renunciation of the subjective and the personal, in behalf of the objective and universal, has been the Gethsemane of science. For, coming out of the Middle Ages, with its preconceptions and subjective thoughts about nature, it has had to fall upon its knees, not without agony, before the Cosmic Truth and exclaim: Not my thought but thine be known. And it is this spirit of humility and obedience that has given to it the exalted character of an all-inclusive objective universalism.

But now, when we have thus concluded that science involves both æsthetical and moral elements, we do not mean that they grow out of the pure theoretical reason, as such; for that, taken merely in itself, only seeks to know the object as it is and, in so far, is purely intellectual. But what is meant is that, since reason is whole and entire in its threefold unity, there is no such thing as the pure theoretical reason in itself—a something manufactured wholly by abstract logic—so that science, however purely we follow it, necessarily carries us over into the values of art, and the universal beneficence of ethics.

Art Involves Science and Ethics: The Art of Food.

Let us now ask how the matter stands with art, which aims at our benefit or pleasure, by seeking that well-being or happiness which grows out of objective beauty; or deals in all the changes and differences of feeling that give value to objective things, and endeavors to develop, refine and construct them into forms that benefit or please.

The artist's beginning is very humble. Food gives man pleasure as well as sustenance, and he finds that he can not only repeat that pleasure but increase and refine it. On this humble plane of mere physical self-preservation, he thus shows himself immeasurably above the animal, and that simply because he is a rational, self-conscious individual, having value in and for himself, such as the animal does not possess. He can, therefore, set up an ideal of gustatory satisfactions, and develop his foods and drinks into artistic forms. Our cook is our first artist and, though the sculptor or musician may not include him in the brotherhood of the *fine* arts, we shall have to admit that much of our health and happiness depends on his æsthetic efforts. If we take into consideration all the human activities of industry, manufacture, and purveyance, involved in the feeling for food, and the consequent volitions to secure and refine it for our welfare and pleasure, we shall be astonished at the large part the food artist takes in developing and maintaining the material side of civilization. The whole vast and complicated process from the raw material to the artistic product of the chef, brings out into activity the intelligence of man in innumerable ways, compels scientific investigation and invention, throws men into industrial and commercial contact, develops wealth, and establishes great world-markets. And all of this terminates in the artist of the kitchen, whose sole business is to give pleasure by meeting the refined taste for food. It must be evident that, when the cook lights his fire to bake his bread or roast his meat, he has compelled a great variety of preliminary activities that involve both intellectual and moral relations. We do not build memorials to him, and yet his humble art necessitates the interplay of rational forces that aid in civilizing man.

The Art of Clothes.

Much the same may be said of raiment. At first a mere necessary comfort, it develops into an art which involves the industries and commerce of the world. But the æsthetico-practical reason enters upon a higher development in the art of clothes than in the art of food, in two particulars. The pleasure of the table, however refined, has grown out of the mere necessity of self-preservation. Raiment, on the other hand, not only serves such an end in protecting the body, but also appeals to the eye and gives pleasure by its colors

and forms. And in doing so, it appeals to certain inner ideals. That is, it comes to symbolize the dignity, the worth, and the social standing of the individual. Symbolize, be it carefully observed, for the thing symbolized may be entirely absent. The dignity that doth hedge a king, is symbolized by his crown and royal purple, which are the fitting signs of one who can rule; but if, beneath the crown and within the purple, there is miserable weakness or incompetence, the symbols are debased into a hollow sham. In such case, we should have to agree with Carlyle that it were better to hang the empty crown and robe on a peg and worship them, for they, at any rate, stand for *something*, while the man stood for *nothing*.

What is more appropriate or significant than the splendid attire of a beautiful woman—the flowers, the jewels, and the silks—the exquisite colors, forms, and precious values, symbolizing the most worshipful object to man! But suppose, as is unfortunately sometimes the case, the woman within is as worthless and empty as an iridescent bubble; the garments, however artistic and beautiful, shrivel into an ironical mockery. Hang them rather on a wire screen, for there they can be taken simply for what they symbolize and deceive nobody.

What is more depressing than a crowd of ragamuffins! The tatters, the uncleanness, the malodor, all indicate idleness, vice, failure, or degrading poverty. On the other hand, what is more pleasing and refreshing than a company of people in appropriate attire! Whether it be the finest creations of the most popular tailor or modiste, or the instinctive taste of the country lass, who knows how to adorn herself with a certain Horatian elegance of simplicity, it is all one. It indicates personal dignity, self-respect, success, prosperity, welfare, happiness; conditions that alone are worthy of man.

Now, in working out this symbolism of clothes, it goes without saying that the intellect has an important part to play, but it is no less evident that a moral element is always involved and at work. For so far as they are artistic, clothes appeal not only to the self but to others. The well-dressed man or woman, *ceteris paribus*, confers a greater favor upon the community than the ill-dressed man or woman. Both show not only self-respect but respect for those around them. If my friend invites me to a feast and I attend in sloven or

inappropriate attire, I do him a wrong which he, in all probability, will resent. The issue, to be sure, is trivial compared with more important considerations—say, if the guest were as celebrated as Dr. Johnson—but nevertheless, it involves a moral element that is not to be overlooked.

The Art of Shelter.

The art of shelter goes a step further, and carries us directly into what we call the fine arts. The house which at first is a mere covering to meet man's necessities and comforts, is not for the protection of the individual alone, as is raiment, but for the family; and, as such, is social in its aim. It, therefore, symbolizes not one person, but a group of persons with common interests. Hence, the architect must furnish not only an appropriate inner shelter for those sacred affections and mysteries of the home which are to burn with a pure and indistinguishable flame, before God, upon the house altar; but also set forth in external, symbolic form the dignity and worth of the family in the community. If things were as they ought to be, each family would have its own home which, in its artistic form, would be as distinctly characteristic as the family itself. Every such house would raise all the æsthetic and moral values of the entire community.

Passing beyond the more restricted interests of the family, the architect must now rear the hall for the city, which symbolizes the *whole* community; and then, the library, the theater, the university, and the cathedral, to express in artistic form all the spiritual interests of man. And it is out of these family and communal relations that rise those highest efforts of sculpture, painting, music, and poetry that give local habitation and a name to all our noblest ideals.

The Fallacy of Tribalism in Art.

Notwithstanding the evident fact that in the function of the artist to benefit and please, beginning in the humblest necessities and moving up, through simple uses of nature and all manner of invention, to the loftiest creations of the fine arts, there is a constant interplay of scientific and moral elements about the central æsthetic motive; we are always in danger of blurring and confusing the mutual interdependence by the fallacy of tribalism. Fixing his entire attention upon the attempt to please, the artist, by creating what is regarded as beautiful, often neglects especially the values of goodness. And

we have seen how whole epochs share this error. The artist and his public will at times draw the hasty conclusion that art may stand quite independent and is to be pursued for its own sake. Beauty, however, does not exist for its own sake any more than truth does. The only thing that stands for its own sake is goodness, and that can not stand alone for, to manifest itself, it must reveal its intent in the beauty of truth.

If we disregard individual and epochal aberrations and take art in its general bearings, we shall find that it necessarily goes over into the realms of science and ethics. The fundamental business and ultimate aim of art is to secure a certain harmonious state of feeling we call pleasure; and the pleasure, as we have found is always the correlate of the known object or known relation among objects. But even then the artistic aim is not brought to its conclusion, until the pleasure is presented to others for their estimation and appreciative enjoyment.

The Fallacy of Immaturity and the Three Stages in Art.

Our understanding of the function of art all depends upon where we are willing to let art rest, or what sort of objects and their correlate pleasures we are going to regard as æsthetically adequate.

We may pause to take our pleasure in the mere sensations that arise from the enjoyment of material objects. I may thus enjoy a temple, a symphony, or a landscape, and see only sensuous beauty.

Or we may demand the pleasure of those manifold emotions that accompany the varied discursive relations among things. Thus I secure a wider and higher enjoyment of the same temple, symphony, or landscape, by distinguishing the relative values, proportions, and inter-relations of its parts; and, in this manner, rise to a view of what we may call logical or intellectual beauty.

Or, finally, we may aspire to that supreme pleasure of an all-satisfying happiness that inevitably results from beholding the truth of things, seen in their relations as constituting a harmonious whole. While thus I may secure great pleasure in viewing the harmonious unity of temple or symphony, it is perhaps only when I see the landscape, as a part of the whole grand cosmic order of things, that the entire range of my feelings is swept by the utmost, noblest pleasures of happiness; for I have seen *intuitional* beauty, I have beheld the objective Truth, I have looked upon the Art of God!

There is a striking illustration of these three ascending phases of

art in the music of Richard Wagner. Music has this advantage—in some aspects, disadvantage—in comparison with the other arts: being vague and incoherent in its forms of expression, it is not compelled, or expected, to present clearly definite ideas and, consequently, is capable of widely different interpretations. The great composer, however, has very definite ideas and, in both his melody and harmony, would represent the correlate emotions which these ideas naturally produce.

Wagner and the Three Stages.

In Wagner, we have the whole range of feeling swept from sensation to happiness. He descends to the flatest realism in the bleating of sheep, the whistle of birds, the roaring of dragons, and the fierce raging of tempests, where our pleasure, if any, is mere sensation. In so far, his art is purely so much naturalistic description, that is, pictorial and sensuous. His widest and most characteristic range, however, is in arousing emotion, and here he deals in all possible human feelings—the vague, gentle moods of melancholy and content; the clear rational emotions of fear, confident hope, just anger, joy, love; and then the tumultuous passions of malicious hatred, unrelenting cruelty, erotic infatuation, and bitter revenge. Here his art becomes intellectual, dealing in logical ideas and their correlate emotions. But in some Pilgrim Chorus or Grail Motif, he takes a loftier flight and bears us, on the wings of his inspiration, into the higher regions of peace and happiness, above the grief and tumult of life, where the soul, absolved and redeemed, dwells in the undisturbed calm and felicity of the Infinite and Eternal. Here his art rises to the intuition of spiritual Reality, because it affords those pleasures that follow upon a vision of the ultimate Truth.

There can be no question that the artist, in pursuing his master aim of giving us pleasure, may play upon sensation and emotion, but to pause there is to commit the fallacy of immaturity. For not until he relates the pleasures of sensation and emotion to, or views them in the light of, the happiness which spiritual Beauty can alone give, has he fulfilled the demands of the æsthetic reason. In so far as he fails to do so, his art is not only immature but false; the enjoyment he offers, an infatuation; and the pleasure, an illusion.

We never tire of nature because, as the noblest, sublimest, and most beautiful work of art within our range of vision, it is an outer

expression of Truth; and when we see it aright, always makes us wiser, better, and happier. So much can not be said of much human art; but when it does hold us, when some Homer, Phidias, Dante, Raphael, Shakespeare, prove their dominance over the mind and heart, it is due to the large way in which they have brought us face to face with Truth.

Shadows of Unreality.

But it is just this sort of consideration that throws us again into confusion. In being faithful to the truth, instead of affording us glimpses of a divine beauty, some of our greatest art portrays the ugliness of human weakness and misery. Artists, especially the dramatist and novelist, seem to batten on whatever is ugly, repulsive and painful; and do so because they would be true to human nature. They portray the selfish struggle of clashing wills; the cruel tyranny of a dark, overwhelming, merciless fate; perhaps, the triumph of wrong or defeat of the right; the mean and petty tragedies of domestic unhappiness; the miseries and sordid vice of a cheerless poverty, or the sensual frivolities of the pampered rich. Such pictures as these do portray life as we actually find it; how then can we say that art, which presents them as true to nature, is beautiful and happifying?

In the first place, the true artist never presents *only* such pictures. He uses them rather as so much material to heighten his leading theme, which is to reveal, lurking somewhere in life, what is really beautiful, the true and the good. If there appear, in his portrayal, the folly and wretchedness of error and wrong-doing, it is only to arouse our pity and execration which are but emotions that, by contrast, reveal our real enjoyment of the true and good. And if he does not succeed in making the true and good triumphant, he only makes them more necessarily condemn the false and evil. Our pleasure is not at all in the false and evil, but in the fact that they have been exposed and denounced not only by their own inherent ugliness but by the ever-present true and good. We take no pleasure in the sorrows of Lear, except as a just rebuke for his senile vanity. We see nothing beautiful in the unfilial hardness of Goneril and Regan, and they have no place in the great dramatist's work, or in life, except to make more lovely, if possible, the exquisite sweetness and charm of Cordelia's modest simplicity, sincere fidelity, and healing love.

We see the workings of this contrast most clearly in the pessimist or cynic, who condemns everything as worthless and false, and who can do so only because he has somewhere in him the highest sense of worthiness and truth. He may be wholly wrong in his judgment of things, but he is inerrant in his conviction that the true and the good, alone, have the value of beauty, while all else is valueless. The mistake these grumblers make is not in denying the beauty of truth and goodness, but in denying that anybody has truth and goodness—not even, perhaps, God!

So that, in general, we must say that, however dark a picture the artist may present, although he may not be vividly conscious of purposely contrasting the ugliness of error and sin with the beauty of truth and goodness, he is, nevertheless, led to do so by an infallible, æsthetic instinct, in the choice and construction of his work.

In the second place, the actual, which the artist presents as the truth of nature, is not necessarily real. Facts and their relations may be set forth as we see them, but it does not follow that we see them aright. In the development of our rational consciousness, in its varied intellectual, æsthetic, practical, and moral interests, from sense to intuition, it is quite possible that any set of facts, or section of experience, we may choose for artistic treatment, does not correspond to the truth of things. So that, when our most faithful devotee of realism or naturalism has given us his replica of life, we must recall what was concluded about incoherent and unrelated facts (p. 126) and say to him: Granting that you have been true to the facts, are the facts true? The reader will discern that we are always making the same demand of the artist as of the scientist, and that is, to guard against the fallacies of tribalism and immaturity. He must get his relation to the sum of things, and he must carry the pleasure which he would give, beyond sensation and emotion into the regions of happiness, before he can appeal to our suffrages for the beauty of his art. We shall not be too exacting and demand too much; for if the scientist can only give us glimpses of Truth, the artist can only give us glimpses of Beauty. But, at the same time, we expect of him that subtle divination of his calling by which his art shall present for our use and enjoyment some genuine phase of that ideal loveliness which reposes in the bosom of spiritual Reality.

If he meets this condition, we shall not be concerned much whether he is a realist or an idealist. For, as a true artist, his realism,

however painful and unlovely in its bare actuality, will, by revealing how things ought *not* to be, only the more clearly emphasize the reality of the ideal, or show how they *ought* to be. If, on the other hand, he chooses to be an idealist, it will not be to present the non-realizable and undesirable fancies of a superficial optimism, but to convince us deeply that, amid the transience, confusion, and irrationality of the present and the actual, there is an unchanging order of Truth and Goodness which is the only real Beauty of the world, and which, however much concealed and obscured, must ultimately come to be known and enjoyed.

Realism and Idealism in Hellenic Art.

The realist gives to the course of events artistic form and lets it convey what lessons it may; the idealist shows us what the lesson is or what the course of events ought to be. We have in the art of Greece very perfect developments of both these artistic attitudes.

In the Greek tragedy, for example, life is seen under the sway of an inexorable fate, and the events march on in an irresistible order just as they do in actual experience to the bitter end. Orestes or Oedipus, once caught in the fatal stream, can not extricate himself or turn back from the appointed doom. This Hellenic manner of art revealed an unapproached technical finish of style and a consistent unity of plan. But its essential virtue lay in being a faithful record of the actual discipline of life. It did not create or select its material to illustrate a tendency, it did not pretend to set up ideals; it simply remained faithful to the objective course of things into which destiny had thrown man.

The value of this uncompromising realism is evident. In presenting the actual, unmodified by subjective tendencies, the dramatist has rightly suppressed his own preachments and allowed the logic of events to enforce its own unavoidable lessons. This is the true realism of experience where life, as it plays itself out on the stage of our earthly existence, instructs us, without the interpolation of artifices and theories of our own. Taken thus, the Greeks learned lessons of humility and submission to a supreme order, before which man's strength, as well as his weakness, is as withered grass. But, in this awful chain of necessity, the dramatist does not fail to justify the value of his art by depicting the ugliness of wrong-doing and the beauty of virtue. There is something sublime in men who, in the

face of a merciless fate, maintain their courage, without the hope of success and their faithfulness, in spite of defeat. It is the greatness of man, rising above the seen and the actual, into the clearer regions of the invisible ideal.

While here and there, as in Aeschylus, we may find a trace of ethical monotheism, according to which there is some hope of forgiveness and redemption, the Greek drama, as a whole, was naturally the reflection of the classical world-view, that of a fatalistic order which not even the gods could change or escape, and to which all must, as best they could, submit. We might be permitted the anachronism of calling it the Hellenic Calvinism, with its sublime acquiescence in the stern and fixed determinism of the changeless and inexorable decrees of destiny. So long as such a world-view is held as ultimate, so long as no way is seen by which the suffering Prometheus can be unbound, the Greek portrayal of reality is the highest form of dramatic art; not in the fullest sense of the term beautiful—except on the side of technic—for beauty must stand for the whole of truth which the Greeks did not have, but as faithful to the best it knew, and touched throughout with a certain solemn and majestic sublimity. It was a perfect artistic presentation of the grand conception of immutable law, unilluminated by the thought of an evolution, moving toward a great end. To become possessed with such a thought, the Greek would need to have been endowed with what he did not have—but which the Hebrew had—an ethical genius, to give to Reality the interpretation of a great moral purpose.

But this statement demands a certain qualification, when we turn to the plastic arts of Hellas. If Greek art in the drama attained an imitative perfection, in reproducing life as it actually is, and in so far met the claims of science; Greek art, in architecture and sculpture was idealistic and presented life as it ought to be, satisfying thus the claims of ethics. Here the dominating thought was the conception of man's life as a divine, harmonious perfection, or rather of the divine, as perfect humanity. In this way, Hellenic art won a triumph for the ideal, which the drama failed consciously to attain, and which Plato secured for Greek thought in his philosophy.

We see, for example, in the Apollo of the Vatican, in the Venus of the Louvre, in the noble sculptures of the Parthenon at Athens and London, or in the Hermes at Olympia, what we may regard either as the human form perfected or divinized; or the immortal gods

humanized. Man is idealized into a god or the god is realized in man. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation, by which God is represented as taking human form, is the product of the Hellenic, rather than of the Hebrew genius.

This union of the human and divine, formally considered, stands for the greatest attainment of Greek creative art, or of any art, which thus does not rest helpless before the remediless actual as an inexorable fate, but sets up the gracious and alluring ideal of perfection, to draw man on to his self-realization as divine, and as belonging to that supreme harmonious order of things which constitutes an ineffable beauty.

Christian Ideals Enter into Art.

But, having thus settled the form that idealistic art must take, by presenting the perfection of human beauty, the still more important problem of content the Greeks were unable to solve. That is, granting that man is to be divine, as the divine is man, how, we must ask, are we to conceive man and the divine, or what content are we to give them in our artistic representations? It is at this point that we must understand clearly the Hebrew element in the Incarnation. While the Greek brought God down, and clothed him in a beautiful human form; the Hebrew raised man up and made him the son of God, clothed in the spiritual perfections of his divine origin. The Greek interpreted God in the term of the perfect natural man; the Hebrew interpreted man in the terms of a perfected god. Or to state it in still another way, the Hellenic Kingdom of God was entirely *of* earth, it was the harmonious beauty of the perfected, natural world. The Hebrew Kingdom of God was the Kingdom of Heaven so brought to the earth, as to transform and lift up the world of nature into the world of Spirit. The harmonious beauty of life which presented itself to the Hellenic mind, through a purely *theoretical* and *aesthetic* interpretation of Reality, was now to receive its ultimate content, through the Hebrew *ethical* interpretation of Reality.

This content was infused into the world of Græco-Roman culture by the Christian moral consciousness, in the early centuries of our era. God, the Absolute Reality, could no longer be thought of simply as Truth and Beauty, but as the Will of Eternal Goodness; the real man now becomes the son of God, full of grace and truth.

and the real world is transfigured into a revelation of Divine Love. From now on, we begin to understand why Reality, as Truth, is the supreme Beauty of man and the world. It is because Truth manifests the Will of Eternal Goodness, in nature and in history.

It was long before Christian art came to itself and realized that beautiful forms are the only true apparel of inner, divine attributes. It was, however, a tremendous gain for man's spiritual development that Christian thought was, at first, centered almost exclusively upon the invisible world of spiritual realities. For while from without, no external beauty, or theoretical truth, can form or create inner goodness; once plant the spiritual idea within, and it will, sooner or later, take on the appropriate beautiful form as the real expression of truth.

This is indeed what happened, first, in the adaptation of the old classical types, in the Romanesque and Byzantine art; then, in that wonderful outburst of artistic genius of the thirteenth century, culminating in the so-called Gothic cathedral; and, finally, in the full bloom and glory of the Renaissance.

It is in the Gothic where we may say that Christian art first comes to a free expression of itself. In the Gothic cathedral, which, although imperfect and incomplete as it is in many details, is, taken all in all, perhaps the greatest and noblest product of creative art in the world, we have the Christian consciousness, as it had been developed among Germanic peoples, escaping, for the first time, from the ancient trammels and seeking to express, in a natural way, its inner ideals of freedom and heaven-soaring aspiration. The sculptures of those great churches can not for a moment be compared, in point of artistic technic, with those of the Parthenon or Erechtheon, but when the expressive attitudes, and especially the faces are regarded, we find ourselves in a new and higher world. Through the crude figures of the Gothic artist, there shines out the deep meaning of an inner spiritual life which the Greek marbles in no way reveal. The Beau Dieu of Amiens, the figure of Christ at the main portal of the Cathedral, as a work of composition and artistic finish, can not be put in the same class with the Zeus Oricoli or the Apollo Belvedere, but when it comes to spiritual meaning, the Beau Dieu has a depth and significance of which a Phidias or a Praxitelles never dreamed.*

* There is here no intention of attributing the Zeus and Apollo to Phidias and Praxitelles, respectively, but merely of suggesting the different epochs to which two representative works belong.

There is the benignity of an infinite compassion for sin and weakness, a profound sympathy with sorrow, the strength of an unvarying gentleness, the power of an all-embracing love, with hope, forgiveness healing, and redemption for all. Apollo, with his sun-lit arrows might enlighten the world; and Zeus, the heaven-father, with his god-like dignity and arbitrary benevolence, might rule the world but it is the Christ alone that can save the world. And that is what the world needs. If ever man *can* extricate himself from cruel fate, from the realistic tragedy of his sin and sorrow, and reach his divine ideal of harmonious beauty, it is only the art, represented in the Beau Dieu, that will enable him to do so.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the spirit of the Greek genius for beauty, in its fulness and power, swept upon the modern world in the Renaissance, Christian art culminated in the harmonious reconciliation between content and form which makes *truth* the expressed *beauty* of *goodness*. The great artists of that epoch reconciled Hebraism and Hellenism, in their portrayals, by showing us the truth that the holiest and best are the most beautiful. We can never too deeply impress upon our minds the significant fact that the canvases of such artists as Titian, Correggio, Leonardo Raphael, and Buonarroti, at their best, give to the Hebrew and Christian saints all the visible beauty of the Greek gods. The prevailing tendency of the Middle Ages, with its irrational dualism was to make the saints as ugly and repellent in form as possible under the ascetic conviction that the earthly life is evil and the heavenly life alone good. They saw no way and no hope of bringing to realization the kingdom of Heaven on earth. But the great artist of the Renaissance transformed the earth into the beautiful garment of God. In so doing, they made beauty truly spiritual and thus in a great way, as never before, they revealed to the world the union of ideal Beauty and ideal Goodness, as the artistic realism of objective Truth.

Modern Realism, Subservient to Idealism.

In the presence of this great lesson, modern realism may be as actual as it will, but it can no longer present the picture of a hopeless destiny, or an inexorable fate. The realist, in setting vividly before us the wretchedness and misery of life, must know that he is portraying for us not the truth of reality but the illusion of unreality.

and the more faithful he is to his realism, the more irresistibly is he driving us to the ideal, as the only real. In the searching light of his realistic actualities, the artist is revealing the brutality of injustice, the titanic wrongs of selfishness, the paltry weaknesses of envy and pride, and the whole inner contradiction and self-destruction of lust and ill-will.

This realism forces us to look to idealism by a sort of negative appeal. It drives man to heaven, by uncovering the horrors of hell. It makes him profoundly feel that his actual life, in its discord, confusion, failure, and suffering, is in some way false, by convincing him that what he calls the real is unreal. It justifies the mocking lines of Gay, inscribed as the epitaph upon his own tomb in Westminster Abbey:

"Life is a jest; and all things show it:
I thought so once, but now I know it."

Or explains the bitterness of Rabelais when, on coming to die, he exclaimed: "Draw the curtain, the farce is over." It confirms the deep religious conviction of the vanity and frailty of human life, with "the whole head sick and the whole heart faint" (Is. i, 5). "Man that is born of woman," complains the afflicted Job, "is of few days and full of trouble" (Job xiv, 1). "Behold," cries the penitent Psalmist, "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Ps. li, 5).

Realistic art sets forth the profound truth of pessimism, taking on an artistic form; and, while it has only the force of a negation, it presents vividly that side of life which must always appear as error and illusion.

This is what led Balzac, who swept the whole range of human experience and saw it with the keen vision of a prophet, to name his portrayals of life, the "Comedie Humaine." A tragedy to us, bitter and deep, when we take it, in our infatuation, as real; but a comedy, nevertheless, for it reveals the ludicrous, self-deceptions and sophisticated chicaneries we practice upon ourselves, amid illusion and unreality.

It is in this view of realism, that satire and ridicule have their place, as legitimate instruments of truth. Happy, if we are keen enough to feel that the satirist is lashing our sophistries over the shoulders of others. Wit, with its sharp, cruel, merciless thrusts, may here justify itself, by riddling pretentious error and folly. And humor,

too, although a criticism, shot through with kindness which salves with gentle sympathy while it wounds, may serve its end, by revealing our incongruous faults and absurd inconsistencies.

It would be the gravest mistake to believe that those who depict human weakness and folly do not see where there is the wisdom and strength of truth and goodness. Rabelais's withering mockeries, or Swift's mordent satire, did not mean an unbelief in what is truly great and real, but a deep and repellent disgust at the actual, which is not real. That Balzac saw something more than the human comedy, one may be convinced by turning to his "Louis Lambert" and "Seraphita." Some one has well said of Thackeray that, while he takes us through "Vanity Fair," he has his eye upon the Celestial City.

And, after all, is there not something worthy of sarcastic scorn and satirical rebuke in a life full of petty lusts, aimless ambitions, pompous pretenses, and the brutalities of selfish struggle? Is there not even something incongruous and laughable in deformity, disease, and sorrow? Are these real, and are they to be taken seriously as ultimate? Or are they not rather the unlovely progeny of our own error, superstition, lust, and ill-will, out of which we ought to be lashed with whips of shame? If they *are* ultimate, then it is wanton cruelty, even to notice them. But if they are only phases of human weakness, the repulsive actual side of life, as it ought not to be, then the artist is justified in using all the resources of his genius to expose them as deceptive illusions.

But no! let us not be too harsh. Life hurts too much! While we are in the midst of the play and take it, like children, to be real, let us be serious and grave; for to make sport of the ills of life, when they are thought to be real, would be a sacrilege. Only when we shall at last look back upon them, standing secure on the shores of the Infinite Truth, may we fill eternity with a deep, resonant, titanic laughter at what fools we mortals have been.

It was with some such meaning as this that the great poet, pondering the vanities of this our mortal existence, made the wise and experienced Prospero say to the young Ferdinand:

"Our revels now are ended: these our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and
Are melted into air, into thin air:
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,

Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve;
 And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
 Leave not a rack behind: We are such stuff
 As dreams are made of, and our little life
 Is rounded with a sleep."

("Tempest" iv, 1.)

This is the meaning of modern realism, in the light of a Christian consciousness, that recognizes no Beauty but Truth, and no Truth but an objective manifestation of Goodness.

But whatever may be the negative function of a realistic art, in exposing the unloveliness of the actual, art as such, in its plenitude, has the absolute, positive aim of drawing us to heaven by revealing the supreme loveliness of Reality. Just as science, amid the chaotic confusion of things, must search out the truth, so art, amid the discord and suffering of life, must give expression to the alluring form of beauty. In so doing, her chief business is to transcend the actual, the so-called real, and present the ideal as the only real: and any art which does not imply, in its negative aspects, and make plain, in its positive aspects, the ultimate beauty and triumph of the ideally real, is illegitimate and false.

The ultimate relation thus established, between science and art, does not rest upon a knowledge of mere technical methods, but upon that mature rational intuition of the truth and the reality of life, which raises man above its passing errors and illusions. It is only with such an insight that the artist can *feel* aright, and *will* those noble creations that ever console, inspire, and exalt our human existence.

If then science, or a knowledge of truth, must form the content of art, Plato was right long ago, when he declared that the beautiful, in reality, is the true; and that, consequently, the vision of truth fills the soul with the ecstasy of an ineffable happiness. It was with deep satisfaction that upon this ground, we found the modern, empirical Huxley and the ancient, idealistic Plato in complete accord (p. 72).

Ethics Involved in Art.

Although we have been trying to consider, just now, simply the relation existing between science and art, the reader will have seen that we could not help repeatedly bringing in goodness, the subject-matter of ethics. In presenting the true, as the only harmonious and

beautiful, the artist is always giving us the plainest evidence of goodness. But we wish now more particularly, to show how this relation is revealed both in the *spirit* and in the *aim* of the artist's work.

In every true artist, we shall find what we found in the scientist, viz.: the pursuit of something *beyond* the immediate impression of things. And then, on the score of his own special vocation, we find him endeavoring to give expression to ideas and forms that rise *above* experience. And for this beyond and above he often shows a faithful devotion and self-sacrifice that amounts to a religion.

Murger, in his classical little volume, depicting Bohemian life in the Parisian atelier, gives pathetic accounts of young artists who sleep in open squares, live on such crusts as they can pick up, endure all manner of hardships and sacrifices for the sake of their ideal, much as the Christian saint or martyr bears all things to attain heaven. This concentration of an unswerving effort, this will to reach his goal, is of the nature of moral integrity, and the artist himself feels it to be such. He counts all things loss, that he may win his art. And he knows that such devotion as this alone will be attended by success. Let him turn aside for a moment, under the mere stress of bread-winning, to make what he contemptuously calls pot-boilers and he confesses with shame, his own self-degradation, which his art reflects. He steps aside from his ideal and yields to the demand of an unrefined popular taste, he caters to the peoples' desire for idle entertainment; and, although they reward him with a golden harvest, he despises them and himself, and takes no real pleasure in their applause, nor does he find satisfaction in his own work. Why is this? Because he knows, in the depth of his being, that his call has the sacredness of a moral ideal, and to be unfaithful to that is debasement. Mr. Browning, in his "Andrea del Sarto," has given us the tragic picture of that "perfect artist" who is agonized by the knowledge that he is being drawn away from what he could and ought to do by the weakness of an unworthy love. There are no pains of hell more poignant than these. They are the thoughts of a traitor who has sold out, and betrayed his sacred trust for a debased coin.

The Aim of Art and Ethics, One.

But besides this spirit of the artist, which must show the integrity of moral faithfulness, his work reveals its close affinity to ethical

aims. In fact, at very bottom, the aim of art is one and the same with that of ethics. The artist creates his work for the express purpose of benefiting or pleasing, and its value, or "goodness," is in proportion to the attainment of this purpose. But this is precisely the aim of the moralist, who, from an outstreaming heart of good-will, would benefit or please. The difference between the two is that, while the artist, as an individual person, may will to benefit or please without any definite reference as to whom he will benefit or please but himself, and so remain an egoist; the moralist must, of necessity, go beyond himself to others, and thus always be an altruist. The artist *can* remain selfish and still be an artist, but the moralist *must* be unselfish, or cease to be: without love, he is nothing.*

A simple illustration may help us to see more clearly, both the identity of and the distinction between the æsthetic and the moral good. Little Boy Blue says that his stick of candy is "good." Alexander, for the same reason—his æsthetic capacity of enjoying what he liked—said the world was "good." Both cry for more, when the original stick and the original world are consumed. The only difference between the two is that of quantity—the size of what each considers to be "good."

So it is with food, raiment, shelter, invention and all the forms of amusement and art. They are "good" because, to our æsthetic capacity of feeling value in things, they give us satisfaction, in meeting our wants or in fulfilling our desire for pleasure. So that all nature, and all invention and artistic modifications of nature are "goods," so far as they are useful to us or contribute in any way to our welfare, enjoyment, or happiness.

We are not, however, to suppose that a man necessarily regards everything that pleases him and in which he, therefore, indulges as a "good" for him. He clearly enough recognizes the difference between what merely pleases and what benefits, as well as the converse, between what pains and what injures. He knows that sometimes what pleases, injures him, and what pains, benefits him. Of this, he becomes aware when he learns that his pleasure is taken in a false object, or in an object that, in the end, will prove to be a "bad" and not a "good." But although he has been thus enlightened and

*Of course, no reference is here made to the *scientific* moralist, who constructs codes of ethics or speculates on ethical subjects—all that belongs to the theoretical reason—but to the *practical* moralist, who *wills*—not merely *thinks*—the good of others in daily life.

reason outruns desire, he nevertheless indulges, because the immediate pleasure appeals to him as a "good," which he prefers to enjoy now, in preference to some future "good," which can only be secured by the present, painful discipline of self-control. He mortgages the Future, in order to raise spending money for the Present. He seizes an immediate sensation or emotion, rather than take the risk of a remote happiness.

In any case, it is a question of satisfaction or pleasure to himself, and his fundamental problem is always, as to whether the object that pleases ought to please, that is, whether his subjective pleasure arises from a real objective "good."

In all this, it is evident that we are not dealing with the moral good at all, but with the æsthetic good; and that our sole concern is to make sure that our subjective pleasure correlates with some genuine objective beauty, or a beauty that arises from knowing truth or an element of truth. And so long as we remain here, we are wholly egoistic, asking simply what we shall secure or what receive to please or happify ourselves

But the moral good reverses all that. Little Boy Blue, first, calls the stick of candy, "good," because it pleases him; then, he reflects upon the source whence this linked sweetness emanates, and calls his mother "good," because she gave it him. This is a new kind of goodness—the good-will of the mother to please her little boy. Or, if she had refused the candy, it would have been from the same good-will, because her larger knowledge saw that the following night the candy would have proved to be a "bad," in producing various, digestive unpleasantnesses for the little man.

Now, while the boy's sense of goodness or badness, in the candy, was wholly æsthetic and egoistic, the mother's sense of goodness and badness was ethical and altruistic. Her question was one of benefit or pleasure, not to herself, but to another. And this is the center and core of the moral good—a will of good, streaming out to benefit or please others.

To be sure, the mother's pleasure lies in doing good to *her* child, but while that gives æsthetic value to the act for *her*, it does not make her egoistic, except only, in so far, as it might affect other children, in the pleasures to which they are entitled. The fundamental nature of good-will to *anybody*, but more especially to *everybody*, is simply to take pleasure in going out of the self to benefit or please others.

But this is precisely the aim of art. While, as we have seen, the æsthetic good may be pursued for one's self, and the artist, as an individual, may be an egoist, *art itself* necessarily passes beyond any individual reference and becomes a universal good.

The rich connoisseur may buy Shakespeare's house or pay fabulous prices for early editions, for his own enjoyment and the pride of displaying them to his friends; or Shakespeare himself, in writing his immortal plays, may have been actuated, more or less, by a shrewd sense of thrift, but Shakespeare's art, so far as it is true art, belongs to all men; and the poorest may, for a penny, possess himself of "Lear," or "Hamlet," or "The Tempest," and freely enjoy the great poet at his best.

What forces itself most clearly upon us, in considering the relation of art and ethics, is that the supreme business of art is to bring about just those æsthetico-practical conditions of "good," which it is the supreme business of ethics, with its will of good, to confer upon all. In other words, the æsthetic good becomes the moral good, when the egoistic will is transformed by, and taken up into, the altruistic and the universal will.

Ethics Involve Science and Art.

Thus far, we have come to see how there is no science by itself—except as a subject of logical analysis—and likewise no art by itself, but that in their concrete reality, and of necessity, they both go beyond themselves and involve: the one, art and ethics, and the other, science and ethics. We must now endeavor to understand how the matter lies with ethics.

Although, in experience, ethics often shows indifference and even hostility to science and art, we shall not be surprised to find this state of things arising again out of tribalism and immaturity in thought.

We have seen how when man concentrates his attention on goodness alone, as in Israel, science and philosophy, invention and art, suffer; and how the saint, in his extravagant ecstasies or in his disillusionments, finds the world to be vanity and concludes that the wisdom of man, that is, science and philosophy, is foolishness with God, or that art is a snare of the devil. There have been and still are Christian communities in which the endeavor is made to follow the literal teachings of Jesus; and, where fanaticism does not invade, the results are a sort of admirable gentleness and peace. But these

communities have no vital connection with the great, ongoing world. Out of them come no productive scientists, inventors, or artists that advance, enlighten, improve, or beautify life. They furnish no inspiration or guidance for a progressive civilization, and if left to them, society would sink back into a dull, unvarying, and fixed routine. And yet they share in the advantages of a progress which they do not further, or even oppose. They have committed the sin of divorcing their goodness from science and art, which God has forever joined together, and life has taken vengeance upon them by closing their eyes to her mystic treasures. If experience teaches us anything, it teaches us that Israel, which embodied the will of good, separated from the intelligence and appreciation for truth and beauty, so characteristic of Hellas, has never and can never master the world. The Parthenon on the Acropolis has its sacred values for the spiritual life of man, as well as the Sermon on the Mount. For if the Sermon stands for the will that impels men *to want* to do the perfect, the Parthenon stands for the knowledge of means and the fine appreciative skill that enable men actually to *do* the perfect. If I conclude that the Hebrew dream of a Kingdom of God on the earth, with its universal good-will, is the ultimate form of human society and I look about for means of realizing it, Greece can alone teach me all those concrete forms of truth and beauty in which that Kingdom can be brought to actual realization.

This indissoluble relation lies in the very nature of the case. Let my good-will toward others be infinite, but taken alone it is a blind, helpless, and even destructive force, doing injury where it would benefit, and causing sorrow where it would make glad. History is full of instances where men and movements have had a zeal for righteousness; but it has been a zeal, not according to knowledge. I must know what means to employ (science), and how to employ them (art), in order to effect my purposes of good (ethics).

If a son ask his father for bread, will he give him a stone; or if he ask for an egg will he give him a scorpion? Most assuredly not, because he already knows that the stone or the scorpion will not benefit his son and accomplish the purpose of his good-will. But, unfortunately the father does not always have this knowledge, and gives his son the stone for bread and the scorpion for an egg. Yet there can be no question about his good-will, which has no end and streams out toward his son day and night; but his knowledge of what

is "good" for that son is sadly defective, so that he injures instead of benefiting him, and although he may at first please, he ultimately sends him to sorrow or ruin. The cause of this fatal mistake is ignorance in the theoretical reason, or incapacity in the æsthetic reason, and not lack of good-will in the ethical reason.

And this lesson applies to every moral effort, wherever men with good-will, undertake to benefit or please others. Knowledge or science, and capacity or art, are absolutely necessary to give content and form to the ethical act.

To revert to the mother and her little boy: she must be a scientist and artist to know the ingredients of candy and to be able skilfully to combine them, before she can confer a concrete "good" upon her boy. Or if she is not equal to this, she must engage the humble scientist and artist of the kitchen, in order to effect her benevolent purpose. If, out of love, I would confer upon the idol of my heart, the whole world or God's heaven, I must either be scientist and artist enough myself, first to create the world or heaven, or else I must get God, the Infinite Scientist and Artist, to do it for me. Whether I have the knowledge and capacity myself or must engage them from another, they are indispensable to my will of good which, without them, remains purely nothing.

Summary and Conclusion.

We see then the absolute unity of knowing, feeling, and willing, in all the activities of reason. Ethics, as the Will of Good, stands for the creative, causal purpose of life; science, as the knowledge of Truth, stands for the very substance, through which that causal purpose acts; and art, as feeling and capacity, stands for the form and effect, or æsthetic end of harmonious Beauty, which that same purpose of good takes on or seeks to attain

But if we are not to mistake the unity, we must not confound the trinity. The good-will is not knowledge, and knowledge is not feeling and capacity, but each is a distinct function, though always implying and necessitating the other two, in the absolute unity of reason. And it is of the first importance to make this threefold unity of reason clear to our minds, if we would be able to give anything like a rational interpretation to life, or in any way, understand the meaning of man, the world, and God.

To know and understand the world (science and philosophy),

in order to master and use it for his welfare and happiness (invention and art), man must cooperate with man, in mutual service, according to the cosmic law of goodness (ethics). And, as the world and man find their relation and ground in the Infinite and Eternal Reality (God), science, art, and ethics, in their unity, constitute religion.

Hence, we see how it is that all our rational confusions and conflicts arise out of the rational fallacies of tribalism and immaturity. Our science is not true enough, when it pauses at sense or logic, which is but sense rationalized; our art is not beautiful enough, when it pauses at sensation or emotion, which is but sensation rationalized; and our ethics is not good enough, when it pauses at egoism or altruistic laws of justice, which is but egoism rationalized. Only when rational intuition brings us to a vision of the Truth, do we behold it as the ultimate and supreme Beauty of the Cosmos, revealing the Absolute Goodness of God.

No science is valid that does not lead to the Beauty of objective Truth, in which is manifest the integrity and purpose of Goodness; no art is genuine that does not rest upon principles of science, and attain the goal aimed at by the Will of Good; and no ethics is imperative, or possible, which does not master science, in order to secure, as its supreme end, a divine, harmonious Beauty for all.

Even if we can not know all the sciences, master all the arts, and accomplish all the good in the world; we can, by understanding the unity of science, art, and ethics, and by keeping an open mind and heart to Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, at least, be counted among the Chosen People who, in the service of Yahweh, the Eternal, would take the Promised Land; or, at any rate, not be numbered with the Philistine worshippers of Dagon, a deified fish.

Up to this point, we have been engaged with the problems that center about the rational subject's powers of thought, feeling, and will; and have found them one, in the unity of Reason. We must now turn to a new set of problems, arising out of the subject's attempt to give the object before him a threefold interpretation, correspondent to his threefold rational powers.

BOOK IV.

THE THREEFOLD INTERPRETATION OF REASON.

I. INTERPRETATION OF THE THEORETICAL REASON.

CHAPTER I.

THE UNITY OF SUBSTANCE AND CAUSE.

IN dealing with the rational, self-conscious subject, it has been necessary to guard against tribalism and immaturity, or more positively stated, to take reason in the *totality* of its threefold powers, and in the *spiritual completeness* of its intuitions. It will be just as necessary, in any rational interpretation of the object, to view it not only from every possible standpoint, but also in terms of an entirely self-realized reason. That is, if we are going to be serious about interpreting the objective cosmos, we must first do so not only from the theoretical or intellectual, but also from the æsthetical and moral points of view—life must be looked upon with the eye of the saint and artist, as well as with that of the scientist; and, secondly, we dare not pause at any stage of sense or logic, but must press on toward the all-pervading light of rational intuition.

These remarks are so obvious as to make them seem needless or gratuitous. But we shall find ourselves, as well as our fellow men, so frequently falling into all sorts of tribalisms and immaturities as to deserve and be profited by fair warning. Moreover, when it is considered that the only possible way of knowing anything about the object, or of giving to it any interpretation at all, is through reason and its powers of thought, feeling, and will, it is of primary importance that every avenue of approach to the truth be thrown open, kept unobstructed and free, and followed to the end.

Therefore, we shall not allow ourselves to regard any interpretation of the object as rationally adequate, until it can be expressed in terms of thought, feeling, and will, when they are viewed in the light of sense, logic, *and* intuition.

The Threefold Object of Thought: Man, the World, and God.

If we revert to the evolutionary process, outlined at the beginning, we shall find, arising out of it, all our present problems. There is,

in the first place, man himself, rising to self-conscious, rational otherness; and, in the second place, there is necessarily the world, which comes into view as the object confronting him. Then, in the third place, since self-consciousness has raised him above the world of nature, as represented in his own physical organism, into the world of rational spirit, man must regard the object before him, not simply as the *natural* world-order, but as some backlying, *supra-natural* Intelligence and Power, mysteriously akin to his own. Man, the World, and God are then the objects of our interpretation, and the problem before us is to discover, if possible, what they are, what their relation one to the other, and what their ultimate meaning.*

The High Destiny before Man.

So far as man is concerned, we have already found him to be the self-conscious subject whose reason, in its threefold capacity of knowing, feeling, and willing, unfolds from sense through logic to intuition, toward a self-realization which means nothing less than to think the Cosmic Thought, will the Cosmic Will, and thus enter into the enjoyment of the Cosmic Harmony. And this high destiny for man seems to have been the inevitable outcome of the whole evolutionary plan.

From the midst of the great inorganic world-order there first arose vital organisms, as plants, endowed with a *sensitive* intelligence, watchful of individual interests. Then, above the sensitive plant, in the progressive unfoldment, there emerged the *conscious* animal, capable of knowing its objects and of adjusting itself to them. Finally, *self-conscious* man appears who, resuming within himself, as a replica of the cosmos, the whole evolutionary plan, and knowing himself as well as, and over against, his objects, is raised above the natural into the supra-natural world-order, where, as a rational being, his evolution passes beyond the outer, sensible into the inner, intelligible process, and becomes a progressive understanding of, and adjustment to, the Thought and Power which manifests itself in the visible world. Hence, to interpret the world and God aright, constitutes the maturity of man's spiritual self-realization, and is the

*These three prime objects, in one form or another, have always engaged the thought of man, from the crudest to the most refined, except where thought itself has become confused and lost in the petty and meticulous details of its own sophistications.

goal of his rational evolution. In the natural order of logic, we begin with the theoretical interpretation.

Necessity of Knowing the Concept

In tracing the course of world-evolution, the most striking feature we observed in it was its character as a rational plan, unfolding toward some definite end. And this applied not only to the whole but to its constituent elements. Whether we took the simplest cell, the most complex and highly developed animal, or the entire cosmos, we found it to be an idea, a concept, embodied as a concrete organism, with its coherently related parts and its cycle of functional changes, obviously making for the accomplishment of some rational purpose. We had reason therefore to conclude that, to understand any given object, it is necessary to know the concept or idea which underlies it, and which it concretely manifests. In a word, the secret of all theoretical interpretation lies in knowing the concept. So that to understand, or to interpret, the objective Cosmos, is to know the Grand Cosmic Idea or Concept which it embodies or sets forth—embodies and sets forth in two clearly distinct yet intimately related modes; first, as *static being*, with its parts interrelated according to rational law; and, secondly, as a *kinetic becoming*, unfolding in a rational progressive order toward some great end.

The Morphology of the Concept.

Now, if we ask ourselves what is the character of such an organic concept or idea, we shall find it to be its unity, not in the sense of its mathematical oneness—it indeed is that as an individual object—but the rational coherence of its parts in such reciprocal relations as to form a harmonious whole.

This unity necessarily concerns those two distinct and never unrelated modes of the object, already indicated, which together constitute the very nature of the object in its entirety. That is, we view it as something objectively existent, as *being*, or regard the object as a *substance*; and as something acting, as a dynamic *becoming*, or regard the object as a *cause*.

Adapting to our use the nomenclature of the biologist, whose especial business is the study of living organisms, we might call the substantial unity of the organic concept its *anatomy*, meaning thereby

the structural relation of its parts, simply existing as spatial forms in juxta-position. Its causal unity, we might call its *physiology*, meaning thereby the time-relation of its parts in the reciprocal interaction of their purposive functions. Taking the unity of the organism in its substantial, causal entirety, we might call that its *morphology*, which stands for the doctrine of both the substantial, spatial form and the causal, temporal function, or for the rational concept, or idea, as a whole, in its entire meaning and life.

Thus anatomy tells us *that* and *what* the organism is in its substantial nature and spatial forms; physiology tells *how* it is in its temporal functions and causal activities; and morphology tells *why* it is as it is, and *acts* as it acts, by presenting to us, in all its forms and functions, the fully self-realized organism as a whole.

So absolute is this unity of the entire organism, that we shall never know its morphology until we know its substantial space aspects in its anatomy, and its causal time aspects in its physiology; nor shall we ever know its anatomy and physiology until we know its morphology. That is, while we may reach a certain conception of substantial unity or of causal unity among things, we shall not understand either adequately until we know the *unity* of substance *and* cause.

Our approach to such a complete interpretation of the object must necessarily be tentative, and our attempts provisional. We first form a synthetic concept, a generalization, a hypothesis, that is, rationally guess the morphology of the thing, so as to know what to look for in its anatomy and physiology; and then allow our more careful investigations of the anatomy and physiology to correct and clear up our preliminary morphological surmise. Our method of procedure will, therefore, be both deductive and inductive; deductive, in order to give our induction an aim; and inductive, in order to correct, enlarge, and finally realize our deduction.

In general, we may say, the diversity and relation of the parts can be understood only in the light of the whole, and the whole can be known only in the light of the diversity and relation of its parts. Thus, we shall never know substances until we know substance, and we shall come to know substance through substances. We shall never know causes until we know cause, and we shall come to know cause through causes. And we shall not know the object in its organic unity until we know the diversity of substance and cause in

their manifold qualities and efficient manifestations, reduced to one rational coherence.

The Cosmic Organism.

The one great objective organism that presents itself for our rational interpretation is the Cosmos. Here we have something complete in itself, and absolutely unique in being alone self-existent, self-active, and self-sufficient.

Therefore, we say of it that it is the Absolute Individual, inasmuch as, there being no second, it is conditioned by or related to nothing but Itself. All others, that is, all individuals within It, are conditioned by and related to one another and by and to It. Concerning its substance as self-subsistent, objective being or reality, of which all things are that are, we say: It is Infinite, and recognize that the various substances, known to us in experience, are finite modifications or *forms* of It. Concerning its self-active, self-sustaining energy as cause, or as a process of becoming, we say: It is Eternal, and recognize that the various causes, known in experience, are temporary manifestations or *modes* of it. Concerning its unity as a rational concept or idea, taken in the complete, coherent reciprocity of its parts in all their relations, coexistent and sequent, we say: It is Perfect, as the Beauty of harmonious inter-relations, and recognize the various, conceptual unities, known in experience, to be conditioned, rational elements, or reflections of It.

In so far as the finite forms of substance, temporary modes of cause, and conditioned, rational unities are known in their true "whatness," "howness," and "whyness," they have, we may say, a certain relative infinity, eternity, and perfection; for every true finite substance must be a form of the One Infinite Substance; every true temporary cause must be a mode of the One Eternal Cause; and every true conditioned, rational idea, or conceptual unity, must be a manifested element in the One Perfect Idea.

The Infinite, the Eternal, the Perfect.

These three terms, infinity, eternity, and perfection, though distinct and not to be confused or interchanged, are yet indissolubly one, each getting its meaning from the others. While we can only properly speak of perfection as applying to unity, or that harmonious

relation of all the parts constituting one whole; and while we can only properly apply the term infinity to substantial totality, and the term eternity to a never-ceasing, unconditioned, causal energy, yet, because the unity is a unity in substance and cause, it must be regarded not only as perfect but also as an infinite and eternal perfection. So, likewise, because infinity, as the total substance, includes all, it must be regarded not only as infinite but also as a perfect and eternal infinity. And because eternity applies to a never-ceasing, unconditioned causal energy, as sustaining all, it must be regarded as a perfect and infinite eternity.

It may be wondered why so much pains is taken to assert what seems axiomatic—an infinite, eternal perfection; an eternal, perfect infinity; and an infinite, perfect eternity. It is only done for the purpose of emphasizing, as much as possible, the necessity of avoiding confusion in the specific use of these distinct terms, each of which is an absolute substantive; while, at the same time, recognizing their identity, seen in the fact that each, as an adjective, may be predicated of the others. Of no other terms, known to thought, can this be done, because no other terms, as these, stand for that which is self-existent, self-active, and self-sufficient.

Knowing then, before hand, that reason demands the Unity of Substance and Cause in the One Objective Reality, we are prepared to treat separately, so far as possible, the constituent parts of the cosmic organism, beginning with substance.

The Formal Doctrine of Substance.

When man awakes to scientific or philosophical reflection, the first question that engages his attention is that concerning substance. Objects are seen to be of different kinds, but many of them seem to be made out of the same material. Perhaps, in the end, they can all be reduced to some, one, common stuff, which would then be their real substance, and the final question would be: What is the nature of this substance?

Aristotle, in his "Metaphysics" (iv., 8), sums up the whole formal doctrine of substance when he says that it "happens to be styled substance in two ways, both as the ultimate subject which no longer is predicated of anything else; and as that which may be this (or that) certain, particular thing, and may be separable."

This is an abstract statement of what everybody knows, be he

peasant or scholar, viz.: that all the particular things we see as separable substances are but various shapes, forms, or other modifications of the stuff out of which they are made, and that this stuff is the one substance of all real, existent things. Hence, Aristotle could say of it that it can no longer be predicated of anything, for the very simple reason that there is nothing else for it to be a predicate of; it itself is everything, and the subject of all predication. It is true, I can make substance a *grammatical* predicate by saying, for example, that gold or water is a substance; but, after all, the predicate here is the real subject, of which it is asserted that gold or water is one of its forms. All that I am doing is to express the judgment that some particular, separable thing in experience is objectively existent, and this I do by calling it a substance, for this is just what substance means, real, objective existence, or being. And when I conclude that gold or water is really and finally a substance, then it becomes a subject which, so far forth, can not be predicated of anything else, but is something to which predicates are always attached.*

It is of primary importance to bear in mind always the ground character of substance as real objective being, that all-inclusive, existent something which constitutes the objective reality of things. Hence, it is we call the verb, *to be*, the *substantive* verb, because it always declares that a thing *is* or, in other words, that it is a substance and has objective reality. Therefore, once sure that it *is*, I can predicate of it all those forms and qualities of it which my sense capacities render me capable of knowing.

As substance is thus at the bottom of all objective existence, I must, in interpreting the object, go on the basis, expressed or understood, *that* substance *is*. We know how the earliest Greek philosophers, of whom we have record, tried to discover the nature of the one fundamental substance, be it water, air, earth, or fire; and then how some, despairing of finding the one, concluded that all things are various mixtures (not chemical compositions in our modern sense) of the four or five elemental substances—a view held for many centuries, even down to very modern times. We are not yet, however, prepared to discuss the *nature* of substance, but must first settle its formal character.

* When, however, I discover that gold and water are only modified forms of the backlying, real substance, then, in so far, they become predicates, and we say of them: They are forms of that real substance of which nothing else can be predicated than that it is what it is.

The Eleatic Changeless One: Being.

Involved in the mind's demand *that* substance *is*, as the homogeneous, common stuff out of which all things are made, is the equally imperative demand that it possess an *immutable permanence*, as objective being.

This aspect of the formal doctrine of substance was, in antiquity, seized and urged by Parmenides of Elea, who maintained that the one, changeless being ($\tau\omicron\delta\ \delta\upsilon$) is the only reality, denying all reality to the changing and the many. For him, movement among divers things was so much illusion; and one of his followers, Zeno, used to devise many ingenious arguments to prove the only reality of the one and changeless, by showing that change among things is not only contradictory and absurd, but rationally impossible.

Parmenides was thus a sort of idealist who stoutly maintained, against the empiricists, the sole reality of the one, changeless substance, or objective being.

And we must admit that so far as he went he was right. There is some underlying, substantial reality that, at bottom, always remains the same. If there was not something that remained the same—if only ourselves—we should never get an idea of existence at all. How necessary is this idea of substance, as a one changeless objective something, is confirmed by our modern chemists and physicists, the princes of empiricism, who are always priding themselves on dealing only with the laws of related changes. But as deeply engaged as they may be in the motions of many things, they are nevertheless always prosecuting an indefatigable search after some one, underlying substance that does not change. Not satisfied with having broken down the four simple elements of the ancients into four score atoms, indivisible and ultimate as the name indicates, which by composition constitute the innumerable, various objects of every day experience, chemists still hope to find the *one* atom from which all others proceed. The chemist is preeminently, we may say, the scientist whose chief concern is substance. He would know what it is, what its parts, forms, or modifications, and what their relations.

But the physicist, who we may say is the scientist concerned chiefly in cause and its modes, in energy, motion, force, now takes a hand at this question of substance. And he justifies his right to do so because he has much finer instruments of investigation than has the chemist. We have all been made familiar with the wonders of

radium, for example, and the conclusions to which they point; how it is that the supposed indivisible atom is divided into simpler elements or ions, and how these are regarded by some as the ultimate matter out of which all things are formed. And even if these prove, after all, to be composite, science will persist in its determination to reduce them to still simpler particles with the hope of finding the one, homogeneous, unchangeable world-stuff.

Attributes, Quality, Quantity, and Degree.

But aside from this aspect of substance as an ultimate subject which is no longer predicated of anything else, or which is the one, existent, changeless, objective reality, there is that other aspect of it, spoken of by Aristotle, in which it presents itself as many particular things, or as substances which are separable. In fact this is the only aspect of substance which ever presents itself to us in experience. The one, changeless, existent, substantial background of objective reality, which Parmenides insisted on, and which our scientists are searching so diligently, we never experience; it is always an ideal of reason. No one ever saw, touched, handled, tasted, smelt, or heard substance, but only secondary modifications thereof. The substances of experience are only relative, conditioned *forms* of substance. Real substance never presents itself, except as an object of thought; why, we shall endeavor to see in the proper place.

The manifold substances of actual experience are constituted by the various qualities of objects, apprehended in sense, always under some spatial form; and, in consequence, they reveal themselves to us by as many qualities as we have senses, no more, and no less. Had we other senses, the qualities of the substances we know would be to us other, and the substances would be to us other. Had we a larger number of senses, or were the range of our present ones increased, our knowledge of substances would be greatly extended. Perhaps there are beings beyond our ken, thus endowed. We know, on the other hand, beings with fewer and less highly organized senses than we possess, whose knowledge of the objective world must be very narrow. We can hardly think of the oyster as getting wide or varied knowledge of the world in which it lives. The dog, however, approaches us in the number of sense inlets from the object.

Our senses differ widely in the range of qualities in objects which they severally reveal. Thus, sight, which Aristotle justly regarded

the supreme sense, gives us a great variety of forms and colors, while taste is comparatively reticent in what it tells us of the object.

Attribute and Quality.

In view of the fact that each sense gives us a variety of qualities in the object, it may be well to make a useful distinction between attribute and quality.

We may regard attribute as that datum which each sense gives in general, and quality as one of the many forms of the attribute. And then we may further distinguish by separating quality into its varieties. That is, we make here the distinction of genus and species.

Thus, sight gives us the attributes of spatial form and color which invariably appear in inseparable union. We see no forms that are not at the same time colored, and we see no color that does not have some spatial form. In fact, all that sight gives us of the objective world is patches of color, in more or less well defined spatial form.

The attribute of color comprehends the primary, specific qualities such as we observe in the natural spectrum or rainbow. Under the generic attribute of form, we have such specific qualities as round, square, triangular, and what we may, somewhat paradoxically, call shapeless forms. Each of these qualities of color and form we may again divide into numberless varieties for our convenience. And this analysis of the generic attribute into its qualities, and of the specific quality into its varieties may go on to the very limit of our sense discrimination.

In like manner, hearing gives us the attribute of resonance in objects, with its qualities of noise and tone. The gustatory and olfactory senses give us, respectively, the attributes of taste and odor, with their qualities and subordinate varieties. The muscular and articular senses, which are most intimately connected, give us, like sight, the attribute of form, but, unlike sight which gives us only two-dimensional form, they give us three-dimensional form, that is, depth as well as length and breadth. They also give us the attribute of weight and impermeability of which we are informed by a certain sense of strain, no matter how vague and indefinite, in the muscles and joints. The tactile sense gives us the somewhat indefinite attribute of touch with its qualities of rough and smooth. And the sense of temperature gives us the attribute of temperature in things, with its qualities of hot and cold.

The organic sense can not be said to give us any clear attribute of things, for *as a sense*, it does nothing more than inform us of the mere existence of the vital organs. Its function belongs rather to feeling than to cognition. Through it, we become aware of a vague, pervasive pleasure of well-being, or of pain in the greatest variety, from a dull feeling of depression or malaise to the most poignant suffering. Discharging this function, it is highly important, but as such it does not come among the senses, the sole function of which is to give us data of the object, that is, inform us of its attributes and qualities. With feeling which, as was pointed out in a preceding chapter, is always the æsthetic correlate of the theoretical cognition of the object, the reader will understand, we have at present nothing to do. Our one concern now is purely theoretical; and, in considering the senses, our only business is to know what information they furnish us of the various substances we meet in experience. The kind of information they give has already been indicated.

Inter-relation of the Senses.

If now we take the various qualities under each attribute, ascribed to the object by any given sense, we shall find that we can trace a sort of origin of species among them. That is, we can pass from one species of sound, or of color, or of form into another species of sound, color, or form by gradual degrees of modification. But if we take the genera, or the different attributes of the various senses, they are found to be quite unrelated and incommensurable. We can not pass from sound to color, or from color to taste. We can not even imagine how a taste would sound or look. We have no means of knowing what color an odor has, or how much it weighs.

It is true, some psychologists have tried to write Beethoven's sonatas in color; and some people claim that when they see colors or hear sounds, there is aroused in them odors or tastes. It may be that the day is coming when some great psychologist will show us how sense attributes of objects can be transmuted into one ultimate, atomic attribute out of which all the others are formed, very much as the chemist and physicist are beginning to show how different substances are transmutable, the one into the other, or reducible to one fundamental ion. But as it is at present, the sense attributes hold themselves clearly distinct and refuse to be transmuted. They

seem to give us so many different kinds of substance. And yet, strange as it may seem, we invariably regard the various attributes as referring, in the end, to one and the same object. Instead, for example, of saying that there are seven different apples, we say that one and the same apple is red and round and smooth and impermeable and heavy and fragrant and sweet. Perhaps this procedure of carrying unrelated attributes back to one object will not seem so strange when we recall what was said about substance being in itself not an object of sense but of thought. At any rate, we must take the fact as it is and wait for further explanation, until we pass beyond the mere formal doctrine of substance to a consideration of the real nature of substance.

But when we speak of carrying many different attributes back to one substantial object, or speak of the underlying substance in itself, we must not fall into the mistake of supposing that, if we should remove the attributes of an object, one by one, we should finally come down to the pure substance of the thing, so that we could see it in itself, without its attributes. The moment we remove these, there is no substance left. Substance without its attributes is pure nothing, so far, at any rate, as any knowledge of it is concerned. Nor are the attributes anything but pure nothing without the substance in which they inhere. One has no meaning or existence without the other. An attribute or a quality of substance, as Spinoza has pointed out, is just the way the substance has of revealing itself to us, or it is our way of perceiving *what* the substance is.* Or, as Kant tells us, quality is simply a declaration of the object's real presence to us. The various attributes and qualities of substance then are the various ways that substance has of making known to us *that* it objectively is *what* it is, so far as our senses are capable of being informed on the matter.

Quantity and Degree.

All of the qualities which reveal to us the various substantial objects of experience, have one of two determinations, that of quantity, which is given in spatial form of surface or volume; and that of degree, dependent upon temporal sequence. Some call this latter, intensive quantity, to distinguish it from the former as extensive quantity.

We may regard quantity as a determination purely of substance

* "Ethics," Part I, Def. 4.

as such, while degree is rather a determination of cause as such. For while we may speak of a quantity of substance, we would not speak of a quantity of cause. Nor while we may speak of a degree of cause, we would not speak of a degree of substance. The intimate relation of extensive and intensive quantity, which applies to all qualities revealed by objects, indicates how intimate is the relation between substance and cause, a discussion of which the very doctrine of substance itself will soon force upon us.

To measure quantity, we have the science of geometry. Number shows its wider extent by being applicable to both quantity and degree which, as indicated, reveals cause working in a sequence of time. Thus, we speak of a bushel of wheat as a quantity, so far as its bulk is concerned, and either describe it as a geometrical figure or name the number of its volume units, say so many cubic inches. But its color or weight can be described only as having a certain degree of intensity.

Well, then, we have the various attributes and qualities of objects, in innumerable combinations and varieties of quantity and degree, to tell us, so far as sense goes, *that* and *what* substances are; thus giving to us those particular, separable things which Aristotle pointed out as the second aspect of substance. And we can only think of these particular, separable things as passing, secondary, relative, conditioned modifications of Substance as such, which in itself is the one, changeless, objective Reality, and which is in no way an object of sense perception, but of rational thought only.

We have thus arrived at a plain contradiction; for that which in its true nature is one and changeless, we find in actual experience to be many in its changing forms. It was to overcome this contradiction that Parmenides stood so valiantly by the one, changeless *being*, as the only reality, and so discarded the changing many of *becoming* as so much illusion.

The Heraclitic Changing Many: Becoming.

But his philosophical opponent, Heraclitus, took just the opposite ground and laid his whole weight upon the changing many; so much so, indeed, that he denied all reality to the Eleatic, changeless one, preaching that the sole reality is the perpetual flow of things (*πάντα ῥεῖ*). He used to say, it is reported, that you can not step *twice* into the same stream. And one of his followers, Cratylus by name,

so Aristotle tells us, went so far as to reprove his master by saying that you can not step into the *same* stream even *once*. (Met. iii, 5.)

We may look upon Heraclitus as an empiricist, pure and simple, who said in effect to all such idealists as Parmenides: "I know nothing about your supersensible, ideal, changeless one, all that is so much metaphysical theory, a mere figment of the mind, without guarantee from any objectively real grounds; give me rather the facts of an actual experience, verifiable by the testimony of sense. Upon such facts, and whatever logic can make out of them, I rely." Perhaps on our meager information about Heraclitus, this may be saying too much for him, but from all we can gather, it seems that in the ancient world men took sides on this question of idealism and empiricism, much as they do in our modern world. We find among us the empiricist, at times, getting irritable at mention of the idealist's Absolute One; while the idealist may be found treating in rather a lofty, transcendental way the empiricist's changing manifold of experienced fact.

We need not go very deep to see that between the ancient Heraclitus and Parmenides, as well as between the modern empiricist and idealist, we have the old pernicious fallacy of rational tribalism. On the one hand, we have the empiricist tribe with its shibboleth of *sense* and *logic*, or nothing; and, on the other, the idealist tribe with its shibboleth of *intuition*, as everything. We must guard the entirety of reason and avoid either extreme.

If we have seen the fundamental truth, lying at the bottom of the Parmenidean doctrine of the One, Changeless Being, we may also find the fundamental truth, lying at the bottom of the Heraclitic, Changing Manifold of Becoming.

The Logos and Natural Law.

What Heraclitus saw clearly was a regular flow of things, according to a definite plan; and this plan he called the *logos*, meaning thereby a rational order. This, it will be seen, is much the same, or exactly the same, as our modern scientific conception of natural law. But of a one backlying, changeless substance, manifesting itself according to this plan or logos, it seems Heraclitus would have nothing to do.

Aristotle, however, who had, through Socrates and Plato, reached the stage of reconciliation between Parmenides and Heraclitus, does better for us; for he recognizes, on the one hand, a substance as

the *first*, having, on the other hand, a principle of motion in itself. (Met. iv, 4.) More precisely, in another place, he tells us: "There is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first impartor of motion is itself immovable." (Met. iii, 8.)

And it would seem that Aristotle has not lived in vain; for, as Heraclitic as our modern scientist may be in his insistence upon the sense and logic of experience, he has moved far beyond Heraclitus in seeking to get at the one, ultimate substance which, although homogeneous and changeless in itself, has nevertheless within it the energy to take on all those varied forms we call the chemical elements, themselves in turn possessed of the capacity to form, by composition, the various grosser objects known to us through our senses, in their attributes, qualities, quantities, and degrees.

Cause Enters the Field.

But when we have thus introduced a principle of motion or energy into the one, changeless substance, to account for its sensible attributes and qualities, the reader will at once become aware that we have shifted our ground; that we have, in fact, passed beyond the notion of substance as such, to the notion of cause as such. We have left the Eleatic world of the one, changeless being and entered into the Heraclitic world of manifold becoming, the onflowing, changing, inter-action among things, the cosmic Logos.

While to Parmenides, substance, as objective reality, had never become a cause, to Heraclitus, objective reality had ceased to be substance altogether and become simply cause. But recognizing the truth in both, as Aristotle did, we must endeavor to see how that while substance always remains substance, the one and changeless; yet, at the same time, it is cause, as the objective ground of the changing many.

If we revert to the knowledge of the object which the senses furnish us, we shall find that they inform us of more than the mere objective existence of various substances, in their attributes and qualities; for they inform us as well of movement, change, action among objects. So that, through the senses, we perceive elements in the objects that not only constitute them substances, but also causes. In fact, our senses may be divided into two broad classes, as the *substantial* senses and the *causal* senses, or as those that passively become aware of existent objects, and those that go out in response.

For example, the visual sense merely receives information of the object, while the muscular sense acts upon it, brings about changes in it, and thus at once reveals to us a cause at work. And this sense of cause at work in ourselves enables us, when we see movement, change, action in things, to see causes at work among them.

It is for this reason that everyone, from the most primitive savage to the wisest philosopher, knows what a cause is, whether it be an evil spirit, a natural force, a man, or God. It is that which, as an exertion of energy, brings something to pass, and without which that something would not come to pass.

But there are very few who clearly think out the meaning of cause in its total significance, and it may be of value to try to do so. In order to get a good start, it will not be amiss to refer again to Aristotle who, taken on the purely theoretical or speculative side, may be regarded as, perhaps, the most penetrating and comprehensive mind in the annals of human thought.

Aristotle on Cause.

To Aristotle, cause seemed to be so important, as an absolutely first principle, that he made it cover the whole of objective reality, including substance. He did this by defining four aspects of cause, *material*, *formal*, *efficient*, and *final*. Thus, for example, the brass of which a statue is made is the material cause; the exemplar or design, according to which it is fashioned, is the formal cause; the power that produced it is the efficient cause; and the end or purpose for which it was designed is the final cause. ("Physics" i and ii. Met. i, 3: iv, 2.)

It will be seen that the first two have been treated in what has just been said about the changeless substance and its secondary, particular forms, known in experience. But what is vitally important to observe is that the second, or formal cause, since it treats of all those variant, changing forms of substance which give us its attributes, qualities, quantities and degrees, has already forced us over into the third and fourth, that is, into the region of *efficient* and *final* cause. For significant as it may be that the one and changeless substance, in order to make itself known as objective being, should cease to be the one and changeless, by changing into many forms; we get no meaning out of it until we can know the efficient power, and the purpose involved in the change. To our *that* and *what* of the object's being,

we must add the *how* and *why* of its becoming. We must follow the nexus of change in its coexistent and successive relations, with the intention of discovering what is the meaning of it, or what is the end aimed at in the whole process.

If, therefore, the unity of substance lies in its being the unchanging oneness of objective reality; the unity of cause, we shall find, is the rational purpose among changing things, within that same objective reality, moving toward some definite end. To use the pompous, but descriptive terms of the schools, while the problem of substance is *ontological*, having to do with objective reality and its nature, as static; the problem of cause is *teleological*, having to do with the same reality, as manifested in the unity of dynamic, rational purpose. Our ideal search, we hope, will end in seeing how the substantial nature of reality necessarily issues in its purpose revealed, or how its revealed purpose rests back upon the ground of its nature.

For the moment, it is to our interests to leave behind the doctrine of substance, so far as possible, and fix our entire attention upon cause, as that efficient power which proceeds, after a certain rational manner, to the accomplishment of some, definite end. By so doing, we shall be the better prepared to make a final interpretation of both that which is and that which acts, being and becoming, the one and the many, as constituting a rational unity in objective Reality.

Change First Arouses Thought.

We said not long ago that when reflective thought awoke, the first question men asked was one of substance. What stuff are things made of? But we shall now have to modify this statement. In reality the question of cause was still more primitive, though it was not so consciously clear in the mind. For what started men thinking was the observation of change among the objects around them. It is plain that unless the ever-existent substance did something, acted this way or that, it could never be known even as an existent object. As Aristotle said, the immovable first must have a principle of motion in it.

In the changes going on about them, men recognized a power at work, bringing things to pass, and they would know not only what that power was, but how and why it so acted. As crude and imperfect as the first answers were, compared with those of modern thought, these early thinkers never missed the real meaning of cause,

as being an efficient power moving, after a certain manner, toward a definite end.

All Forces Rest on One Principle.

We have seen how our scientific Titan felt compelled, more and more, to regard all the varied activities he met in the universe as being phases of some one, fundamental Energy or Power which he would fain discover. All the causal forces he examined worked together in such reciprocally rational relations that he was compelled to infer one Ultimate Cause variously manifested in them. So that when we hear the scientist talk about causes, we must not confuse them with Cause, any more than we confuse substances with Substance; but simply recognize, in the one case as in the other, secondary conditioned modifications of the one original Principle.

Meaning of First Cause.

We sometimes hear the one, original, Causal Principle spoken of as the First Cause; but this term is misleading because it too often suggests merely the first of a series, in time. In the nature of the case, we are not dealing with a first, in its relation to a temporal series, but with cause as such, or the only energy that brings things to pass

The ancient mythologist who said that the world rested upon the back of an elephant, the elephant upon a tortoise, and the tortoise upon a coiled serpent was struggling with the problem of the all-sustaining, causal power; but he had got no further toward cause than when he started out, although he had wearied his mind into a satisfied quiescence by the temporal recession. In like manner the good old negro parson mistook mental weariness for explanation, when he informed the inquirer that the earth rested upon a big rock and that upon another; and then, becoming irritated at the persistence of the skeptic, reproved him severely for not knowing that there are rocks all the way down.

Nor are we any more rational, if we mistake the causes of natural science for real causes, or for an explanation of cause; for they are all, on one side, only effects of other causes. Just as the substances we know in experience, which are made out of other substances, are different forms of the one, fundamental Substance, which is made out of nothing but itself, or is self-existent; so the causes we know,

which are effects of other causes, are other than the one, fundamental Cause which is uncaused, or is self-sustaining. Therefore, we may speak of the First Cause of all change only in the sense of being the *ultimate ground* of all change, or the one Real Energy that brings all things to pass.

Heraclitus was getting near to the true meaning of cause when he saw in the perpetual flow of things, a *logos* or rational order. And, for the same reason, our natural scientist is getting near to the true meaning of cause when he sees the varied forces of experience reducible to one great, rational law. And in tracing the world-development, we believed we got an inkling of cause in surmising it to be the Grand Idea of evolution itself, rather than any specific mode of energy within the process.

Change Rests upon a Principle of Permanence.

This conception of the firstness and the unity of cause presses us to rather strange issues, for we must recognize that while cause brings to pass the many changes among things, it, in itself, remains one, changeless, dynamic idea; and we are driven near to encroaching on the domain we had reserved for the one and changeless substance. According to the old logical principle of parsimony, which forbids superfluous entities, it looks very much as if we must either drive substance out of the field altogether, as something no longer needed, or turn it simply into a permanent cause. We are not, however, yet prepared for such heroic measures; for, while we know something about the unity and permanence of substance, and are discovering something about the unity and permanence of cause, we are yet too uninformed about their real nature to know their true relation, whether it be that of a mutual inter-action between two separate entities, or an identity. For the present, we must let them stand as they are; Substance as the one, changeless being, of which all things are made; and Cause as the one, moveless energy of becoming that moves all things.

However mysterious it may seem to us that a permanent something can, at the same time, be the real causal energy of all change, we, at any rate, see the fact about us, constantly exemplified, in nature. Whether we take an atom or a world, a living cell, a plant or an animal, we have something that is one and changeless, and yet, at

the same time, is constituted by the inter-acting changes among many things.

Thus an atom of iron, a thousand times smaller than the smallest object discernible by the most powerful microscope, is a fixed unity, stubbornly maintaining its integrity as a permanent one, and yet revealing within itself the most complex variety and change. It is composed of a hundred, or perhaps two hundred, thousand particles, ions, or electrons—call them what we will—comparatively far apart, dashing back and forth, and circling around each other in the most vehement activity. And it is this incessant, reciprocal activity among the many particles that comes to form a balanced system in the seemingly fixed and motionless atom.

Nature Reveals Change in Permanence.

Or, if we turn from the small to the great, we shall find the same conditions. Our cosmic Titan, in an afternoon's stroll through the cosmos, might trample on our solar system which, to his coarse perceptions, would appear to be nothing but a flat, elliptical pebble. He could not see the spaces between sun and planets, any more than we can see spaces between ions, and the whole would appear to him as a fixed, solid mass. Even its slow drift toward Vega in Lyra would escape his observation, as the movement of a clock hand escapes ours. And yet we know that what to him is a dull, inert pebble, apparently with its fixity of form, is constituted by activities so related and balanced, as to make it one system in the heavens, a sort of celestial atom. He has to spend patient æons of scientific investigation in studying the solar pebble, as we patient years over the iron atom, before discovering the fact of change, *in* permanence.

If we look carefully at either the iron or celestial atom, we shall see that the one permanent cause of all its inner activities is the idea or concept of it—not, to be sure, the idea or concept merely in our minds, but the objective, permanent, dynamic idea, constituting the unitary system. From the idea all separate activities proceed and to it all are again referred. They change, are related among themselves and to it, but it does not change and is alone related to itself. It is the Heraclitic *Logos*, the scientist's cosmic law or order of becoming, the Platonic ideal form (*idéa*) according to which all objects are patterned, the Aristotelian formal cause, or concept, which is the permanent reality amid the flow of things. It is to be observed

that while the iron atom or solar pebble is related to other iron atoms or solar pebbles, it represents the total Cosmic Concept, in which the changing manifold constitutes the changeless one.

In the organic world, the change of the many in the permanent one is even more evident. The simplest cell or the most complex organism, plant or animal, follows a definite rational plan of development to which its every particular activity is related. A fixed unitary idea seems to be carrying out, through a multiplicity of subordinate ideas, a purpose which is no other than the unfolding or realization of the dynamic idea. More especially does this appear in that whole, vast process of phylogenetic evolution, from amoeba to man, in which myriads of interrelated activities work together toward the one end. Here is a Logos, a grand rational plan, as a fixed, changeless energy, which is coming to objective manifestation, through a constant, purposive order of change and becoming.

Whether then we take the static condition as in the atom or solar system, or the kinetic condition, as in the movement of evolving life, we have in the idea, as a dynamic power, the immovable energy which moves all things. These things, as objective modes of the idea, change, and, in a secondary sense, we may call them causes; but the idea which is at once, the rational purpose, the efficient power, and the guiding form of the whole process, is unchangeable and is present as much at the beginning as at the end. Nor must it escape our attention that, in so far as the constituent elements or things are harmonized by and within their idea, they enter into its changeless nature, through a transformation of their restless changes, into the unchanging rest of a ceaseless activity in a permanent, balanced harmony.

Cause, a Purposive Idea.

A simple illustration may serve to gather up the various elements involved in the notion of cause and make the whole scope of its meaning more clear.

Suppose I find a dead bird in the woods. Normally it ought to be joyously singing among the branches of the trees. What has broken into the normal order and caused this tragic change? Who has killed cock robin? On examination, I find a drop of blood on the side of the bird's head and, from previous observations, I conclude that a *stray* shot from a huntsman's gun has put an end to the merry

little songster. As bad as men are, we resent the charge that any one *deliberately* laid him low. A *stray* shot, then, caused the bird's death. But if the shot had struck the tree, no harm had been done. The result, death, was possible not merely because a shot flew through the air, but because it struck a *living* thing. Moreover, it was not the shot alone, taken by itself, that produced the result, for that would have done the bird no harm. It was the shot in rapid motion, caused by the explosion of powder. Belonging to this causal chain was the toughness of the steel barrel of the gun. Had it been of clay, no projected shot, no dead bird. Then, back of the explosion was the flash of the cap, caused by the falling hammer which in turn would have amounted to nothing, if the gun had been loaded with sand. It had to be powder to react upon the flash. Furthermore the whole thing had been harmless, if human intelligence had not loaded the gun and pulled the trigger. And here we are getting in sight of the cause of the whole performance. Up to this point, we have been dealing with the *that* and *how* of the changing process, now we are getting at the *why*.

What really happened, we come to learn, was this. A boy in the neighborhood, was taken with the very natural appetite for a pigeon pie—at bottom, a mere animal instinct for food, but raised into an ideal to be pursued, that is, the human desire for a particular kind of food, prepared in a particular kind of way. The boy's mother promises to make the pie, provided he furnishes the pigeons. His intelligence then sets to work, or he devises means, to secure his end. Centuries of purposive, human ingenuity have put into the boy's hands the necessary means, in the form of a gun and proper ammunition. Taking advantage of these, he adds his knowledge of where the pigeons may be found, his skill in marksmanship, and his efforts. Much to our sorrow, as an incident in the prosecution of his innocent purpose, a stray shot from the boy's gun has destroyed our beautiful robin to which, with the tribute of a tear, we give decent burial.

Now, what we have discovered, in trying to find the cause of the bird's death, is that it was incidentally swept into a complex series of events which were nothing more nor less than a rational, human plan, involving the use of means, to carry out the purpose of meeting a specific desire. All the events that interact, preceding and following each other in carrying out this idea, we may regard, for practical purposes, as causes; but after all, they are only apparent causes, or

conditioned phases of the one, unvarying cause, viz.: the dynamic idea. And this, it will be seen, is Aristotle's final cause which of necessity includes all the others. As the dynamic source of all action, it is the efficient cause; and, as involving the means employed and the mode of procedure, it is the material and formal cause.

The All-inclusive Chain of Events.

But in seeking the cause of the robin's death, we can not be satisfied by merely including it as an incident in the boy's purpose of having a pigeon pie; for the boy belongs to and is included in a larger whole, of which he is an effect. To meet the demands of reason, we must go on to ask why the gun metal proves to be so tough and stable in texture, as to resist sudden pressure, while the powder is so loose and unstable in composition that, at the least spark, its elements violently fly apart; why the boy comes to have an appetite at all; and why he formed the ideal of a pigeon pie, and so on, until we get back to the beginning of the world; where, for the first time, we come in sight of the real cause, in the rational purpose of the one, grand, Cosmic Idea, involving not only all the material means employed, the efficient power, and the formal modes of activity, but also the boy's intelligent motive which, as a secondary, conditioned cause, reflects the primary, Absolute Cause of all.'

In other words, we can regard no event in Heraclitus's onflowing, manifold world of becoming, as causally explained to reason, until it is seen in the light of the total rational plan or *logos*. Or we may conclude with Tennyson, about his little flower in the crannied wall, that to know it, root and all, and all in all, would be to know what God and man is. It is a matter of no little significance that Israel, whose ethical genius led him to think of God as the Almighty, Creative Power, habitually disregarded all secondary causes and carried every event, evil as well as good, directly back to God, as the One, Primal Cause.*

We are by no means prepared, as yet, to say specifically what the Ultimate Cause is, or what its nature as expressive of purpose may be, but we have come to know formally the meaning of its unity as a

* The reader must be asked to reserve his judgment about a fatal necessity in all things which seem here to be implied, until we can consider the question of how man comes into the whole scheme as an intelligent, causal agent, and what that means for him as a rational being.

permanent, dynamic idea in which all changes among things are rational relations bearing toward one, common end.

Unity of Substance and Cause.

Thus far then, in seeking to interpret theoretically the object before us, or the grand Cosmic Organism, we are driven to regard all particular substances, with their attributes, qualities, quantities, and degrees, known to us in experience, as relative, conditioned modifications of the one, changeless, Infinite Substance, or Substantial Reality; and to regard all particular, sensible causes as so many secondary, conditioned modes or effects of the one, permanent, Eternal Cause, or Causal Reality. And now, we are no less inexorably driven to regard this Ultimate Substance and Ultimate Cause as, constituting together, One, Ultimate, Absolute Reality.

It would seem that in the oneness and permanence of the Causal Idea, to which all the many changing events of experience must be referred, we had got at the very secret of the one, changeless being of Substance. But, as the matter still stands, there are certain difficulties which must first be cleared away before we can come to understand adequately the relation between substance and cause. We must ask, just how are they one? By reason of inherence? Or, if not that, by reason of exclusion? Or, if not that, by reason of identity?

Inherence.

The difficulties of inherence to the scientific mind are very great and, indeed, insurmountable. According to the law of inertia, which Newton made the first of his famous trilogy, a body forever rests where it is, or forever continues in motion, unless some causal energy is imparted to it either to set it in motion, divert it from its course, or stop it. That is, matter taken alone as mere objective substantial being, is a dull, helpless something which can do nothing, not even make itself known to us as existent, unless motion is imparted to it, or, to use Aristotle's phrase, it has a principle of motion in it.

How are we to conceive of the relation existing between two such entities as inert matter and energizing motion? If we might live a hundred years back, it would be easy to think of motion as a subtle substance *in* matter, and we could see the iron bar, for example, soak up heat, much as a sponge soaks up water. Unfortunately

Count Rumford made it impossible to give such an easy explanation, by showing that heat is in no sense a substance but simply motion. When the iron bar grows hot, it is due to the fact that the molecules of the iron have got into rapid vibration, and when the bar cools or loses its heat, the vibration of the molecules is decreasing in rapidity; and the bar is just back to where it started, a dull inert mass of matter.

But how did the heat get into the iron in the first place, that is, how were its particles aroused to vibration? It is easy to say that the vibrating ether gave the original shock to the molecules of the bar, and that the ether got its shock from the sun; and, if we wish to go on, that the sun got its shock from the whole universe which is matter in motion. But this only brings us back to the point where we started, in trying to conceive how matter as we know it, a dull motionless mass, ever got into motion at all. We can not rest content in this situation, for the mind is unable to conceive, or imagine, so much matter here and so much motion there, and then the motion getting into the matter. We must, therefore, turn to some other conception than that of inherence to explain, if possible, the relation between matter and motion.

Exclusion.

Suppose we try the idea of exclusion, that is, drop either one or the other, and thus get rid altogether of troubling about the relation between them. We have seen how Parmenides satisfied himself by dropping out cause and, therefore, having only to do with substance. But we can not regard this as a solution; it is rather a desertion of the problem. For we can not shut our eyes to what Heraclitus plainly saw, a perpetual, onflowing change. And this phase of the objective reality before us is what engages absorbingly our modern science. And there have not been wanting among us those who go so far as Heraclitus and drop substance altogether as needless, contenting themselves with cause, or the perpetual energy of motion, as a sufficient ground for all things. They would reduce everything to vibration. It is little disconcerting at first, we must confess, to find our science, which we have always been inclined to think of as resting upon the solid foundations of substance—or matter, as it is usually called—and leaving the only ground under our feet a sort of eternal quiver. Thus, the physicist falls into discontent over the chemist's ultimate, indivisible, solid atom of matter and

demands for the basal reality something like "centers of force," "ether spirits," or "vortex rings," which, so far as we can make out, are no better than modes of motion; or perhaps, reduces the ions, of which the atom is composed, to electrons which are only charges of negative electricity. That is, we are to think of the minutest conceivable particle of matter as charged with negative electricity, then scoop out all the matter and throw it away as useless, leaving simply the electricity which is just motion, and is reality.

If the "ether squirt" man or the "vortex ring" man protests that he is going on the supposition of a substantial ether, we have nothing more to do with him, for he belongs to the doctrine of inherence which affords us no rational light on the subject in hand. But what can the "motion" man do for us?

He would show to us that motion *is* matter, or matter *is* motion, that is, cause is substance or substance is cause. Thus all the forms of matter by which, to our apprehension, it occupies space, has attributes, qualities, quantities, and degrees, arise from and are constant activities in the one, fundamental motion which gives to the atom, the molecule, and the mass their integrity and the permanence of their fixed character. The same conclusion seems practically to have been reached by Mr. Spencer, who may be called the scientist's philosopher. "Amid all the mysteries," he says, "which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about [by the present cultured man] there will remain the one absolute certainty that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed."*

And we can not deny a certain sort of mild conversion. But, yet, as gratifying as this may be to our rational demand for unity, in the back of our minds, Aristotle keeps saying that a cause must be material as well as, and in order to be, efficient. Besides, science does not bring into full light how it is that motion can act except in matter, any more than matter can move without motion; or how a cause can manifest itself except through, or as substance. The fact is, scientists can not dispense with either matter or motion—they must have both—but all the time they are embarrassed with difficulties in trying to make them fit in to the demands which reason imperiously makes for substance and cause.

* *Religious Retrospect and Prospect*: Eccles. Inst., p. 843, "Principles of Sociology." Pt. vi.

We begin to see why it is that the non-material, motion-theory of reality *almost persuades* us and, at the same time, why it fails *wholly to convert* us.

We are half-persuaded because it begins to suggest what we are willing to admit as rational, viz.: the *identity* of substance and cause—*provided*, the identity leaves substance and cause distinct, by finding their ground in *one* Absolute Reality which manifests itself as *both* substantial and causal, in its ultimate nature, or as an objective something, which is at once the one, changeless, substantial Being, and the manifold, changing, causal Becoming of all things.

The Fallacy of Immaturity Abets the Fallacy of Tribalism.

We are not wholly converted because the theory, unable to make clear this twofold identity or establish the unity of two ultimate phases of reality, saves itself by losing one of the real phases, *substance*. The reconciliation which it effects is simply a modern reaffirmation of Heraclitus's "*all is motion*," while Parmenides, who we must believe was really saying something, when he insisted on the reality of the *one and changeless*, is wholly neglected or denied.

We, therefore, refuse to accept a peace that is secured by killing off one of the contestants, for this is the result of a mere tribal warfare. But if we are determined to overcome the fallacy of tribalism, by making a genuine and lasting peace between the contending claims of substance and cause, we must make a thoroughgoing investigation into the sources of the fallacy.

What a strangely illuminating outcome it would be if we should discover, at the bottom of the tribal fallacy, the fallacy of immaturity! That is, we should be carried a long way toward the harmonization of thought, if we should find that men are rationally tribal because they are rationally immature.

The Intelligible not Reducible to the Sensible.

And, in the present case, the scientific motion-theory of objective reality, our surmise seems to have strong confirmation. In dealing with the many, sensible objects of experience, regarded as substances and causes (generalized as matter and motion) we have been dealing with them *only under the conditions of space and time*, which at best, therefore, may be regarded but as finite, temporal forms and modes, or as attributes and effects, of ultimate substance and ultimate cause,

which themselves are spaceless and timeless, that is, infinite and eternal. In other words, no one dealing with the objects of sense, together with all the logic in the world to rationalize them, has ever seen, heard, tasted, or touched real matter or substance as such, and real motion or cause as such, but only their manifested forms and modes. As we have before said, Substance and Cause in themselves lie beyond the perception of sense and the discursive reasonings of logic, the function of which is to rationalize sense; and reveal themselves to rational intuition alone. Hence, the inevitable confusion arising out of looking for them where they are not to be found, viz.: in the sense-world of space and time; and especially the rational absurdity of attempting to apply a finite, temporal measuring rod to the Infinite and Eternal Reality. In a word, although the Sensible can be understood alone in terms of the Intelligible, men seem to persist in trying to write down the Intelligible in terms of the Sensible. The futility of this procedure is what Kant so ably exposed, as we shall have occasion, in due time, to discover.

If, then, we would know anything about the reality of substance and cause, understand the unity of their true relation, and thus avoid a one-sided tribalism, we must unfold thought to its *mature* self-realization, by rising above the passing, conditioned world of sense and logic to the abiding, unconditioned, intelligible world of rational intuition.

It is only when reason outgrows its immaturities of sense and logic, and attains the maturity of its native endowments in intuition, that we may hope to get some understanding of why, in spite of appearance amid the multiplicity of forms and modes, attributes and effects, the mind stubbornly persists in asserting One, Infinite Substance and One, Eternal Cause, in the Absolute Unity of objective Reality.

The Problem of Identity as Unity.

The problem, then, for our theoretical interpretation of the object, is to discover what must be the real nature of that object, so that it can reveal its rational unity as the harmonious relation of a one and changeless being, or Infinite Substance, and a manifold, ever-active becoming, or Eternal Cause; and, at the same time, comprehend within that unity, not only the infinite and eternal but also the finite and temporal. It is clearly evident that the true nature of the object as One, Absolute Substance-Cause, manifesting itself under the

sensible conditions of space and time in an infinitude of substantial qualities, and in endless, causal activities, can not be revealed in those spatial and temporal conditions, but only in itself.

Perhaps, the problem altogether transcends the powers of reason! Nevertheless, we must confront it, for it is reason that has forced the problem upon us. At any rate, we shall not be deterred by any lions of difficulty in the way, for they may, after all, be chained. Besides, we could take courage to essay any danger when the city of rational salvation lures us on. Moreover, we can not avoid sharing the conviction of Hegel that a problem which rises in reason, for that very reason, reason can reason out. And we must believe that the emergence of any difficulty in the mind is just the mind's way of beginning its solution, and is, at the same time, the earnest, as it were, of ultimate success.

Our further cause of procedure is distinctly marked out for us by the very nature of the case. Strange as it may seem, it is nevertheless an inevitable outcome of our attempt to interpret the object, that we are now thrown back upon the subject.

Thrown Back upon the Subject.

Unable to know the real object through the avenues of sense, and by means of the logical rationalization of sense, we must turn back to the subject's powers of rational intuition, to view in its light the object's ultimate meaning.

But this necessary reversion to the subject ought not to surprise us, if our feet are guided by the rays that fall from the lamp of experience. For wherever men, in a great way, have sought to interpret the object, they have been invariably thrown back upon the subject to discover, if possible, in what manner and to what extent the subject may or can know the object.

In India, this thought revolution clearly stands recorded in those immortal Upanishads, where the poet-philosopher is discovered turning joyously from the illusions of sense and logic to the realities of the inner self which reveals itself as akin to the Self of the World.* In Greece, we have the great names of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who reconciled the contending claims of Eleatic and Heraclitic, in

* Khandogya-Up. VI., 12: 1-3; VII., 25: 1-2, "Sacred Books of the East," Vol. I.

NOTE:—The quotations from Aristotle are to be found in M'Mahon's translation in Bohn's Library.

the concept, the idea, and in the all-pervasive Mind, which is the moveless mover of all things (*νόησις νοήσεως*).

In the modern world, beginning with Descartes, passing through Locke and Hume, and ending in Kant and Hegel, we have thought coming back from the shifting sands of sensible experience and discursive reasoning to the immovable foundations of the ego, for the final interpretation of reality; and proclaiming the Gospel of the Theoretical Reason, that the Kingdom of Truth is within.

It would be most enlightening to trace out in detail the unfolding of this modern thought-movement, but the present purpose and limits permit but a suggestive outline, in order to reach the main results, and get their meaning for our interpretation of life.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWING.

IF our misfortunes are going to teach us valuable lessons some day, it would be reasonable, in the end, to regard them as good fortunes. At any rate, we may consider the check to our knowledge of the object, which we experience in trying simply to know the object, as fortunate; because, by throwing us back upon the subject, there is revealed the only way of knowing *both* subject and object. We have made great advance, when we learn that the object can not be known apart from the subject, nor the subject apart from the object.

If we remove all self-consciousness from everybody's—including God's—knowledge of the object, the object ceases to exist. We ourselves would not remain conscious, even to imagine an object. On the other hand, if we remove all knowledge of the object from the subject's—including God's—self-consciousness, the subject becomes a pure, abstract nothing. God, as the Absolute, is both subject and object. Hence, if we have been disappointed in our search for knowledge in going out toward the object, we may be well content with being forced to return to the subject, in order that by knowing the subject, we may come truly to know the object.

We have said that we can not know real substance and real cause through sense and logic, but only through rational intuition, because they belong to the intelligible and not to the sensible world; and that men are always trying to measure the intelligible by the sensible, whereas the true procedure is to view the sensible in the light of the intelligible. How this necessitates the reversion to the subject is not hard to understand.

Knowledge Must Be Coherent and Real.

If knowledge is to be knowledge, it must meet two absolute conditions. First, it must be *logically coherent*, that is, free from inner contradiction, which the laws of logic demand of it; and, secondly, it must be *real*, or inform us of the object in its reality, a condition

which rational intuition demands of it. Such knowledge, however, our outgoing search does not afford. Sense objects do not give us logical coherency, for they are constantly leading us into errors and illusions, by their shifting mutabilities and contradictions; and, at best, when logic has been satisfied by reducing the objects of sense to rational coherence, they give us only *apparent* and not *real* knowledge. Thus, for example: For thousands of years we thought the sun daily rose up in the east and went down in the west; and that the earth was flat, very large, and immovable. And it is only recently we have learned that not the sun in the east and west, but we ourselves rise up in the west and go down in the east every day; that our earth is roundish, ridiculously small, and moving constantly in at least a half dozen different directions.

Coherent Knowledge May Be Apparent Only.

Having discovered these errors of sense, suppose we set ourselves, logically, to correct the last one, about the immovability of the earth. And do so by securing the most eminent mathematician in the world to plot out exactly, say, the luminous path which the Goddess of Liberty, in New York Harbor, is blazing with her torch through the universe.

Our mathematician, the very greatest known, perhaps to be secured only at the famous University of Weissnichtwo in Niemand's Land, would need, to begin his work, certain fixed points of reference in space and time.

For his space measurements, he would require three fixed, straight lines, mutually perpendicular, to represent the three dimensions of space. But how would he get his *first* line? He could not draw it from the sun to the North Star, for they are both moving; nor from Sirius to Algol, for the same reason. In fact, he could find no two stars that are motionless. He could not fix arbitrarily on some imaginary center and draw his three mutually perpendicular lines from that, for he would need one straight line to begin with, and he has no empirical means of determining its direction. We will allow him, therefore, to fix his lines, conventionally. But when at last he gets his formula, he will only know the path of Liberty, *relative* to those conventional lines, and this gives us only the *apparent* path, while we have employed him to show us the *real* path through space.

As to time, we will suppose that he selects for his point of departure, nine o'clock A. M., January 1st, 2000 A. D. But this only indicates a particular point reached in the axial revolution of the earth, after it had gone around the sun two thousand times from the birth hour of a given, historical personality. This, however, is only a *relative* date. We should have to ask how that date is related to the birth of the world, and that to the birth of the sun, and that to the beginning of the Milky Way. What, in short, is the real point of departure by which we can set our watches and so know the real time, by the Cosmic Hour Glass, when our mathematician begins and ends his calculation of the luminous path? He could not tell us, and we should have to be content with his conventionally chosen date.

In like manner, every object we seek to know through sense and logic is apparent and not *real*. As already indicated, all the substances and causes we know, being conditioned and secondary forms and modes of real substance and real cause, are only *relatively* and *apparently* substance and cause. So that, although we may free ourselves from all the inconsistencies and contradictions of sense by the most perfect logic, and thus make our knowledge logically coherent, it is still not *real* knowledge of the object.

But, if thus harrassed and goaded on by the demand of rational intuition for *real* knowledge, we do turn from the object to the subject, what hope have we of getting any nearer to the goal of reality through the subject?

How Real Knowledge Is Gained through the Subject.

Well, we see that what our mathematician required, as a necessary precondition for tracing the real path of freedom's light, was some fixed points of reference in space and time; or, in other words, he needs the absolute fixity and permanence of infinity and eternity, which finite space and passing time can not afford.

But if he turns back to his own mind, he will find the infinite and eternal already there, as it is found in every self-conscious, rational subject. By the very fact of man's rise above nature into supra-nature, which is effected through his becoming a self-conscious subject, he passes beyond the relative and conditioned finite and temporal, into the absolute and unconditioned infinite and eternal. So that when he discovers that the finity and temporality of the object does not afford him the absolute ground he requires for real knowledge,

he perforce is thrown back upon the infinite and eternal, to be found, where the demand for real knowledge arises, in the rational subject.

The Infinite and Eternal in Man.

But the infinite and eternal is not found in the subject, it may, with emphasis, be protested; for no experience is more widely felt and expressed than that of man's insignificance and transience in the midst of an objective world whose greatness utterly overwhelms him. And, yet, turn to the philosophers of ancient India and Greece, and you will hear them forever talking of the Infinite and Absolute. Turn to the sacred scriptures of the Hebrews, old and new, and you will hear them forever talking about the Eternal and Almighty. Where did the Hindu and the Greek or the Hebrew get this Infinite and Eternal? Certainly not from the world of experience, the insignificance and transience of which, as contrasted with the Infinite and Eternal, is the very cause of complaint, and which, in view of that contrast, is regarded as the unreal and perishable.

Shall we hear the testimony of the Hindu, or Hebrew himself? The Hindu says Brahman, the Infinite, revealed it to man's inner self;* and the Hebrew says Yahweh, the Eternal, spoke to the spirit of man.† But even if Brahman and Yahweh did reveal the infinite and eternal to man, man would be utterly blind to it, unless he had some inherent capacity of understanding it. Indeed, both Hindu and Hebrew give a deeper account than revelation to explain this extraordinary paradox, that in the mind of finite, temporal man, there is the infinite and eternal. The Hindu declares that the inner self of man is identical with the Supreme Self of Brahman;‡ while the Hebrew declares that man is the son of God, created in the divine likeness and image.|| If in the one case, the relation becomes an identity; in the other, it is kinship and communion. And in both, there is made known the reason why the infinite and eternal is found in the mind of man.

The Greatness of the Rational Subject.

A little reflection will make clear to us the peculiar greatness of the intelligent subject. Suppose we say that the North Star is a thousand

* Katha-Up. 2/23. S. B. E. Vol. XV. † Khandogya-Up. VI. 12/1-3. Ib. Vol. I.

† Ex. iii, 4ff. || Gen. i, 26-27. See Note, p. 659.

light-years away from the earth, which means a thousand times as far as it would take a ray of light to travel in a year, going at the rate of 186,000 miles per second. This distance which is nearly six billions of millions of miles, to travel which an express, running without pause at the rate of a thousand miles a day, would take over sixteen thousand millions of years, is traversed by thought before the word can be uttered; and we stand there, on the instant, having entirely lost sight of the Solar System whence we came, and look out with rapture upon the glorious splendors of new worlds and constellations. Though it is impossible to conceive how the body, under its limiting conditions of space and time, could ever reach that distant point, the mind leaps the chasm, not in a day, nor in an hour, nor in a second, but in that absolute instant when thought determines to do so. And this is possible, because the mind, unlike the body, is not in space and time. Space and time, any space and any time, all spaces and all times, that is, infinity and eternity are, it is true, not *in* but rather, *of* the mind.

This great, rational fact may be seen in the relation of every individual, conscious subject to space and time. While I may say: *Then*, I was *there*; *now*, I am *here*; *soon*, I shall be *yonder*, these distinctions apply wholly to the body, which is only a conditioned phase of the mind's unfolding consciousness, and not the mind itself. The mind itself at each moment, is forever *here* and *now*. Have I lived in the past, do I know anything of world-history? then, it is always, so far as I am conscious of it, present to me *now*. If I did live back then in the past and had a certain experience, that experience is either with me *now*, as an element in my present consciousness, in the form of vivid memory or psychic residuum, as thought, sentiment, and habit; or, if I prefer to transfer myself in thought to the then, that *then* at once becomes my *now*. In like manner, the moment I fancy myself in the future, it is either with me *now*, as a present element of my consciousness; or, in case I actually reach it in experience, it will be to me my *now*, then.

That is, I never depart, except so far as my body is concerned, with its limits and conditions of space and time, from the ever-present *here* and *now*. How wide and varied soever may be my experiences, in my self, as a conscious, rational subject, I still forever live in an infinite here and eternal now. Indeed, I have never lived and shall never live in any other place or at any other time than here

and now. And, so far as any changes in my physical, spatial and temporal conditions are concerned, I shall always, so to speak, carry my *here* and *now* around with me, and thus forever be at home to myself, wherever I may be in the universe.

Real Points of Reference in the Rational Subject.

But how, the reader may perhaps demand, does this help out our practical mathematician, in his endeavor to plot the path of Liberty's torch? Much in every way. For he is now *justified* in fixing *any* points of reference, lines or moments, in space and time, as his absolute and permanent center. If he does not shift, separate, or leave these points, once chosen, he will have something absolute to which all other points of space and time may be referred back; and the only further condition, to secure results, valid everywhere and at all times, is perfect accuracy of observation and logical consistency in calculation.

But what if another individual mathematician chooses his absolute points of reference in space and time, will not his results clash with or contradict those of our calculator? Not if he is faithful to his chosen *here* and *now*, accurate in observation, and consistent in logic; *provided*, he always makes allowance for his difference of spatial-temporal reference points from his colleague. Whether the first transfers his points to those of the second, or the second transfers his points to those of the first, will make no difference in giving absolute results. If, however, each insists on retaining his own points, his results may be accurate and consistent, but they will only be relative in validity to the results of the other.

You choose the center of the earth for your absolute center of space, and the vernal equinox, 4241 B. C. just when the Egyptian astronomers first observed Sirius rising with the Sun, as your absolute point of time. I choose the center of the moon and the date when Pope Gregory XIII introduced the reformed Julian Calendar. But these points must never be allowed to shift from where and when each of us has chosen, nor be separated, one from the other, unless exact allowance is always made for the change. And when our work is done accurately and consistently, there will be absolute agreement, provided the difference of our respective places and times be taken into account. The reason such calculations can not be practically carried out is that we can empirically get no point of

space that is permanent. Whether we stand on planet, or sun, or star, we are moving, and this movement through space shifts also our point of time, or itself constitutes time. But what we can not do empirically, we can do ideally in the spaceless chambers of the mind.

Absolute Weight Weighs Nothing.

Perhaps it may seem that this reference of the relativity of the spatial and temporal to the absoluteness of the infinite and eternal is an illegitimate procedure of the mind, because it stands for an impossibility. But a simple illustration may help us to see that this inter-reference between the finite and infinite, the temporal and eternal is not only possible but compelled by the mind itself.

Let us suppose, for the moment, that the Solar System represents the whole universe, in space and time; and then seek to get its weight. We would begin by weighing the Sun, Mercury, Venus, the Earth and so on out to Neptune. The grand total, we might say, is the weight of the Solar System. But in what terms is the weight expressed? In avoirdupois? That is wholly unsatisfactory, because it represents all the members of the Solar System, as if they were objects on the surface of the earth. If we look at the matter more closely, we shall see that just as the weight of every terrestrial object is determined by the pull of the earth upon it, so the weight of each planet is determined by the pull of the Sun upon it. Hence, to get the weight of the planets we must take our stand upon the Sun, and with a great balance weigh each, thus getting its weight in terms of the Sun's pull. Then, to get the weight of the Sun, we should have to take our stand successively on each planet and get the amount of its pull on the Sun. The end of our effort would be that the pull of the Sun on the planets, or their weights, just equaled the pull of all the planets on the Sun, or its weight. The two weights would exactly cancel each other, so that when we undertook to weigh the Solar System, as a whole, we should find it to weigh exactly nothing. It could rest upon the palm of an infant's hand without his knowing it. Thus the Solar System, though containing the sum of all weights within it, yet itself weighs nothing. It is the total aggregate of all relations, dependencies and conditions, but is itself unrelated, independent, and unconditioned. Of course, we know that the Solar System is moving, or rather falling, toward some far distant star, say Vega in Lyra, so that if we stood on Vega with our cosmic bal-

ances, we might weigh the Solar System. But by agreement we took the Solar System to represent the entire universe, as known in space and time, which enabled us to see how it is that, while the universe contains all weight, itself weighs nothing.

Thus we see that, to get real knowledge, we must pass beyond the relative and conditioned, in space and time, into the absoluteness of the infinite and eternal which, while they contain all the relations and conditions, transcend them. By no possibility can we reach the infinite and eternal, by adding little bits of the finite or little moments of the temporal, however far we carry the process. We often make the mistake of regarding an indefinitely large space as infinite, or an indefinitely long time as eternal; but, although including the finite and temporal, the infinite and eternal transcend them and become qualitatively different and other; just as the weight of the Solar System, while including all weight, transcends weight and is something different and other, because it weighs nothing.

And the reason all this is possible and necessary to our knowledge, is that, not finding in the sensible object, in time and space, any permanent ground for knowledge, we turn back to the subject, where the unconditioned and absolute data of the infinite and eternal are forever present.

The Æsthetic and Moral Absolute Found in the Subject.

The incalculable advantage of getting back from the conditioned relativity of the object, to an absolute permanence in the subject, does not belong to the theoretical reason alone, but, as we shall see more and more, to the æsthetical and ethical reason as well. Thus, feeling demands as its goal, pleasure. Where shall it be found? It is looked for in vain among sensations, which no sooner please than they pain; nor shall we succeed by seeking it among the emotions, which cause us suffering as well as enjoyment. This confusion and contradiction naturally arises from the fact that sensation and emotion are relative pleasures, conditioned by the sense objects and logical relations among sense objects, to which they are the æsthetic correlates. Absolute pleasure or happiness can only be attained when the return is made to the subject, where the infinite and eternal is the only ground of its existence. Then, for the first time, it is that sensation and emotion, related to happiness, find their true value and meaning.

So also with our moral relations. So long as I find my criterion of action among the moral objects with which I come into contact, I never reach moral self-realization. I begin by taking my neighbors as mere elements in my selfish purposes. They do the same, and the result is a bitter, unending strife that defeats the purpose of all of us. When I discover that it is better to form with them a moral convention and set up laws of justice, it proves of great advantage to my interests to be honest and just with my neighbors. But, as far as justice may be above egoism, my points of reference are still external and there is conflict and confusion. In the first place, which law of justice shall I make it my duty to observe? that of Draco, Solon, Lycurgus, Manu, Confucius, Hammurabi, or Moses? These are all in a measure, shifting and uncertain, because they are related to and conditioned by different times and places. And at best, in the second place, they do not overcome the hard struggle for selfish, personal advantage. It is only when, with Socrates, I turn to the inner concept of virtue within my own mind, as a true expression of myself; or when, more perfectly, at last with Jesus, I recognize the real moral attitude toward my neighbors to be my own out-streaming will of good, that I rise above the conditioned and the relative to the unchanging absolute. Then, it matters not what may be the codes and laws, what the times and places, or who my neighbors, black or white, yellow or red, bond-servants or freemen, I always act toward them with that love which is the fulfilling of the law; and, in giving to them all, I receive all. So that the personal interests which, as an egoist, I hoped to secure by selfish strife, I now really, for the first time, secure as a free and generous gift, without effort but that of loving my neighbor as myself.

Knowing, its Method and Validity.

Well then, if really to know the object, we must turn back to the subject, where we can find those absolute points of reference, from which to determine the object in its reality, we come not only to understand that reversion, seen in the universal experience of thought, but easily recognize the profit in reviewing the modern, philosophical movement which lifts us from the external, the conditioned finite, and temporal, into the inner realm of the infinite and the eternal.

The entire meaning of modern philosophy has centered around the rational subject's activities in knowing its object, and has developed

a distinct department of thought, which found its greatest exponent in Kant, and which has come to be called the Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology, a term derived from the Greek words, *ἐπιστήμη*, knowledge (which Plato used in distinction from *δόξα*, personal opinion or belief) and *λόγος*, doctrine.

In following this new philosophical discipline, there are always two fundamental questions to be considered. First, what is the *method* of knowledge, or the *process* in the subject's mind, in knowing his object; and, secondly, what is its *validity*, or what guarantee have we that such knowledge, once gained, corresponds to the real object? In the first instance, our chief concern will be to clear away all *fallacies of contradiction* and reduce the process to inner consistency. In the second instance, we shall have to grapple with the *fallacy of subjectivity*, and assure ourselves that we are not being led into mistaking our own subjective thoughts for real objective things, or losing objective things altogether.

The Logic of Reasoning and the Logic of Reason.

As we proceed, it will become more and more evident that we are not dealing simply with logic as it is commonly understood, but going far deeper into the life of reason. Logic, in its popular sense, we may call the Logic of Reasoning, which is a conscious and voluntary application of the laws of true thinking to the object. The Theory of Knowledge, we may call the Logic of Reason, which is in itself a subconscious, or rather *supra*-conscious, and non-voluntary activity of the whole rational self. It reveals, as it were, the morphology of reason, in its total and mature unity.

While the Logic of Reasoning is liable to fallacies and, in spite of itself, constantly permits us to run into errors and illusions, the Logic of Reason is absolutely reliable and inerrant. For it lies in the very nature of reason to be infallible, because it rests upon, and has its source in, Reality. It is, therefore, the only ultimate means by which the fallacies, errors, and illusions of reasoning, or discursive logic, which is the expression of man's freedom in the search for truth, can finally be corrected.

Momentous Issues.

It will be, then, not without the deepest concern and even trepidation that we follow the efforts of thought to determine the organic

structure of reason; for the supreme interests of our rational life depend upon its failure or success. If thought fails, we shall be shut out from the Truth, condemned to wander blindly, as those who are lost, amid the waste places of our own illusions. And, shut out from the Truth, the Paradise of Beauty and Goodness will be barred to us, or only fitfully appear to our hopes and dreams. If, on the other hand, thought succeeds in making possible to us the knowledge of the Truth, we shall little reck the hardships and dangers by the way, be they burning wastes or savage foes, for when the Truth gleams in the distance, *there*, is Reality, and Reality is the Absolute Beauty of Eternal Goodness.

The Object, First Lost in the Subject is then Reestablished by the Subject.

If Kant must be regarded as the great central figure in the Doctrine of Knowledge, the way was prepared for him by those who went before, and his work was largely, though not wholly, completed by those that came after. So that to understand Kant and his tremendous significance for modern thought, we must cover the distance from Descartes to Hegel.

We have said that, to be sure of our knowledge, we must avoid the fallacies of contradiction and of subjectivity. It will be interesting to observe, as we proceed, how the contradictions and incoherencies, in the knowledge of the object, keep driving men back toward the subject until, arriving at the subject, they at first doubt having any trustworthy knowledge of the object at all. But the subject, unable to remain alone, now demands reliable knowledge of the object, which it succeeds in basing upon the reliability of certain necessary and universal, inner activities of its own.

But while this secures reliability for knowledge, by freeing it from superficial contradiction and so makes it, as we say, scientific, it leaves knowledge wholly subjective. Then men see that this subjectivity is a great fallacy, because it is, after all, a contradiction in itself. The attempt to banish subjective error from the knowledge of the object has resulted in the irrational outcome of shutting the subject entirely within itself, having no outlet to the object whatever. This is the fallacy of subjectivity, with a vengeance. To be valid, knowledge must be knowledge of the object. So men are further driven to see how the inner activities of thought follow exactly the

outer activities of the thing, that is, how the subject and object interact, so that one reflects the other.

From Descartes to Hegel.

It was Descartes who was first driven by the contradictions in our outer knowledge to take refuge in the subject. But he went so far as to make the subject do too much. So that while contradictions in the object threw him back upon the subject, where he could find the true starting point for knowledge, he fell into the fallacy of subjectivity to such an extent as to cast doubt upon knowledge, at any rate, so far as Locke saw it.

Hence in reaction, Locke flew back to the object, where he supposed that at last he had secured reliable knowledge. But if it is only by looking at the object we can get valid knowledge, Hume came in with the discovery that what Descartes claimed, viz.: certain innate powers of the subject at work in constituting knowledge, was after all true. But while Descartes considered that those subjective elements made knowledge objectively valid, it was just because of the presence of such subjective elements, that Hume threw doubt upon all science; for in order to be valid, science must be gained by Locke's objective method. If Locke corrected Descartes's fallacy of subjectivity, Hume showed how Locke's objectivity is a fallacy, but got no further than doubting the possibility of knowledge altogether.

This brought Kant to the front with his great, epoch-making work of showing clearly how much the subject really does in constituting knowledge. So that the inner, rational activity of the subject, instead of invalidating our science, as Hume believed, is the very thing that makes it trustworthy. But if Kant thus corrected Hume's skepticism, he fell into the arch fallacy of subjectivity. For while he cleared knowledge of all subjective errors and illusions about the object, he so completely shut up all our knowledge within the subject, locking the door and throwing away the key, that what we call our sciences, however reliable for us, are after all only our own private, human affair, not deserving the name of knowledge, in the true sense of the term.

This was Hegel's opportunity, who broke the prison bars of subjectivity and led the mind out into the full light of subjective and objective reason, where the subject's activity proves to be the object's activity, in the total maturity of rational self-realization.

But if in this entire process, beginning in Descartes and ending in Hegel, we find Hegel at last completing Kant, we shall discover in the sequel that he did not wholly do so. For while he cleared up the process of knowledge by tracing it in a masterly way, from sense to logic, and from logic to intuition, thus leading the subject out to a valid knowledge of the object, he still left two problems, which Kant started, insufficiently treated. One is the true deduction of the categories, and the other, the ultimate guarantee of objectivity; both of which it will be our future task more fully to consider.

It is to be hoped that when, in tracing the development of the Doctrine of Knowledge, we have occasion to condemn certain results as false, no one will suppose that the work of each stage of advance is therefore rejected. For each stage was a forward step; and, as an inevitable and necessary phase of the problem, had to be thoroughly worked out. So that what is condemned is not the positive results secured, but the exclusive and one-sided attitude in which certain elements are emphasized, to the neglect of others which as much belong to the whole.

These somewhat abstract statements will become, we trust, more intelligible in the light of the actual history which, beginning with Descartes, we now shall endeavor very briefly to trace.

Descartes.

René Descartes (1596-1650),* professing himself to be a faithful son of Mother Church, would in no way deal with the ecclesiastical doctrines of revelation, although the theologians, not unjustly, looked upon him at times with grave suspicions. But toward philosophy he showed no such deference, for finding philosophy so incoherent and contradictory, he resolved to raze the old structure with the ground and build anew from secure foundations. The cause of confusion and conflict hitherto, he conceived, was the want of some fixed point of reference to which all were agreed. That, once secured, a consistent logic might be trusted to build up a true and universally accepted philosophy.

What then is this point of reference, or sure foundation of knowledge upon which all can rest? Our philosopher began by looking about

*We must not suppose that Descartes was the first philosopher in modern times who saw the difficulties of thought and tried to mend them, but so thorough, comprehensive, and significant was his "Discourse on Method" that he is justly regarded as the father of modern philosophy.

him in the outer world of experience, and was astonished to find that so much, which was usually taken to be knowledge, was subject to grave doubt. So much was this the case, that it suggested to him a method of procedure, which was to doubt everything until it could prove itself no longer subject to doubt (*de omnibus dubitandum*), much as Aristotle had challenged everything by doubt (Met. II, 1), in order to make it give a clear and distinct account of itself.

In the Act of Knowing, I Am.

He did not reach sure ground until he got back to his own conscious self, which as existent he could no longer doubt. For to doubt it is to assert it. Hence this was to be the foundation stone for the new philosophy. "I think, therefore I am" (*cogito ergo sum*).*

The Test of Knowledge, Clearness and Distinctness.

Having this ground of ultimate certainty in conscious, thinking existence, Descartes went on to examine its character and found it to be *clearness* and *distinctness*, which he therefore took to be the final test of all that might be considered valid knowledge (*omnis verum est quod clare et distincte percipio*).

By subjecting all objects of thought to this criterion of a *clara et distincta perceptio*, he believed he could distinguish the false from the true; and, in this way, he found a series of ideas, innate in the mind, upon which he could build up a comprehensive, rational system of philosophy regarding man, the world, and God, and their relations.

In this effort, carried on with much luminous and cogent reasoning, Descartes's great significance for modern thought, is his reversion to the self-conscious, rational subject, as the center of all knowing, without which, as Kant afterwards showed, nothing can be known. But it will be seen that in resting the fate of knowledge simply upon clearness and distinctness in thought, he was dealing only with the more obvious, outer logic of reasoning, rather than penetrating to the deeper *logic of reason*, which his reversion to the subject really demanded.

* Those are mistaken who have criticised Descartes for making existence a *logical inference* from the fact of thinking. Because *ergo*, in this expression, is for Descartes little more than a copula, and merely indicates apposition. I do not exist *because* I think, but I exist *in the very act* of thinking (*sum cogitans*) or thinking is necessarily one with self-consciously existing.

Locke.

John Locke (1672-1704) rebelled against this Cartesian procedure, not because he would go deeper into the rational process of knowing within the subject, but because too little account was taken of objective experience. Once, we have our ideas, and we can argue about them almost any way we please; but how do we get our ideas to begin with, Locke insisted; and it was his attempt to find the origin of these ideas in experience, that justly entitles him to be regarded as the founder of modern empiricism.

Locke would be content to take Descartes's innate ideas as valid knowledge, if they were really innate, that is, implanted in the mind by the Creator. But with such an inerrant origin as this, they must have a clearness and distinctness in all minds which Locke could not find, and he took great pains to invalidate the objectivity of Descartes's innate ideas.

The Doctrine of Experience.

Having cleared the ground of the Cartesian subjective fallacy, Locke now proceeds to seek the true source and origin of our ideas; and this he finds in experience. First, objects from without are impressed, through the senses, upon the mind as upon a blank tablet (*tabula rasa*), very much as the images fall upon the screen of a *camera obscura*; and these we examine and logically relate so as to form our sciences and philosophies.

Here Locke is contenting himself with a simple, naive common-sense view, which supposes that objects come into the mind from the outside, full-fledged and complete; and all we have to do then, to secure valid knowledge, is to reason about them logically. We have already seen (p. 52) how the simplest object is an elaborate construct, produced for us, far back in the sub-conscious reason. In his zeal to overthrow Descartes's clear and distinct innate ideas, Locke overlooked a real innateness which is a necessary element of all knowledge, to which Descartes was really, though not adequately, calling attention. He merely took the objective world out there in a superficial way as a real something, quite independent of our minds, directly known to us through our senses, and then argued out by logic into rational order.

Inadequate, however, as this account of the knowing process

proved to be, it had the merit of breaking down the previous one-sided tendencies of laying too much emphasis on mere subjective thinking, at the expense of objective experience, which also has eminent claims and can not be disregarded, if we would really know the object. It was the spirit of modern science asserting itself in philosophical form. "To know the truth," it says in effect, "examine the data of sense and reduce them by logic to rational order."

Hume.

Unfortunately for the simple empiricism of Locke, but fortunately for the theory of knowledge, David Hume (1711-1776) appeared on the scene, and brought with him a most uncomfortable power of clear thinking and forcible expression. Accepting Locke's doctrine that, if we are to have reliable knowledge of the object, we must get it in experience, Hume determined to look at the object with all his logical might. The result was most disturbing and painful for the security of knowledge. For he looked at the object so hard that it practically disappeared, so far as being anything reliably known to us as an object. He recognized, as we all do, a certain compelling dignity about the word science, which can be applied to knowledge only, when it is *necessary* and *universal*, that is, when we *must* accept it as true, and *all* of us must accept it. And he saw that what gives to science this necessity and universality is such notions as substance and cause. Take these out from under the objects of our knowledge, and nothing remains but a series of events—we can not call them qualities and effects, for that always means an underlying and backlying substance and cause—in juxta-position and succession.

The Subject Again Discovered.

Hume's enlightening and revolutionary discovery was that he could nowhere find among the objects of experience substance and cause. Turn where he would in outer nature, he could only see juxta-position and succession of sense impressions. Nor was it any better when he retired within himself to observe the activities of that inner nature, his own soul. Sharpen his wits as he might, he could not see his rational self as the substantial causal ground of his psychic existence, but only a string of perceptions, feelings, and volitions. Where then, he inquires, shall we find this substance

and cause, which alone give to our knowledge of the object the validity and worth of science? Why, if not to be found in the object, they must be supplied by the subject, which is thus always leading us into the illusion of supposing ourselves to have a scientific knowledge of the object, when, all the time, it is imposing its own subjective activities upon us. And what gives cogency to Hume's discovery is its indisputable reliability.

Hume's One-sided Consistency.

If only Locke had not so completely abolished the innate ideas of Descartes, or had allowed some kind of innateness in the mind, as a constructive or constituent element of knowledge, Hume might have seen a better way out. But, as it was, Locke had thrown him completely upon the sense objects of experience as the source of all valid knowledge of the object; and, as experience could in no way furnish those elements of substance and cause, that make knowledge truly scientific, our knowledge is, therefore, *not* truly scientific at all, because it is vitiated by the subject's tendency to feign the presence of substance and cause where they are not; giving out all the time that they are in the object, whereas in reality they are only in the subject. In view of this fact, we may apply to our knowledge such terms as the customary, the usual, the habitual; but scientific it is not.

Under these circumstances, what else could Hume become but a skeptic, regarding our knowledge of the objective world. He is popularly thought of as a religious skeptic because of his famous attack upon miracles, but his great significance for the development of the doctrine of knowledge lies in his being a *scientific* skeptic. He doubted altogether our ability to know the objective world, that is, have any true science. We might trace out the relation among things in their juxta-position and succession, and observe their habitual regularities; but this would only give us probability, and not that necessity and universality which a true science always involves.

In due time, we shall see the strange spectacle of Hume's doubt being turned into the very ground of certainty. While Hume concluded that our knowledge of the object lacked the necessity and universality of science because the subject takes so large and im-

portant a part in its construction, Kant concluded that it is just the subject's constructive activities that alone make possible the necessity and universality of scientific knowledge. Hume might have reached Kant's result, for it was he who opened the way to it, if he could only have caught something of the meaning of Descartes's innateness. But it was in part Descartes's fault; for, in returning to the subject, he did not show what the subject really does, and consequently represented it as doing too much. So that Locke, in exposing this fallacy of subjectivity, went too far the other side and made the object loom so large as the source of knowledge, that he overlooked altogether the true meaning of Descartes. Hume's great service was in reviving the Cartesian subjectivity and in showing, as Descartes did not, just what the subject is doing in the construction of knowledge. Descartes had only applied the logical tests of clearness and distinctness to our ideas, but Hume began to go into the very anatomy and physiology of the subjective reason itself, in its endeavor to know the object.

We can understand how indispensable was Hume's work, in running down the ever-present subjective elements in objective knowledge. We can not with him however allow them to hang suspended in mid-air without ground, or honorable pedigree, but must find their source in self-existent and self-sustaining reason. While Hume was right in pointing out the subjective elements in knowledge, he drew a false conclusion. He was consistent but wrong.

We can perhaps no better illustrate the value of Hume's half-truth, and at the same time its rational immaturity, than by the position of Professor Huxley, one of our great modern empirical scientists.

Huxley's Rational Tribalism and Immaturity.

In some very important particulars Huxley is beyond Hume. For one thing, he is not disturbed about the reliability of knowledge because it centers in mind. In so far he frankly confesses himself to be an idealist. In a lecture on Descartes's "Method," he shows how Descartes opened the way, on the one hand, for modern metaphysics to the Critical Idealism of Kant, and on the other hand, to the materialism of La Mettrie and Priestley; and he reveals his catholicity in recognizing metaphysics and physics as two branches of the one tree, not antagonistic but complementary in such a way that "thought will never be completely fruitful until the one unites

with the other" ("Methods and Results," p. 191). "It is an indisputable truth," he tells us, "that what we call the material world is only known to us under the forms of the ideal world; and, as Descartes tell us, our knowledge of the soul (taken as the sum of the states of consciousness of the individual) is more certain than our knowledge of the body" (Ib., p. 193). On a previous page he says: "The method, or path which leads to the truth, indicated by Descartes, takes us straight to the Critical Idealism of his great successor Kant. It is that Idealism which declares the ultimate fact of all knowledge to be consciousness, or, in other words, a mental phenomenon; and, therefore, affirms the highest of all certainties and indeed the only absolute certainty, to be the existence of mind" (Ib., p. 178).

So that we would suppose that Mr. Huxley is now ready to find some solid ground for Hume's unsupported subjective substance and cause in the mind. But, no, he at once withdraws and is determined to press his empirical way, with Locke, along the material path (that is, trust for his knowledge of the object, to the rationalization of sense data by logic), with the confident belief that sooner or later we shall "arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat" (Ib., p. 191). In other words, his ambition for science is to reduce what he regards as the ultimate certainty, mind, to the terms of what is not a certainty at all, matter, a something which we have no possible means of knowing.*

He refuses to press along the path of Idealism, where he asserts "the only absolute certainty" is to be found, to its meaning; and contents himself with the path of materialism, at the end of which he expects to find the objective truth. To justify himself in this procedure, he invokes the Critical Idealism by saying: "But it is also that Idealism which refuses to make any assertions, either positive or negative, as to what lies beyond consciousness" (Ib., p. 178). It is here where Professor Huxley reveals a rational tribalism, for he does not really mean "beyond consciousness"—to warn ourselves against going beyond consciousness is a shallow absurdity; for, in the nature of the case, it will forever be impossible

*It is true, he takes matter in the modern sense (p. 560) of psychic stuff or mind atoms, but he still overlooks the fundamental significance of the antithesis between the constructive activities of mind and the given material of sense experience.

to go beyond consciousness. What he really means, however, is the Lockian empiricism, and that is, in order to get knowledge of the object, we must not go beyond the data of sense and what logic can make out of them. He does not seem to recognize that the principles at work in the mind are elements of consciousness, just as much as are the outer phenomena of sense experience; and just as much demand a rational scientific treatment. So that his profession of faith in Idealism is hollow, for while he accepts with his lips the absolute and ultimate certainty of mind, he refuses to consider all that is *in* mind, and with the entire devotion of his heart renders his homage to matter or, what is the same thing, the outer data of sense, as the true and only source of knowledge.

And yet he frankly admits, or rather emphatically asserts, that there are certain principles in the mind which are not to be found in sense experience, but which dominate sense experience, and are absolutely necessary to make any knowledge whatsoever possible. Though, as empirical as Locke, he fully recognizes, with Hume, that to have any knowledge of the object at all, worthy to be considered scientific, sense and logic alone are utterly helpless, unless there is something more *in* consciousness, which the subject supplies and, without which, the object can not be known. But he is not as consistent as Hume who saw that, if sense and logic is the only source of objective knowledge, the introduction of subjective elements casts doubt upon it; for Professor Huxley is sure of what he calls natural knowledge, or the knowledge he gets by logically rationalizing the data of sense.

Huxley on Bacon's Novum Organum.

In discussing the value of Bacon's "Novum Organum" for modern science, Professor Huxley does not find it "easy to discover satisfactory evidence that the "Novum Organum" had any direct, beneficial influence on the advancement of natural knowledge." He continues: "No delusion is greater than the notion that method and industry can make up for lack of 'mother-wit' either in science or in practical life; and it is strange that, with his knowledge of mankind, Bacon should have dreamed that his or any other *via inveniendi scientias* would 'level men's wits' and leave little scope for that inborn capacity which is called genius. As a matter of fact, Bacon's *via* has proved helplessly impracticable; while the 'an-

ticipations of nature' by the invention of hypotheses, based on incomplete inductions, has proved itself to be a most efficient, indeed, indispensable instrument of scientific progress" ("Method and Results:" *The Progress of Science*, pp. 46-7).

Now these anticipatory guesses or hypotheses, based on incomplete inductions, which the "mother-wit" or "inborn capacity of genius" can alone make, and which are so indispensable to the progress of science, are just some of the things which pass beyond sense and logic, but do not pass beyond consciousness, and must be taken into account, if we would have the mind's true process in knowing its object.

The Only Conditions of a Valid Science are Idealistic.

In another place, the eminent scientist declares for the necessity of regarding physical science as "one and indivisible," and of granting "the objective existence of a material world." He then goes on to give the conditions under which science can alone be pursued: "It is assumed that the phenomena which are comprehended under this name [the objective material world] have a 'substratum' of extended, impenetrable, mobile substance, which exhibits the quality known as inertia and is termed matter. Another postulate is the universality of the law of causation; that nothing happens without a cause (that is, a necessary precedent condition), and that the state of the physical universe, at any given moment, is the consequence of its state at any preceding moment. Another is that any of the rules or so-called 'laws of Nature,' by which the relation of phenomena is truly defined, is true for all time" (Ib., pp. 60-61).

Suppose we carefully note what Professor Huxley thus regards as absolutely preliminary conditions, *above* and *before* experience, which science, therefore, built upon sense and logic, can not discover or prove, but which the mind itself must furnish before science can begin to give us knowledge of the objective world.

In the first place, there is the knowing mind itself with its "mother-wit" and "inborn capacity of genius," able not only to know Nature, but to make anticipatory guesses of her secrets; then, there is the certainty of the objective world as something which can be interpreted and understood; and, finally, there are the assumed postulates of *unity, substance, cause, rational order, and permanence*, with which,

while outside the province of science proper, science must begin and continue, if it would reach its end of knowing the object.

Professor Huxley clearly recognizes where all these things belong, viz.: beyond science, with its sense and logic, in the province of philosophy, with its rational intuition; but he knows no way to guarantee their validity, for he says of them: "The validity of these postulates is a problem of metaphysics; they are neither self-evident nor are they, strictly speaking, demonstrable. The justification of their employment, as axioms of physical philosophy, lies in the circumstance that expectations, logically based upon them, are verified, or, at any rate, not contradicted, whenever they can be tested by experience" (Ib., p. 61).

Here we are thrown squarely back upon Hume's perfectly justifiable skepticism. If the real foundation of our knowledge of the object is certain rational elements in the subject, what right have we to call our knowledge science, with its necessity and universality, if these fundamental, subjective elements have no ground, or sway unsupported in mid-air. Hume was right when he said that under such conditions, we may talk about our knowledge of the usual, the habitual, the customary, but science, in the real sense of the term, is out of the question.

Huxley, unlike Hume, was inconsistent, but right in claiming that our knowledge of the object is valid. Hume was consistent in saying that if you are going to draw your knowledge of the object from purely empirical sources, the inter-mixture of subjective elements will make it invalid. He was, however, entirely wrong in suspecting the right of those subjective elements to enter into the construction of objective knowledge.

Huxley, on the other hand, was right in claiming the necessity of those subjective elements in constituting a true objective knowledge, but he was inconsistent in claiming to draw valid knowledge of the object from purely empirical sources, without finding solid ground for those principles of reason which make any rational knowledge whatever possible. Their difficulty lay in the fact that neither of them had examined, to its roots, the real process of knowing. Hume tried, but failed, to know knowing. Huxley did not even try.

As gratifying as it may be to find a great scientist, such as Professor Huxley, recognizing fundamental rational principles upon which science, in order to have any worth, must rest, we can not stop here,

for he simply assures us that the world rests upon a big rock, or a coiled serpent; while we must know, if possible, what the rock or serpent rests on.

We will boldly stand by Professor Huxley in his somewhat gratuitous determination not to go "beyond consciousness"—we do not see how we could, even if we wanted to; we will give him full swing for his sense and logic, based upon the necessary, subjective, rational postulates; and we will agree that these postulates are not "strictly speaking demonstrable." But here we part company, for we must show that the reason why they are not strictly speaking demonstrable is just because they are *self-evident* and *axiomatically certain*; and, therefore, why we may have, in place of Hume's doubtful knowledge, based on custom and habit, and, in place of Huxley's scientific but unsupported knowledge, a real knowledge of the object, or a true science, resting upon principles of necessity and universality.

The Greatness and Necessity of Kant's Work.

The reader will now see how absolutely necessary it is to go to the bottom of the subject's mind, in tracing out the process of knowing the object, in order to find the ultimate and trustworthy grounds of knowledge. And because Kant did this with a penetration and thoroughness, never before exhibited in the history of thought, he deserves the following chapter. Hume, and Professor Huxley, make it clear to us that our sense and logic have a right to be, as instruments of knowledge, so far as they go back to certain notions or postulates in the mind. These notions and postulates must now show their right to be, as grounds of knowledge, if we are going to talk rationally about having anything like science, with its necessity and universality. This is just what Kant is going to attempt to do for us.

If we clearly fix in mind, at the start, two things, we shall be a long way toward understanding what he did. First, he admits Hume's discovery that subjective rational elements enter into the construction of the object, but reverses Hume's conclusion by showing that, instead of casting doubt upon knowledge, that fact really first establishes knowledge, and makes it truly scientific. Secondly, he penetrates far below the superficial, conscious logic of reasoning, and is always dealing with the deeper, inerrant, sub-conscious *logic of reason*, of which we are not consciously aware but which, nevertheless, is

constantly guiding us, in so far as we do not confuse and blur it by our superficial, conscious logic of reasoning. He shows us the necessity of knowing knowing, if we would know.*

* It is of interest to observe that nearly a century after Kant's day, psychology has come to recognize its widest and most important field in the realm of the sub-conscious and unconscious, a realm which, as yet, it has but barely skimmed. But it should be carefully observed that however far our investigation goes, into the sub-conscious or unconscious, beyond consciousness, it can never go beyond conscious investigation.

CHAPTER III.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

EVEN if Hume did cast doubt upon the validity of knowledge, because of the subjective elements that enter into it, he rendered us a great service in pointing out that fact, in the process of knowing. He, however, rendered us a still greater service in awaking, from his dogmatic slumbers, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who, thereupon, was led to take the Copernican resolve of carrying the whole problem of knowledge from the periphery altogether to the center, or from the object to the subject, to see whether or not, by so doing, he could not find in the subject itself all the constructive forces and laws that first make a rational experience, and so a true science, possible.

To do so, he would have to exclude all empirical elements, or such as come from outer sense experience, and get at the pure process of knowing in the mind, *before* and *above* experience, and show how this is just what alone can give to objective knowledge its scientific character of necessity and universality.

It is easy enough to understand that the scientific certainty we seek can not be found in the fortuitous chaos of sense data, affected, as it is, by individual peculiarity and whim; but can we justify ourselves in looking to the subject alone for those formative principles, permanent and trustworthy, which will turn this chaos of sense into rational order? That is the question which Kant undertakes to answer and, in answering it, believes he can show how a rational experience, and so by consequence, how a scientific physics (all natural sciences) is possible.

Hence, he set before himself the task of subjecting the mind's process of knowing, to a searching examination, and because this process must be free from all contamination by experience, he entitled his great work the "Critique of the Pure Reason."

Inasmuch as the subjective elements of knowledge come *before* experience (before in a logical rather than temporal sense) and *rise above* or *dominate* experience, he designated them respectively, a *priori*

and *transcendental*, in distinction from what is a *posteriori* and *empirical*, terms applicable to objective experience.

Sensibility and Thought, the Two Avenues of Knowledge.

Now it is agreed, on all hands, that there are just two avenues through which we gain knowledge, viz.: *sensibility* and *thought*. Sensibility, as sense perception, which Kant, it must be remembered, invariably calls intuition, is the avenue by which we receive the elements of experience from without; and Thought, as a logical process, is the means by which these elements are analyzed, compared, classified, and built up into clear and distinct objects of knowledge. We must particularly observe, that Kant is not using the word thought, here, as designating the *conscious*, *logical process* of *discursive reasoning*, by which a Locke or a Huxley would classify his objects and construct them into a science or philosophy; but as designating the deeper *sub-conscious* process, by which we get clear and distant objects of experience in the first place.

He is bent on showing us what nobody else before had done—and, with all deference to modern psychology, what has not since been so thoroughly done, viz.: how experience, with its individual objects, to which we apply conceptual names, is, to begin with, possible.

What, then, is *pure*, that is, what is a *priori* and *transcendental* in Sensibility, or in the intuition of sense impressions? What is *pure* in Thought, or in the sub-conscious, constructive, logical process?

Divisions of the Critique.

The "Critique" naturally falls into two main parts, dealing respectively with *sensibility* and *thought*. But as Kant divides the second again into two distinct parts, his work has really three main divisions.

The first part, he calls the Transcendental Æsthetic, using the word not in the modern sense, as referring in any way to art, or as we have used it with reference to the feelings in general, but in its old Greek etymological meaning of sense perception (*αἰσθησις*).

The second part, he calls the Transcendental Logic, indicating thereby that the subject under consideration is the logical, constructive, relational activities of thought. The Logic he again divides into the Analytic and Dialectic.

The Analytic is the examination of the various powers and activities of thought to be found in the knowing process, their origin, in-

ter-relation and application. The Dialectic deals with an illegitimate use of these logical powers of thought, which consists in the endeavor to apply them beyond the realm of sense, to which they are restricted and where they are competent to give us a scientific physics, in a futile attempt to furnish us with a scientific metaphysics. The only result is that we are led into all manner of illusions which it seems to be the fate of reason itself to impose upon us.

As the Dialectic involves the consideration of ideas which arise neither from the *Æsthetic* nor the *Logic*, but which reason forces upon us, we are here raised above sense and logic into what we have ventured to call the realm of rational intuition.

So that Kant's Critique is preeminently the work suited to our needs, for he thoroughly examines with a master mind just those three stages of rational life, viz.: sense, logic, and intuition, upon which we have laid so much stress.

Indeed, the secret is out and we may as well make a virtue of confession. While these three phases of the rational life are recognized by almost every great philosopher, ancient and modern, we owe to Kant their clearest definition, as well as the most masterly analysis of their functions; and, therefore, his general divisions and designations have been adopted here.

For his *Sinnlichkeit* (sensibility), meaning the rational organ, we use the word *sense*; for his *Æsthetik* (sense intuition or perception), as the function of sensibility, we use indifferently the words, *perception* or *sense*. His words *Verstand* and *Logik*, for organ and function, it will be seen are simply our English words *Understanding* and *Logic*. His word *Vernunft*, as the supreme and ultimate organ of all rational life, is our English, *Reason*; but for the function of reason he had no word, because for him the function does not exist as a legitimate means of knowledge. He recognized, it is true, the function to be in reason, as a logical necessity, driving us, as if by some grand imaginative power, to form certain great metaphysical ideas about man, the world, and God; and he would have called it *intuitive understanding*, if he had thought it could really give us objective knowledge; but denying this power, he never fully recognized what we have called the function of *intuition*, or *rational intuition*; that is, an intuitive power to see more than the things of sense, or a rational power to see the things of spirit.

What then does Kant do for us in revealing, in the process of know-

ing the object, those pure elements that are *a priori* and *transcendental*, that is, precedent to and quite independent of outer experience?

The Æsthetic. Space.

Beginning with the Æsthetic, Kant found two such elements, viz.: space and time. Both of these are pure forms of sense intuition, by means of which we see the objects of sense experience in juxtaposition and succession.

Space is not an object among other extended objects, as stones, trees, houses, animals, men, the earth, the sun and the stars, but is already in the mind before hand, as the necessary precondition by which we are enabled to see these extended objects in juxtaposition. That is, we do not learn to see space, as some suppose, from experience by examining objects in space and then making a logical generalization by induction. Our space-seeing power may be brought out and greatly developed through experience, but the possibility, in the first place, of seeing objects in space at all, is based upon our having already in the mind this power of space intuition.

We carry it around with us, as it were, so that, go if we might to the utmost regions of the universe, we should still stand in the midst of an illimitable space, because it is the mind that carries space with it and projects it on every side. In a word, the mind is not *in* space, but space is *in* the mind, or as we have already preferred to say, *of* the mind.

It is this space-seeing power in the mind, as a *pure, a priori* intuition, that, Kant holds, not only makes it possible for us to see things as juxtaposed in space, but that renders us so certain of all geometrical relations. Whether I draw a triangle on my thumb nail or construct it from the North Star and Aldebaran to Vega, I have not the least doubt that in both cases the sum of the internal angles will equal two right angles. Even if I could experimentally measure all the triangles in the world, I could not be so sure of the result, for, in the first place, there would always be the possibility of empirically making a mistake, and in the second place, my conclusion would only show a general probability, drawn from experience. It is told of the celebrated German mathematician, Gauss, that he measured a great triangle which he constructed near the city of Braunschweig; but of even that one he could not be very sure, empirically speaking, or after the event. The simple demonstration before hand, however, based on his *a*

priori space intuition was apodictic. It is evident that unless there is something in the mind, in advance of experience, on which we can rely as fixed and ultimate, we can be sure of nothing, except the immediate, passing experiences of the moment.

A great deal has been said since Kant's day in opposition to his doctrine of space because, it is claimed, he knew only one kind of space, the Euclidean or tri-dimensional, whereas there are many possible kinds of space; and because he did not know our modern psychology which shows us how space is developed in experience. But these things do not really touch the point of Kant's main contention or invalidate it. Though there be n kinds of space, we should never be able to see objects in them, unless the n -space-seeing power were first in our minds. In fact, the spatial constructions of modern geometry are a direct confirmation of Kant's doctrine, viz.: that the rational subject has the *a priori* power of seeing space and space relations.* And as to the claim of certain psychologists about the empirical origin of space, they mistake the function of experience to bring out or develop the space-seeing power for the original power of space intuition, which must first be in the mind before it can be brought out or developed.

Time.

In like manner, Kant shows the *a priori* character of time, as a general form of sense intuition, in the mind, by which we are able to see things in succession. With this difference, however, that while space gives us the juxta-position of extended objects without, time gives us not only the succession of objects without, but of the psychic states within the mind itself. It is especially the intuitional form of the inner sense.

It is evident that time is not—no more than space—an object among other objects which we perceive, but simply our way of seeing one thing go before and another come after something else, thus making the knowledge of succession possible to consciousness.

Then, as pointed out regarding space, how the mind sweeps here and there, without effort carrying space with it, so it is with time. We always exist in a present, with the past and future before and after

* Or if non-Euclidian spaces must be thought of in terms of conception and not of perception, then the *a priori* nature of the mind's activity becomes still more evident.

us. All this could not come from our experience, or from our logical inductions, which, at best, are very limited.*

The Logic.

After thus showing, in the Transcendental Æsthetic, that the mind has within itself these two *pure, a priori* forms of intuition, by which it is possible to see things in coexistence and succession, he turns to the Transcendental Logic to see what may be found in thought that is *pure*, or a *priori* and *transcendental*, as that which is before and dominant over experience.

It is very important to observe clearly, at the start, how this faculty of *thought*, as the function of the Understanding, is distinguished from *sensibility* by two fundamental characteristics. Sensibility is simply *receptive* or *passive*, but has the function of *seeing*, it is *intuitional*. On the other hand, the Understanding is *constructive* or *active*, that is, it has the function of comparing and relating things in judgments, but it does *not see*, it is merely *relational* or *logical*. It is like saying that while *sensibility* has eyes but does nothing, *thought* is blind but does everything.

Inter-action of Sensibility and Thought.

From which, it necessarily follows that there is an inter-dependence and mutual service between them in constituting our knowledge. Intuitions of sensibility, without the concepts of thought, are helpless and dead; concepts, without intuitions, are empty and meaningless forms. So that neither the one nor the other, alone, can yield any real knowledge, because sensibility furnishes the content of thought, while thought gives form to sensibility. And these faculties can never exchange their functions; Sense must do the *seeing*, and the Understanding must do the *thinking*, so that, between them, we have knowledge.

The Analytic.

Let us now ask, what are the *a priori* elements of the Understanding which by their activity construct and give rational form to the data furnished by sensibility.

* This, it must be carefully remarked, does not mean that space and time have no objectivity whatever, but that their objectivity can alone be cognized on the condition of their subjectivity in the perceiving mind.

The Analytic, the first division of the Logic, has two main parts, dealing, first, with the Elements, and, secondly, with the Principles of the Pure Understanding. In reality, Kant introduces between these two what amounts to a transitional stage, which he calls the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.

For anything like a complete view of these topics, the reader must be referred to Kant himself. Our purpose will be served here, if we can get a clear outline of the great philosopher's thought.

Elements of the Analytic, Found in the Judgment.

In reviewing the Logic, then, we have first to do with the Elements of the Analytic which, as the name indicates, is an analysis, necessary before hand, in order to make more clearly rational the synthesis which will give us the Principles.

If we ask what is the peculiar function of the logical activity in the Understanding, we shall find it to be that of forming judgments. A judgment is a simple sentence with its subject, of which something is predicated. It involves names of things which are always concepts, or general ideas, with which other ideas may be compared, or to which particular things can be referred. Thus, the judgment may be a comparison of concepts, as for example, *the horse is a mammal*; or it may be a concept of some substance or cause of which a particular attribute, quality, quantity, degree, or action is predicated, as *the horse is black, strong, large, trots fast*, and so on.

Now, in general, there are two forms of judgment, *analytical* and *synthetical*. The analytical judgment does not really increase our knowledge, but rather explicates or clears it up. When I say, *all bodies are divisible*, there is only unfolded in the predicate what is already contained in the subject; for bodies, being extended, are necessarily divisible.

But if I say, a certain *body is heavy, or red, or square*, etc., I have added something new to my knowledge, or made a synthesis.

The peculiarity of all analytical judgments is that they may be made *a priori*, because the subject already contains the predicate, and we can be very sure of the result. But in the synthetical judgment, there must be some *a posteriori* experience, in order to add a new feature to knowledge, or something not already contained in the subject.

Knowledge Begins with Synthetical Judgments.

And just here lies the point of difficulty. My knowledge must begin with synthetical judgments, or I can never have any concepts, which are nothing more or less than syntheses, to analyze. But if these synthetical judgments are only possible *a posteriori*, or in experience, I am thrown back on Hume's skepticism where my knowledge may represent what is habitual or usual, but where it can never attain that necessity and universality which a true science demands. If, therefore, I would have synthetical judgments truly scientific, they must be raised to the same certainty as that of analytical judgments, where the certainty depends upon the fact that they are formed *a priori*, and in no way vitiated by the fortuitous elements of an *a posteriori* experience.

The Possibility a priori of Synthetical Judgments.

Kant's crucial question, therefore, and that upon which rests the larger question as to whether a scientific physics is possible, is: Are *pure, synthetical* judgments, *a priori*, possible? His whole Transcendental Analytic—Elements and Principles—is an exposition of how they are possible as applicable to sense experience; and his Transcendental Dialectic is an exposition of how they are *not* possible, but misleading and illusory, as applied to anything beyond the physical world of sense, or to the metaphysical realm. In a word, they make scientific physics, but *not* scientific metaphysics possible. To show their possibility, then, he begins, in the Transcendental Analytic, with the *pure, a priori* Elements of knowledge.

The Categories in the Understanding.

In the matter of synthetical judgment, as possible *a priori*, we have put our finger on the center of the problem, and are ready to summon all our resources for the attack.

If we are to look, in a thoroughly scientific way, for the elements involved in this form of judgment, we can not pick them up haphazard, as they appear in the ordinary, conscious logic of reasoning, but must seek some one underlying principle that unites them all in the unity of the Understanding. Now this principle is just the peculiar faculty of the Understanding itself, viz.: the spontaneous activity of *judging*. Indeed, the Understanding may be defined as the

faculty of judging, the essential function of which is the unification of particular things under a general idea or concept.

If we look the entire field over, we shall find that all judgments—leaving out their content and taking their mere form—may be brought under four heads, viz.: of *quantity*, of *quality*, of *relation*, and of *modality*, each one of which takes on three special forms. So that there are altogether twelve modes of judgment in the Understanding which thought may employ.

As every judgment involves, as we have seen, a concept, under which particulars may be unitized, there must necessarily be pure concepts of the Understanding, correspondent to these judgments and making them possible; all of which refer *a priori* to objects of sense intuition in general. Hence, we may look for twelve and only twelve of such *pure* concepts, because the table of twelve logical judgments exhausts completely the power of the Understanding, and comprehends every one of its faculties.

To these *pure, a priori* concepts of the Understanding, Kant gives the name of *categories*, a term employed by Aristotle for the same class of ideas or general abstract notions, but not employed in the same systematic and exhaustive way.

Kant's Table of Categories runs as follows:

I. QUANTITY.

1. Unity. 2. Plurality. 3. Totality.

II. QUALITY.

1. Reality. 2. Negation. 3. Limitation.

III. RELATION.

1. Substance and inherence (substance and accident*).
2. Causality and dependence (cause and effect).
3. Community (reciprocity between the active and passive).

IV. MODALITY.

1. Possibility—impossibility.
2. Existence—non-existence.
3. Necessity—contingency.

The meaning of the first three groups is clear enough, but it may be well to observe of the last group that it has to do with the manner in which the object may or may not exist. In this regard, that is,

* In the sense of attribute or quality.

there are always three questions to be asked about any given object of thought. 1. *May* it possibly exist, as over against its impossibility? 2. *Does* it really exist, as over against its non-existence? 3. *Must* it necessarily exist, as over against its contingency, or conditioned dependence upon something else?

These, then, are the simple, primary elements at the very beginning of all logical activity of the Understanding, making it possible to bring many particulars, by means of synthetical judgment, into unity under one head. It must be observed that Kant invariably speaks of these categories as concepts.

Deduction of the Categories.

But now these concepts or categories must justify their existence in the Understanding, or show their credentials, as it were, very much as the attorney must show to the court the grounds of his plea, in the law. This justification Kant calls their Transcendental Deduction, by which he means to explain how they can refer, *a priori*, to objects of experience in general. It is to be distinguished, he warns us, from an *empirical* deduction, which shows merely how a concept may be gained by experience and by reflection upon experience. Locke tried this latter procedure because he did not understand the peculiar nature of the deeper and more necessary transcendental deduction.*

Thus experience, no doubt, constantly gives examples of cause, from which a rule becomes possible according to which something *usually* happens, but never so that the result should be *necessary*. But there is a dignity about the synthesis of cause and effect, a necessity and universality, which can not be expressed empirically. Experience may illustrate cause, but can never establish it.

The principle that must guide us, in the transcendental deduction, is the recognition that all of the categories are necessarily the *a priori* conditions, already in the (sub-conscious) mind, which make any (consciously rational) experience possible at all. Hence, it is plain that all attempts to derive these concepts, with their character of unity, necessity and universality, from experience, which can only have rational existence and meaning when established by them, would be as futile as a man's trying to lift himself by his boot straps. He does not see what he is standing on.

* Kant is telling us here that Locke was dealing with concepts on the superficial plane of the conscious logic of reasoning, while he himself would go into the profounder sub-conscious depths of the *logic of reason*.

The Three Ascending Phases of Knowledge.

Thus far we might be led to suppose that Kant is only going to treat us to a lot of abstractions. But no, he now turns directly to concrete facts and plunges into the very depths of the soul, to see what goes on there in concrete experience. For it is only by so doing that he can discover any possible field to which his categories apply, and so justify themselves. He finds concretely three faculties or powers in the soul, which contain the conditions of all possible experience and which themselves can not be derived from any other faculty, and these are: 1, sensibility; 2, imagination; 3, apperception. Out of them originate, respectively, what he calls:

1. The *synopsis*, *a priori*, of the manifold impressions, received through the *senses*.

2. The *synthesis* of this manifold of sense, through the *imagination*.

3. The *unity* of this synthesis, by means of original *apperception*.

We must again and again remind ourselves that these subtle, inner faculties, Kant means, always act without our knowing it, or sub-consciously, which accounts for the fact that we constantly overlook them, in the presence of their more obvious, conscious uses, which we superficially take to exhaust their entire meaning. But, in reality, it is the sub-conscious, *a priori* working of these faculties in the mind that, Kant is going to show us, necessarily precede and make possible our conscious, rational activities in experience.

The Synthesis of Apprehension, of Imagination, and of Apperception.

The first step of knowledge, then, is the mere reception of the manifold of sense impressions, forming a sort of synopsis or general view of things. This passive function of sensibility in receiving the manifold of sense, Kant calls the *synthesis of apprehension*.

But, in the second place, if these possible sense objects did not occur and recur in some regular order, the apprehension of objects would be a mere chaos of impressions that could never become knowledge. The required regularity in the occurrence and recurrence of impressions must be secured by a higher synthesis than that of apprehension, for it is more than a mere receptivity, it is a synthesis of association (reproduction). As it is effected by some sort of mysterious power of the imagination, which is an original and underived faculty

of the soul, Kant calls it the *transcendental synthesis of the imagination*.

But, even yet, we have not knowledge of objects and can not have until those objects are connected in consciousness with the knowing subject. The self-conscious perception, in which the subject knows itself in knowing its objects, Kant calls *apperception*; and since knowledge can never become knowledge for us until all objects are thus *synthesized*, or centered around the self-conscious subject, he calls this process the *synthesis of apperception*.

The Centrality of Apperception.

It is this synthetic act of apperception that is the ultimate ground of all thinking and of all possible knowledge. Without it, we could neither perceive objects, as such, nor even if we could, they would not be reducible to rational order. For it is the changeless unity of the ego, amid the ever-changing flow of phenomena, that makes it possible to see anything like permanence and unity in objects, and reduce them to unitary laws. It makes it possible to see Nature as one rational order of things.

In fact, it is that which gives laws to Nature, strange as it may sound. For if we consider that Nature, as known to us in experience, is nothing but a totality of sense impressions in our consciousness, which are not the things in themselves but exist only in being known to us, it will not be surprising that she can only take on the form of our own modes of thinking, which derive their meaning and unity from the fundamental faculty of all knowledge, viz.: the *transcendental synthesis of apperception*.*

*The reader is doubtless reminded in all this of something already made familiar to him. He recalls how in tracing out the development of the concept, we found first a mere unorganized heap of sense impresses, gathered into the mind through the senses; this is Kant's *synthesis of apprehension*. Then there was a selecting out and classifying so that these impresses occurred and recurred according to some regular law of association; this is Kant's *synthesis of imagination*. Finally, as the rational subject came to self-consciousness, the concept appeared in connection with every clearly perceived object, which could thus be named and classified with all similar objects under a general head.

We saw also how this conceptual development begins in the animal mind, but only comes to fruition in the human mind. So that of Kant's three fundamental activities of the soul, apprehension, imagination, and apperception, the animal possesses only the first two, viz.: the *synthesis of apprehension* in his sense perception, and the *synthesis of imagination*, as association and memory, in his associational logic; while the *synthesis of apperception* belongs to man alone who, in coming to self-consciousness, *comperceives* himself, as a thinking, feeling, and willing subject, along with his objects.

Kant lays great stress on the transcendental function of the imagination, the importance of which is seen in the fact that it brings the manifold of sense intuition, on the one side, into connection with the unity of pure apperception, on the other. So to speak, it stoops down and gathers together, into some kind of form, the chaos of sense impressions, and then hands it up to apperception, for the final work of turning it into the unity of various concepts.*

What the Deduction Means

Now, so far as this whole process stands for the *spontaneous activity* of thought, as opposed to the *passive receptivity* of sense, it is called the Understanding; and, as such is a faculty of thinking, or of judging—all of which comes to the same thing; or, better still, a *faculty of rules*, because it supplies the rules for connecting phenomena, and thus becomes the lawgiver of Nature.

But as a faculty of rules for connecting phenomena, the Pure Understanding must have proper concepts for doing so; and these concepts are just what it has in the categories, through which, as general unitary forms, it effectuates the unity of all phenomena in rational experience. In other words, the categories are the constructive powers of the Understanding by which it unitizes the sense data of the *Æsthetic*, into clearly defined objects, and thus makes experience, so far as its form is concerned, for the first time possible. What we are shown here is that the categories, derived from the various forms of judgment in the Understanding, are constructive, rational activities, the essential function of which is to bring the mere apprehensions of sense, up through an associational imagination, to the clear syntheses of apperception.

In this way, Kant believes that he has proved all he has been called upon to do in the transcendental deduction of the categories, viz.: to make the relation of the Understanding to our sensibility and, through it, to all possible objects of experience—which means, establishing the objective validity of the *pure, a priori* concepts of the Understanding—conceivable; and thus to establish their origin and their truth.†

*It will always be seen that this mysterious power of imagination is the relational activity of logic.

†*An Inadequate Deduction.*—Without doubt, Kant has established the truth of the categories and proved their *a priori* necessity as constructive, rational activities that alone made experience possible; but he does not give us an adequate account of their origin. He leaves us with the impression that

Having found the Elements of the Pure Understanding to be no other than the *a priori* categories, working upon or among the data of apprehension, imagination and apperception, and having thus satisfactorily, as he supposed, deduced them, Kant now goes on to the *Analytic of Principles*. Before, however, reaching the *Principles* proper, he has to consider a question of the utmost delicacy, which he treats under the somewhat formidable head of the *Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding*, though the matter is simple enough when we get the clue.

Schematism of the Pure Understanding.

Our knowledge, as we have agreed, is increased by synthetical judgments, which bring scattered particulars into unity under one head. Now, while we have found that the categories or concepts are so many general forms or rules in the mind, which precede and make possible experience, we do not yet know how the manifold of sense, in experience, can be brought under them. That is, how do the active, constructive concepts of thought master the dull inert material which sense supplies? This is just the peculiar work of judgment, viz.: to subsume sense data and unitize them under concepts. And we must

the categories, derived from the various forms of judgment in the Understanding, are one thing; and the three phases of knowledge, apprehension, imagination, apperception, are another thing, in the process of knowing; and that they are brought together because they have to be, in order to make possible any rational experience. That is, his deduction is mechanical rather than truly rational; and this is due to the fact that he does not really deduce or derive the categories from their true origin.

Supposing that he had really deduced the categories, showed their credentials, proved their right to be, or revealed their origin, by merely showing them to be conceptual forms which the judgment uses, in order to unitize the scattered data of sense into distinct objects of experience, Kant committed the gravest oversight, an oversight which necessarily led him directly to his nescience. If the categories have no other origin than he gives them, then he was right in subsequently restricting their application to sense experience, and revealing to us all the compulsory illusions of the *Dialectic*.

But in time, we shall come to learn that in going into the sub-conscious, he did not go deep enough; and, consequently, instead of tracing the categories to their real origin in Reason—not in the Understanding—as ultimate, underrived, *a priori*, rational intuitions, he allowed them to hang suspended in mid-air, as the functions of empirical judgment, from which he derived them. But it is the judgment that needs founding, for it is not the categories that depend upon the judgment, but the judgment that depends upon the categories. He does far better for us it is true than Hume or Professor Huxley, for the principles which they recognized at work in science, but did not found, Kant has rationally and solidly established in the Understanding, as something quite necessary and universal for human thought; but after all, for real knowledge, what good is it to us to have an Understanding, however rational and reliable if, as Kant is going afterwards to “prove” to us, it can give us only the knowledge of appearances, without any possible known connection with Reality?

know, as Kant would have it, how this can be done *a priori*; for, again, we recall that unless our judgments rest upon *a priori* grounds, they can never rise to anything like scientific certainty.

The peculiar difficulty of our present situation lies in the fact that, while the homogeneous alone can be brought into relation, we must find here a relation between two quite heterogeneous things, viz.: the *categories* or pure activities of the Understanding, on the one hand; and the quite alien *manifold of sense* intuition, given in a passively receptive sensibility, on the other. It is, in effect, the same difficulty which confronted Descartes when he would reconcile the two incommensurable realities, ponderable, extended, passive *matter*, and imponderable, unextended, active *mind*. Only Kant's difficulty concerns not two different substances, matter and mind, but two different faculties and functions of the mind itself; that is, thought and sense, concept and percept, understanding and sensibility, Logic and Æsthetic, or the active form and the passive, given content.

The only possible way out of the difficulty is to find some third term that stands between the two and looks, as it were, both ways. And this third term, Kant believes, he finds in the pure, transcendental intuition of *time*. For, on the one hand, it is a general form which includes the manifold of all possible sense intuition, inner and outer; while on the other, it shares with the categories or concepts the character of being *pure* and *a priori*.

The Intuition of Time Mediates Thought and Sense.

Time, then, is the middle term, and we must bring it into conjunction with all the categories in order to get those *a priori* forms which apply to all sense data, bring them into unity as objects of thought, and thus, for the first time, make a rational experience possible. In this manner, we get *a priori* forms, in the mind, which contain not only the function of the Understanding in the category, but also the function of sensibility in the intuition of time. These forms are what Kant calls the *schemata*, and the function of the Understanding in forming these schemata, he calls the Schematism of the Pure Understanding.

The faculty of the soul that brings about this conjunction of category and intuition, to form the schemata, is again, as in case of synthetic apprehension and synthetic apperception, that very important mediator, imagination; not the conscious imagination, however,

that produces what we call images in consciousness, but the sub-conscious imagination, of which we have already spoken.*

It will be now clearly seen what Kant means by a *schema*. It is a sort of rational paradigm, or a faint outline form, which reason creates before hand, and by which it is able to classify particular things of experience under separate general heads. It is, in fact, the ground of what, it will be seen, we have called the concept (p. 153) which is found in the mind, in connection with every distinctly perceived object, the moment man wakes to self-consciousness. As we saw, it is the result of a long sub-conscious process, beginning even in the animal mind, but reaching its goal only in the mind of self-conscious man, where Reason *comperceives* both subject and object.

The function of these concepts or *schemata*, as we have now been taught to call them, which are formed by a sub-conscious conjunction of the pure, *a priori* categories with the pure, *a priori* intuition of time, and effected through a sub-conscious act of the imagination, Kant goes on to show in detail, by tracing them through his table of categories. Thus, for example, the schema of substance is *permanence* of the *real*, in *time*. The schema of cause and the causality of a thing in general, is the *real* which, when once supposed to exist, is *always followed* by something else, in *time*. The schema of reality is *existence*, at a *given time*. The schema of necessity is *existence of an object*, at *all times*; and so on.

Taking the four classes of categories, quantity, quality, relation, and modality; Kant finds that the schema of quantity contains and represents the *production* (synthesis) of *time itself*, in the *successive apprehension* of an object. The schema of quality contains and represents the *synthesis* of *sensation* (perception) with the representation of *time* or the *filling up of time*. The schema of relation contains and represents the *relation of perceptions* to each other, in *all times*. The schema of modality contains and represents time itself as the *correlation of the determinations* of an object, as to *whether* or *how* it belongs to *time*.

In general, the schemata are nothing but determinations of time, *a priori*, according to rules, and these, as applied to all possible objects, refer, following the above classes of categories, to the *series of time*; the *contents of time*; the *order of time*; and the *comprehension of time* (that is, what is comprehended in time).

* Which again, it must be noted, is simply the relational activity of logic.

Thus, the schemata, as so many rational unities, effectuated through imagination, sub-consciously, between the categories of the Understanding and the time intuition of sensibility, are pure, *a priori* forms, outlines, or concepts, already in the mind, to be applied to the manifold of sense intuition in experience. And it is by means of them alone that this manifold, given in sense experience, is gathered up into separate objects of perception, related, and classified into the clear and distinct objects we know in rational experience. Without them, in their connection with the self-conscious apperception of the knowing subject, no rational experience would be possible.

The Possibility of Synthetical Judgments, a Priori.

But with the categories and the schemata, determined as *a priori* activities in the mind, Kant has finally to attain the chief object of his "Critique," viz.: to know if and how synthetical judgments, *a priori*, are possible; and so how a rational experience—and a consequent scientific physics—is possible. Synthetical, they must be, for by synthesis alone can our knowledge be increased or new truth gained, and *a priori*, because that alone will give them the necessity and universality of science.

Here, then, beyond the *categories* and the *schemata*, we must take a third and final step, in ascertaining completely and systematically what are the transcendental Principles in the Pure Understanding, according to which the activities of thought may be united with the data of a possible sense experience, in *a priori*, synthetical judgments.

Highest Principle of the Analytical Judgment.

Kant clears the way for this inquiry by pointing out the nature and use of the analytical judgment. Its highest principle he lays down as that of *contradiction*, which he states thus: *No subject can have a predicate that contradicts it.* This is a negative criterion of truth and belongs to the logic of reasoning, serving to clear up and make consistent the knowledge we have, without any reference to its objective validity. Yet it has a positive use, in so far as it enables us to banish error from our thought, and thus serves as regulative in all our judgments. As no knowledge can ever run counter to this principle, without destroying itself, it is a *conditio sine qua non* of all our thinking; but it must never be taken as a means of determining the objective truth of our knowledge, for that is alone the function of the

synthetical judgment. Hence, while the principle of contradiction is sufficient for all analytical knowledge—and its highest principle—its authority must not be allowed to extend beyond that.

The Highest Principle of the Synthetical Judgment.

But the deepest concern of the theoretical reason is not simply as to whether the knowledge we have is logically coherent, but whether it corresponds to the objective truth, and how new truth may be attained. And this conjunction of the known object with the knowing subject, in order to increase knowledge and to test its objective validity can be effected alone by the synthetical judgment. So that while our synthetically gained knowledge can never offend against the principle of contradiction, this principle is not sufficient for it; and, therefore, it must have a principle of its own. What is that principle? Logic, as we commonly know it, or the logic of reasoning, knows nothing, not even the name, of synthetical judgments. But in the *logic of reason*, or as Kant calls it, the Transcendental Logic, it is the most important task, nay, the only one, to consider the possibility of synthetical judgments, *a priori*, their condition and the extent of their validity. For, having accomplished this task, Kant regards that the object of the transcendental logic, viz.: to determine the extent and limits of the Pure Understanding, will have been fully attained.

In the analytical judgment, as we have seen, we never go beyond the concept; but in the synthetical judgment, this is just its peculiar nature, that is, we go beyond the given concept, in order to bring something together with it, which is new and other than what is contained in it. Here we have neither the relation of identity, nor of contradiction, and nothing in the judgment itself by which we can discover its truth or its falsehood.

Therefore, just as, in the case of the relation of category to sense intuition, we had to find some mediating middle term, so here, between the concept and the new element to be synthesized with it, we must look for a mediating middle term; and Kant finds that term in the same *a priori*, pure, internal intuition of time.

As the synthesis of representations, or sense impressions, depends on imagination, which functions, *in time*, while their synthetical unity, which is necessary for forming a judgment, depends upon the unity of apperception, persisting *through time*; it is here, amid the sources of representations, *a priori*, that we must discover the possibility of

pure synthetical judgments. If knowledge is to have any reality, that is, refer to an object and have any sense and meaning, the object must *necessarily be given* in some way or other; for without that, all concepts are empty. Hence, it is simply the *possibility of experience*, in general, which alone gives objective reality to all of our knowledge *a priori*. While experience, without the inner constructive principles of the mind, would be an incoherent chaos of sense impressions; at the same time, the inner principles would be empty and meaningless, without the material of experience to give them content.

So that the highest principle of all synthetical judgments is that the inner constructive and unifying activities of thought are *valid only in so far as they are applicable to a possible experience*. This may seem like a very simple and obvious conclusion; but, as we shall see in a moment, it is very fundamental in all of Kant's thought.*

The Principles of the Analytic.

Having ascertained the highest principle of all synthetical judgments, Kant proceeds to determine the specific, *a priori*, Principles of the Understanding, applicable to all possible experience.

He is again guided by his table of categories for drawing up a table of Principles, because the latter are but rules for the objective use of the former. Thus, from Quantity we get the (1) *Axioms of Intuition*; from Quality, the (2) *Anticipations of Perception*; from Relation, the (3) *Analogies of Experience*; and from Modality, the (4) *Postulates of Empirical Thought in General*. The Principles of quantity and quality he calls *mathematical*, because their form is capable of direct intuition; while the Principles of relation and of modality, he calls *dynamical*, because their certainty is reached by a discursive logical process. Our purpose here does not involve any detailed statement of these Principles. It will suffice to indicate merely their general character.

Thus, by *Axioms of Intuition*, based on Quantity, Kant means such

* It is to be observed here that the great philosopher does not take advantage of his reasoning; for, instead of concluding to the necessary existence of the object, which mere knowing as such compels, he drew the, by no means enforced, conclusion that our knowledge is necessarily restricted to a certain definite field, viz.: sense. Had he taken the larger view, he would have later, when accused of subjective idealism, saved himself the embarrassment of trying to save the existence of the object by inconsistently appealing to the category of cause.

mathematical axioms of apodictic certainty, as that in all extensive quantities the whole contains the sum of its parts. By *Anticipations of Perception*, based on Quality, he means the necessary anticipations that all our perceptions of objects must have some figure and quantity; but more particularly, that every sense intuition must have some degree or intensive quantity, capable of a continuous increase or decrease, and thus make itself known to us as having certain attributes or qualities. By *Analogies of Experience*, based on Relation, he means those dynamic, *a priori*, rules which determine the mutual relation of all phenomena in time; and, as there are three *modi* of time, viz.: *permanence, succession, coexistence*, there are three dynamical relations, analogies, or Principles from which all others are derived. They may be expressed as (1) *inherence* in a permanent substance (substance and accident or attribute); (2) *consequence* in the successive order of causation (cause and effect); and (3) *composition* of the whole in a community of reciprocal, coexistent, inter-related, parts (inter-action). By *Postulates of Empirical Thought in General*, based on Modality, he means to define possibility, reality, and necessity.

“What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in intuition and in concepts) is *possible*.”

“What is connected with the material conditions of experience (sense intuition) is *real*.”

“That which, in its connection with the real, is determined by universal conditions of experience, is (exists as) *necessary*.”

As the peculiarity of the categories of modality is that their determination of the object declares simply that the thing is possible, existent, or necessary, the principles of modality, which are the postulates of empirical thought in general, “never increase the concept of a thing, but indicate the manner only in which the concept was joined with our faculty of knowledge.”

Thus, in the Principles of the Analytic, which reveal the final, *a priori* effort of the Pure Understanding, on its positive side, as an organon of knowing the object, we have gathered up and unitized the functions of intuition in the *Æsthetic* and the preceding Elements in the Logic; the whole process culminating in those sub-conscious, rational activities that go before, dominate, and thus make possible experience.

In leaving these Principles—axioms, anticipations, analogies, and

postulates—we must take note of two fundamental conclusions of the “Critique,” in their bearing upon the meaning of objective knowledge. First, the Principles, as *a priori* rules of the Pure Understanding, are always and only applicable to the manifold of sense intuitions, in a possible experience; and, secondly, the sense intuitions, which furnish the objective material for the constructive activity of the Principles, are but modifications of our own consciousness, and have no other existence.

The Kantian Nescience.

We have here the meaning of phenomenal as contrasted with the noumenal, of appearance as distinguished from reality; and the momentous significance for knowledge of Kant's earnest insistence that the highest principle of synthetical judgment is applicability alone to a possible experience.

Not only the constructive logical powers in our minds, but also the given material of sense perception, which those constructive powers build up into the distinct, coherent objects of knowledge, are all data which the human mind itself supplies. So that our knowledge of particular objects of experience and, in consequence, all our sciences—our geology and astronomy, reaching back into an indefinite time and out into an indefinite space; our physics, chemistry, and biology, tracing long æons of evolution—do not furnish us with *real* knowledge of the object, after all, but only *phenomenal* knowledge, which is simply the way the object *appears* to us, under *subjective* limitations and conditions of our *human* minds. So that what Kant meant by a scientific physics (all natural science) being possible, or knowledge being objective, was in the sense that, since the pure *a priori* principles of reason in all human beings are alike, we must necessarily and universally see all things alike; or all things, if we are truly scientific, that is, accurate in observation and consistent in logic, must necessarily and universally *appear* to us all alike.

But is this all the knowledge we can get of the object, its *appearance to us*? Can we not know things as they really are by themselves, unmodified by our human way of looking at them; can we not know Reality, or, as Kant called it, the *Ding-an-sich*? Kant's answer is final and positive. The phenomenal, the apparent, is all we know; and, from the very nature of our minds, we can never know Reality.

The synthetical judgments, by which alone we can ever hope to

increase our knowledge of the object, have, as the only *possible* experience for their application, the data of sense intuition, which are but modifications of our own consciousness, and have their meaning and existence no where else. Hume, because he found certain subjective elements mixed with our knowledge, became skeptical about having any real scientific knowledge of the object; a conclusion that drove Kant in so far upon the subject that, after examining those subjective elements in the process of knowing, he lost the object altogether, by *proving* that we can have no *real* knowledge of the object at all.

But, if he deprives us of *real* knowledge, he at any rate, saves us from Hume's skeptical uncertainty by showing us that, in any case, knowledge must take on the subjective forms of our own knowing minds; and by making certain, or scientific, the *apparent* knowledge we have, in the necessity and universality of the subjective principles, common to all minds.

Kant thus carries the fallacy of subjectivity, into which the doubts of Hume plunged us, to its rational terminus. We are now shut up in the prison of our own minds with *only* subjective knowledge; and Kant has thrown away the key. This is the Kantian nescience, or rationally enforced ignorance of the real object.

But we must allow Kant to speak for himself, for he has something more to say in the "Critique" which may yet throw some light on the subject of why he has thus imprisoned us, seemingly without hope of release.

The Dialectic, a Critique of Illusion.

Having closed the positive aspects of his criticism, in the *Analytic* of the *Logic*, he turns to the negative side of the problem, in the *Dialectic*, which, as we have already said, really forms a third natural division of his great work, because it repeatedly brings into view, by his very denial of it, the third and final power of reason, viz.: rational intuition.

He has made it clear to himself, in the *Analytic*, that the constructive principles of the Pure Understanding are only valid for knowledge when applied to a possible sense experience; and he is going to confirm this conclusion, by showing, in the *Dialectic*, how it is that when we seek to apply them to anything beyond, they only, and necessarily, lead us into all sorts of illusions.

The Dialectic brings to light the bitter Tantalian tragedy of the Reason. For Reason, unsatisfied with anything less than the knowledge of Reality, and impelled by its own inner needs to hunger and thirst after Reality, is, nevertheless, perpetually driven back to feed upon the husks of phenomena. It asks for bread and receives a stone; for the more earnestly it strives to know Reality, the more it finds it to be an unknown x , and the more it is filled with the pain of its own inner contradictions and confusions. Kant shows us how and why this is, and undertakes to make us satisfied with our lot, by teaching us not to hunger for real knowledge, for the very good reason that we can never get it.

Reason Compelled to Think, but Unable to Know Reality.

Reason compels us to think of three great realities back of all phenomena: 1, a primary substance and cause, back of the changing phenomena of the world; 2, a unitary, substantial, causal soul, back of the passing, psychic phenomena of consciousness; and 3, a one, ultimate Reality, or God, as the Absolute Ground of the world and man. As *ideas* in Reason, these realities are necessary and inescapable, but the moment we undertake to prove their objective truth, we fall into mutually destructive contradictions; or, more accurately, their disproof is as logically cogent as their proof.

This result, as Kant claims, is very natural, and due to the fact that we apply to them the categories and principles of the Understanding, which only legitimately apply to, and are competent for, a possible sense experience, in which it is impossible that the *real* world, the *real* man, and God, being *meta*-physical, should be revealed.

If we only had, thought Kant, an *intuitive* Understanding which, besides thinking, could *see*, then we might know those ideas as objective truth; but our *only seeing* faculty is sense, and our Understanding is *only a thinking* faculty, which is restricted to relating and constructing the data of sense, so that Reason has no way to get knowledge of *meta*-physical realities, but is confined entirely to physical phenomena.

The Ideas of Pure Reason as Regulative.

But while we can not know the world, man, and God, in their reality, they are nevertheless *necessary ideas* in the mind; and, as being compelled by the reason itself, may be regarded as the *ideals* of the

Pure Reason—God is *the* Ideal of the Pure Reason. Hence, Kant calls these ideas *transcendent* and *regulative*, as opposed to the transcendental and constructive powers of the Understanding; for while the *a priori*, transcendental categories and principles, as such, are *before* and *above*, or dominate over, empirical knowledge, and so construct and give it form; the *transcendent ideas* of Reason go *beyond* all empirical knowledge, and thus, although having no part in constructing, yet exercise a necessarily *regulative* function in, all knowledge.

As deep and thorough as his criticism was, it was not deep and thorough enough to lead Kant to ask: What power or faculty in Reason is it that *compels* it to *think* these ideas as regulative principles?

Belief in Reality: Religion.

The Kantian nescience, or ignorance of Reality, has more recently taken on the name of Agnosticism, a term which Professor Huxley claims to have coined and which, by his brilliant lectures on natural science, he has made so popular.

But it would be a grave mistake to suppose that Kant's nescience or agnosticism meant that he was irreligious or even indifferent to religion. Indeed, except to the town-infidel, whose weight of knowledge could not silence the Delphic oracle, agnosticism does not necessarily involve religion, one way or the other. Such men as Professor Huxley and Mr. Spencer could not be called irreligious—except by those who identify religion with certain definite traditional forms of ritual and creed—although their agnosticism made them exceedingly reticent about the realities of a spiritual world. While, on the other hand, some men have professed themselves to be agnostic, just because of their certainty of religious truth. The great Hindu philosopher, Sankaracharya, goes as far as reason can carry him, and then confesses at last that it is Brahman who reveals to him, in the Sacred Vedas, the ultimate Reality. Al-Ghazzali, one of the greatest Arabian theologians of the Middle Ages, was an agnostic, in order to enhance the value of the revealed truth in the Koran. One of the most learned progressive schools of German theologians frankly professes the nescience of Kant, in order to ground religion more deeply in ethical and spiritual intuition. And numberless Christian theologians, throughout the history of the church, have emphatically asserted the incom-

petence of reason, in order to find, with more certainty, the supreme knowledge of God in Divine Revelation.

But Kant differed in his agnosticism from all of these, with their belief or unbelief in revelation. And yet he took no little credit to himself for having, by his agnosticism, rendered the very greatest service to religion; because he claimed to have opened a way to its better understanding, and to a more sure and confident belief in God.

He destroyed, it is true, the dogmatic theologian's "proofs;" but he also destroyed the unbeliever's "proofs," and left the way clear to an impregnable and unshaken faith. And it was because he saw that Reason is something more than theoretical or speculative; it is also ethical.

The Kantian Ethical Argument.

To him, it was intolerable that we should be marooned upon an island in the midst of an illimitable ocean of the unknown, where our theoretical reason leaves us, without any hope of reaching home, upon the shores of Reality; and so he gives us his "Critique of the Ethical Reason."

Here he looks for some pure, fundamental, *a priori* moral principle in reason, which is *a priori* and *transcendental* to the passing volitions of experience, and which must, therefore, be necessary and universal. He finds this in his Categorical Imperative: *Let every act be such as to conform to a rule, capable of universal application.* Here, it will be seen, we have an abstract statement of the Golden Rule.

This imperative Ought, however, we can not perfectly fulfill in our present phenomenal life; but the *ought* has no rational meaning for us unless we *can*. Therefore, to make the *ought* of the Moral Reason rationally valid, there must be a real life where the soul *can* attain its moral destiny, which can be guaranteed only by a Supreme Moral Being who is the Ground of all existence. So cogent is this argument to Kant's mind that, while he can not *know* God, and the immortality of the soul, he *must believe* them to be *certain*.

While these considerations here presented by Kant have had and still have great weight with many minds, our persistent question, which we can not escape, is whether such considerations, after all, quiet the demand of the theoretical reason to *know* Reality.

If we can trust, we must always ask, the ethical reason's claim to have its *ought* fulfilled, why can we not trust the theoretical reason's

direct, clear, and inescapable ideas concerning the objective reality of man, the world, and God? If an argument based upon the one is valid, then an argument based upon the other is valid. If the *categorical imperative* necessitates objective Reality for its fulfillment, the *ideals* of the theoretical reason as much demand objective Reality; or if they lead us into illusions, the ethical argument is an illusion, for it is but a logical inference of the theoretical reason, based upon given data of experience.

The Strength and Weakness of the Kantian Nescience.

The great point of Kant's weakness in his nescience, is the point of its strength. Its strength is in showing that with only sense data and logic, we can never reach Reality; its weakness is in the constant illustration of the presence of rational intuition, and at the same time the constant neglect or denial of it.

There is something truly pathetic in the work of the great critic of the mind, who, penetrating more deeply into the process of knowledge than all others, in order to rid the mind of every illusion, himself fell into a fatal illusion, or rather blindness. He was profoundly right in showing us the illusory attempt to find Reality—the real world, the real man, and God—through the avenues of sense and logic, which are competent only in the regions of appearance. But failing to measure the real by the phenomenal, he fell into the fatal error of supposing that we can not measure or know the real at all. He failed to see that it is the very light of Reality by which he saw phenomena to be non-real. What he was looking to see, and thought he could not see, was the very thing by which he saw that he could not see Reality by sense; whereas, he did not see that it is immediately visible to reason by intuition.

Fortunately, this most original and, in some respects, greatest of modern philosophers, presents us with a correction of his own defects. It is not without precedent that a great genius reveals more truth than he himself realizes; he speaks better than he knows; or he fails to carry out to their legitimate conclusion his own utterances. This was strikingly true of Kant. He *thought* of everything, he, indeed, *suggested* everything, but he just failed to *say* everything.

This fact makes him the most fascinating and, at the same time, if one may be permitted to say so, the most exasperating of philosophers. He leads thought along a path of triumphant analysis, and just when

he would issue into light, he grows timid, hesitates, and draws back, as if afraid of too much light; and we wander again in the circle of our own past footsteps.

In due time, we shall endeavor to see how Kant's own thought carries him forward and compels a more complete and consistent conclusion than that with which he contented himself. In a word, the attempt will be made to show that he failed to recognize the supreme function of rational intuition, in the Dialectic, because, in the Analytic, his Deduction of the Categories was, after all, incomplete and not carried back far enough, for its justification, to its true source; a procedure which his whole criticism is constantly urging.

Three Great Indisputable Results.

In leaving Kant, we must clearly fix in mind three great and indisputable results of the "Critique" which can never be disregarded, if we would understand the nature of knowledge.

First, we do not receive the object by thought or by any logical process, but by intuition. We *think* the object given, analyze it, clear it up in our minds, and relate it to other objects likewise given, but to do so it must be given to us, it must come from another source than ourselves, we must *see* it. The one concern then is: do we see it right? And here thought, logic, reasoning, becomes our guide and friend; but the knowledge of the object, as an object, can alone be gained through some sort of intuition.

Secondly, all knowledge, whether it turns out to be mere illusion, or is correspondent to objective reality, must pass through our mind, to take on its forms, and be interpreted by it, before it can become *our* knowledge. So far as we can know man, the world, and God; in so far, indeed, as they can exist at all for us, they must submit to the subjective forms of our own seeing and thinking. It is no irreverence to say that God can never be to us any greater than our own inner capacity to intuit and conceive Him. Whatever we can know at all, can alone be known in *our* way, according to the subjective power of *our* thinking.* It must always, therefore, be remembered that, to say an idea is subjective, in no way settles its objective validity. The question is: Is it *merely* subjective, or does it correspond to some

*It will be recognized that what Kant has really done here is to bring out the full meaning of Descartes's "innateness," or to show how great the subject must be, before it can know, or *in knowing*, the object.

objective truth which, in no way, depends for its validity upon *our* way of seeing and thinking? In either case, it must be subjective in order to exist at all for the knowing mind. The problem of primary importance is to determine how we know that our *always subjective* knowledge is valid or corresponds to the real object. Kant has rendered us great service in showing us the process of knowledge; but he is very inadequate on the question of its validity. Yet, perhaps, when we subsequently come to look into the matter, we shall find that, if he had gone more deeply into the process, he would have made us more certain of the validity.

Thirdly, sense and logic can only give us a knowledge of phenomena and never a knowledge of Reality. Search through the illimitable reaches of space, or delve into the infinitesimal secrets of the atom; let us make our natural sciences and philosophies comprehend the visible universe, past, present, and future, still we shall be living in a world of appearances, and not know Reality. Reality is not seen by sense, nor is it constructed out of sense and logic. Indeed, the scientist no longer pretends—because since the days of Kant he knows why—to reveal to us real substance and real cause, or the One Absolute World-Ground. He describes to us the character of extensive qualities, juxta-posed in space, and defines the laws of successive effects in time; but he frankly confesses Reality to be beyond him, and forever unknowable. And, with Kant, he is irrefragably right, for to *sense* and *logic*, Reality *is* unknowable.

Possibility of Knowing Reality.

But shall we rest in this conclusion as representing *all* that Reason enables us to know, and be content with subjective ideas of Reality, or with a belief, however probable, in Reality? Can we regard a knowledge of appearances, however necessary and universal to human thought, as really valid knowledge of the object? No, our knowledge of the phenomenal world, to which we apply the term science, should be called *docetics* (appearances), and the word science should be reserved for Reality, the knowledge of which, Reason demands, and names the Truth.

There must be something in the claim of Kant's successor, Hegel, that Reason never sets up a demand that Reason can not meet; and Reason certainly refuses to be satisfied with phenomenal knowledge, and demands the objective Truth.

We must now turn to Hegel, who swept the entire range of Reason, from sense to logic and from logic to intuition, in order to see how he corrects and completes the noble work of Kant

If the reader has been inclined to object to so much being said about Kant, the reply must be twofold: The more we reflect upon Kant, the more we shall find that he truly analyzed and described what really goes on in the sub-conscious process of knowing the object. Secondly, to know modern thought, which centers around the doctrine of knowledge, we must know Kant; for we can only learn from him the real difficulties in knowing anything, what knowledge to be knowledge must be, the intricate problems involved, and the way out, which he is always indicating, though not always taking.

NOTE.—The quotations are taken from Max Mueller's translation of the "Critique of the Pure Reason."

CHAPTER IV.

THE LOGIC OF REASON IS THE LOGIC OF REALITY: HEGEL.

‘Of the greatness and power of the Mind, one can not think too highly. The concealed nature of the universe has no power in itself which can offer resistance to the courage of knowing. It must reveal itself, and lay open its deep treasures for the profit and pleasure of intelligence.’*

These are the brave words of the last great philosopher of modern times, George Friederick Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831) who, passing beyond the one-sided interpretations of Kant, by Fichte and Schelling, completed the modern cycle of idealistic thought. After Kant had shut us up within our own minds to a world of appearances, because Reason, he would persuade us, is incapable of knowing Reality, it is certainly with some relief that we find our confidence in Reason once more restored to us.

Where Kant Leaves Us.

Before Kant, men had been taking sides on the question as to whether reason could or could not lead us to Reality. Kant showed us wherein both attitudes were wrong. Dogmatic Rationalism, which would *prove* God, was wrong because it trusted to a superficial logic of reasoning; and Ecclesiastical Belief was wrong because, doubting reason, it too readily took refuge in a supernatural revelation of God. And both made this mistake because neither went down deep enough into the sub-conscious process of knowing, or the Logic of Reason.

But if he destroyed the superficial reasonings of the one, he showed men that they do not have to *prove* God, to be sure of God; and if he invalidated the easy faith of the other, he showed men that they needed no supernatural revelation, to have a confident belief in God; and he made clear to both that they *must believe* in God, because the ethical reason compels it.

* Translated from quotation in Hibben's "Hegel's Logic."

The Humiliation of Science.

And yet, as flattering as this may be to ethics, it casts discredit upon science, the proud servitor of the theoretical reason, the inmost function of which is to *know*; belief for it is entirely inadequate. It would be the quintessence of irony if science should have to end by confessing that it not only does not know the truth, which has no meaning except as the knowledge of Reality, but that, from its very nature, it can not know it; and then seek to find consolation for its ignorance, by talking about the mechanical order and regularity of *appearances*.

But, as if it were not enough for our endurance to be banished to a world of unsubstantial, phenomenal dreams, behind which we can not know God, science must also renounce all knowledge of the knowing self, except as an appearance, or as a phantasmagoric flow of sense-impressions. The consistent outcome of Kant's phenomenalism is, taken on one side, this scientific agnosticism, which proclaims, for its utmost gospel, that man is a phantom, in a phantom world. Let him fancy what he will about Reality, it matters little, for Reality is unknown and unknowable. If he would talk about knowledge, he must confine himself to the phantoms. This is the one great "truth," and of other truth, such as knowledge of Reality, he has none, neither in himself, nor in the object which confronts him.

Thus, it seems as if reason had taken vengeance on man for seeking to penetrate too deeply into her secrets, and had shut him up in a perpetual ignorance of the Truth, the only thing worth knowing.

The Protest of Reason.

But perhaps, after all, if reason can lock the door and shut us in, it can also unlock the door and set us free. At the very threshold of our difficulty, the question forces itself upon us: How does reason come to conclude that our only knowledge is phenomenal and not real, if it does not know Reality in some form or other? If the mind by its very nature does not and can not know Reality, how is it that it ever occurred to the mind that what it does know is *not* the knowledge of Reality? Granted that we may be deceived, and mistake the apparent for the real; how is it that we ever come to know, or even imagine, anything at all about *that* which *appeared*, or concerning which we were deceived?

It certainly would be a most inexplicable and irrational state of affairs, if Reason, setting up within itself the ideal of Reality or Truth,

by which it determines and estimates appearances, should be shut out from the very Reality which alone makes appearances possible, and can give any rational explanation of their existence and meaning.

Since the one thing the human spirit as a theoretical reason demands, is knowledge, which we must again and again insist can only mean the conscious rational understanding of Reality, an awareness of the objective Truth; to offer it only phenomena, is to feed it on swine's food and to condemn it to perish with hunger. On such nourishment, the mind sinks into a sordid materialism, into the bravado of a dogmatic agnosticism, into the agonizing struggle for spiritual food, or into the obscurantism of a transcendental faith. The unrest, the commonplace, the world-weariness of the past generation is but the inevitable outcome of the most brilliant epoch in science, the world has ever known. And it is because science, with its new evangel of salvation, and with its offer of bread, has only led men out into the desert of barren agnosticism to feed them on the husks of appearance. Like the starving flock in Lycidas, "The hungry sheep look up and are not fed." Natural science has met its absolute limits, in the knowledge of phenomena; and, as a savior of man has failed, because it does not offer what alone can save man, Reality.

It has offered and can only offer to man more food, more raiment, more shelter, more rapid motion; and those who are satisfied with the gross Philistinism of worldly comfortableness have been content; but to those who have sought for streams of living water in the wilderness, or, amid their wanderings, have looked for a city which hath foundations, science has been no guide, has set up no pillar of cloud by day, nor of fire by night. Its message has rather been: You shall ever hunger and thirst, and you shall wander in waste places, without hope of ever reaching that city whose builder and maker is God. And the message has sometimes been enforced with all the pomp and circumstance of final truth.*

Hegel Culminates an Epoch.

But out of this intolerable exile, Hegel brings us, because he shows that, if Reason leads us into the wilderness, it is only to lead us out

*It must not be supposed that this is the real significance of science, but simply of that agnostic phase of it which would restrict our knowledge to its descriptions and logical rationalizations of phenomena. The real significance of science lies in those great ideas which it unfolds, inevitably leading the way to the ultimate philosophy of life.

again, disciplined and developed by our experiences, to the conquest and true enjoyment of the Land of Promise. He shows us how that, since all the difficulties and contradictions about appearance and reality arise within Reason itself, it is to Reason we must look for the power of resolving them.

And his appeal is all the more cogent, because it presents itself as the culmination of a historical development of thought to which all past tendencies moved forward, and in which they are harmonized. Thus, we must never think of Hegel as an opponent of Kant, though he often appeared in that guise; any more than we think of Aristotle as an opponent of Plato, though he often appeared in that guise. Just as Aristotle brought the transcendental, ideal concepts of Plato down into realization in the actual world; so Hegel brought the transcendent, unknown Reality of Kant down into the manifested phenomena of experience, as the immanent Reason in all things. The modern cycle of development, however, is much more profound and comprehensive than the ancient, because it goes to the very center of all philosophical problems, the knowing self; while Plato and Aristotle contented themselves rather with a logically abstract treatment of the problem.

Fichte and Schelling Transitional.

Between Kant and Hegel, stand Fichte and Schelling, as transitional stages; each representing a great truth in its extreme phases, and both finally merging into the Hegelian Rational Objective Idealism, as the complement or completion of the Kantian Criticism.

In Kant, we have the subject becoming conscious of its own efforts, in the process of knowing the object, in which it appears how the inner, constitutive principles of our thought make a rational sense experience, and so, by consequence, a true science possible. But knowledge is left out of all relation to the Real Object, the *Ding-an-sich*. Indeed, we only learn more clearly that we can never know it.

It is true, Kant did not doubt for a moment the existence of the Thing-by-itself, or the Reality, back of the phenomenal world, even if it could never be known; and resented being regarded an idealist such as Berkeley, who taught that the object's only *existence* is its being *perceived* by the subject. For he said, in effect: If we have an appearance, it must be the appearance of some *real* substance, and have its origin in some *real* cause. But while this is indisputably true, Kant, as has often been pointed out, had no right to say it. For

his fundamental conclusions about the nature of our knowledge, as we have seen, is that the categories can not be applied beyond sense intuitions, which are only modifications in our own consciousness, and have existence nowhere else; or, if we do try to apply them to the backlying Reality, they only run us into contradictions and illusions. In other words, to account for the modifications in our own consciousness, which we call sense perceptions of the objective world, Kant was not justified, according to his own reiterated conviction, to refer them to the unknown and unknowable *Ding-an-sich*, or to any backlying *real* substance or *real* cause. If he had only admitted the mind's ultimate and supreme power of rational intuition, the master light of all our seeing, by which Reason directly knows the *real* man, the *real* world, and God as the One Absolute Ground of man and the world, then his subjective phenomenalism would have been completely rational, as a manifestation of Reality in space and time, appearing to us under the conditions and limitations of our sense intuition.*

Fichte's Subjective Idealism.

Nor did Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), who began as an ardent disciple of Kant, see the function of rational intuition in the knowledge of the object; but he *did* see that, without it, Kant's *Ding-an-sich*, wholly unrelated to our knowledge, is entirely worthless; and so dropped it altogether. Confining himself wholly to the subject, Fichte asserted that all our knowledge is a pure construction of the inner self. Reflection will show, he taught, that while the objective percept seems to come from an external source, it is really a free, though unconscious, creation of the self.

But this sort of subjective knowledge, Fichte frankly recognized, could not stand for anything like what we represent to ourselves as Reality. Hence, to get Reality, we must turn to the will, because the intellect only furnishes us with a passing show of things. It is in the world of action where Reality is to be found. Thus, as his great

*Kant's real justification, on the side of the theoretical reason, for the assertion of a real objective existence lies in his Highest Principle of the Synthetical Judgment, as already indicated. The possibility of having knowledge at all, or of in any way increasing knowledge by the addition of something new, necessarily rests entirely upon there *being* an object. Without the possibility of forming synthetical judgments about such an existent object, not only would knowledge for us be utterly impossible, but we could not have so much as the data we call appearances. By denying rational intuition of the object, Kant so completely shut up the subject to its own data and processes, that the real object could not be known, nor even known to exist.

master, he had to look beyond the theoretical reason to the ethical reason for an assurance of the real object. But, unlike Kant, this did not lead him to restore the *Ding-an-sich* which he had before lost, for he still found within the subject all he needed.

In the great world of duties, the ego first limits itself, by setting up an object worthy of itself; and then presses forward to overcome that dualism by finding unity in the consciousness of the Pure Ego. It is a process of self-diremption and self-reconciliation. It is not, however, my own individual self which I am trying to find as Reality, but the Absolute Self, in which all individual human selves are included as passing forms, in the unity of Pure Spirit.

But, in thus passing from division and difference to unity, Fichte ends in a Reality in which all differences seem to be abolished in a sort of abstract Moral World-Order—an idea with which Carlyle, in his “Sartor,” and Matthew Arnold, in his “God and the Bible,” were more or less imbued. Such an idea is adequate, provided it has the energy of a living, objective content; but that is just what it is likely to want. For example, we have in Matthew Arnold’s description of Israel’s religion and belief in God, as “morality touched with emotion,” and “a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness,” something altogether too thin and inadequate to express the fulness of Israel’s meaning. We should rather say that the Hebrew’s religion was a profound and over-mastering emotion, born of his genius for morality, and his belief in God, which was a concrete, living conviction in the presence and power of Yahweh, the Eternal Creator and Sustainer of the Universe, who searches the heart of man, and in wisdom and goodness, guides and disciplines him by His daily providences.

The Fichtean objective Reality has too much the nature of a logical abstraction, within the subject; and, besides always tending to swallow up the concrete diversity of things which we clearly know, lacks the power of a real object.

It is true, Reason demands nothing more than an all-comprehensive unity, and that must be found in the Rational Ego; but it must be a unity that includes all differences by reconciling and rationally harmonizing them, and not by sinking them into the dark abysmal depths of an Absolute, where nothing longer can be seen. We are, indeed, troubled by the dualism of the subject and object, and would overcome it if possible; but we prefer the life of the struggle which

it involves to an absolute, undifferentenced unity, where the subject or the object is lost altogether. We do not want peace, if we must lose the only treasures of individuality we have. In fact, if the object is lost, then, so far as we are concerned, the subject is lost too, for it loses all content, except the abstract assertion of pure being. This is prevailingly the outcome of the Hindu idealistic philosophies, which emphasize the category of unity at the expense of diversity. There is always the tendency of reducing unity to the quantitative meaning of mere oneness, with an oversight of its true meaning as a rational harmony of the many, in the one, all-inclusive Concept.

Schelling's Philosophy of Identity.

Schelling (1775-1854), who began with Fichte, could not content himself with a view of nature which regarded it as little more than a mere phantasmal, subjective arena, through which man passes to the Absolute Ego. So, drawing apart from Fichte, he laid stress more and more upon an objective nature, in which he found the same intelligence at work as in the subject. This led him, in the middle period of his development, to recognize an equality between the two, and then an identity, in which all concrete differences of mind and matter, spirit and nature, are lost in a pure indifference, which it takes the immediate intuition of mystical vision to apprehend. Into this "night in which all cows are black," Hegel, who began with Schelling and agreed to the unity of intelligence in nature and man, would not go.

How Hegel Profits by the Past.

But, if Hegel would not agree with his predecessors, neither did he disagree with them altogether, and profited by what they had done, indeed, was prepared by them to work out his own system of thought.

If Fichte had said: "*Ich bin alles*," Schelling had gone to the other extreme by saying: "*Alles ist ich*." Each pressed one truth too far; Fichte losing the object in the subject, and Schelling losing the subject in the object. Kant, on the other hand, who began the entire movement, had both subject and object; but the object for him was wholly unknown. Hegel, then, had the great advantage of having inherited these results. What was false, incomplete, or one-sided he could reject, and what was true and adequate he could accept and incorporate into his own larger interpretation.

From Kant, he could take the self-conscious subject, as the thinking, rational, constructive center to which the object must be referred, if it is to have any meaning; but he must break down the fictitious barrier that separated the known phenomena from the unknown Reality, and show that the peculiar capacity of the subject is just to know the object.

From Fichte, he could adopt the limitation or negation of the ego by the non-ego for his dialectic movement of contradiction and reconciliation. Only, while Fichte's non-ego was no real object at all, but only a self-limitation, set up by the subject itself; with Hegel, it must be a true object.

From Schelling, he could take the notion of an identity of subject and object; only it must not be Schelling's identity of pure indifference, but that of a harmonious inter-relation.

The Antagonism of Subject and Object: The Unity of Reason.

The whole difficulty of the problem rises, in the first place, out of the antagonism between subject and object, the moment the self-conscious subject emerges into being and confronts the object as other than itself. Going forth in its self-assertive activities, it is met and opposed by the object, as an *other*, as something foreign to it. It is thus checked, limited, denied, as it were, and so the world falls into an antagonistic dualism. Whereas, the deepest demand of the subject itself is for unity—the world must be one and not two—so that, while experience is forever thrusting a necessary, though unwelcome, conflict upon us, thought is forever urging upon us reconciliation and peace. But, when all that is involved in the original dualism is taken into account, we find ourselves thrown helplessly between two contending forces that seem impossible of reconciliation. The subject, in its self-assertion, would theoretically understand and practically master the object; while the object constantly withdraws itself and seems bent on compelling the subject to complete submission.

Thus, for example, we find with Descartes the subject to be non-spatial, unextended mind; while the object is extended matter in space, so disparate and incommensurable as to refuse all relation. In vain the Cartesians seek to effect a union in God. Nor does Spinoza, though he approaches solution, succeed by making matter and mind distinct attributes in one Absolute Substance. All this is

only *saying* that it is so, rather than demonstrating to reason how it is so.

Besides, if the extended, incommensurate object points behind and beyond itself to some intelligible Reality, such as stands for the Cartesian "God," or the Spinozistic "One Substance, with its two attributes," Kant then enters and compels the rational subject to renounce all claims of ever knowing that objective Reality.

So that not being able to understand the object, what hope is there for man of ever practically mastering it for his use and welfare!

But rising above this intellectual and practical irreconcilable difference, and in part out of it, we are confronted by a still more painful and incorrigible opposition, in that the subject feels himself free and self-determined; while the object is necessitated and determined, and, meeting the subject, checks and binds him by its inexorable laws. The whole history of man's life upon the earth has been an unrelenting struggle between things as they *are* and as they *ought to be*. Prometheus bound has ever torn at his chains for freedom. In other words, the demands of the free moral intelligence of man, with its ideal of self-worth and mastery, has always met in the objective world of nature and of history the stern and seemingly irreducible opposition of actual fact in actual experience. To free himself from this intolerable struggle, man has, at times, with the proud Stoic, withdrawn from the incorrigible objective world to the peace of the subjective moral freedom within, where he could rule supreme. Or he has, with the Vedantist, Buddhist and Christian mystic or ascetic, counted the objective world as an illusion and cast it from him as worthless.

A Solution Demanded and therefore Possible.

But this can not be said to be a rational solution of the opposition between subject and object; it is simply flight, by wholly disregarding or suppressing one of the opponents. Besides, in the modern era, since the days of the Renaissance and the Reformation, science and politics have discredited all renunciation and withdrawal by demonstrating the value of the object, either as nature or as human fellowship, in proportion as the object has become better known.

When nature is approached with intelligence and obedience, she takes on a less hostile aspect and even becomes friendly; and the moment man lays aside his egoistic self-assertion and acts with good will toward all, he finds his highest interests secured by mutual co-

operation with others; and human society, ceasing to be a chaos of contending selfish claims, more and more approaches a harmonious fellowship.

Therefore, let the past do what it would; if it so chose, it might desert the struggle as hopeless; but the arbitrament of time has thrust upon us the necessity of a rational solution which will abolish neither object nor subject, but bring them into unity. We will acknowledge the greatness of Kant in bringing subject and object face to face, in the process of knowing; but we can not respect his *caveat*: Beware of ever trying to know the object. And while we gratefully recognize the aspects of truth which Fichte and Schelling emphasized, we refuse to desert the problem as they really did, by taking refuge either in the subject or in the object.

We will rather, with Hegel, boldly confront both subject and object, in the firm conviction that the subject not only knows the object, but that in the very process of knowing it, the subject itself unfolds toward the self-realization of that total reason, in which subject and object, with all the oppositions arising out of them, are brought into the harmonious unity of living, self-conscious Spirit.

*The Rational Mechanism of Kant Becomes with Hegel a
Living Organism.*

What the real Logic of Reason is, in the process of knowing, Hegel undertakes to show us, and he does so by following the simple path which Kant pointed out but did not take. We recall how Kant indicates three steps of knowledge: (1) the chaotic heap of sense intuitions which give us our first knowledge of the object and which he called the *synthesis of apprehension*—we have called it the knowledge of sense, or perception; (2) the sifting out and classifying of this given manifold of sense into some order of regular occurrence and recurrence by the *synthesis of imagination*, or by what we have called the sub-conscious associational logic; (3) the emergence of clear objects of perception under concepts, through the *synthesis of apperception*, or, as we have described it, as the coming to self-consciousness of the subject over against the object.

It is fundamentally necessary to keep these three degrees or phases of knowledge always distinctly in mind, if we would understand the procedure of Hegel, who traces them out as the natural unfoldment of thought from sense to logic and from logic to intuition, in the midst

of which the contradictions and oppositions that arise, instead of being hinderances, are necessary means in the logic of reason, by which knowledge of the object is ultimately attained. And this subconscious logic of reason, he raises into the full light of self-consciousness, as the process by which the subject, in coming to know the object, is unfolding itself, in its own rational evolution, toward self-realization. While Kant made the process of knowing a sort of rational mechanism, with juxtaposed parts, Hegel rather made it an organism, with its inter-related parts, evolving by natural stages toward the complete outcome.

In this entire process of the logic of reason, by which it unfolds toward self-realization, there are always the two inter-related elements of the inner, subjective thought and the outer, objective thing, which never exist apart; so that we have the *method of inner rational unfoldment*, and the *outer resultant fact of the unfolding object of knowledge*, each of which passes through three successive and mutually correspondent stages.

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis.

If we begin with the *method* of rational unfoldment, we shall find it expressed in three words, viz.: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The thesis is a mere *position* (that is, the mere positing or placing of a thing), the antithesis is an *op-position*, and the synthesis is a *composition* or *reconciliation* between the two.

Thus when there presents itself a simple object, we have an affirmation, or thesis of knowledge (position). But, at once, because this thesis is finite and so incomplete, there appears, from the very nature of thought, the antithesis, which is a form of limitation or negation (opposition). But, again, as this antithesis is no accidental or fortuitous circumstance, appearing at random, and is the necessary outcome of the finite limitation or negation of the thesis, we have at once necessarily established a fundamental relation between the two; and, when we penetrate to that relation, we see that it, as a unitary principle, sweeps thesis and antithesis together into a total, inclusive synthesis (composition, reconciliation, absolute negation or final affirmation).

Meaning of Negation.

Hegel in general, uses the terms, affirmation, negation, and absolute negation by which he really means final affirmation. When he em-

plays the term negation, however, we must not take him to mean denial of existence, but rather limitation, by defining or determining an object of thought, in Spinoza's sense: *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. That is, every time we define or determine a thing, we set limits to it and thus negate it, as it was when first presented to our attention. It is only the Infinite that we can not thus define, determine, limit, or negate. As it has nothing beyond itself, there is no other besides itself to bring it into limitation. It is absolute, unconditioned, self-existent.

But every finite thing is limited, defined, or determined by its relations to other things, and in this sense is negated or opposed by them.

Negation is Overcome by Absolute Negation.

Now, this negation (opposition, determination) of the thing is constituted by the fact of another thing coming into relation to it. But this very relatedness diminishes the force of the negation, for it reveals in the relation an advance towards a new and positive affirmation. That is, we can not stop with the first negation (definition, determination, limitation by another thing, antithesis, opposition) of the thing (which originally is a mere affirmation, thesis, position) but must absolutely negate the first negation *as* a negation, because the relation between thesis and antithesis (position and opposition; affirmation and negation) reveals an underlying unity which, as a new fact of knowledge, is an absolute or final affirmation (synthesis, composition, reconciliation) concerning the related pair. Then, this new and higher affirmation meets with *its* negation (opposition, limitation, in the thing related to it), and the relation of the two carries us forward, by another absolute negation, to *their* unity in a still higher, larger, and final affirmation.

Thus knowledge continually grows from more to more by an unfoldment of thought, according to which the first, simple cognition of the object or thesis (mere affirmation of objective existence) is met, on further observation, by an antithesis or something other than itself that defines and sets limits to it (negation), whereupon there is necessitated, by this relation, the discovery of the unity between the two or the synthesis which, being a negation that there is really any antithetical negation, as it would at first appear, is an absolute negation, amounting to a final affirmation. This unfolding of thought, from affirmation through negation to absolute negation or final affir-

mation, is the so-called Hegelian Dialectic, or method in the natural Logic of Reason.

Thought and Thing Unfold Together.

Of necessity, this method of unfoldment is but the subjective process, exactly revealing the unfoldment of the object, as it presents itself to rational consciousness. A simple illustration may help to make this clearer both as a method of thought, and a correspondent knowledge of the object.

An acorn which I hold in my hand, I affirm at first to be a simple object, quite complete in itself and unrelated, for the moment, to anything else. But I drop it into the ground and observe results. The dialectic process at once begins. The acorn bursts asunder and, sending its root downward and stem upward, grows in due time into the full sized oak. Now the moment the acorn began to grow, it entered upon a series of changes that negated it as a simple acorn, complete in itself. With something other than the acorn, I now have to reckon; and yet though other than and negating the acorn as such, it is most intimately related to it. In the full grown tree, the acorn with which it started does indeed seem to have been negated altogether. But if I look at the whole process closely, I shall see that this negation of the acorn has not abolished it, but only lifted it up, as it were, and transmuted it. The acorn, as a simple acorn complete in itself, has passed away, it is true, and thus been negated, but it has been taken up into the developed tree and, after the tree has gone through its whole range of development, the acorn appears again as the tree's fruit or ultimate effort.

In this coming back to the acorn, I get an inkling of the further process by which the whole cycle of thought, regarding the oak, can be completed. For in the reappearance of the acorn, which at first seemed to be lost in the oak, there is forced upon my attention some kind of larger total that includes both acorn and oak, in a final unity.

Up to the present, I have had the simple affirmation (thesis) in the acorn, then the negation (antithesis) in the developing tree, as two quite distinct facts, but now the relation between them, as something deeply essential and intimate, compels me to recognize that there is more in the real oak than the two simple facts of the acorn and tree, as such. I can not be satisfied with merely saying that the acorn produced the oak and the oak bore the acorn, for thus I can come to

no final resting place for my thought. Hence, I must go beyond the series of outward manifestations, appearances, or phenomena, which have presented themselves in a related developmental order, to the real oak as the substantial and causal ground out of which the whole process sprung. And this ground I find is, indeed, no other than just the total process itself, or the plan, idea, notion of the tree. It is the oak-thought, we may say, that has been at work all the time from acorn to tree, back to acorn again.

But this idea, plan, or oak-thought is not merely a notion in my mind; it is rather the idea which unfolded in consciousness, in my coming to know the unfolding object, in which it is the dynamic, constructive, rational energy that produced the oak in its entirety. In fact, it is the *real* oak, while the acorn and tree are its outward manifestations or appearances to the observing mind; and it is only when I know this oak-thought, that I have knowledge of the real oak.

Now as the tree (antithesis) had negated the acorn (thesis) so this oak-thought negates the tree, as a mere negation of the acorn; and, since in doing so, it negates absolutely the first negation (the antithesis), it is really the final affirmation or synthesis (reconciliation) that includes both acorn and tree in all their various relations, in a harmonious unity. This second, absolute negation or final affirmation as the synthesis, however, is not like the first simple affirmation (thesis), nor the first negation (antithesis), for each of these was relative to something beyond—the one necessarily limited and negated by the antithesis, and the other by the second or absolute negation; hence, as the synthesis of the whole process, it is called the absolute negation, or final affirmation which, since it gathers up into a total system all the potentialities, implicit in the acorn, and all the resulting activities that have become explicit in the tree, admits of nothing beyond to negate it, and consequently presents us with our ultimate knowledge of the oak.

Of course, the oak is not complete in itself; or, if at first we take it to be such, we shall soon find that it is limited or negated by those things to which it is essentially related. And this new antithesis we must overcome by a new synthesis which will also meet its antithetic negation, demanding a still higher synthesis; and thus we must go on until we finally take in the whole of nature, when we should have in our Final Affirmation, the Absolute Cosmic Thought or Concept.

That is to say, beginning with the oak, we should have to find its relations to all other forms of plant life, then the relations of plants to animals and of both to inorganic nature; and so on, until, like Lord Tennyson again, with his flower in the crannied wall, when we had traced out all the connections of the oak, acorn and all, we should know what God and man is. The poet's verses represent admirably the spirit of the Hegelian Logic, which is an exposition, in an abstract, philosophical form, of the indissoluble, rational relation among all things.

A Misunderstanding Corrected.

Thus, in the logic of reason, whether it has to do with a single object or the whole universe, there is, with the successive unfoldment of the inner method of thought, the correspondent outer unfoldment of the thing, as an object of our knowledge, *provided* we follow the process truly. Some of Hegel's critics seem to think that he endeavored to evolve from the depths of his inner consciousness the whole objective order of things, or to make mere subjective thought dominate the thing. But this is entirely a misconception of the great philosopher. For it is just his especial merit that he emphasizes the necessity of *knowing, concrete, objective reality*. What he means is that knowledge, to be knowledge at all, is necessarily knowledge of the object, as opposed to Kant who really made knowledge, the knowledge of something else or other than the object. Hegel would show that in knowing the object, the subject is coming into exact mutual correspondence to, or is reflecting in himself, the object. So that, as the mind of man comes into contact with nature, as an object for rational interpretation, he is really interpreting it, and is, in proportion to the faithfulness of his reading, reflecting the mind of the Cosmos, which reveals itself to him in its various manifestations.

Thought and thing, the Logic of Reason and the Logic of Reality are one; but not in Schelling's sense of an undifferented identity, nor in Fichte's sense of a one-sided subjectivism, but in the sense of a rational unity, wherein each retains its own distinct individuality, while related to all others and to the whole.

Thus, if we could free a child from the vitiating influences of pedagogic faults, and put him under an omniscient instructor, who would guide his unfolding mind to see the object, stage by stage, as it really is, freed from all subjective errors, the natural unfolding of his

subjective thought would completely correspond to the objective reality.

The logic of thought and of the thing does not mean that *anything* the child might think would stand for a real object—that would be nonsense—but it expresses the kinship and inseparable unity of subject and object. Hegel always rests in the ontological position of Schelling that knowledge is possible only on the basis of a rational unity of nature in subject and object.

How mind and matter interact, Descartes and his followers could not explain, as we have said, except by carrying them back to God. If the objective fact runs parallel to the subjective idea, it is not because there is any real relation between the two, but because we see all things in God (Malebranche); or because an event in one series is an *occasion* for the occurrence of a corresponding event in the other series (Geulincx); or because they are two aspects of the same thing, seen from different sides (Spinoza); or because there is a preestablished harmony (Leibnitz). Kant fully recognized the real reciprocal relation between subject and object, and timidly recognized that the objective appeal must have its origin in objective Mind, but yet regarded that Mind as so foreign to the knowing subject that it could not be known.

But with Hegel, the logic of unfolding thought is possible just because the only meaning of a knowledge *in* the subject is constituted by its being a knowledge *of* the object, based upon the fundamental unity of rational nature in both subject and object. Hence, he could regard thought and thing as one, and the unfolding thought in the subject as a coming to consciousness, or as a reflection of, objective Reality.

Being, Essence, and Notion.

But now if we turn from the method of the inner logical unfoldment, in order to emphasize the correspondent outer unfoldment of the object, as such, in knowledge, the whole dialectic process will be found to fall naturally under three great categories, which form three progressive stages, the one growing out of the other, and all forming a complete, self-inclosed and self-sustaining cycle.

These categories are Being, Essence, and Notion (in the sense of the comprehensive, rational, total, unitary concept).

Being (*Sein*) corresponds to the first simple affirmation (thesis); Essence (*Wesen*) to the negation (antithesis, where things are seen to limit and condition each other in various relations); and the Notion (*Begriff*) to absolute negation or final affirmation (synthesis, in which Being and Essence are reconciled in the unity of the Notion).

It is evident that we have here over again the Kantian *synthesis of apprehension*, in the mere confrontation of the objective manifold of sense intuition; the *synthesis of imagination*, in the logical analysis and construction of the objective stuff given; and the *synthesis of apperception*, in the self-conscious concept of the object. Or to follow our own modes of expression, we should say: Being is that knowledge given in immediate sense perception; Essence is that same knowledge rationalized by discursive reasoning or logic; while the Notion is the unitary concept of the whole, effectuated in rational intuition.

We must remember that this unfolding process in the logic of reason, which is at first *sub-conscious*, describes also the natural history of evolving *conscious* human knowledge, from its primitive common-sense, through a developed science, to the maturity of a final philosophy. We shall always find that man begins his intellectual life upon the earth with the immediate perceptions of sense, in which he rests content, until such knowledge breaks down, as in time it must, into all sorts of contradictions and illusions. The reason, more fully awakened, begins its scientific, discursive processes, in order to find the underlying relations and laws of things (the point where Kant and natural science stop with knowledge). Finally, reason, by an inner necessity, must go on until rational intuition affords a comprehensive grasp (*Begriff*) of the whole, which presents the knowledge of objective reality, as a total rational unity.

Three Ascending Stages of Culture.

It has already been pointed out how these three ascending degrees of knowledge stand for three general stages of culture, or points of view, at which men arrive. There is, first, the so-called *common-sense* view of things, when the chief reliance is placed on the data of sense, taken at their face value; while logic is very naive or half-conscious, and intuition is wholly unconscious. This is the child stage of culture.

Then a profounder and more thorough view is taken in *science*,

where a very alert and searching logic seeks out the deeper relations of things, but where rational intuition is still quite sub-conscious, or only half acknowledged. That is, the scientific man, as we saw in the case of Professor Huxley (p. 230), seldom thinks it necessary, for the solidity of his knowledge, to inquire into those basal, primary intuitions upon which the possibility of his entire work rests, and find for them a solid ground in reason. He is usually a compound of naive common-sense and logic. This is the culture of manhood.

Finally, a true *philosophy*, fully awake to the supreme significance of rational intuition, reaches a still profounder view than science, by endeavoring to grasp the object as a whole in a harmonious unity, that is, to reach through rational intuition, the grand Cosmic Notion, Concept, or Idea, as the underlying, underived, self-existent, self-sustaining, self-sufficient, and Ultimate Reality. This is the culture of maturity.

It is not until this final philosophical stage is reached that we can really be said to know the object, or be seriously attempting to know it. The only reason we can admit that science, or the culture of manhood, is seriously attempting to know the truth, is because it is always guided by rational intuitions, above its head, whether it will or no. That men have denied the possibility of reaching this stage is due to rational immaturity or rational tribalism. By a sort of stubborn fidelity, men hold to the gods of the tribe, and refuse to push out into the larger world beyond, to which Reason, the One Supreme God, is ever calling them.

If it has proved impossible to make a true interpretation of life out of common-sense, with its immediately given world of experience, because it has no solid ground in logic; so it has proved no less impossible to make an adequate interpretation of life out of science, with its logic, because it has no sure resting place in a comprehensive, rational intuition. Nor must we suppose it possible to give life its total meaning by trusting *solely* to the rational intuition of philosophy, because to rest in that alone, reduces knowledge to vague abstractions, without concrete, living content. Philosophy has, by no means, been free from this one-sided fallacy. Indeed, it has often fallen headlong into it. To interpret life, reason must unfold in its totality and maturity. If sense needs the corrective and constructive discipline of logic in science, and science needs the regulative guidance, as Kant has made clear, of intuition in philosophy, so philosophy can not

attain its goal, unless it seeks to give some definite meaning to the concrete facts of common-sense, and to the rational order of science.

Now, if we keep in mind the necessity for this totality and maturity of reason, and look back, from the end of the unfolding knowledge of the object to the beginning, we shall find that the whole was really wrapped up, or *implicit*, in the vague undeveloped Being, and that it began to unfold or become *explicit* in the Essence, and finally reached full expression in the Notion. Thus, beginning with our common-sense, we find that everything, including logic and intuition, however vague and undeveloped they may be, lies wrapped up in it. The humblest man is a scientist and philosopher, though he may be a very poor one. Then our science clears up and explains our common-sense, the confused, inherent logic of which thus becoming more and more explicit. In the meantime every scientist is a philosopher, whether he wishes to be so or not. Unfortunately, he may be a very poor one; and yet he shows what the total maturity of reason includes. Finally the philosopher, to have anything of value to say, must explicate the whole preceding process of common-sense and science, as the germ out of which his thought has developed to its full maturity.

Or, if we take our oak tree, we shall find the same inter-relation of Being, Essence, and Notion. The acorn, as Being, had wrapped up in it the oak, it was the oak *implicit*, but in quite a vague and indefinite form. In fact, so far as we could directly see, there was no oak tree in the acorn at all; but when the tree developed, we saw that it was really the acorn made *explicit*. Finally, taking into account the whole, from acorn to tree and from tree back to acorn again, we discovered that the substantial, causal reality of the tree was the notion, the oak-thought, which manifested itself in the various activities and stages of its development.

Being Passes into Essence and Essence into the Notion.

In Being, then, according to Hegel's view, we simply know *that* the object is, and this knowledge is so vague and indefinite that we might consider it as good as no knowledge at all, or even call it *no-being*. It is such knowledge as the little child first gets of the world, a mere confused mass of sense impressions, which do no more than simply announce that the object is there, by revealing that it has some sort of quantity and some sort of quality. The child is thus made

aware of Being, as an object of his apprehension, but what he knows of it, we could be hardly justified in dignifying by the name of knowledge.

But then this simple, homogeneous, undifferentiated Being, with which all our knowledge begins, as we examine it, breaks up into innumerable parts, or, to use an expression of Mr. Spencer's, begins to differentiate and become heterogeneous; and here we are launched into the Essence of the thing. We have passed out of the mere being of the object into its becoming, where there is change, movement, confusion, contradiction. This is the realm and opportunity of science. Being, which we at first took to be complete and self-contained, is now negated, as we discover things mediated, dependent one on another, inter-acting, and inter-related. But it is just as plain that they are inter-acting and inter-related on some underlying, permanent principle which negates the opposition of change and becoming, by binding them together into one great system of things. However great the change among things may be, however inter-dependent they are, each insufficient in itself, they find a permanent unity in one, fundamental ground-Notion, which amid all change remains the same, and is the one sufficient reason for the explanation of all things; because, as the moveless mover of all things, it reveals the identity of substance and cause in the unity of the many in the one.

We have here again, in this Notion, the absolute negation, or final affirmation, as an ultimate synthesis or reconciliation, in which the unceasing contradiction of change among things has become the ceaseless activity of harmonious relations in a permanence, that constitutes the rational unity of the Notion. This Notion is the object in its substantial, causal reality, and all that has preceded the rational intuition of this reality is its manifestations to us, in the various phenomenal forms which our experience may lend it.

Kant Pauses at the Objectivity of the Notion.

It is this Notion which, as the final affirmation mediating the antithesis between Being and Essence, is Kant's *Ding-an-sich*, or Reality—the unknown x , a something we must believe to exist, but which we can never know. He stopped with the affirmation and negation, or sense and logic; or, objectively expressed, with Being and Essence, as the only method and realm of knowledge; and did so because he overlooked the absolute negation or final affirmation (rational intuition), and the

real objectivity of the Notion or Concept. He was perfectly right in asserting that, on the basis of sense and logic (thesis and antithesis, affirmation and negation, Being and Essence), which can give only phenomenal manifestations of Reality, we can never come to know Reality. But his great mistake was in not carrying out to its ultimate term the logic of reason, by doing which he would have seen, in the light of rational intuition, how the affirmation and negation, Being and Essence, are brought to a synthesis in the objective reality of final affirmation or of the Notion. As it is, his knowledge of the phenomenal world can not give us the slightest inkling of the real world; and what is worse, can not make us certain that it is even a veritable appearance of the real world at all, or has any relation to it whatever. His phenomenal world hangs suspended in mid-air, apart from any known relation to Reality, and, so far as knowledge is concerned, deserves only the name of *docetics*, rather than that of *scientific physics*.

But taking Hegel's view, the world of experience is at once and always related to the unconditioned, substantial, causal Reality, as its conditioned manifestation in space and time, under the limitations of sense and logic; and thus is raised to the dignity of a sacred revelation of Truth. However obscure and inadequate that revelation may be to our minds, it still, so far as it goes, makes Reality known to us. The savage who trembles before the tempest because his god is angry, or the pagan who bows down to wood and stone is always seeing behind the outer form, something real upon which all things depend. However vaguely conceived, this is the objective Notion, the Final Affirmation of Reason.

The Content of the Notion: Substance and Cause.

But now when the Notion is reached, as the final affirmation of objective Reality, Hegel has still to inquire as to the nature of its content. This also reveals itself through the dialectic process.

The first affirmation declares it at once to be *substance*, out of which all separate things, as its accidents (attributes, qualities) arise, and into which they sink back, as their all-embracing source. In itself, it is the one permanent, undifferenced ground of the many qualitative differences in the world of phenomena.

But the Notion, thus conceived as a static permanence of substance, is negated by the concrete fact of change, revealing a dynamic force

moving among things; and hence, to substance we must now add *cause*, regarding both as forming the content of the Notion. Cause, however, as already indicated (p. 197), must be taken as the total system of reciprocal inter-actions, and not merely as some original power at the beginning of a process.

And yet this system of inter-acting causes and effects is an incomplete and inadequate view of cause, representing only a total sum of things—a conception with which science is always too prone to rest content; for an aggregate of inter-acting dynamic elements, in itself, does not rise above a conditioned dependence upon something else; whereas thought demands of cause that it be the ground, or *sufficient reason* for Reality, complete and independent in itself. Hence, the conception of cause, as the aggregate totality of inter-action among many causes, must now be absolutely negated by the conception of the one, self-sufficient, self-determined, Absolute Cause. In this final affirmation, the fullness of the Notion, in its total unity, is attained. The dependent, conditioned necessity, to which things are subject in a system of inter-acting causes, rises to *freedom*, in the Notion; and substance, ceasing to be merely the basal stuff of which things are made, becomes rational, self-centered, self-conscious Mind or Spirit.

To express this final outcome of the dialectic process in the logic of Reason, Hegel uses the significant word *Idea*, as standing for the ultimate, absolute Reality, which is God, who as Spirit is the One Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause, in whom all diversities of attribute and action have their origin, reveal their inter-related harmony, and find their end.

The Idea, as the Final Cause or End.

The *Idea*, then, presents itself as the Final Cause, or the End, in which is gathered up the entire process of rational unfoldment. And as such, it overcomes the old and long-standing conflict between the subject and the object, and thus brings them to complete rational unity; for, in realizing the End, the one-sided subjectivity and the show of objective dependence confronting it, are both canceled. Or in Hegel's own words: "Through this process, there is made explicitly manifest what was the nature of design [Final Cause or End]: that is, the implicit unity of the subjective and objective is now realized. And this is the *Idea*" (§ 209, p. 351).

During the process of rational unfoldment, this great End is con-

cealed from us, so that we labor under the illusion of a real discrepancy between subject and object, which disappears, however, when that End is realized. "Within the range of the finite, we can never see or experience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of the Infinite End, therefore, consists in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unmanifested. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world; and the result is that it need not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality, accomplished" (§ 212, pp. 351-2). That it is not accomplished, or that the subject and object have not come to complete reconciliation in the Idea, is the illusion under which we live.

The Actual Is Real when Related to the Idea.

Therefore, while the Idea is the Truth, because the Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion, I must not take for true *any* correspondence of external things with my subjective conceptions, for these may be only *correct* conceptions held by *me*. In the Idea, we have risen far above individual views, or figurative conceptions, or external things. "And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea; for which, therefore, yet other actualities are needed, which in turn appear to have a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the Idea is realized" (§ 213, p. 253).

It is then only so far as things are related to the Idea that they may be said to be true; otherwise they are false. A state or a work of art is true, if it is as it ought to be; that is, if its actuality corresponds to its notion. When thus viewed, to be untrue, means much the same as to be bad—as we say of a bad man, that he is an untrue man, because he does not behave as his notion or vocation requires.

"Nothing, however, can subsist if it be *wholly* devoid of identity between the Notion and reality [actuality]. Even bad and untrue things have being, in so far as their reality [actuality] still, somehow, conforms to their notion. Whatever is thoroughly bad or contrary to the Notion, is for that very reason, on the way to ruin [error has no principle of support either in itself or in Truth, and hence destroys itself]. It is by the Notion alone that the things in the world have their

subsistence; or, as it is expressed in the language of religious conception, things are what they are, only in virtue of the divine, or the creative thought which dwells within them." So that, while the Idea is transcendently above the actualities of life, it is nevertheless manifested in them, so far as they are understood in their relation to It. "When we hear the Idea spoken of, we need not imagine something far away beyond this mortal sphere. The Idea is rather what is completely present; and it is found, however confused and degenerated, in every consciousness" (§ 213, pp. 253-4).

The defect of life lies in the fact that, on the one hand, we see the idea only implicit, as the natural or phenomenal object existing *in* itself; or, on the other hand, take it to be the subjective conscious idea, in our minds, as if it existed there *for* itself. Whereas, "the unity and truth of these two is the Absolute Idea, which is both *in* itself and *for* itself. Hitherto, *we* have had the idea in development through its various grades as *our* object, but now the Idea comes to be its *own* object. This is the νόσις νοήσους [thought thinking] which Aristotle, long ago, termed the supreme form of the Idea" (§ 236, pp. 373-4). Thought has now attained complete unity, subject and object are one, and reason has reached its goal.

Being and Essence Saved in the Notion.

In attaining this goal, therefore, reason loses nothing but gains all, in coming to the totality and maturity of self-realization. For, in the unfolding, dialectic process, it takes up into itself everything real, by discovering its relation to the Idea.

As the thesis, in the affirmation of Being, is met and opposed by the antithesis, in the negation of the Essence, it, in a sense, passes away; and so also does the antithesis, in the negation of Essence, as it is met and opposed by the synthesis, in the final affirmation of the Notion. But, in a larger sense, they are both saved. Hegel uses the expressive word, *aufgehoben*, to indicate this successive advance, by which it is meant that the thesis and antithesis are carried away, lifted up, and transmuted, in being harmonized and brought to realization in the synthesis.

Taken in themselves, the affirmation of Being (sense) and the negation of Essence (logic) are incomplete, dependent, and offer no explanation or sufficient ground for their existence; but unfolded and merged into the final affirmation of the Notion (intuition), they are elevated and

transformed into their true meaning. They really first come to find themselves in the Notion, which alone is absolute and complete in itself, or is the self-centered, self-determined, self-explanatory Idea, or Reality. In other words, the phenomenal world of Kant is meaningless illusion until it comes to be seen as the manifestation in space and time, under the conditions of sense and logic, of the rationally intuited world of Reality.

It was in this dialectic of reason, whereby the first, immediate knowledge of sense (being, substance) must perish in the larger, mediated knowledge of science (essence, causal inter-action), which in turn must pass away into the final knowledge of philosophy (notion, reality of the Idea), that Hegel found expressed the profoundest truth of religion. "Whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the Gospel's, the same shall save it" (Mk. viii, 35).

Only the Idea and Its Manifestations Are Real.

The rational subject, then, comes at last to know the true object in the Idea. All that which, in the unfolding subjective thought, does not harmonize with the Idea, whether it be whole systems of science or philosophy or theology, is unreal or has no objective existence, but is the mere subjective error and illusion of human thought. In so far, however, as the unfolding thought *does* correspond to the Idea, it reflects Reality or Truth; and, in this sense, God may be said to come to consciousness in man.

The Logic of Reason in Man, but of God.

But a grave misconception, into which some of Hegel's readers have fallen, and which is partly due to Hegel's own ambiguity, must be scrupulously avoided. God's coming to consciousness in man, through the evolution of the Idea, must not be thought of as an evolution of God, but rather as an evolution of man *in* God. The Reality of Spirit, the Absolute Idea, has no need of evolving in time under the limitations of space, in order to reach its own Infinity and Eternity. The Supreme Reason, has no need of a dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, but always remains the ever-existent substantial, causal Idea, as the total, explicit, changeless unity of Objective Truth.

The entire evolution is constituted by the logic of reason in the unfolding thought of man, from Being through Essence to the Notion; that is, it is the unfoldment of human consciousness from sense to

logic and from logic to intuition, into the ultimate reflection of the Thought of God.

So that all which belongs to the restrictions and limitations of sense and logic, or to the antithetic confusions and oppositions of Being and Essence constitute, under the conditions of space and time, the world of phenomena, in contrast with which the untrammelled freedom and unity of rational intuition and the Notion reveal the World of Reality in its Infinity and Eternity.

Immanence and Transcendence.

If Hegel bridged the chasm which Kant left yawning between the phenomenal and the real, he nevertheless did not destroy their permanent distinction. Though the Real world is no longer cut off from the phenomenal world, because it manifests itself therein as the Immanent Idea, to the reflection of which the human consciousness unfolds; it, nevertheless, forever remains transcendent to all limitations of space and changes of time, as the underived, unconditioned, self-centered and self-determined Reality, in its infinite and eternal Perfections. The necessity of recognizing God as forever immanent in the world and at the same time forever transcendent will more and more make itself felt as we proceed in our interpretation. If, on the one hand, God is entirely absorbed in the world, simply as its immanent energy, he sinks to the level of an undifferentenced commonplace. If, on the other hand, his presence and power are nowhere to be seen in the world, and seen as the ground and guarantee of its permanent law and order, then the world ceases to have any meaning for rational beings, capable of thought, feeling and will.

Significance of the Hegelian Logic.

If we were to ask what is the fundamental significance of the Hegelian Logic, we might indicate it by two words which express more than any others the spirit of the whole modern era, viz.: *totality* and *maturity*, between which, as we have seen in one aspect of the subject (pp. 146-8, 205), there is a mutual and inseparable relation.

By *totality* we do not mean merely the allness of things, but their allness in rational unity. Every philosopher has recognized the necessity of bringing all the elements of life into some sort of unity, but he has often secured unity at the expense of totality, or totality at the expense of unity. Thus a Fichte secures unity, on the basis of the

subject, but invalidates his totality by blurring the object or lowering its value. Or a Schelling secures unity by blurring both subject and object into some sort of indistinguishable identity, so that we see neither in their totality. While, on the other hand, a Kant is total enough in his assertion of the true value of subject and object, but he loses all unity, by simply putting them side by side in an utterly unknown relation. In *here*, we have the subject, with the entire phenomenal world of its own manufacture; while out *there*, we have the true object, Reality, but it is a Thing-by-itself, a wholly unknown x , related to the subject only by the mere, arbitrary assertion that it is so related.

With Kant, though he did not mean it to be so, all knowledge is a one-sided, subjective construct, made out of the given sense-intuitions—which are data of our own consciousness, having existence nowhere else—and the subjective activities of thought. With Hegel, on the contrary, the peculiar and unique nature of knowledge is just such an indissoluble correlation between subject and object that one does not exist without the other; whereupon it follows that Truth for us, or knowledge of Reality, is the complete coincidence of subject and object—an ultimate state of rational consciousness, taken in its totality, which æsthetically confirms itself by its own feeling of harmonious unity. Hence, in our knowledge, the subject and object, on the one hand, maintain themselves without the one losing the other, nor are they blurred into a characterless indifference; while, on the other hand, they are not merely juxta-posed as abstractly necessary coordinates of thought in general, but are clearly estimated and set in their true relation as cooperant functions of Truth; whereby it comes to be seen that the meaning of knowledge for us is that the subject, in coming to know the object, is unfolding itself, and, in unfolding itself, is coming to know the object.

The Hegelian Philosophy of Evolution.

And Hegel's totality is possible because of his maturity. That is, he takes Reason through its successive stages to its full self-realization. In this particular he is peculiarly the philosopher of his age; for he presents the philosophy of evolution, and reveals that philosophy to be the developed outcome of all past, evolving tendencies.

But, in speaking of evolution, we must never, under the charge of the most arrant tribalism and immaturity, think of resting its meaning with the names of Lamarck, Darwin, Wallace, Haeckel,

Weismann. For these eminent scientists are only dealing with one phase of the whole great problem of evolution, viz.: that of organic, physical life, and that too in a descriptive, rather than in an explanatory sense. But in Hegel, we have evolution as such, in its entire meaning, as the unfolding in rational consciousness of all nature and all history, toward the fulness of the Ultimate Idea, in the totality of which, self-realized Reason, in its maturity, reflects the meaning of both nature and history, as the phenomenal manifestation in space and time of the Reality of Absolute Spirit.

And it is in the subject's unfolding knowledge of the object that there emerges not only the contradiction (absolute opposition) of error and truth, but the antithesis (relative opposition) of phenomenal and Real, matter and Mind, nature and Spirit; wherein we have the negation of error as a total denial of Reality, as distinguished from the negation of sense as a limited assertion of Reality. So that, in the unfolding coincidence of subject and object, as we approach the knowledge of Reality, while error utterly disappears as pure nothing, nature as the phenomenal or material world of sense is lifted up into the light of Truth, and is thus transformed into terms of Mind, or Spiritual Reality.

The Limits of Hegel's Work.

But as much as Hegel has done for us in revealing the Logic of Reason, he still did not entirely complete his work, so well begun. He turned Kant's mechanically related *apprehension*, *imagination*, and *apperception*, into an organic unity, by showing how sense rises to logic and logic to intuition, in the evolving knowledge of Being, Essence, and Notion; but that other effort of Kant's, the Deduction of the Categories, which as Kant justly recognized is fundamentally important, he did not follow out to its rational terminus; and, in consequence, did not catch the full significance of rational intuition in establishing the validity of the object.

But this is absolutely essential, if we would determine, in its final meaning for us, our knowledge, both in its nature and in its objective validity. Kant was wholly right in regarding it primarily essential to demand of the inner, constructive principles of the mind that they be brought before the final court of Reason, to show their credentials and prove their right to be. But he did not meet the conditions of the demand. For, as we have seen, he thought he had done his work

when he had picked up empirically the rules of judgment, or the categories of Aristotle and, after burnishing them up a little and ranging them in order according to school logic, had shown how they do apply empirically to the manifold of sense-experience.*

But Reason will not be satisfied with such evasions. Reason is not content to stop with the mythologist's coiled serpent or the old negro's last big rock, as a final resting place for Reality, or the knowledge of Reality. Nor was Kant himself really satisfied, for that matter, because after he got his categories deduced and, by means of them, had constructed the whole world, he was painfully conscious of having left it suspended in the vacuous inane, and needing support which he managed to find in the moral reason.

The secret of all this lies in the fact that Kant did not really deduce his categories, did not go down to the bottom of Reason, and find there their ground and their underived, absolute right to be.

And because Hegel does not adequately serve us here, we must now assume the task ourselves; and in doing so, we shall reach the last point of support in the criticism of the Logic of Reason, beyond which we shall find it impossible to go without taking that point of support with us.

* It is not asserted here that Kant *thought* he empirically picked up his categories, for he prided himself on having for the first time rationally grounded them, *a priori*; but, as a matter of fact, he did find them empirically and did not carry them back to their true ground in Reason, as *a priori* principles.

NOTE.—The preceding interpretation of Hegel, who is a country not only wide and varied but rich in hidden resources, must be regarded as necessarily very limited. The reader who is desirous of getting a larger view of the great idealistic philosopher is recommended to make himself familiar, first of all, with the "Logic" (of the "Encyclopædia"), which may be found in the excellent English translation of William Wallace (Oxford), used for the above quotations. Wallace's "Prolegomena;" Stirling's (J. H.) "Secret of Hegel;" Caird's (Edw.) "Hegel;" Harris's (W. T.) "Hegel;" and Hibben's (J. G.) admirable essay in interpretation, on the "Logic," will be found very helpful for introductory study.

CHAPTER V.

THE FINAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES THROUGH RATIONAL INTUITION.

KANT may be charged with the same philosophical crime which he laid at the door of Locke, that of not having given to the categories a clear certificate of birth, such as to ennoble them as legitimate offspring of Reason.

Even though we have learned that a rational experience is possible, because certain forms of judgment or categories in the mind construct and give order to the manifold of sense, presented in experience, we have not yet reached the ground of knowledge. For we must still ask: How are *the categories* possible, what right have they to construct and order experience, what is the fundamental principle in which they take their rise?

Kant discovered the place of their origin, and, with the greatest clearness, pointed it out, but he took no advantage of his discovery. Like a searcher for precious jewels, when he at last found the pearl of great price, he threw it aside as having no value.

The Self-conscious Subject in the Beginning.

We have seen how, in his deduction of the categories, he makes the synthetical unity of apperception, or the ever-present, knowing subject, the center to which the manifold of all experience must be gathered, as well as, or because it is, the point from which all the unitizing, spontaneous activities of thought emanate; how, indeed, it is the very creator and law-giver of nature, as we know it.

In his second edition of the "Critique," he emphasizes, with more insistence if possible, the fundamental centrality of this underived, ultimate datum of reason. In his Deduction there, under the special heads of "The Original Synthetical Unity of Apperception," and "The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the Highest Principle of all Employment of the Understanding," he makes the following deeply significant statements.

"It must be *possible* that the '*I think*' should accompany all my

representations. I call it *pure* apperception as distinguished from *empirical* apperception, or *original* apperception because it is that self-consciousness which, by producing the representation '*I think*' (one and the same in every act of consciousness), can not itself be accompanied by any other." And its unity he calls, "the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate that it contains the possibility of all knowledge, *a priori*."

Unity of Subject Makes Possible Synthesis of Object.

Without reference to the identity of the subject, he continues to show, all objects of experience would remain disconnected and indeed unknown. "This reference to the subject is not brought about by my simple consciousness of the object [that much the animal has] but by my *adding* one to the other and being conscious of that adding, that is, of that synthesis." "Connection does not lie in the objects and can not be borrowed from them by perception and thus be taken into the understanding, but it is always an act of the understanding which itself is nothing but a faculty of connecting, *a priori*, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception which is, in fact, the highest principle of all human knowledge." In a note he adds: "The synthetical unity of apperception is, therefore, the highest point with which all employment of the understanding and even of the whole logic and afterwards the whole of transcendental philosophy must be connected: aye, that faculty is the understanding itself."

He says further: "The unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of a representation to an object, that is, their objective validity and, consequently, their becoming cognitions, so that the very possibility of the understanding depends on it."

"The first pure cognition of the understanding, therefore, on which all the rest of its employment is founded and which, at the same time, is entirely independent of all conditions of sensuous intuition is the very principle of the synthetical unity of apperception." "It is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge, a condition not necessary for myself only, in order to know an object, but one to which each intuition must be subject in order to become an object for me, because the manifold could not become connected in one consciousness in any other way, and without such a synthesis." Hence, the nature of a judgment becomes clear as being not so much the repre-

sensation of a relation between two concepts, but rather "the mode of bringing given cognitions into the objective unity of apperception."

These quotations are given at such length in order to secure Kant's great authority in justification of a more rational and profound, yet more direct and simple, deduction of the categories, which can be effected not from the derived functions of logical judgment, but from the underived, original unity of the self-conscious, knowing, feeling, and willing subject, from which all start out and to which all must return.

*An Original, Underived Datum Needed for the Deduction
of the Categories.*

These utterances also convict Kant of not carrying out his own intention of analyzing the process of knowledge down to its ultimate foundation in the Pure Reason. To carry out that intention, we must follow our investigations back until we reach an original datum, beyond which we can not go; and this original datum is the synthetical unity of apperception, according to Kant himself, a datum which is derived neither from the given manifold of sense, nor from the constructive logic of thought. It not only rests upon itself, but is also our last and only authority; for even its sense of dependence, as a conditioned element in the Absolute, is its own immediate declaration.

If we needed further justification for this ultimate datum of knowledge, the self-identical ego, we might refer to the beginnings of modern philosophy in Descartes, who discovered that knowledge, to be secure, must rest upon the solid foundations of the thinking subject; or to the great philosophies of India, which find in the self the beginning and end of all knowledge.

If, therefore, we are going to be serious in seeking the foundations of knowledge, it is to the synthetical unity of apperception, or *com-perception*, the self-identical subject, that we must look, in order to find the ultimate, underived datum of knowledge from which all its derived powers must be deduced, and to which they must be carried back for the ground of their existence, and the justification of their use.

The Subject Emerges in Knowing its Object.

The first power of the subject, declared in the subject's simple coming to self-consciousness, is to recognize its object as an object to itself.

As we have seen, the emergence of the self-conscious subject was a momentous event in the natural world-order, when the cosmic unity was invaded by an *other* who rose above nature, to begin a supra-natural or rational evolution of his own. The end of that evolution, as we conceived it, was to be the subject's coming to know the object in such a way as to become one with it again; not, however, in an *unconscious* unity as it began, but in the *conscious* unity of rational reconciliation, by which the subject attains freedom and self-realization.

It is evident how fundamental that rational act is by which the subject, in becoming conscious of the object, becomes conscious of itself, and thus brings subject and object into a rational synthesis in consciousness; and how such a rational act alone can lay the foundations of all possible knowledge. For if the subject does not distinguish its object as something other than itself, of which it becomes aware, then, while there may be experience, as with the animals, there can be no rational knowledge. And, of necessity, if the object existed as a something which no subject perceived, there could be no knowledge whatsoever.

Nature of the Rational Power in Apperception.

Therefore, to ask what is the nature of this act by which the subject sees itself in seeing its object, is to make the true beginning in the attempt to discover the original powers of the mind in the process of knowing.

Does this power of apperception, or of *comperceiving* the subject along with the object, rank as either of the two rational functions which Kant found at the bottom of all our knowledge, viz.: sense intuition, which perceives objects; and logic, which relates and constructs those given sense objects into the various forms of knowledge?

It is evident that mere perception of objects does not give to the perceiving subject the sense of self, for in that case every animal that has sense perceptions at all would at once become self-conscious. Nor can we look for it in logic, for logic does not *add* to our knowledge, because as Kant has well pointed out, it is *not a seeing* faculty; it only relates and constructs into rational form what is already given through sense perception. And yet this sense of self, in knowing the object, is something *added* to our knowledge, and not at all an inference or logical construct. It is entirely a new datum of

knowledge, in addition to anything that the most advanced animal is capable of, through his sense perception and sub-conscious, associational logic.

Rational Intuition Makes Apperception and hence Knowledge Possible.

There is only one source left in which we can hope to find this new datum of knowledge, and that is—what Kant denied had any existence—an *intuitive* understanding, or as we prefer to say, *rational intuition*. And this gives what is in the power of neither sense nor logic, viz.: the very beginning of all knowledge, or the knowledge that there is an object to be known.

Kant recognized that, if we only had an *intuitive understanding*, which could not only relate but *see*, and thus add to our knowledge by means of synthetical judgments, *a priori*, we could advance beyond a mere rationalized sense experience to the world of spiritual Reality. But strange as it may seem, although in apperceiving the self, the rational subject has already risen above the realm of sense into the realm of spiritual Reality, Kant did not see that this is the act of immediate, rational intuition; and consequently overlooked its ultimate significance as the ground of all knowledge.

Of necessity, he could not find intuition in the understanding, for that he repeatedly restricts to a relational, constructive function, as a faculty of comparing and judging what is already given.

Rational Intuition Makes Logic Possible.

And yet he failed entirely to show how his logical understanding could ever begin its function of judging; for the only rational power that makes the relational activities of logic possible is intuition, since every logical relation or construction is impossible unless it ends in an immediate intuition that the conclusion is true (or false). But here enters another one of the great philosopher's peculiar *unconscious* admissions and *conscious* denials. While denying any intuitive power to the understanding, which is perfectly right, if we are going to restrict the understanding to the relational activities of logic, he yet takes great pains to show that the supreme function of the understanding, viz.: rational judgment, is entirely impossible without intuition.

Kant seems to be like one who is always rendering us a great service, although not intending to do so. He compels us to see what

he denies as having existence, by constantly using a function of reason, the existence of which he will not admit. He first makes the synthesis of apperception, or the direct recognition of the subject with its objects, the very corner stone of all knowledge—a function of reason that is neither found in his intuitive sensibility nor in his logical thought, but exists only in rational intuition; and then he forces us to admit that his faculty of judging, or his logic, has its ground in rational intuition, the primal significance of which he wholly neglects. He puts on his spectacles to look for his spectacles, and then declares that he can not find them or forgets them altogether.

The Faculty of Judgment Demands "Mother-wit."

There is perhaps no passage elsewhere that better illustrates how a man, bent upon pressing his "theory with vigor and rigor," and at the same time unintentionally admitting and using a principle that goes far beyond his theory, than that found in his Introduction to Book II. on the Analytic of Principles.

In "The Transcendental Faculty of Judgment in General," he tells us that "if the Understanding is the faculty of rules, the faculty of Judgment consists in performing the subsumption under these rules, that is, in determining whether anything falls under a given rule or not." And upon the quintessential character of this power to judge, he insists with perfect intelligence. "Though the Understanding," he continues, "may be improved and instructed by rules, the faculty of judgment is a special talent which can not be taught but must be practiced. This is what constitutes our so-called 'mother-wit' [Professor Huxley's 'mother-wit' or 'inborn capacity of genius' which throws out its happy anticipatory guesses about nature, and without which science could make no advance]; the absence of which can not be remedied by any schooling. For although the teacher may offer and, as it were, graft into a narrow understanding plenty of rules, borrowed from the experience of others, the faculty of using them rightly must belong to the pupil himself and without that talent no precept that may be given is free from abuse."

Unintelligent Learning.

He cites, for example, a physician, a judge, or a politician "who may carry in his head many beautiful pathological, judicial, or

political rules, nay, may be an accurate teacher of them and who yet, in the application of these rules, may commit many a blunder, either because he is deficient in judgment, though not in understanding, knowing the general in the abstract, but unable to determine whether a concrete case falls under it; or, it may be, because his judgment has not been sufficiently trained by examples and practical experience." So much weight does he lay on this distinction between the Understanding with its rules, and judgment with its 'mother-wit' that, in a note, he relieves himself of an apparent grudge, by making a thrust at some very unbearable persons whom he doubtless knew. "Deficiency in judgment," he says, "is really what we call stupidity and there is no remedy for that. An obtuse and narrow mind, deficient in nothing but a proper degree of understanding and correct concepts, may be improved by study, so far as to become even learned. But as even, then, there is often a deficiency of judgment, we often meet with very learned men who in handling their learning betray that original deficiency which can never be mended." We frequently find this combination of a learned understanding and a blind judgment illustrated in men who accept scientific advance, but do not see that it has entirely invalidated the traditional creeds which they so naively hold.

In effect, then, Kant is telling us that we may argue and split logic forever but never get any further on our way, unless we put into every act of judgment the power of intuition. The reader's "mother-wit" will at once enable him to see that Kant has really introduced here, as fundamentally vital, something in addition to the mere logic of the understanding, and without which logic is only a formal and valueless activity.

We shall allow him to retain the term, Understanding, for that rational faculty which has to do with the relational activities of logic, but from his own account, we will abolish the term *intuitive understanding*, as representing nothing possible or even desirable; and we shall employ the term *intuition* for that function of Reason which he unintentionally admits as absolutely necessary to make his logic of the Understanding possible, and which is the fundamental organon of all our knowing.

If Kant asked himself: How is rational experience possible? and answered by saying: Through the *a priori* intuitions of pure Sense (*Æsthetic*), and the *a priori* categories and principles of the pure

Understanding (Logic), we must ask: How is the Æsthetic, how is the Logic Possible? and how, in general, was the production of the "Critique of the Pure Reason" possible? and the only answer we can find, an answer enforced upon us, is: Through the *a priori* intuition of the Pure Reason itself. Hence, if we are to have any true doctrine of knowledge, we must build it up from the foundation. We can not, therefore, begin with Locke's sense perceptions, for that is to set our structure on its head—Kant has made that clear enough to us; nor can we stop with Kant's undeduced and unjustified logical categories, for that is to lay our structure on its side—a much safer position than the first and satisfactory, if Kant himself had not proved it to be unsatisfactory by showing the necessity of something more; but we must squarely found it upon its true base in rational intuition.

Kant's Nescience and Fichte's Subjectivism.

We can easily understand why Kant concluded that the subject can not know its object. It was because he would admit sense intuition and the relational activities of logic as our *only* source and means of knowledge, and did not recognize the indisputable and sacred rights of rational intuition, upon which both sense and logic ultimately rest.

In like manner, it was because Fichte did not recognize the indisputable and sacred rights of this intuitive act, that he denied the object altogether. The difference between the two was that while Kant was right, but inconsistent, in clinging to the object as real, though unknowable; Fichte was wrong, but consistent, in discarding the object as unreal, though knowable. Both were wrong in denying the fundamental fact of rational intuition.

But suppose, after all, that Kant was right in saying that we can never know the object, because reason has no power of intuition other than sense, then Fichte was right in rejecting the real object altogether, because sense intuition gives us only subjective modifications of our own consciousness.

Intuition Guarantees the Object.

On the other hand, suppose we do persist in clinging, with Kant, to the existence of the real object, what justification have we in doing so? Simply the authority of rational intuition, in virtue of which the subject declares its object to be other than itself. So that, although all

knowledge is necessarily subjective, that is, must take on the forms which the interpreting, rational subject gives it, it is not *only* subjective, as Fichte would maintain; simply because the rational subject, by a direct and immediate act of intuition, declares the object to be other than itself, and that therefore the knowledge of it comes from another source than itself.

There is then no other ground and guarantee whatsoever that the real object exists, except that which is to be found in rational intuition, involved in the original synthesis of apperception. Not even a divine revelation could make us more certain of objective reality, for such a revelation would have to take on the form of the subject's interpretative capacity and thus fall under the same doubt as all other knowledge, unless the subject, by rational intuition, could declare it to be objective and coming from another source than itself.

But perhaps the reader may insist: Do not our senses clearly testify that objects are out there in space? They assuredly do, but not in virtue of any power possessed by the mere senses. For the senses, as such, only give us a chaos of passing perceptions which are only modifications, in our own consciousness, and if they only remained such, we should never get the notion of an object at all. It was this consideration that led Fichte to assert for the subject the necessity of setting up its own object. And this position at bottom is true; not, however, in the sense that the subject *sets up its own object*, but in the sense that it *directly declares*, in virtue of rational intuition, *the object to be*. But if the subject does so much, why is not Fichte right after all, in saying that there is no object, except such as the subject makes for itself? The only answer again is to be found in rational intuition, which is the ultimate authority in all our knowledge. There is no appeal beyond. If we can not depend upon *it*, we can depend upon nothing we claim to know. If I can be certain that the grass is green and the sky is blue, by looking at them with my senses, then I can be certain that the greenness of the grass and the blueness of the sky comes from an other source than myself, or from a real object, because I directly see it by rational intuition; and if I can not be certain of thus *rationally seeing* the object, then I can not be certain of *sensuously seeing* the green grass and the blue sky; and all knowledge—even Kant's phenomenal knowledge—is an utter impossibility. This is the fundamental truth in the so-called common-sense philosophy, viz.: that our cer-

tainty of the object is in directly seeing it. The mistake in common-sense philosophy is in supposing that it is *sense* that gives us this knowledge and certainty, whereas it is *rational intuition*, possessed alike by the child or savage, as well as by the mature man, or the most enlightened philosopher.

Therefore, if we are to have any object at all, to begin with, and if we are to have any trustworthy power of knowing and interpreting it, we must take our start from rational intuition. We thus, at last, reach a final Court of Appeal, before which the categories of the Understanding—and indeed also the *a priori* sense intuitions of space and time—must be brought to show their credentials and prove their divine rights, as free citizens in the realm of mind.

Emergence of the Categories. Relation.

If then we would look for the ultimate ground of all rational principles in the mind, employed in constructing our knowledge of the object, we must go back to this original act of intuition, at the very beginning of all knowledge, in the synthesis of apperception.

With the emergence of the self-conscious subject, amid its objects, there necessarily arises the first and most general of all the categories, that of Relation, by virtue of which all specific relations become possible. Related to the object, which is related to it, the subject is at once enabled to recognize the inter-relations among all things.

But the general category of Relation is purely formal and has no interpretative value in itself, until it takes specific forms. While it makes all judgments possible, and so is preeminently the category of logic as such, it is always necessary, if we would have knowledge, to know what *definite* relation exists, that is, we must settle such questions as to whether an attribute results from a cause, or inheres in a substance; whether an effect inheres in a substance or results from a cause; whether things are alike or unlike, and so on.

That such relations are known by rational intuition and not from perception, we may assure ourselves by considering the psychology of the animal. While the animal sees objects and events, he does not see them as substances and causes, with their attributes and effects. While he sees like and unlike things, he does not see *that* they are like and unlike. He does not at all see the relation among things because, while he possesses sense perception and an associational logic, he has

not the power of intuition to see himself as a rational subject with his objects.

With the rational self-conscious subject, however, relation among things and events is at once seen to exist. Indeed, he first clearly becomes aware of relation among his own inner capacities of knowing, feeling, and willing. The object stands in relation to him not only as something *known*, but also as something *felt* and *reacted upon*. It is in this inter-relation of knowing, feeling, and willing, within the rational subject, that the category of Relation reveals its highest meaning as Unity, or as a One which is such, because the Diverse and the Many form a harmonious Totality.

Substance, Cause, Unity.

But while Unity is thus the highest expression of Relation, it is not the mere category of Relation that effectuates the Unity. To understand how it is that the Diverse and the Many come into such relations as to form a harmonious Totality, we must go back to the original, underived, self-conscious, thinking, feeling, and willing self.

When we were discussing the problem of substance, we found that it must be the immovable something of Aristotle, or the changeless substratum of all things, which is not a predicate of anything else, but of which all else is predicated; it must be the subject of all modifications and forms, of all attributes and qualities, while at the same time, remaining identical, as the objective, one being. When it came to cause, we found that it must be Aristotle's mover of all things, providing the efficient force, the formal direction, and the one rational end to be attained. As sufficient ground for all change, all inter-action, all becoming, it must, in itself, necessarily be the one, changeless order of things. But, as such, we saw how it becomes just what we are looking for in substance which, while immovable, is nevertheless, as something undergoing manifold and diverse modifications and forms, at the same time, the mover of all things. Our difficulty, it will be remembered, was to find in either matter or motion, or in both, regarded as substance and cause, an objective reality which satisfied our demand for something that is at once changeless and changing, which we must have if we would conceive the unity of substance and cause (p. 206.)

We have now reached a point where we can not only see such a unity, but also see why reason demands in the object the same sort of

substantial causal unity. The knowing, willing, and feeling subject, by direct rational intuition, sees itself as such a unity, and, therefore, necessarily interprets the object, with which it comes into rational relations, as such a unity. In other words, the object can not be revealed to the subject, as being anything else than a substantial causal unity, because the subject itself is a substantial causal unity.

The Rational Subject as a Substantial Causal Unity.

The rational subject, now boy, now man; now prince, now pauper; now sinner, now saint; through all differences of being and changes of becoming, is always the same, self-identical ego. Carry the imagination back into the past or forward into the future, and extend conscious experience throughout all space—the self remains one and the same, no matter how vast, how varied and changing the manifold of thought, feeling, and will may be. How infinite in their variety soever the number of perceptions, ideas, reasonings, intuitions, they all come back in the end to the one, substantial, thinking subject of which they are forms and modifications. How eternal, in their perpetual change, soever may be the impulses, activities, volitions, purposes, they all come back in the end to the same causal, willing subject. And how infinite and eternal, in their variety and change, soever may be the sensations, emotions, and felicities, they all come back in the end to the one reality of the feeling self, by virtue of which capacity to feel, the final harmonious unity of all things is immediately recognized.

Here is the ultimate deduction of the fundamental, all-inclusive categories of Reason viz.: Substance, Cause, and Unity. Substance is the one, ever-existent, changeless substratum of the self, as Thought. Cause is the one, ever-active energy of the self, as Will. Unity is the ultimate intuition of harmonious relations, centered in the self, as Feeling. It is thus in the *feeling* of Unity that the great formal category of Relation comes to its highest and final concrete expression. For it is in virtue of feeling that the Diverse and the Many can be finally recognized as the harmonious inter-relation of objects and events in Unity.

The Function of Feeling.

Perhaps it may be objected that altogether too much importance is thus given to feeling which, as the most subjective, evanescent, in-

definite, and unstable of our original, rational capacities, is the least worthy to be considered as the ground for so all-important a category as Unity. Is it not, it will be asked, the supreme prerogative of the theoretical reason to reason its way out to Unity? Or is it not the supreme function of the ethical reason to pursue its one, definite end? Yes, it must be replied, provided first we *feel* that rational unity, or estimate in terms of *feeling* the value of that purposed end. It will be remembered how all logical incoherence is announced by a *feeling* of disturbance, and how all logical coherence is announced by a *feeling* of satisfaction; and how ethical ill-will and good-will reveal themselves in the *feelings* of pain and pleasure. (pp. 72, 76, 99.)

If we look deeply enough, we shall see that what we mean by the great word Beauty, the objective reality of which always gives us Happiness, is simply a *felt*, rational coherence in our thought, and a *felt*, harmonious inter-play of volitions in our will. Indeed, we may say that the fundamental intuition, or category of Reality, as distinguished from either appearance or illusion, rests upon feeling. Real knowledge is coherent thought. Incoherent thought is only apparent or altogether illusory knowledge, that is, only phenomenal or entirely false. In like manner, real goodness is harmonious will. Inharmonious will is only apparent or altogether illusory goodness, that is, either only the goodness of justice or wholly egoistic. And that feeling should play such a leading role is not strange, for feeling is the very life of Reason. Without it, there would be no reason in thinking or willing anything.

*Substance, Cause, and Unity Based upon Knowing,
Willing, and Feeling.*

But we should fall into the grave fallacy of tribalism, if we supposed, therefore, that feeling takes precedence in any way of thought and will; for Reason in its totality, is the ever-existent, indissoluble unity of thought, will, and feeling. In asserting the unity, we do not confuse, but distinguish, the trinity; as in distinguishing the trinity, we do not deny, but establish, the unity.

Therefore, when we say that feeling is the life of Reason, we mean that, as the arbiter of values, it gives meaning to life; but it gives values to *known* things, the highest values of which come to be *felt* in *willing* to share them with others.

We have reached, then, the fundamental ground of Reason, beyond

which it is impossible to go, when we say that the self-identical *thinking* subject is the one, changeless *substance*; that the self-identical *willing* subject is the one, ever-changing *cause*; and that the self-identical *feeling* subject is the one, individual changeless, ever-changing *unity of reality*. So that the great, all-inclusive categories, by which alone we can interpret the object before us are but the threefold capacities of the rationally organic individual who, through them, expresses his own inner nature.

It is for this reason and this alone that, looking out upon the passing manifold of sense, the rational subject sees behind it some homogeneous matter, as the substance in which all attributes and qualities inhere, and out of which all things are made; sees back of it some homogeneous motion, as the cause out of which rise all modes of activity and divers effects; sees the necessity for some harmoniously inter-related and inter-active order, which binds all together in a total unity of things.

We shall see how it is for the same reason, that the self-identical, rational subject, recognizing itself as lifted above the sensible into the intelligible, supra-natural, rational order, and moving forever in the realm of the infinite, the eternal, and the absolute, can not find, in matter and motion and their conditioned logical coherence, the Substance, Cause, and Unity it seeks, but beholds them alone in the self-subsistent, self-sustaining, and underived Infinity and Eternity of Absolute Mind; because the unchanging oneness of Substance and the changing manifoldness of Cause alone come to unity in the unity of the knowing, willing, and feeling subject.

Derived Categories.

Now, it is out of these original, concrete categories of Substance, Cause, and Unity which are direct, intuitional expressions of the self-identical knowing, willing, and feeling subject—taken together with the formal category of Relation, which has its origin in the intuitive comperception of subject and object—that all other categories arise.

Totality, as a mere Aggregate or Sum, has its origin in Substance and Cause which, purely as such, constitute the all of things, static and dynamic—the Infinite, Eternal, all-inclusive Something. Partiality necessarily reveals itself in the elements of the Total, and represents a Limitation, as related to the whole. The allied categories of Number and Quantity have their origin in the subject's immediate

recognition of its otherness from the object, and of its own threefold capacity; and express (1) simple Oneness (not conceptual unity, but mere *quantitas*) and (2) Plurality (the addition of ones in a *quantum*, sum or aggregate) which may ultimately attain (3) Totality.

In the addition of ones in an aggregate or *quantum*, there is necessarily involved the Homogeneous or Similar, both in quality and quantity—quality standing for the same kind of thing and quantity for the same amount of thing. In the various specific aggregates or quanta, thus secured by the addition of similars, there comes to light the Heterogeneous or Dissimilar, either in quality or quantity, or both.

Principles of Existence, Excluded Middle, and Sufficient Reason.

The category of Homogeneity or Similarity has its ground in Substance, as the same, unchanging identity. And upon it rests the great logical principles of *existence*, and of *excluded middle*: What is, is what it is; and What is can not both be and not be.

But what is actually undergoes change, shows difference, because objective existence is not only Substance but Cause (will as well as thought), by virtue of which what is becomes other than it was; and we have the category of Heterogeneity or Dissimilarity. And out of this rises the great principle of *sufficient reason*, both as formal and real. When we see change, difference, dissimilarity, reason demands both *how* and *why* what is becomes other than it was.

The Absolute and the Relative.

The principles of existence and excluded middle are never absolutely but only relatively denied by the appearance of change; for the principle of sufficient reason shows how and why all things are only relatively the same because they are absolutely different. Two peas in a pod are relatively alike in size and shape, but absolutely unlike in place and time (the difference of time in cognizing them). In like manner, it shows how and why all things are only absolutely the same because they are relatively different; as the same two peas are absolutely alike, in being modifications of the *same* substance, but relatively unlike in being *modifications*.

Thus all things in the Cosmos are absolutely alike or homogeneous, in being elements of the One Absolute Substance and Cause, and

relatively heterogeneous, in being distinct, individual forms and modes of that same One Absolute Substance and Cause. And of the One, Absolute Cosmic Individual we can say that it is only relatively the same, in so far as it manifests itself not only in its absoluteness but also in its infinitely and eternally varied forms and modes. And of these forms and modes, we can say that they are absolutely unlike, in so far as they are established, by their differences, as distinct individualities in the Absolute.

We often boggle over the Absolute and Relative, as if they both did not have a place in Reality, or did not together constitute Reality—much as we do over the One and the Many. The Absolute exists as the ground of the Relative, and the Relative exists as the manifestation of the Absolute; just as the One exists as the Totality of the Many, and the Many exists as the constituent elements of the One. The One Absolute would remain a non-existent unknown, without its manifestations in the Many Relative. And the Many Relative would be meaningless, even when known, and could not be known as many and relative, without a knowledge of the One and Absolute.

Meaning of Reality.

But we must now turn back to Totality as being something more than a mere Aggregate or Sum of inter-related elements. As already indicated, it reveals itself also, on the basis of the knowing, willing, and feeling subject, as Unity. And, in this sense, it stands for Reality, which is the declaration of objective existence as Substance and Cause in Unity. Substance which does not manifest itself in its modifications, as attributes and qualities, and thus reveal itself as Cause, does not come into existence even as appearance, to say nothing of manifesting itself as Reality. Cause which is not the activity of Substance, or as a Something acting, has no meaning. That is, in general, if Substance is not a Cause, and Cause is not a Substance, they are non-real and illusory. And this is so, for our knowledge, because the knowing subject immediately recognizes its own reality as the unity of a substantial causal existence

Unconditioned Reality, the Absolute.

But Reality has two phases as the Unity of Substance and Cause, represented in the Unconditioned Absolute, and in the Conditioned Relative.

As the unconditioned, Reality, viewed merely as substance, is the Totality of being; and viewed merely as cause, is the Necessity of becoming. For there can be nothing beyond it, since it includes all; and since it is self-existent, it can not not-be, as the necessary cause of all manifestations. Thus as Totality and Necessity in Unity, Reality is the Absolute One, or the Absolute Individual.

Conditioned Reality, the Relative.

Viewed in its conditioned aspects, Reality comes under the categories of Partiality and of Contingency, as something not self-existent and self-sustaining, but as related to and dependent upon the Totality of Substance and the Necessity of Cause. That is, an attribute or quality is real if it can be carried back to real Substance, and an effect is real if it can be carried back to real Cause. Its reality as something partial and contingent lies in its true relation to the total and necessary Substantial Causal Unity. If an attribute or effect falls outside this relation, then it is a mere, chance existence, or an accidental happening, and is an illusion, representing only subjective ignorance of the Unity of Substance and Cause (*in mundo non datur casus*).

That conditioned Reality is contingent upon Absolute Reality, does not destroy freedom in the self-conscious, rational subject, who directly intuits himself as dependent upon the Absolute, but establishes it; for the Totality and Necessity of Substance and Cause, as Reality, is revealed in his own rational nature, as alone the self-existent, self-sustaining, and self-sufficient, or free.

Reality, as partial and contingent, is manifested in conditioned forms and modes. Form is Attribute, Quality, (Quantity as extensive) of Substance. Mode is Effect, Quality, (Quantity as intensive or as degree) of Cause. Taken absolutely, Reality is the Infinite (total) Form of Substance, and the Eternal (necessary) Mode of Cause in their Unity, which is revealed in the manifold of partial and contingent attributes and effects.

It is not difficult to see how these determinations are carried back to and rest upon the reality of the self-conscious subject, as a three-fold knowing, willing, and feeling reason. Knowing, willing, and feeling are not attributes and effects of reason, but the underived, self-existent substance of thought and the underived, self-sustaining causality of will, in the unity of an all-inclusive, self-sufficient feeling.

But thought takes on innumerable forms which may be called the properties (attributes) of thought; and will manifests itself in innumerable modes which we call effects; while feeling, in all the varieties of sensation and emotion, evaluates innumerable, conditioned unities within the one Absolute Coherence or Harmony of Reason.

The Real and the Unreal.

Therefore it is that, in so far as a quality reveals the objective reality of substance, it is real and gives us knowledge of the object; so far as it does not reveal the real substance, it is illusion, does not give us knowledge of the object, and has subjective existence only. Recognizing its mere subjectivity, we are no longer deceived and the illusion disappears. Thus, if I take the sensible qualities of an object to reveal the existence of a real, sensible substance such as extended matter, I suffer from a subjective illusion; for I do not know, and have no means of knowing, such a real extended matter, as a real objective substance. But when I immediately recognize, in rational thought, the real substance to which is carried back all sense qualities, the illusion disappears.

In like manner, it is that so far as an effect is traced back to its objective cause or, in other words, its place is found in the whole chain of causation, it is real. So far as it is not thus related, it is a subjective illusion. Thus, if I explain the siphon by saying that its action is due to nature's abhorrence of a vacuum, I am deceived. When I learn that it is due to atmospheric pressure, my knowledge of objective causes becomes veridical. Thus also, if I find gravitation to be a cause, accounting for the atmospheric pressure, as an effect, I am further instructed. But if I assign gravitation, as an effect, to the bombardment of ether atoms, or to some mysterious power of motion in a hypothetical matter, as cause, I have entered the realm of all possible illusions, for the only real cause I immediately know is rational will.

We commonly speak of the quality of a thing as inhering in the thing, as an underlying substance, or of the effect as following the cause; as if quality and substance, or effect and cause were two different things. This view is right so far as the quality is not the whole of the substance, or the effect the whole of the cause; but more properly, the quality is a form and the effect is a mode in which the substance and cause, to that extent, reveal themselves to be what they

are. For example, when we say that color, odor, taste, and so on inhere in the apple, it must not be supposed that the color, odor, taste, are one thing, viz.: the qualities, and the apple another, viz.: the substance. For the concrete qualities *constitute* the concrete apple. They *are* the apple and manifest its substance as an apple to our various faculties of sense perception. Nor must we fall into the error of supposing the apple to be simply an *aggregated group* of qualities. The apple is *that particular, concrete grouping of qualities*, revealing a substantial unity. When by chemical analysis in digestion, that particular grouping of qualities is dissipated, the apple as such disappears, a fact which simply means that the original substance takes on different forms or qualities.

Or, if the apple is regarded as an effect produced by the tree as cause, it is not one thing and the tree another. The tree is manifesting itself in a specific mode of activity.

Thus the relation between a quality and its substance, and between an effect and its cause is always an intimate and indissoluble one, leading in the end to that supreme, real relation of a total unity of substance and cause, in which are included all forms and modes as its manifestations.

Therefore, the various forms which Substance takes on, in its manifested qualities, we may call substances, but only substances *in part*, because they are always related to the one, total, real Substance. If we regard them as real, we fall into illusion. I may name snow, ice, rain, vapor, dew, substances, if I recognize that they are only conditioned forms of the real substance, water. Or, I may regard water, earth, air, and ether as substances only in so far, however, as they are conditioned forms of the one changeless, absolute, real Substance.

And so the various modes which Cause manifests, we may call causes, but only *contingent* causes, because they are always conditioned by and related to the one, necessary, real Cause. But if we regard them as real in any other sense, we fall into illusion.

Nothing is real which can not thus establish its relation to the Absolute Unity of Substance and Cause.

The Phenomenal and the Contingent.

It is in view of these considerations that we can understand the meaning of the phenomenal, as distinguished from partial and contingent reality. The phenomenal is the conditioned form and mode

of Reality, as perceived in space and time, under the limitations of sense. While the partial and contingent are not necessarily phenomenal, because they are not necessarily seen in space and time, under the limitations of sense; the phenomenal is necessarily partial and contingent. The oversight of this fact is always leading us into various illusions; for the first instinct of our theoretical reason is to take the objects of sense as real in themselves, whereas their only reality is in being the conditioned, manifold forms and modes, in space and time, under the limitations of sense, of the One Absolute, Infinite and Eternal Reality.

When we give to sense objects this latter meaning, then they become real, but real only as phenomena. That is, so long as we regard the phenomenal world as truly real, it is an illusion, and the source of all illusions; the moment, however, we recognize it for what it is, a conditioned manifestation of Reality to sense, in space and time, and thus find its ground in Reality, it becomes real and the illusion disappears.

Pure Illusion.

But when we do not know the phenomenal world, even taken as a phenomenal world, we fall into illusions pure and simple, which can not be removed by finding their ground in Reality, but which must be utterly destroyed.

Thus I partake of a dream banquet, but on waking find it to have been a pure or absolute illusion, for I still hunger for *real* food, which I find in the *real* world about me. But now I wake again to find my *real* banquet an illusion, for I still hunger for Real food. I had fallen into the illusion of taking the phenomenal for the real, and consequently found no satisfaction for a hunger that can alone be stilled by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God. That is, when men seek the reality of substance, they do not find it in dreams, and they do not find it even in real phenomena as such, but only in the objective Truth, to which all real phenomena must be related, if they are to have any meaning and value.

So also if I regard the cause of certain mental diseases as the indwelling of concrete spirits of evil, from some subterranean inferno, I cherish a pure illusion, because I have misinterpreted the real phenomenal world. This illusion I destroy by learning the cause of the disease to be some disorder in the nervous organism of the patient.

But while I have thus reached the real phenomenal cause of the disease, I still suffer from illusion, if I take it to be the *real* cause, which I can not find until I get back of the phenomenal into the regions of Reality, already dimly suggested by the original illusion of indwelling evil spirits; that is, in the regions of Will, the perversions of which are manifested in the phenomenal cause—the real phenomenal *cause* itself thus being an *effect* of something beyond.

Necessary Distinctions.

So that we have certain distinctions concerning Reality that must be kept clearly in mind. First, we have Unconditioned Reality, in the Unity of its Totality and Necessity, as distinguished from conditioned Reality, in its Partiality and Contingency; or, in other words, Substance and Cause in their Absolute Unity, as distinguished from those conditioned forms and modes whose only reality lies in their relation to the Absolute Unity.

Secondly, we have Reality both unconditioned and conditioned, as distinguished from the phenomenal, which is the manifestation of Reality to sense, under the limitations of space and time. Or, we may say, that our sense knowledge is the appearance of Reality to us, as conditioned and constituted by the limitations of space and time.

Thirdly, in our knowledge of the phenomenal world, we have to distinguish between that which is the real and that which is illusion, absolute or relative. We must regard the phenomenal as real, so long as it is recognized as a manifestation of Reality to sense, under the limitations of space and time; but we must regard it as illusion, when taken to be real in itself—relative illusion, if known in its objectivity, but absolute illusion, when our knowledge of it is merely subjective and so corresponds to nothing in the true, objective phenomenal order. It is evident that we can never be free from illusion, until we carry back the whole phenomenal world to view its meaning and value in the light of Absolute Reality, upon which it rests, and of which it is a spatial and temporal manifestation.

As knowledge may be that of Reality as Absolute, of Reality as Relative, of Reality as phenomenal (the world in space and time) and of Illusion, absolute or relative, we have the categorical determinations of Limitation, Negation, and Actuality.

Limitation is seen in the conditioned, partial forms of Substance,

and in the conditioned, contingent modes of Cause, which, as determinations, may also be brought under the category of Negation—but Negation as relative, for the denial does not abolish but simply determines what is defined, limited, or negated.

Negation, as Non-existence, is absolute, and applies to all illusions which have no ground in Reality. All illusions have some sort of *occasion* in Reality, that is, dreams, hallucinations, fancies, errors, volitional perversities are occasioned by something objectively real, but they do not correspond to the Real Object, and so are absolute negations of Reality.

Actuality expresses a relation to the real and to the phenomenal. The real is always actual, but the actual is not always real, absolutely, relatively, or phenomenally. That is, every experience is actual, but it may be the pure illusion of dreams, or the relative illusion of taking phenomena for Reality. Thus Actuality may stand for the highest and lowest possible degrees of existence in consciousness, that is, either as Objective Reality, or as mere subjective illusion.

Not a Complete Table of the Categories.

There is no intention here of presenting a complete table of the categories—that would require a volume—but simply of indicating how it is, first, that rational intuition, in self-consciousness, reveals the object as existent, and is the ultimate function of all knowing; secondly, that the inner rational principles, which make all coherent knowledge of the object possible, rise out of the synthetical unity of the knowing, willing, and feeling self; and, thirdly, that all these principles are immediate rational intuitions, having no other source than the substantial, causal unity of the subject.

Kant proved the first, though he neglected to recognize that he had revealed thereby rational intuition to be the supreme and ultimate function of Reason. He failed to recognize adequately the second and third, because he regarded the categories as functions of logical judgment, whereas logical judgment is a function of them; while they are functions of rational intuition, or are themselves direct intuitions of Reason. Had he not been inconsistent, or had he been faithful to his intention of restricting our knowledge to sense data and the discursive activities of the logical understanding, he would not have been able to show how we get any knowledge at all. As it was, he inconsistently allowed rational intuition to play an important, if

not leading, role in the whole process, but very ungraciously permitted it to carry off none of the honors.

The process of knowledge is, therefore, not restricted to Kant's sense intuition (sensibility) and logic (thought); for it not only includes rational intuition, but rests upon it as the very ground of all knowing.

Kant Limits Intuition to Sense.

It must seem to be the height of presumption, if not, indeed, hazardous, to call in question so mighty an intelligence as that of Kant, did he not in a way justify us in doing so.

In discussing the manner in which Plato used the term *idea*, Kant makes the keen observation "that it is by no means unusual, in ordinary conversation as well as in written works, that by carefully comparing the thoughts uttered by an author on his own subject, we succeed in understanding him better than he understood himself, because he did not sufficiently define his concepts and thus not only spoke, but sometimes even thought, in opposition to his own intentions."* Kant himself did not sufficiently define his concept of intuition, or rather, he defined it too narrowly, while practically using it all the time in a larger meaning, and consequently very often spoke in opposition to his own intention.

His intention was to inclose our knowledge within the limits of sense and logic; and he did not shrink from the consequences to which that restriction would condemn us. "This domain," he says, in one of those happy figures he knew so well how to employ, "is an island and inclosed by nature itself within limits that can never be changed. It is the country of truth (a very attractive name) but surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the true home of illusion, where many a fog-bank and ice, that soon melt away, tempt us to believe in new lands, while constantly deceiving the adventurous mariner with vain hopes and involving him in adventures which he can never bring to an end."†

We must share his desire to refuse the name of knowledge to all those imaginary dreams of a metaphysical world which would reveal to us how Reality looks in terms of sense. But we decline to

*Transcendental Dialectic, Bk. I. Of Ideas in General.

†Analytic of Principles. Cap. III. On the Ground of Distinction of all Subjects into Phenomena and Noumena.

admit that to the alternative of such "knowledge" of Reality and no knowledge at all, we are confined. For Kant himself, "in opposition to his own intention," reveals a rational intuition which not only makes possible the existence of the object and its logical rationalization, but declares Reality to be the ideal aim of all knowledge.

As wise as it may be to cultivate our island and search out its hid treasures, we shall still, like some ship-wrecked Crusoe, be fully aware that we are in exile, and with beating hearts shall daily scan the horizon for any sail that may bring us tidings of home or bear us thither. And if we do push out upon the deep, we shall not turn back because fog-banks and ice deceive us, for in coming to discover them to be illusions, we shall be only the more certain that the shores of Reality lie beyond.

Taking, then, the entire scope of the rational subject's ability to know the object, let us briefly examine the nature, the relations and the limits of the Perception of Sense, the Logic of the Understanding, and the Intuition of Reason.

CHAPTER VI.

PERCEPTION, LOGIC, AND INTUITION: SENSE, UNDERSTANDING, AND REASON.

To anticipate, we may say, in general, that *perception*, the function of Sense, is entirely confined to the world of space and time, which fact determines knowledge so gained as *phenomenal*; that *logic*, the function of the Understanding, is simply relational in the various processes of analysis and synthesis, which fact determines knowledge so gained as *formal*; and that *intuition*, the function of Reason, enters the field of the intelligible, which fact determines knowledge so gained as *real*.

Perception and intuition are alike in alone directly giving us objects to be known. They differ in that perception is limited to the sensible in space and time, that is, to the phenomenal; while intuition is free from such limitations in dealing with the spaceless and timeless intelligible, that is, with Reality. So that we may regard sense perception as a limited and specific form of rational intuition.

Since logic differs from both perception and intuition, in being relational and not cognitive in its activities, it is indirect or mediate in its processes, and formal in its results. That is, while it unfolds, widens, and deepens our knowledge and gives to it a coherent and definite form, it does not essentially add to it. It depends entirely upon both perception and intuition for its materials, and has its origin in, and is wholly guided by, intuition.

Since, therefore, intuition is the ground of perception and the effectuating power of logic, it not only enables us to *see that* the object is and *understand how* the object is, but also, within its own limits, *know what* the object is, and *why* it is as it is; and thus covers the entire meaning of thought, as the supreme function of the theoretical reason.*

*It must be observed that the term, thought, is not restricted here to a mere, abstract, discursive, thinking; but comprehends intuition of the object, both sensuous and rational, as well as the formal and relational activities of logic. Thinking has meaning only, when it has the concrete objects of intuition to think about.

In dealing strictly with perception, as the avenue to a knowledge of the sensible object, we must rigorously confine its meaning to the impressions that come to us through the senses from the outer world. That those impressions come to us from the outer or objective world, is not a datum of *perception*, but of *intuition*. Confining perception to this meaning, we may say with Kant (and Aristotle) that "the senses never err, not because they always judge rightly, but because they do not judge at all. Truth, therefore, and error, and consequently illusory appearance also, as the cause of error, exist in our judgments only, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding."* Thus, dreams, the hallucinations of an inebriate, the visions of a prophet, are real data of sense perception. Do they or do they not correspond to actual objects, is a matter of logical judgment. The rising of the sun, the convergence of parallel lines at a distance, a staff bent in the pool, are real data of perception, and we should be greatly deceived if they appeared otherwise. Whether in the real object the sun rises, the lines converge, or the staff is bent, is a question for logic to answer. A wider knowledge of the laws of optics show us why the immovable sun, the parallel lines, and the straight staff must appear to rise, converge, and bend, and that our deception has been one of logical inference and not of sense perception.

The Work of Sense, Distinguished from That of Logic.

Perception, therefore, as the faculty of sense impressions, which pour constantly into the mind from every side, we distinguish clearly from perception, as popularly understood, which is supposed to give us the distinct objects of sense and their relations with which we deal in a more or less developed experience. All that perception, as such, gives me of that tree yonder is a complex group of separate sense impressions; as a clearly defined object of experience, which I name tree, it is a logical construct, guided by intuition.

We have seen (p. 51) how when man comes to self-consciousness, he is already possessed of a vast number of distinct sense objects which, because they have corresponding concepts in his mind, he can name and classify; and how that every one of these objects is not merely a single datum of sense but the complex result of a long logical process, carried on sub-consciously in the mind which has

* Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic.

grouped and built up, into what seems to be an immediately given simple object, various and distinct impressions of sense.

This, it will be remembered, is just what Kant showed us, in his *Transcendental Logic* (p. 243) where he traces out the sub-conscious growth of cognition, from the manifold of *apprehension* (sense perception), through the *synthesis of imagination* (associational logic), and of *apperception* (self-consciousness of rational intuition), to the consciously recognized objects of experience, an experience alone made possible, as he shows, by the presence of certain logical activities of the understanding, already in the mind; and by the presence, we must add, of intuition guiding those logical activities.

This work of the Pure (*a priori*) Understanding does not present us, Kant distinctly means, with the rational cosmos as it appears to the scientist or philosopher—that is the work of the Pure Reason, as distinguished from the Pure Understanding—but as it appears to the child or primitive man. The scientist or philosopher has *consciously* entered into the process of logically building up his own world *for himself*; but the child's or primitive man's world has been sub-consciously constructed *for him*, and *for all of us*, up to the point where we begin our reflective logic.

We must, therefore, always understand, when we speak of sense objects, even in their first and simplest forms as we know them in conscious experience, that they are not the gift of immediate perception, but the complex constructs, out of sense data, of indirect or mediate logical activities which, while wholly sub-conscious, have nevertheless done their work for us.

How the Senses Deceive Us.

We can now understand the meaning of the popular expression that our senses often deceive us. The objects of experience, constructed sub-consciously by the understanding out of immediate perceptions, are commonly taken to be *simply*, and *simple* objects of sense; so that, overlooking the logical elements at work in the entire process, we directly attribute our deceptions to sense, whereas they really have their origin in a half-conscious, naive logic. The deception is always removed by a larger experience and a more enlightened logic.

Even Touser who dropped his bone and so greedily sprang for the one reflected in the water, was not deceived by his senses as

furnishing immediate perceptions, but by his senses as presenting him with sub-conscious logical constructs. Because he has no rational intuition to guide and enlighten his logic, he will never learn, as we do, from the laws of optics why he was deceived and why the bone, although not in the water, must nevertheless always appear there to his senses; but his sub-conscious logic of association, at any rate, teaches him never to spring for the deceptive bone again, at the loss of something tangible in his jaws.

But even if we find sense perception to be entirely reliable, we are not much advanced in our knowledge of things, for the data of perception are quite chaotic and meaningless until logic gives them some form and significance.

The Work of Logic.

So then we must advance to inquire into the nature and work of logic in its dealing with the objects of our knowledge. If we find logic to be the source of many errors and deceptions, we must not grow impatient and condemn; but be fair-minded enough to recognize that logic in all its varied rational activities, in its comparings and classifying, its analyzing and groupings, has a tremendously complicated task, and may be charitably excused for its frequent derelictions.

It is when the sub-conscious logic emerges into self-conscious logic of the child or child-man, who seeks to explain and understand his surroundings, that we may speak of the beginnings of logic, as commonly understood. And here it becomes very plain that in his various judgments and inferences, the child or primitive man is deceived not in his perceptions, so much as in his logic. If he seems to us ignorant, superstitious and crude in his conclusions, it is not due to his *sense* of things but to his *logic* of things.

So much so is this the case that we may regard him—indeed the vast majority of men—as only half-consciously, naively, or instinctively logical. Logical he must be, for it lies in the very nature of his mind to be so, but he is hardly aware of what is going on within him; or even if he knows that he is trying to reason, his logic is very vague, incoherent, and imperfect.

But in time the naive process becomes aware of its own defects and develops into a serious reflection upon things and events when, we may say, science and philosophy properly speaking take their

rise. And yet, although man is now clearly conscious of being logical, of knowing what he is trying to do, it is still long before some Aristotle appears with his wonderfully exact and comprehensive doctrine of the *logic of reasoning*. And it is still longer before some Kant and Hegel appear, to show us the Logic of Reason.*

Three Stages of Logic.

Speaking generally, logic as a relational activity, covers a wide range which may be presented in three stages. It first reveals itself at work in the sub-conscious process of knowledge, even in the animal's mind, gathering up, classifying, and constructing perceptions of sense into clear, separate objects of experience. Then, in self-conscious man, it begins as a half-conscious, naive, or instinctive reasoning; and, finally, comes into fully conscious activity in the scientist or philosopher who, it is to be hoped, knows with a fair degree of clearness what he is about.

So that our logic is constantly serving us by first gathering up the separate and scattered perceptions of sense, arranging, relating, and grouping them into distinct objects; then it compares and classifies these objects and builds them up into a common-sense world, where everything is properly explained in some mythological way; and, finally, it completes its work by enlarging and clearing our common-sense world, until we are led to a grand scientific or philosophical view, in which all things are so related and inter-related as to form one harmonious, rational Cosmos, as the Absolute Individual Object of all our knowing.

While in this whole process, logic does not *see* but only *relates*, it nevertheless sharpens the sight, so to speak, and enlarges the range of vision. It enables us to see more and further, for it leads us to look for more and further as we proceed. Thus, for example, a good dog can *see* as much as a savage, but he does not, because the

* It may be of interest to note in passing that Kant found this fully conscious logic of reasoning, employed in our sciences and philosophies, which he attributed to the Pure Reason, as distinguished from the sub-conscious logic of the Pure Understanding, peculiarly subject to misleading and embarrassing illusions, which are impossible to banish because reason itself forces them upon us. We shall see when we come to consider intuition that, while the logic of reasoning, it is true, often confuses and misleads us, it does not belong to the Pure Reason but to the Pure Understanding; that the function of Pure Reason is intuition; and that because Kant did not recognize this he was always befuddling intuition and logic in the process of knowledge, by trying to make a logic without duly recognizing the part played by intuition.

naive logic of the savage has opened his eyes to a wider range of objects than is possible to the dog. The savage can *see* as much as a Humboldt, perhaps his eyes are actually keener, but he does not really see as much, because generations of reflective, logical activity have aroused Humboldt to look for innumerable things which the savage never dreamed of.

Analysis and Synthesis.

But let us ask: Just what is the relational activity of logic? We shall find it to be twofold, synthetical and analytical, that is, it puts things together and it takes them apart, with the sole purpose, all the time, of enabling us to get a clear and complete knowledge of the objects of experience in their true relations.

The supreme logical aim is always synthesis, which is an adding of one thing to another in such a way as finally to bring all things together into a comprehensive unity of harmonious relations. But analysis is just as necessary a taking things apart, in order to run down the separate objects to their last details, and thus come not only to know the objects to the bottom, but to see more clearly the relation of things in the final synthesis.

These two forms of logical activity, it will be seen, are the methods of *induction* (synthesis) and *deduction* (analysis) and are constantly and inseparably going on in the naive logic of the bushman as well as in the developed logic of the scientist. The scientist, as we have learned, has the advantage of consciously knowing the process, and can guide himself to much surer results than his humbler fellow logician.

Knowledge Begins with a Synthesis of Sense.

It has just been said that the *end* of logic is a synthesis. We must also say that the *beginning* of logic is a synthesis. For until something is put together, nothing can be taken apart. We can not analyze a purely simple thing. In fact, it is doubtful if we could ever come to know just a single thing.

But our actual experience provides generously for us by presenting us with a vast manifold of sense, at the very beginning of conscious life. Thus the infant has, at first, a vague indefinite world of perception, which is a mere composite blur or continuum of sense impressions. He can not be said to have knowledge, because he does

not yet know his world as an object. He is lost in it as in a boundless, unexplored, and unknown ocean of sense. This is what Kant meant by his *synthesis of apprehension*, and it is Hegel's *Being*, the vague and incoherent datum, of mere objective existence. But it is a good start, and indispensable as something given, to be known and understood.

Analysis Sets In.

Provided with this original synthesis of apprehension, the infant, or rather the mind at work in him, begins to analyze out of this general mass certain vague groups of perceptions, such as tactual and muscular impressions, sights and sounds; and then out of these groups, he disentangles distinctly particular sights, sounds, touches, and so on, which emerge one by one, and which he cognizes and recognizes as separate percepts.

Thus, he comes to distinguish the voice of his mother from that of a stranger, he gets to know the difference between the dog and the cat, or between his bottle and his toes. Once he did not know these differences, but ran them all together into one massive blur of perception. He has been making progress, however, by analyzing things, untying them one from the other, and setting them apart. The Germans have two very expressive words for this process, *los-loesen* and *aus-einander-setzen*, terms which explain themselves.

Synthesis Again.

This much done, Master Bounce can now begin a synthesis on his own account, always, however, under the sway of a sub-conscious logic. He now puts certain things together, or finds them always together in regularly fixed associations. His rubber ball always rolls and bounds in a most entertaining way, or he can count on his ivory rattle glinting and tinkling much to his satisfaction; the cat's frolics and her fur never fail to please his visual and prehensile senses, or as a matter of poetic justice, her sharp claws impress him with the first lessons of a deserved retribution—a great cosmic lesson which very weak and unwise parents often seek to destroy by punishing the cat and coddling the “kid.”

So it is that, in time, when our infantile logician, like some primitive Adam, has learned to give his objects names, he has analyzed out his vague, original impressions and then synthesized them into

distinct concepts, or separate objects of sense. Up to the point of forming these concepts, he has simply recapitulated the logical process in the general development of sentient life, which begins in the lowest forms with a pervasive sensibility to impressions, and then slowly differentiates into the separate organs of sense perception, capable of perceiving different things.

Once the child has come fully to self-consciousness and clearly distinguishes his objects from one another and from himself, he begins his naive logic; and then, if his development goes far enough, he enters upon his reflective logic in the attempt to understand himself and his objects as a synthetical whole. In either case, he continues the process begun sub-consciously, and even if he chooses learnedly to call it scientific or philosophical induction and deduction, it is in the end the same simple putting things together and taking them apart, in order to know more widely and deeply their inter-relations.

Synthesis and Analysis Illustrated.


Suppose we look for some simple illustration that may render more clear the nature of these two logical methods as means for increasing the extension and intension of our knowledge.

You assure me, for example, that the three internal angles of a triangle equal two right angles; and, in view of my doubt, you proceed to prove it to me by the inductive method of gradually putting together the simple things I already know and admit, until you bring me around to a point where I see what I did not know before.

Drawing a horizontal line, you erect an upright upon it and show me that two angles are thus formed at the point of meeting. If I admit that an angle is the amount of divergence between two lines, meeting at a given point, you wish to establish some quantitative expression for the two angles you have formed by the horizontal and upright lines. I am easily enough convinced that the two angles together occupy the whole angular space about the point of contact, on one side of the horizontal, for I can directly see that it is so. Then, to get convenient names of description you move the upright back or forth on the point of contact as pivot, until both angles are exactly equal. To move it either one way or the other would destroy the angular equality. It is exceedingly convenient and, indeed, indispensable, for further progress, to understand now,

once for all, that when an upright upon a horizontal thus exactly divides the angular space about the point of contact, it is to be called perpendicular, and the angles are to be called right angles. Let the angular divergence be less, and we have an acute or sharp angle; let it be more, and we have no obtuse or blunt angle.

Having determined these simple elements, the way is paved for comparing the three angles, within a triangle, with the two right angles, on one side of a straight line. You now construct a triangle with its base upon the horizontal, and adjoining the upright; and then move the upright so as to bring it exactly parallel with the



opposite side of the triangle. It becomes clear to me that, since the three angles BCA , ACD , and DCF , formed about the point C , comprise the entire angular space about C on the upper side of the line EF , they are equal to two right angles. Hence, if you can convince me that to them, the three angles, ABC , BAC , and ACB , within the triangle, are equal, you have proved to me the truth of your original proposition, that the sum of the angles in a triangle are equal to two right angles; for I can not dispute the axiom that two things, equal to the same thing, are equal to each other. You first point out that the angle ACB , is identical in both groups; and then, that the angles ABC and DCF are equal, because by construction you made CD diverge from the horizontal in exactly the same direction as does BA .

So that we have left only the angles, BAC and ACD , to compare. Are they equal or not? You show how it is that the line AC meets the line DC in exactly the same direction as it does the line BA , because DC and BA have, by construction, been made parallel; so that the angular divergence of the two sets of lines at the points C and A is exactly alike, and therefore the two angles are equal. The whole matter is then settled, for I have been led to see that the three angles within the triangle, ABC , are just equal to all the angles about the point C , which are equal to two right angles.

This childishly simple illustration shows the nature of an induction, or synthesis, by which single, direct perceptions are added one to another, and so brought into relation as to form a larger perception, which combines many particulars into a unity, and which is therefore no longer simply a perception but a concept, or rational object of thought. However complex and long continued may be the induction, it differs in no essential particular from the simple process just pointed out.

But once, by an inductive process, I have my synthesis, I may, by deduction, begin an analysis, in order to secure a further extension of my knowledge.

Suppose one of the angles of my triangle happens to be a right angle. Immediately I *deduce* the conclusion, from an axiom about equals taken from equals, that the other two angles must *together* equal *one* right angle. If now I am in a position to measure one of these angles, I again *deduce* the size of the other. And thus I have within my hands, as surveyor of the earth or the expanse of heaven, an instrument of the utmost practical importance; for keeping on with my inductions and deductions, I find the relations of the sides of the triangle to the angles and to each other, so that with the knowledge of only certain sides and angles, won by induction, I can deduce all the rest.

If the Solar System, with its petty ten or eleven billions of miles of diameter, were not so pitifully small, and I could construct a base line, say of some million billions of miles, I might be able to measure all the distances in the universe. I might know that far bourn whence Sirius pours his glowing light upon our earthly track, how remote the North Star guards his loneliness from the fellowship of the Southern Cross, and what the countless leagues over which belted Orion keeps his nightly watch.

All deductions, however complex and long continued, do not essentially differ from drawing conclusions out of the simple right angle triangle.

Suppose I have with Newton made a previous induction, from various scattered data, to the effect that all planets follow some elementary law of gravitation. Much to my disappointment, however, the planets show various deviations from what the law prescribes. One planet, especially, shows such startling vagaries as to reduce me to despair. But I am so enamored of my previous induction,

its simplicity, its rationality, that I am loath to give it up without a struggle. Therefore, firmly holding it to be true, what can I *deduce* from it, in view of the shamefully errant Uranus? For these perturbations, the inter-action, on the basis of the law, between the planet and the Sun does not account; but, once granting the law, they must be accounted for by the presence of such a mass, in such a place, and at such a time. Carrying out my deduction rigorously, I turn with the confidence of a prophet to the astronomer and say: Train your glass on that point of the heavens and you will discover a new world! This, as we know, is just what Adams and Leverrier, independently of each other, did, and thus added Neptune to our knowledge of the Solar System. In the same way, Lagrange and Laplace showed that the irregularities of the other planets perfectly fit into the one great law, and they did so by rigorous deduction from the law, held to be true.

In our more elaborate reasonings, these synthetical (inductive) and analytical (deductive) logical processes constantly inter-play in producing the result, but in every case it goes back in the end to a comparison of simple things and a bringing into relation what is given by direct perception and intuition.

A Natural but Unjustified Confusion.

A very natural confusion grew up in modern times concerning the relative merits of induction and deduction. Before the great scientific age men were too prone to trust almost entirely to deduction. They took for granted certain conclusions of the past—many of them drawn by careful but inadequate induction—and either rested content with such knowledge, or deduced further conclusions without questioning whether the original authorities were trustworthy. Or they took an easy and obvious theory about nature to stand for natural law. Thus it was a deep and long cherished conviction that all the heavenly bodies moved in circles, because the circle, being the most perfect figure, was alone such as the Creator would choose for the celestial orbits.

When, therefore, Copernicus confirmed an old and long forgotten guess that the planets moved around the sun, the natural conclusion was that they moved in circles. For a long time men clung to this idea and sought to deduce from it conclusions that would agree with the actual paths of the planets. It was not, however, until

they began to doubt the circle doctrine altogether and then patiently, by induction, to gather and place side by side the observed facts, that finally Kepler arrived at a new synthesis, viz.: that the planets move in ellipses.

So fruitful, in all branches of science, was this method of carefully observing and gathering the facts that men got to believe that the inductive method was a sort of scientific god, who reveals everything to man about nature. Everybody is familiar with the fame of Bacon as the founder of the Inductive Method in science, and it has been widely supposed that this method is the key to the mysteries and powers of the universe.

We have seen (p. 228) how Professor Huxley renounces this idea and points out that without some anticipatory guess, or hypothesis—which is purely a means for deduction—in his mind, by which the scientist can be deductively guided in his investigations, his inductions will prove to be futile wanderings, or not even begin at all. So that our modern science owes its success as much to deduction as to induction. In fact, it is idle to talk about the *relative merit* of an analytical and a synthetical process in reasoning, for they are both equally necessary, and are always inseparably playing back and forth in all our logical activities, from the simplest to the most complex and elaborate.

Intuition Enforces Its Demands.

But now, however indispensable the work of logic may be in the unfoldment of our minds to the increase of knowledge, Kant enters and forces upon us the most important and startling consideration, viz.: that logic never *sees* anything, but only relates. No matter how much we relate things, take them apart and put them together in every possible mode of comparison, it would avail nothing unless we could *see* the relations. Every logical relation is a judgment and a judgment always ends in *seeing* something unseen before, or else it is meaningless. It is the necessary "mother-wit" of Kant, or Huxley, that brings to completion the process. But this seeing, as we have learned, is not perception, for that only sees sense impressions. It is, in short, that highest and final seeing of all, by which we see all other seeing, viz.: *rational intuition*, upon which, we have been forced to conclude, the whole process of knowing rests. Our logic would be a helpless and futile activity without

intuition both to arouse and guide it on its way. The chaos of sense impressions, logic by synthesis and analysis and synthesis again, orders and constructs into clearly known objects. But logic in itself is utterly incapable of thus constructing objects for us, until intuition makes the construction possible, and then declares the objects to be, as objects of our knowledge.

But the reader may object. Do I not directly *see* with my *eyes* the upright line on the horizontal, and the angles formed with their relations to the triangle; and is it not logic that convinces me of the result finally reached? Yes, I see with my eyes upright and perpendicular lines and the angles and figures formed out of them. And so does my dog Rover. But he can not reason about them and draw logical conclusions, because he does not see what I see. He does not see that the lines are perpendicular or oblique, that the angles are right, obtuse, or acute, and that the angular space within the triangle is just equal to the angular space on one side of a straight line. And he can not draw these conclusions, because he does not possess what I do possess, a mind's eye. And without this, my own logical conclusions would be impossible; for, with every comparison, by which two things are related, there must be the mind's eye to see what that relation is. And this mind's eye is always rational intuition, which is the supreme organon of all knowledge, and is possible only to the self-conscious, rational subject who knows himself among his objects.

It matters not what may be the relations among things. Are they similar or dissimilar, one or many, do they constitute a sum or a unity, does a quality belong to a substance or an effect to a cause? No answer can be given without a direct, rational intuition. Logic, by its relational activities, can only serve the purpose of bringing the mind around to the point where it can finally *see*.

Indeed, the essential function of the analytico-synthetical activity of logic is that of a purposive relation to intuition. The supposition that logic is a sort of abstract, discursive process of pure thinking which, by its comparing and relating things, has the mysterious power of revealing to us the truth is entirely erroneous. For logic is both more and less than this. It is more, because it is a *willing* as well as a *thinking* process, or pursues a definite, rational purpose; and it is less, because it does not attain the truth but only leads to its attainment.

The purposive aim of logic is the understanding of the Idea which, in its lowest terms, is the rational coherence of the many in the one, and, in its highest form, is the concept as the unity of substance and cause. But this ideal or conceptual goal of logic is attained by rational intuition alone, which at the beginning arouses logic to its activity and gives to it its purpose.

The Categories as Intuitions Guide Logic.

Thus that things can be seen as similar, we have found, rests upon the categorical intuition of substantial sameness; that they can be seen as dissimilar, rests upon the categorical intuition of causal otherness; that a quality is the quality of a substance, and that an effect is the effect of a cause are direct, rational intuitions and nothing else; while knowledge begins and ends in the primary intuition of all, viz.: that by which the self-conscious subject sees itself in seeing its object, and seeing itself as a substantial, causal unity, is able to see its object, as a substantial, causal unity.

It is intuition which, in the parlance of Hegel, grasps or comprehends the Notion, by attaining to the final Affirmation or Ultimate Synthesis, when all relational antitheses and oppositions (on the plane of sense and logic) have been overcome and reduced to a harmonious unity. It is only here that Reason rises above the sensible into the intelligible, or passes beyond the phenomenal object, in the sense world of space and time, to behold the Reality of Spirit in its Infinity and Eternity.

Kant recognized this third stage also, as final in the knowing process, seen in the synthesis of apperception; by which the manifold of sense, logically constructed, is brought into the conceptual unity of the object. But not clearly distinguishing the all-important part which intuition plays, as distinguished from logic, he limited our knowledge to sense and logic, and so denied our power to *see* the real object, or to know the supersensible Reality back of all phenomena.

Kant's Regulative Ideas of Reason, Only Subjective.

Yet he saw clearly enough that Reason drives us to *think*, or *conceive*, such an objective reality, but struggled to show that we can not *know* it. In his Transcendental Dialectic, he points out that, while the logic of the Pure Understanding (always the sub-conscious

logic) gathers up the manifold of sense into the conditioned unity of *concepts* (that is, the clear sense objects of ordinary experience) by means of the judgment, the logic of the Pure Reason (by which he always means the ordinary conscious discursive logic) gathers up these concepts (of experience) into the unconditioned unity of *Ideas*, by means of the syllogism. And as there are three kinds of syllogism, (1) the *categorical*, having to do with "the relation of representations to the subject," (2) the *hypothetical*, having to do with "the relation to the manifold of the phenomenal object," and (3) the *disjunctive*, having to do with "the relation to all things in general," so there are three *ideas* of Reason, "the *first* containing the absolute (unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject* [the soul or real man]; the *second*, the absolute *unity of the series of conditions of phenomena* [the real world]; and *third*, the absolute *unity of the conditions of all objects of thought in general* [God]."*

But, while these three Ideas, the real man (soul), the real world, and God, which form, respectively, the subject matter of a Rational Psychology, a Rational Cosmology, and a Rational Theology, are forced upon us by Reason itself, as having objective reality; Kant, nevertheless, held them to have only subjective validity as ideas in our minds. Because, as he supposed, sense perception (sensitivity), which is our only means of seeing the object, can not give them; and logic (thought), our only rational function, which does not *see* but *relates*, can not construct them; while as for rational intuition, which could *see* supersensible objects, we do not possess.

To show how all attempts to assert—or deny—the objective reality of the ideas of the Pure Reason, drive us into necessary and perpetual contradictions, the great dialectician gives us his Paralogisms (insoluble illusions), having to do with arguments about the soul or real man; his Antinomies (contradictions), having to do with arguments about the real supersensible world; and his inadequate "proofs" of the existence of God, an idea which is the absolute *ideal* of Pure Reason.

In these paralogisms, antinomies, and inadequate proofs of God, Kant is really undertaking the impossible task of trying, on the one hand, to stretch the finite and temporal, sensibly phenomenal world so as to cover the infinite and eternal, intelligibly Real World; or, on the other hand, of squeezing down the infinite and eternal, intelli-

*Trans. Dia., Bk. I, System of Transcendental Ideas.

gibly real into terms of the finite and temporal, sensibly phenomenal. Of course, the attempt fails, because he is applying one set of ideas to another set of ideas which are qualitatively different.

But while his attempt proves what he was not then interested in proving, viz.: that sense and logic can not give us knowledge of the supersensible world; it does not prove what he was interested in proving, viz.: that we have no possible means of knowing that supersensible world. On the contrary, it only the more clearly brings to light that direct rational intuition of Reality, which is incapable of proof because it needs none. But if this highly significant result of the Dialectic was unintended by Kant, we must, at any rate, give him full credit for having adequately recognized that the *ideas* of the Pure Reason are the absolute regulative norms, by which the logic of the Understanding and the consequent knowledge of the phenomenal world are rendered possible.

The Integrity of Intuition is Final.

As already pointed out, we can and do as directly see Objective Reality, by rational intuition, as we see the green grass with our eyes. If not, no possible argument of logic can enable us to see the one any more than the other; nor could it in any way produce the *ideas* of objective Reality in the Pure Reason. Logic can render the indispensable service of putting together and taking apart, of shifting things into all sorts of relations, so that we can get larger and deeper views, but the views themselves are direct intuitions. And if the knowing subject can not see the real man, the real world, and God as *objective* realities, but only as *subjective* ideas, then he himself becomes the unconditioned Infinite and Eternal. But in that case, there would be no rational explanation of the subject's persistent assertion of an object.

Besides, if we question the reliability or, we might say, the moral integrity of the subject in declaring the object to be other than itself (not a *subjective object* of our own manufacture, which was the only one Kant claimed to know, but a *real object*) then we can not trust Reason with *any* of the distinctions which it asserts, subjective or objective; for all others rest upon this primal one of a subject that *is* a *subject*, and an object that *is* an *object*. The intuition of this real distinction has a certainty and immediacy that is final and absolute.

The fundamental character of intuition, therefore, is that of being the supreme and ultimate function of the theoretical Reason, by which the rational subject in seeing itself, sees its object; and in seeing *itself* as a substantial causal unity, sees the *object* as a substantial causal unity. And upon this primal act, the possibility of all sense perception of objects, and of all logic ultimately rests. Without intuition, we could have no rational knowledge at all, we could never have, to begin with, an object to know; and we could never understand the logical relations within that object by which it becomes a unitary, rational object for our thought.

Intuition Gives Certainty to All Knowledge.

How fundamental and absolutely necessary to rational knowledge intuition is may be seen in the simple fact that it alone gives certainty, and so meaning, to all knowledge whatsoever. We can not always delude ourselves with the pleasing illusion that we have knowledge or science when all we know is quality and effect of some indefinite and unknowable substance and cause. To know an appearance but not to know what it is an appearance of, is not knowledge worth speaking of. It does not at all satisfy the demands of Reason for knowledge. Our science with its whole phenomenal world, won from sense and logic, can at best, as we have had occasion to observe, only afford us better food, better raiment, better shelter, and better amusements. And not until science offers us knowledge of something *real*, will it be anything else but a purveyor of phantoms, as fleeting as the hours of the day, and wholly inadequate to satisfy the mind.

On the other hand, with a knowledge of Reality, effected alone by rational intuition, phenomena first gain their true meaning as manifestations of objective Truth; and the world of nature, with which science is dealing, now becomes, to the conditioned appreciations of sense and logic, the spatial and temporal revelation of God, upon whom man with absolute security ultimately rests.

Inadequate Knowledge Does not Mean No Knowledge.

It matters not how incomplete, confused, and inadequate our intuitions of Reality may be, we shall not permit ourselves to fall into the still more fatal confusion that our incomplete, confused, and inadequate knowledge is no knowledge at all. Even if we only see

men as trees walking, no one can persuade us that we see nothing but ideas in our own heads. However confusedly we see, we at any rate see that there are objects to be seen.

Indeed, even our pure illusions, such as dreams, which for a time are mistaken for phenomenal objects, have a sort of objective character; for if on waking, we find that they have no reality in themselves, we yet discover their substance and cause in the objects of real experience. And if we find that these "real" objects of waking experience are only phenomena and do not have reality in themselves, it is because we directly *see* that they must go back to a real substance and a real cause, whence they spring and upon which they depend. However much an enlarging experience and a logical discipline may correct and clear up our first confused intuitions of the object, the object is directly seen to be there, in virtue of the very nature of knowledge itself.

Thus it is that, by rational intuition, the child or the most primitive savage, as well as the wisest philosopher, directly sees himself as a unity of substance and cause, that is, as a real something which is permanent amid change, and which chooses ends; and, in the same rational act, and by virtue of it, sees as an object other than himself, the world, and, behind it as its cause, God. The crudity, imperfection, logical contradiction and confusion in man's conceptions of these realities, does not invalidate the fact of objective knowledge. All that is a matter for further experience and logical development. The simple question of fact is: Does he or does he not see them? And a universal experience answers that the self-conscious rational subject, however undeveloped and superstitious, or however developed and enlightened, always sees them as objective realities. This is the great truth in Descartes's innate ideas—not as clear and specific conceptions, but as the rational germs of clear and specific conceptions which rational intuition presents as objective realities.

The specific conceptions which any individual may have of himself, the world and God, depend entirely upon the stage of his own advancement, the range of his experience, the cogency of his reasoning, and the keenness of his intuitions; but, confused or clear, inadequate or adequate, he knows himself as a real subject, and the world and God as real objects; and he knows this neither by sense nor logic, but by a direct rational intuition which, as the first and last act of reason, is original, underived, and dependent upon nothing

but the Absolute; and sees what it sees in its own light. This is the most objective, solid, and universal of all facts, upon which all other facts depend, and from which they derive the only meaning they can have.

The Comprehensive Spirit of Philosophy.

If then we would form a true doctrine of knowledge, we must recognize the process of knowing in its entirety, as involving sense, logic, *and* intuition. Perception gives us the phenomenal aspects of the object, or the object as seen by sense, under the limitations of space and time. Logic relates those phenomenal aspects and constructs them into a rational order, or, in other words, rationalizes the world of sense. Intuition makes possible both the objects of sense and their logical rationalization, because it transcends perception and logic, by revealing the object in its noumenal aspects, above and beyond space and time; and carries us forward to the unconditioned and unlimited substantial causal ground of things. It thus lifts Reason to the intelligible world, which alone makes possible and gives meaning to the sensible world. Here is the realm of a true philosophy which, while it bases itself upon rational intuition, knows how to value the functions of sense and logic in the final maturity of self-realized Reason. The true philosopher can neither be a *dogmatic* idealist, nor a *dogmatic* empiricist, but must be both a *rational* idealist and a *rational* empiricist, or an Empirical Idealist.

Empiricism and Idealism.

Much of the dispute between empiricism and idealism has grown out of rational tribalism and immaturity. Empiricism, or the doctrine of experience, is wholly justified in asserting the value of knowledge, won from sense perception and logic, and in denying the claims of an idealism, or doctrine of ideas, that would win valid knowledge by simply trying to *think* its way to Reality. But it is wholly wrong in assuming or asserting that truth or the knowledge of reality, can be gained through sense and logic alone, or if not so gained, not to be gained at all; thus denying the legitimate claims of rational intuition with which a true idealism deals.

On the other hand, idealism is wholly right in denying the power of sense and logic, to which empiricism restricts itself, to attain reality; but wrong so far as it denies the value of sense and logic as a

discipline of unfoldment toward the intuition of reality, and restricts itself to the analysis of rational ideas alone.

But if sense, logic, and intuition are spoken of in succession, we are not to suppose that they follow a chronological order, except in the clearness with which they come into view in the slowly unfolding human consciousness. For they are simultaneous, even from the beginning of self-consciousness, constantly inter-acting in the unity of Reason. Sense may occupy the center of the field, but logic and intuition are at work in the background. Logic may absorb the attention, but intuition is guiding it on to its end. It is oversight of these three indissoluble functions of the theoretical reason that leads to many of our disputes and contradictions.

Coexistence and Inter-relation of Sense, Logic, and Intuition.

Logic rises above perception, but in doing so does not deny it. It widens, clears up and gives it order as coherent, rational experience. Intuition transcends logic, but in doing so does not abolish it. It guides, enlarges, deepens, and finally brings it to its goal, as affording the means of making possible a complete knowledge of the object in its reality. Perception sees the same objective world of nature as intuition, but sees it under the limitations and conditions of sense, or as a phenomenal world in space and time. Logic, as a mediating, relational activity, brings this conditioned sense intuition up into the light of an absolute rational intuition, by which the phenomenal order is transformed into the conditioned world of reality. Then intuition, including, transcending, and transforming sense and logic, beholds Absolute Reality as the One Infinite and Eternal Substance and Cause from which all things proceed.

In virtue of the inseparable unity of these three activities in Reason, we come to see unity in our knowledge of the entire object. Thus, in the realm of sense and logic, the realm of the sensible and conditioned, we are not dealing merely with phenomena as the only known and knowable objects to us, while an unknown and unknowable objective Reality lies beyond the reach of intelligence; but we are dealing with the manifestations of Reality. And so far as we know them as they are, Reality, through them, is being manifested to us; and, in thus manifesting Reality to us, the phenomenal first comes to have any value or possible meaning.

When Mr. Spencer calls that most certain of all things—"the

Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed"—the Unknowable, he is using a flat contradiction in terms. It would be more like an Unknowable if we knew certainly that all things do *not* proceed from it, and even then we should have to know a great deal about it to know that much. But, as it is, in so far as all things proceed from it, it makes itself known, to the extent of our knowing the proceeding things. If he means only that the conditioned and limited manifestations of the phenomenal world do not reveal *all* of Reality, or that we do not know *all* of Reality, he is simply using a common-place of thought, acknowledged in all times.

Necessity of Knowing Phenomena as They Are.

But if the phenomenal is a true though limited manifestation of the real, we must be very sure that we know that manifestation as it really is, and not as we suppose it to be. In other words, we must be sure of our sense and logic, else what little light we have will be darkness. We must not take the sun to be a chariot in which a god drives daily across the sky. We must not take the earth to be flat and the center of the universe. We must not regard our fellow men as the legitimate prey of our passions and greed. We must not account for disease by indwelling devils, or hold any of those errors that obscure the world of real phenomena. That is, before the phenomenal world of sense and logic can be for us a true manifestation of the real world of intuition, we must see it as it is, in its objective actuality, and not read into it our subjective errors which, while to us actual, are in fact mere subjective illusions.

Universal Acknowledgment of Sense, Logic, and Intuition.

Upon these conclusions we may rest with certainty, for they are not the private opinion or tribal teachings of any school, but the outcome of all thinking. Even Kant who denies intuition employs it throughout all his rational labors, and constantly forces it upon our attention. Had he recognized the full meaning and function of intuition, in the process of knowledge, it is perhaps not too much to say that his "Critique" would have been the greatest, most important, and most original philosophical work ever done by one man. As it was, he saw the central problem of modern thought to be the doctrine of knowledge; and so essential, penetrating and comprehensive was his criticism of the process of knowing that he became

the turning-point of our modern philosophical world. In him converge all preceding efforts, and from him diverge all succeeding tendencies. Such diverse minds as those of Hegel and Spencer can not be accounted for without him; and the various schools of theology which have desired to continue their life in the modern world, as well as the various doctrines of science have been profoundly affected by what he said. Men may live and act in the modern world, but they can not know it, without knowing Kant.

Well, this great speculative genius, though unintentionally, forces upon us the conclusion that no perception and logic alone can make our knowledge, even of the phenomenal world, possible, but that rational intuition is the light by which we see all things; first, by giving us the object to be known, in the synthesis of apperception; secondly, in making possible logical judgments; and, finally, in setting forth the ultimate, regulative norms or ideals of all thought.

Hegel intentionally shows us, in his logic of Reason, that the object must yield its secrets to thought, as our knowledge passes from the vague awareness of Being (manifold of sense perception) through the unfolding Essence of things (the scientific world of logical analysis and synthesis) to the fullness of the objective Concept or Notion which, as the Idea, is the Objective Reality of all things (known through rational intuition).

That the process of knowledge has this threefold nature was the conviction of three other great minds of our modern era who, because of their widely divergent character, are well worth quoting. They are Leibnitz, the German whose versatility and depth led Zeller, the historian of Greek Philosophy, to deem him the only modern worthy to be compared with Aristotle; Spinoza, the Spanish Jew who, as a pure rational philosopher after the Hellenic type, it is perhaps not too much to say, is the greatest mind Hebrew genius has produced, not even excepting Philo; and Balzac, the Frenchman who some regard, not without justification, as the greatest novelist of whom we have record.

Leibnitz's Doctrine of Progressive Knowledge.

In his famous paper entitled "Meditations Concerning Cognition, Truth, and Ideas," Leibnitz traces the process of knowledge, from the phenomenal to the real, in such a way that we may regard him as preparing the way for Hegel, and, by anticipation, of correcting

Kant. For while Kant considered our phenomenal knowledge as no knowledge of Reality at all, Leibnitz considered it as affording such knowledge, though very crude and confused.

Thus, according to Leibnitz, our cognition of the object of experience is first *obscure*, when we do not distinguish it from other objects or the objects around it. It is an objective *something*—not a mere nothing—but just what it is, as contrasted with other things, we do not know. This is Hegel's Being, which at the beginning is so obscure, considered as knowledge, that he considered it as amounting to no-Being. It is Kant's *synthesis of apprehension*. It is the condition of the infant's knowledge when his objective world is a vague mass of sense impressions.

Cognition becomes *clear* when we see the object *definitely* among other objects. Here we have the beginning of Hegel's Essence. It is also the outcome of Kant's *synthesis of the imagination*, merging into the *synthesis of apperception*. It is when the infant distinguishes one object from the other.

Again, *clear* cognition may be either *confused* or *distinct*. It is confused when we do not know the marks, characteristics, or properties that enable us to discriminate the object from others. This is the point of knowledge where the infant clearly knows the dog from the cat, but is confused about just what properties in the one or the other make it clear to him. His cognition, however, becomes *distinct*, when he knows the properties of each, when he can tell, that is, why the dog is not the cat—one has hair, the other fur; one barks and the other meows, and so on.

Further, *distinct* cognition may be *inadequate* or *adequate*. It is inadequate when the properties are not analyzed down to their simple elements and clearly distinguished one from the other. This is the stage at which the growing boy arrives when he is curious to know things, and it is the beginning of science. Cognition becomes *adequate* when science analyzes to the end the various properties or marks of an object. It may be disputed whether anyone has arrived at this complete knowledge. It is, however, the ideal of science; it is Hegel's fully developed Essence; and Kant's scientific physics, or knowledge of the phenomenal world, built up by the conscious logic of Pure Reason.

Finally, and here Leibnitz takes the step that shows the true connection between the phenomenal and the real, cognition is *sym-*

bolical or *intuitive*. Symbolical cognition is knowing the object on the outside, as it were, in its phenomenality. Intuitive cognition, on the other hand, is to know the object in its real inner nature. When cognition is *adequate* and *intuitive*, it is Perfect, and we have a Real Definition of the object, that is, a clear and direct vision of it in its reality. This is at last Hegel's Notion or Idea, reached as the terminus of knowledge, after the analytical and synthetical processes in the Essence have been completed; that is, it is the Final Affirmation or Ultimate Synthesis in which the Logic of the subjective Reason reflects the Logic of the objective Reality. It is also the stage where Kant reaches his subjective, regulative ideas of the Pure Reason, which, however, he will not allow us to regard as giving us knowledge of objective Truth.

Thus Leibnitz, in an elaborate form, describes in effect the knowledge of sense passing through the cleansing dialectic of logic to intuition. But from the very beginning the object is always seen to be there as an object known, and to be better known, as some sort of substantial existence *other than* the subject, and as produced by some sort of cause *not originating in* the subject.

Spinoza's Three Stages of Knowledge.

Spinoza, in his "Ethics," tells us how we come to perceive and form our general notions, through the three stages of sense perception, logic, and intuition. The first kind of knowledge he divides under two heads, which comprise what we have called sense, guided by an instinctive or naive logic.

In the first place, "we form our notions (1) from particular things, represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly and without order, through our senses. I have settled to call such perceptions, knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2) From symbols, e. g., from the fact of having read, or heard certain words, we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things. I shall call both these ways of regarding things, *knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination.*" This is what is usually called common-sense knowledge, and is conscious sense, mixed with half-conscious logic and wholly sub-conscious intuition.

In the second place, our knowledge is due to "the fact that we have notions, common to all men, and ideas of the properties of

things; this I call *reason* and *knowledge of the second kind*." Here we have scientific knowledge with its fully conscious logic and sub-conscious intuition, still quite unrecognized.

In the third place, "besides these two kinds of knowledge, we have a third kind which is called *intuition*. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."

To illustrate his meaning, Spinoza uses the problem of three numbers given to find a fourth, proportional to the third. Tradesmen follow the rule either (1) because they simply remember it as received from the master without any proof; or (2) because they understand proportionals from Euclid; or (3) they may see it intuitively when the example is 1, 2, 3, and it becomes at once evident that the fourth is 6.*

Balzac's Instinctive, Abstractive, and Specialist.

Readers of Balzac will remember that in his "Louis Lambert" he represents an eccentric mystic who, taken away before his time, left certain fragmentary "axioms" which his friend is supposed to have preserved for us. In these he indicates the three stages of knowledge as Instinctive, Abstractive, and Specialistic, and gives the following account of them.

"XIV. The greater part of visible Humanity, that is, the weaker part, inhabits the sphere of Instinctivity. The Instinctives are born, work, and die without rising to the second degree of human intelligence, namely, Abstraction." This is again the stage of sense and naive logic.

"XV. At Abstraction, Society begins. Though Abstraction, as compared with instinct, is an almost divine power, it is infinitely feeble, compared with the endowment of Specialism which alone can explain God. Abstraction comprises within it a whole nature in germ, as potentially as the seed contains the system of a plant and all its products.

"From Abstraction are derived laws, arts, interests, social ideas. It is the glory and the scourge of the world. Glorious, it creates societies; baneful, it exempts man from entering that path of Specialism, which leads to the Infinite. Man judges all things by his

* Ethics, Part II. On the Nature and Origin of the Mind. Prop. 40, Note II.

abstractions—good, evil, virtue, crime. His formulas of right are his scales and his justice is blind: the justice of God sees—in that, is everything.

“There are, necessarily, intermediate beings who separate the Kingdom of the Instinctives from the Kingdom of the Abstractives, in whom Instinctivity mixes with Abstractivity in endless variety of proportion. Some have more of the former than the latter, and *vice versa*. Also, there are beings in whom the action of each is neutralized because both are moved by an equal force.

“XVI. Specialism consists in seeing the things of the material world, as well as those of the spiritual world, in their original and consequential ramifications. The highest human genius is that which starts from the shadows of Abstraction to advance into the light of Specialism (Specialism, *species*, sight, speculation, seeing all, and that, at one glance: *Speculum*, the mirror or means of estimating a thing by seeing it in its entirety).

“Jesus was a Specialist. He saw the deed in its roots and in its products; in the past which begot it, in the present when it is manifested, in the future when it develops; his sight penetrated the understanding of others. The perfection of the inward man gives birth to the gift of Specialism.

“Specialism carries with it Intuition. Intuition is a faculty of the Inner Man of whom Specialism is an attribute. It acts by an imperceptible sensation of which he who obeys it is ignorant—witness Napoleon instinctively changing his position before the bullet comes which would have struck him.

“XVII. Between the sphere of Specialism and the sphere of Abstraction, and likewise between those spheres and that of Instinctivity, we find beings in whom the divine attributes of the two kingdoms are mingled, producing a mixed nature—the man of genius.

“XVIII. The Specialist is necessarily the loftiest expression of Man—the link which connects the visible to the superior worlds. He acts, he sees, he feels through his Inner Being. The Abstractive thinks, the Instinctive simply acts.

“XIX. Hence, three degrees for Man. As an Instinctive, he is below the level; as an Abstractive, he attains to it; as a Specialist, he rises above it. Specialism opens to man his true career, the Infinite dawns upon him, he catches a glimpse of his destiny.”

In effect, Balzac is following Swedenborg, and in consequence, like the great Swedish mystic, he puts over against the threefold power of knowing a threefold object to be known.

“XX. There exists three worlds—the Natural World, the Spiritual World, and the Divine World. Humanity moves hither and thither in the Natural World, which is fixed, neither in its essence nor in its properties. The Spiritual World is fixed in its essence and variable in its properties. The Divine World is fixed in its properties and in its essence. Consequently there is a material worship, a spiritual worship, and a divine worship; which three are manifested by Action, Word, and Prayer; or, to express it otherwise, Deed, Understanding, Love. The Instinctive desires deeds; the Abstractive turns to ideas; the Specialist sees the End, he aspires to God, whom he inwardly perceives or contemplates.”

But the lower can ascend toward the higher, and the higher can inform and transmute the lower.

“XXI. Therefore, perhaps one Day the inverse sense of *Et Verbum Caro Factum* will be the epitome of a new Gospel which will read: And the Flesh shall be made the Word; it shall become the Utterance of God.”

What is meant here is that the intuitive interpretation of the natural world has so transformed it, by banishing its errors and defects, that the New Jerusalem, which Swedenborg saw, as a new dispensation in modern history, descending from God out of heaven, has come fully to possess the world; or that the Kingdom and Will of God has come to be realized on earth as it is in heaven.

We are now in a fair position to ask our final question: What interpretation does the theoretical reason, with its perception of Sense (Kant's only intuition), its logic of the Understanding, and its intuition of Reason, put upon Objective Reality?

CHAPTER VII.

SENSE, LOGIC, AND INTUITION INTERPRET THE OBJECT.

THE reader has perhaps, ere this, been oppressed with the suspicion that somehow an imposition has been practiced upon him. Long ago the evolution of the theoretical reason was traced out (Bk. II, Cap. 2), and then he was promised an interpretation of the object by the theoretical reason. But no sooner was the promise made and his attention turned away from the knowing subject to the object, to be known, than he was plunged back into the dark labyrinths of the subject again, and dragged through a half-dozen wearisome chapters on the intricacies of the knowing process, with the object only appearing here and there by implication.

But he will recover confidence again when he considers the necessities of the case, and recalls how peculiarly difficult the problem is; how men, again and again, sought to know and understand the object but, whether in Ancient India and Greece or in Modern Europe, were invariably thrown back upon the subject, to learn first how it knows and what right it has to know. But, most important of all, he will recall how it was that, at the end of a great modern epoch, Hegel, following up the work of Kant, showed that thought and thing unfold together, that the subject only really comes to know its object in knowing itself; for unless there were this intimate parallelism, or mutually responsive inter-relation between them, there could be no knowledge whatever.

It makes no difference whether we are to regard the subject as assimilating the object to itself, or the object assimilating the subject to itself, the unfolding thought and thing must coincide; and, as thought is the immediate concern of the knowing, rational subject, it is fundamentally necessary for him to know what is going on within himself, if he would be sure that his knowledge of the object is valid.

If the reader will permit himself to be mollified by this view of the case, we may now proceed amicably to an interpretation of the object, as our knowledge of it unfolds from the limited conditions of sense perception, through the relational, discursive activities of logic, to the final act of rational intuition; remembering that we can

regard our knowledge in no way complete, until sense and logic have been transcended and transformed by and in the light of intuition. Although, as we have seen, logic is always present in sense, and intuition always present in logic, we must follow them out in the order in which they unfold into the clear light of rational consciousness.

The Perception of Sense.

The deep toned bell sounds from the old church tower and arouses in us bitter-sweet memories of long ago. Perhaps it solemnly peals the knell of some departing soul, or rings out the joy of the wedding day. Our Schillers and our Poes sing of the bells until the very name seems to be imbued with a poetic glamor.

But the scientist comes upon our romantic dreams, with his chilling matters of fact and leaves our poetry dead. The old bell did not peal forth or ring out sorrow or joy, it only vibrated so fast per second—the physicist gives us the exact figures—and that set the air rolling toward us in undulations which finally struck the ear. The physicist now commits us to the instruction of the physiologist who shows us how the air vibrations are caught up by the membrane of the outer ear, transmitted along a chain of little bones to the inner ear, and then, running through the lymph of a snail-like chamber and along a harp-like range of minute chords, reaches the auditory nerve. Here the physiologist becomes vague, but he is quite sure that a quiver of some kind runs along the nerve inward and terminates in the grey granules of the brain at a certain point of the cortex, or outer “bark” of the cerebrum. When suddenly a mysterious, we might say almost miraculous, transformation occurs; for what was vibration in the air and nervous quiver in the nerve and brain flashes into the consciousness of sound, that which we call the tone of the bell; and we are at once over in the realm of the psychologist, who claims the field of consciousness for his own.

From the vibrating bell to the brain granules, in the auditory tract, the changes are quite mysterious enough, but still there is a direct, successive connection between them. They are all some sort of movement in space among adjacent particles of matter. They can all be measured and estimated, or, at any rate, imagined in terms of spatial motion, or in terms of force in duration. And anybody who will take the trouble, may observe these mechanical changes; but when the percept of sound arises, not only is everybody else, except

the conscious hearing mind, shut out, but that mind itself is wholly unconscious of the antecedent process as a mechanical, measurable motion or transmutable force in space. He is alone conscious of the consequent non-mechanical, non-measurable, non-spatial percept of sound, wholly different in character from its external antecedents. Let the hearing mind be absent, in sleep or in death, and while we may trace all these preliminary, mechanical changes, there will be no sound.

The tone of the bell then is not in the bell, not in the air vibrations, not in the nerve quiver, but simply in consciousness. And what is perhaps the strangest of all is that the sound is not heard where its last mechanical antecedent occurred in the grey granules of the brain; nor yet in the subtle, complex mechanism of the ear; nor yet in the vibrations of the air; but vaguely out yonder in some object whence it seems to come.

How is it then, in the first place, that spatial mechanism becomes non-spatial perception, and, in the second place, that the sound is not heard where the immediate connection occurs in the cortex—for connection between the two events there certainly is—but out there somewhere at a distance which we in turn can cover by certain muscular efforts?

Our physicist, physiologist, and psychologist have, as yet, given us no answer, and are not likely to do so. They simply assert the fact. It is just so. The conscious mind has first transmuted spatial mechanics into non-spatial perception, and then thrown it out into space again as if it were there. We might fill universal space with concordant vibrations, which fancy might picture to the eye as so much oscillating motion among material particles, and if there were no intelligent consciousness to catch up these vibrations, turn them into sound, and ascribe them to an object, the universe would be absolutely silent. Indeed, if there were no intelligent consciousness, neither could there be a visual fancy of how such oscillating motion even looks. It must be evident that, if we are going to know anything about the object, we were right in first trying to know something about the knowing subject.

Objective Antecedents to All Perception.

The history of the conscious sound repeats itself with every kind of perception which reveals to us the objective world of sense.

There is a large and tempting red apple on the table across the room. Lest there be any doubt that it may be only a roundish patch of red shaded color, painted on a screen, I test it by the other senses. A few muscular and articular strains and pressures, in the act of walking, bring me to the table; touch assures me of a certain objective smoothness and firmness; pressure and muscular strain of objective weight; taste and smell of a certain kind of objective juicy sweetness and odor. It is not all in my eye. Well, then, how do I come to know the apple as an object?

The physicist, physiologist, and psychologist will repeat their story of the sounding bell for the apple. Vibrations or mechanical contacts from without affect each of the sense organs concerned, which, after manipulating the objective consignment in its own way, sends it along as a nerve quiver to its appropriate center in the cortex, where it totally changes its character and becomes a non-spatial percept in consciousness. Then, all of these percepts, instead of appearing in the various scattered localities of the cortex, where the last objective appeal was made, are all thrown out together into space and grouped in the object which we know as the apple. It is true, I see the apple in immediate contact with the surface of my body, but that is at a distance in space from where the final nerve stimuli call forth in me the responsive percepts of touch and taste.

Our Objective World Made up of Percepts.

All that we know of the objective world, which lies out there before us in space and time, first comes to us in the form of distinct particular percepts, as in the case of the sounding bell and the red apple; and there is no other way of coming into contact with it. A grain of sand, the titanic mountains, the mighty ocean, the circumambient air, the sky, the sun and moon, the Polar Star, the bands of Orion, the Milky Way, we first know through percepts in consciousness. If we imagine worlds on worlds throughout illimitable space, they are all made up of percepts.

We breathe, eat, drink, and wear percepts. We build percepts into houses, temples and palaces, carve them into statues, and compose them into music and poetry.

And while they all seem *out there* in space, in the form of extended matter in motion, and while we explain or imagine their antecedent causes as spatial vibrations, the percepts themselves are in the space-

less, timeless regions of consciousness, which itself is nowhere or everywhere, and no when or always. For the conscious mind is not in space and time; space and time are *in*, or *of* it. It traverses all regions of space and dwells in an infinite here; it comprehends all periods of time and exists in an eternal now. Because of this infinite here and eternal now of conscious mind, it is able to project and juxtapose its states in an infinitely divisible and extensible space, and range them in an eternally fluent succession which we call time.

But let us never forget that while these percepts are *always* modifications in our own consciousness, which throws them out into space and time, consciousness itself persistently refuses to regard them as *only* such modifications, but directly declares them to have their origin in the object.*

Origin of the Percepts.

What, then, is the nature of that object, or of those objective stimulant vibrations that arouse consciousness to responsive percepts; or, if we prefer to say, that culminate as conscious states? We have only one means of finding an answer, and that is to consult consciousness itself. For, since the unknown can alone be known through the known, and since consciousness is the only thing we directly know, our question becomes: What must be the nature of that cause which arouses the response, or culminates in activities of, conscious mind? One answer alone is possible and that is, *mind*. Dissimilars can not be brought into relation, except on the basis of some common, underlying similarity. In the end, the homogeneous can alone interact.

We may measure with a yard stick the distance blind Homer can grope in a day, but it would be useless as a means of estimating the flights of his genius. We should not think of binding the young artist to the drudgery of the counting house, with its dull and deadening repetitions of number, in order to develop his talent; but rather throw him out into the wide, luminous, and varied world of nature, or surround him with all the beauty and power which poets, musicians, artists, heroes and martyrs have experienced and accomplished, if we would appeal to and arouse his slumbering and kindred genius.

* But that the percepts have their origin in the object, we must recall, is not a declaration of consciousness, as (sensuously) *perceptient* but of consciousness as (rationally) *intuitional*.

So it is in case of perception. If the knowing subject is aroused to conscious perception by the object, the nature of the appeal must be similar to that of the response. If the perception is mind-activity, whether considered as a response of the knowing subject, or merely as the culminating result, then the objective appeal, whether considered as emanating from the object, or only as a causal antecedent, must be an activity in mind.

Can Mind and Matter Interact?

An obvious objection may be raised. The objective stimulus comes from extended, ponderable matter in motion, distributed throughout space, and that is quite other and different from the spaceless, imponderable perception in consciousness. Matter, the extended object, and mind, the non-extended subject, are two quite disparate and incommensurable things which we must take, with Descartes, as ultimate facts of experience, even if we can not comprehend their relations. All inter-action is mysterious, and we must leave this with the rest.

But such an objection wholly overlooks the deeper fact of experience. For all the extension, all the vibratory motion of matter in space, is entirely in terms of conscious mind. The vibrations which we take to be the causal activities in space, as of the resonant bell and the red apple, calling out the response of perception, are themselves *imagined* in the form of perception, to explain perception.

We say, for example, that the redness is not in the apple but in the conscious, perceiving subject. All that the apple as an object of vision gives is infinitely minute vibrations in ether. But we are all the time picturing how these minute vibrations *look* to the eye, as if when that is done, we had reached the root of the matter and understood just what objective redness is. Whereas we are really no further along, so far as concerns the objective nature of the apple, than when we first saw the red apple, or we are like the ancients who left the coiled serpent to take care of himself as best he could, resting upon nothing.

We must look for a reason that is sufficient to account for all these vibrations, and we can only find it in an object of such a nature as to arouse the conscious subject to intelligent response. Whatever else the object may be, it must be mind, at any rate up to the level of the

mind which it stimulates to the reaction of perception. Our whole notion of matter, which seems so dull, inert, and mindless, is a *theory* which *mind* itself constructs, to explain matter. Matter as a something other than mind and incommensurable with mind is purely a product of mind.

Suppose, however, we persist with the Cartesians in asserting that matter and mind, while in themselves two wholly incommensurable things, are brought into relation by some third underlying thing, which is neither, but so related to both as to make them interact. But this third thing is something entirely unknown, and we have entered the realm of pure conjecture. Whereas we are seeking knowledge. Besides, this third thing is merely a construct of the mind, which sees all the difficulties and must do all the explaining. In fact, beyond mind, taken all in all, as we know it in consciousness, there is nothing which we can even imagine. Or if we imagine it, such as this Cartesian third thing, that very moment it is brought into relation to, and under the dominance of the inquiring mind.

Mind the Ground of the Sensible World.

There is, then, no other conclusion, not even a possible imaginary one, than that the entire *sensible* world, in its whole vast extent and variety, is, on this side, the various forms of responsive, interpretative perception in the conscious subject-mind; and, on that side, some form of activity in the substantial causal object-mind.

When, therefore, we see the numberless colors in nature, hear all its sounds, "feel" the muscular strains and pressures of gravitation in the weight of our own and of all other bodies, experience warmth and cold in objects, perceive their manifold "touches," tastes, odors, we are really seeing, hearing, weighing, touching, tasting, smelling, or in general, perceiving mind.

But this does not mean that we are treading upon phantoms or fancies of our own brain. The solid world of extended, ponderable, impenetrable, so-called matter exists just the same; stones are as hard, water as fluent, and air as tenuous as ever, and all their distinctions remain firm; but it means that there is not and, in the nature of the case, can not be, so far as our knowledge is concerned, an inert substance we call matter, other than and independent of the object-mind, which is thus speaking to us in terms that we can understand.

Mr. Spencer's Mistake.

Mr. Spencer fondly cherished the conviction that his Synthetic Philosophy was consistent with either an idealistic or a materialistic view of the universe, because we can, as he believed, reduce it indifferently to terms of mind or of matter. But this is a fallacy, wholly confused and misleading. The only instrument of reduction we have to work with is mind. All the hard, impenetrable, heavy things in the universe must, to be known, take the form of percepts in consciousness. Must we think of a substantial matter back of them and disseminated, in a perpetual, causal motion, throughout space? Well, this is but a theory constructed by the mind, as we have already seen, and enforced by the demands of rational intuition for a unitary, causal substance, first seen in the subject-mind itself. Even if such a material substance existed and there were any possibility of our ever knowing it, we should not find it capable of reducing things to terms of itself. The knowing mind would still have to effect this reduction, and then try over again, with all the Cartesians, to explain how this extended matter could come into relation with non-extended mind.

The greatest triumph of modern science and philosophy has been the breaking down of the irrational and impossible heterogeneity of a dualism of mind and matter; and the reduction of the world to a rational homogeneity in the one Absolute Mind. The doctrine of Reality as the One Mind, immanent in all the phenomenal manifestations of the rational cosmic order, is the one great revelation of Modern Science to our age. Science has won its great successes, and can alone exist and have its being, upon the ideas of Unity, Mind, and Rational Law. Let the objective world be two or more real substances and causes; let any part of it withdraw from the realm of mind; and let chance or disorder invade its inter-relations, and science becomes utterly helpless or rather ceases to be. But we anticipate our next step, or the logical interpretation.

The Meaning of the Logical Interpretation.

So far, we have made a great gain in coming to see that the object, in order to awake in the conscious mind of the subject, the percepts of sense, must itself be mind; but our result is still vague and indefinite, for at best, perception can only give us a chaos of sense impressions. We are not, however, left helplessly here, for logic enters with its claims to offer further interpretation of the object.

Thus, if we were left simply with perception, we should never have any knowledge of the apple as a single object in which various qualities inhere. We should have only separate and unrelated sense impressions. It is, as we have learned, a sub-conscious logic that gathers these up, arranges, classifies, and relates them so as to form, out of their scattered diversity, a simple object which we regard as the substance in which they inhere and the cause whence they emanate. And so it is with all the particular objects of sense. Then in a naive, and finally in a fully reflective conscious way, we gather up, arrange, classify, and relate all the particular objects of experience, and form them into one great object, the universe.

Perception presents the world to us, like the page of a book in an unknown tongue, with nothing discerned but the separate letters. It does not show us whether the letters have any meaning. In fact, taken separately they have none. But now logic steps in and begins to see that the letters are related to one another in such a way as to form intelligible words, and these again are found to be related in such a way as to form rational sentences full of meaning.

The world of nature is thus constantly presenting to us a volume for our logical reading, and the peculiar merit of an enlightened science, as distinguished from the loose and incoherent mumblings of common-sense, is that it relates the letters and words in such a way as to get out of the great book some definite and rational reading of what the original author means.

Father Jasper, with his common-sense, could see plainly enough that the sun is round and moves, and that the earth is flat and does not move. Besides, it stands to reason that if the earth turns upside down, all the men and animals would drop off, and the water would run out of the rivers and ocean. Anybody in his right senses can see that. But science construes the sentences of the volume differently and better, by learning more of the letters and understanding more of the words; and, as it proceeds, it finds the book more and more coherent and intelligible, as of a great cosmic order of rational relations and laws.

Logic in the Objective Mind.

But if the object thus yields to a logical interpretation, it must itself be logical. It shows everywhere we turn the same rational order of relations which we find in our own minds. In fact, if the object were

not logical, that is, did not have in it rational relations, the logic of the subject would be entirely useless. It would be like trying to read a book, written by a mind so wholly different from our own, that all attempts to understand it would be futile. But, on the contrary, the more we try to understand the book of nature, the more it yields a clear intelligible meaning. And here is where we must pay our profoundest homage to modern science.

Homage to Modern Science.

The ancients saw enough to convince them that the world is a beautiful, harmonious cosmos of rational relations. But their conviction was more of an instinctive persuasion than a clear demonstration. It was left to our modern science to prove, as certainly as anything can be proved by objective evidence, that the order of the world is strictly logical. And in rendering this great positive service, science has done for us what is only less important, viz.: cleared away many of the old false readings of our first naive logic. The work of science is by no means complete—we may say that it is just begun—but it has done enough to prove unquestionably its entire competence to interpret the objective logic of the cosmos, simply because the logic of the object is the logic of the subject.

The success of science is not hard to understand. It will be remembered that Bacon's fame, which is supposed to rest upon his inductive method, or new way of discovering truth, is very seriously questioned by Professor Huxley. But Bacon's fame rests upon something other and far more important than his inductive method which he himself did not carry out and which nobody else followed—a something that can hardly be called in question. It rests upon his complete understanding of the new era, or the true spirit of modern science.

For centuries men had been using their logic, for the most part, on abstract questions of metaphysics, and when they applied it to physics it was rather to *dictate* to nature than to inquire. Bacon saw that this was all wrong. Man must not *impose his logic* upon nature, but must first humble himself as a child and obediently *ask nature for her logic*. The results of this new attitude, which a true science has always taken, every school boy knows to be a bewildering array of brilliant triumphs, each one of which proclaims that the Reason of the world is ever calling to the Reason of man.

How it is that the reason of man shows itself to be coincident with the reason of the world, was strikingly illustrated long ago by Professor Whewell, the famous Master of Trinity College, in calling attention to the exact correspondence between geometrical relations and the movements of celestial bodies.

Reason Calls to Reason.

One of the earliest attainments of the human mind was exact mathematical reasoning, and nowhere do we have a more brilliant example of it than in the "Elements" of the Greek geometer Euclid, three centuries before our era. If anywhere exact and reliable logical relations could be found, it was here. Men have always, with justice, admired the demonstrable certainty of mathematical reasoning, and accounted for it because it takes place, *a priori*, within the mind. And it has always been a desideratum to raise our *a posteriori* knowledge of nature up to that same demonstrable certainty.

Well, after the lapse of nearly two thousand years, a renewed study of nature, in the true spirit of humility and obedience, revealed the astonishing fact that the logical laws of angle and curve, which Euclid found in the mind, are likewise found in nature; so that, to the point of a second, the motions of the heavenly bodies can be predicted or their past chronology be read, with demonstrable exactitude.

In like manner, the subjective logic of mathematics is more and more found to express relations among objects on the earth, in mechanics and chemistry; and our progress in exact science is proportioned to the widening discovery of this coincidence.

Moreover, aside from mathematical relations, it can only be because the mind in nature is akin to the mind in man, or the logic of the object correspondent to the logic of the subject, that the great scientist can throw out an anticipatory guess or construct a hypothetical theory that may serve as a working basis for further advance. Some of these guesses have amounted to exact prophecy. For example, astronomers have surmised on logical grounds that there must be the fragments of a burst planet, or of an undeveloped solar ring between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter; and they have afterwards found them. Mendeléeff, the great Russian chemist, who did so much to trace out and formulate the Periodic Law, completely described *germanium*, *gallium*, and *scandium* with respect to their own properties and those

of their compounds, without ever having seen them. They were discovered after his death. That Newton could anticipate gravitation and Darwin evolution,* was possible only on the basis that the objective logic of nature does and will answer to the subjective logic of man.

Therefore, if to account for sense perception in the subject's mind, we were compelled to recognize the objective appeal that called it forth to be some sort of activity in mind; we are no less driven to conclude that the subjective logic which rationalizes those same sense perceptions can be accounted for alone on the basis of *rational* mind in the object. If man can claim to reason, nature still more can claim to reason, for she shows an exactitude and consistency in all her logical relations such as man would fain emulate.

But, as we have learned that sense has no sense, until logic makes sense out of it, and that logic can not be logical, until intuition arouses and directs it, in all its relational activities; we must finally know what interpretation intuition puts upon the object.

Intuition Distinguishes the Phenomenal and Real.

The first great service that intuition renders us, after its primary act of giving us the object to know, is to make us aware of the distinction between the realm of science, which confines itself to sense and logic, and the realm of a true philosophy, which comprehends within its range not only sense and logic but rational intuition also.

Science might and ought to be philosophy, but up to the present, it has not only stubbornly refused to consider the data of intuition, but fails entirely, as we saw in the case of Professor Huxley (pp. 228-31), to justify, except upon empirical grounds which are not entirely rational, the very logical principles by which it has its being. Science restricts itself rigorously to the data of sense perception and their rationalization by logic. So that it can give us at best an interpretation of the phenomenal world only. And this can never be satisfactory; for Reason, through that supreme function of intuition, is first constantly showing us how limited and incomplete an interpretation, confined to sense, is; and, secondly, calling for a knowledge of Reality, because the knowing subject, recognizing itself, through intuition, always to be above sense and logic, is already in the regions of Reality.

* The name of Darwin is employed here not as standing for the entire meaning of evolution, but only for certain phases of it which have proved very useful in biological investigations.

Limitations of Sense and Logic.

We are daily only made too conscious of how narrow is our range of sense vision, and how frail our logic. Though sight and hearing sweep a comparatively wide gamut, we know that we are blind and deaf above and below the visual and auditive scales. What visions we might behold, what harmonies we might hear, if our eyes and ears were not so dull! Besides, within the limits to which we are confined, we have to help ourselves out by artifices. But even with instruments a thousand times more delicate than any we now possess, sense would refuse to appreciate vibrations above or below a certain rate of speed. As to the muscular, articular, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory organs, they are still more limited than either sight or hearing.

Then when it comes to logic, what with its slow and painful efforts, its fallacies and subterfuges, its proofs today and its disproofs, tomorrow, we are almost inclined at times to throw it overboard altogether and trust rather to rational instinct. And yet, deceive and fail us as it may, with all its limitations, it is the only means we have to rationalize what little we can know of the phenomenal world, and we prize it so much the more.

The Value of Sense and Logic.

For, limited as it may be to space and time, under the conditions of sense perception, the phenomenal world is, at any rate, some manifestation, so far as we see it truly, of the Real World. Therefore, we would sharpen all our senses and cherish all the resources of logic; we would bind every true scientist to us with hooks of steel, that we may know the most and best we can of the world in which we live.

Of course, if we have a suspicion that the phenomenal in no way can reveal the Real, then we shall be inclined, with Gotama and all fine ascetics, to throw it away altogether as a vicious illusion.

Indeed, Kant almost makes us do this, for his phenomenal world is so detached and disparate from Reality, which is only an unknown x to us, that it seems to be suspended upon nothing. Yet he meant it to rest upon something—though he could not show how—and he had a real meaning in his emphasis on detachment and disparity. He strikes a true chord and impresses us with the transcendent power and glory of Reality, as contrasted with the limitation and lowliness of the phenomenal, but he goes further than he is justified. For

by making the phenomenal too limited and lowly, he not only makes it worthless as knowledge, but casts doubt and discredit upon the Real. If the Great God has sunk us little men down so deep in this world, that we can know nothing of Him at all, it is hard to see how we could ever come to prize the world as His, or how He would ever come to win our service of adoration and praise.

Leibnitz and Kant on the Phenomenal and Real.

We can do no better, in thinking of the relation between phenomena and Reality, than by combining Kant and Leibnitz, whom Kant sharply criticised on this very point in question. Leibnitz held that our phenomenal knowledge, is knowledge of reality, but seen in a very confused and obscure way. Kant condemned this view, holding that the phenomenal is wholly different, or qualitatively diverse from the real, so that, in knowing phenomena, we do not know reality at all.

Now, suppose, with Kant, we think of Reality as so much more exalted than phenomena and so inconceivable in terms of phenomena, that it amounts to a distinct otherness in quality, and can not be attained through sense and logic. This will be sufficient for any doctrine of *transcendence*.

But, at the same time, phenomena are not *simply* modifications of *our own* consciousness, as rationalized by *our own* logic, and having existence nowhere else or guarantee from no other source. Subjective as they may be to us, they nevertheless go back to and rest upon Reality as the original source whence they emanate, or as their substance and cause, which they manifest to us under the conditions of sense and logic. So that, with Leibnitz, we may hold that in looking upon phenomena, so far as we truly know them, we are in some real sense looking upon Reality, though it may be in a very obscure, confused, and inadequate way. We must agree with him that when we come to know phenomena distinctly, clearly, and adequately, we are knowing the symbols of Reality, which itself then comes to view in intuition. Here we have sufficient for a doctrine of *immanence*.

However, Leibnitz's tendency was to regard God as too immanent in his world, so as to make the world appear better than it is. Kant's tendency, on the other hand, was to regard God as too transcendent, so as to make the world appear worse or less revelatory of the Divine

Presence, than it is. If we could unite the two, we should have a truer doctrine, by which, while God is seen as ever immanent in his world, he, at the same time, infinitely transcends it.

A Comparison with Plato and Aristotle.

This sort of commingling the views of Kant and Leibnitz by dropping the extreme attitudes of both and combining the great truths expressed by each, may be adopted for the reconciliation of those two greatest philosophers of antiquity, Plato and Aristotle. Plato, like Kant, put Reality, or, as he called it, the intelligible world of ideas, so far above the sensible world of daily experience as to make them two quite distinct things; and while he had to admit, as Kant did, some sort of connection between them, it was so tenuous and artificial that his only way to reach Reality was finally to turn his back upon the world of sense and desert it altogether, as being too false and illusory to furnish him with any account of the objective Truth. This was, in effect, the view of Medieval Christianity.

Aristotle, on the other hand, brought the intelligible world of ideas down into the sensible world as a form of reality; only he brought the ideas down too far, and in a way debased them to the commonplace. What we need for the true doctrine is the ideal loftiness of Plato completely united with the everyday, practical actuality of Aristotle. There are certain things that Reason can not endure. It can not endure a duality of two real objects; nor, when that duality is reduced to the unity of one all-comprehensive mind, can Reason endure a second unreconcilable duality in phenomena and Reality, which must be brought into some sort of rational relations. Still less will Reason, in order to secure this mutual relationship, allow the two objective elements of thought to be blurred by raising one too high or sinking the other too low. We can never hope to find the sensible world coming to the full significance of the intelligible world, but we can find the intelligible giving to the sensible its true meaning, because, under the limitations of sense, it reveals itself therein.

This reconciliation Hegel effected, by recognizing the entire competence of Reason to know the object in its entirety, from the obscure beginnings in Being, through the unfolding Essence, to the full and comprehensive knowledge of the Notion or Idea. While the Platonic, Kantian position of a great unbridged gulf between phenomena and Reality is taken by a few great modern theologians, the Aristotelian,

Leibnitzian, Hegelian view, of a real immanence as well as transcendence, is becoming more and more the characteristic doctrine of the newer Christian Theology of our era.* In fact, the doctrine of the Transcendent Reality of the One Substantial Causal Mind, *immanent* in and throughout all real manifestations of the phenomenal, cosmic order, is the noblest attainment of rational thought in modern times—or in all times—and has a significance for man's future development, as yet not adequately recognized.

Intuition Distinguishes Between Conditioned and Absolute Reality.

When, however, intuition thus distinguishes between the phenomenal, as a limited manifestation of Reality to sense and logic in space and time, and Reality itself, it no less enforces the distinction within Reality itself, between the conditioned and the Absolute, regarded under the aspects of partiality (modified forms) and Totality (Substance); contingency (effectuated modes) and Necessity (Cause); manifoldness (the changing many) and Unity (the One). That is, apart from any sense limitations in space and time, intuition sees Reality as Absolute in its *totality*, *necessity*, and *unity*, as well as conditioned in its *partiality*, *contingency*, and *manifoldness*.

No substantial being can have any existence at all outside of the Absolute Totality of Being; no causal becoming can arise, except as dependent upon the Absolute Necessity of Becoming; and no diversity and manifoldness can exist or arise, except so far as it is related to the Absolute Unity of objective Reality.

But as Absolute Totality absolutely includes all things, a Absolute Necessity is absolute freedom, and as Absolute Unity is an absolute harmony of all relations; Reality not only reveals itself as Absolute, but also manifests itself in a real, non-phenomenal world of conditioned partiality, contingency, and diversity. This conditioned, real world, as distinguished from the spatial, temporal, phenomenal world, never passes away, but is the infinite and eternal manifestation of the One Infinite and Eternal Absolute Reality, no matter whether we think of it with the Hindu as an emanation, or with the Hebrew as a creation.

* Unfortunately, Hegel, as if following Leibnitz, made immanence *so* immanent, as to lead some of his followers, not without reason, into the confusions of pantheism—an implication, however, which he himself denied.

Intuition Sees the Knowing Subject as a Reality.

But if intuition enables us to see a conditioned Reality, as distinguished from Absolute Reality, it does so because the rational, intuiting subject at once distinguishes itself, as a reality, from and other than the conditioned and the Absolute. For though, like the conditioned, it is dependent upon the Absolute for its existence, its relation to the Absolute is not that of partiality, contingency, or diversity. Its dependent relation is rather that of a likeness of nature, or kinship. And by reason of this relation, it is, in its way, an absolute one, and has within itself the possibilities of infinite totality and eternal necessity.

Without this understanding of God, the Real World, and the Real Man, afforded by rational intuition, we should never be able to rise above the natural, phenomenal order, into the supra-natural, real order, where Reason conceives and demands objective Reality to be the Trinity of an Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause in Absolute Unity, manifesting itself through the real, intelligible World, to the real, rational Man.

Nor without this understanding, should we ever be able to see any significance in the natural, phenomenal world and the natural, phenomenal man. Nay, we should not be able even to see them at all, as objects of rational knowledge.

The supreme importance, then, of rational intuition, involved in synthetic apperception, becomes evident, by which the subject in knowing its object knows itself, and in knowing itself as a substantial causal unity, knows its object also as a substantial causal unity.

Interpretation of the Categorical Intuitions.

By virtue of this fact, we have seen how the categories are direct intuitions, or rather the modes in which the rational subject expresses itself. And it is through these categorical intuitions alone that we are able, first, to establish the perceptions of the spatial, temporal world as phenomenal, or as a manifestation of Reality, rationalized by the relational activities of logic; and, then, see beyond them the conditioned, real world, resting upon the Absolute Unity of Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause.

Thus if we take the intuitional category of Substance, we shall find that it is the ground of the great scientific doctrine of the indestructibility of matter. Experiment does not *prove*, but simply *illustrates* it. It is only the self-identical *thinking* subject, unchang-

ing amid all change, that can see and give meaning to one, indestructible substance, *standing under* all things. No manner of sense experience could demonstrate it, nor even suggest the notion of it, without the permanent self-identity of the rational subject. Nor could we, without it, even perceive that individual objects remain the same. They might be the same, all the time, but I could never recognize them as such, unless I myself remained the same.

Substance.

Matter is the rational intuition of substance as objective reality, under the restricted and conditioned forms of sense. Space is the same intuition pure and simple, without the further intuition of objective reality, and as such is pure, absolute *nothing*. It is the no-thing ($\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$) of Plato, the illimitable and undefined ($\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$) of Anaximander.

It is for this reason that the physicist can never think of action at a distance, across empty space, but must, if he can not perceive, by sense, an intervening matter, intelligibly construct some strange non-descript, unintelligible, self-contradictory ether to fill up the empty places, in order that he may get his material universe to work.

But when the category of substance comes to its full expression as an interpretative principle of the ever-thinking, self-identical subject, it reveals, in rational intuition, objective Reality as Infinite Thought.

Cause.

In like manner it is that the intuitional category of Cause becomes the ground of the great scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy, by which all forces in their inter-actions are seen to be transmutable, but not perishable. They change their mode, but do not lose their existence. No sense experience and no experiment can *prove*, but merely *illustrate* the doctrine. It is only the self-identical *willing* subject, ever-changing, yet the same substantial self, that makes the conservation of energy a possible, interpretative concept of objective reality, and reveals it as "an eternal energy from which all things proceed." Without the original self-activity of the willing subject, we could never see, in any order of events, a cause at work; and, without the one rational purpose which will sets up as an end and to-

ward which all volitions aim, we should never see the transmutability of forces, and the conservation of an undecaying energy.

Motion is the rational intuition of cause, as objective reality, under the restricted and conditioned forms of sense. Time is the same intuition pure and simple, without the further intuition of objective reality, and as such is pure, absolute non-existence. It is impossible to think of time as having any meaning, apart from motion which represents the successive activities of cause.

Kant called time the internal sense, because it differs from space, the external sense, in being necessary to the consecution of thoughts within the mind, as well as to the sequence of things without. He did not call attention to the fact, however, that the thoughts which thus succeed one another in the mind are the thoughts of *spatial* things, the succession of which, as representing objective, sensible reality, constitutes time.

But when the category of Cause comes to its full expression as an interpretative principle of the ever-willing, self-identical subject, it reveals, in rational intuition, objective Reality as Eternal Will.

Inseparability of Substance and Cause.

The inseparability of matter and motion, which is a universal and necessary datum of experience, and which has its counterpart in the inseparability of space and time, goes back to the intuition of substance and cause as inseparable. As matter could not be known unless it revealed itself by change (motion), and motion could not be perceived unless it were the change of something (matter), so space could not be perceived unless it offered the possibility of succession for the changes in time, nor could time be perceived unless it were a succession of things in space.

The supposition that thought, as such, requires succession in time is an error based upon the fact, already alluded to, that most of our thoughts concern spatial objects. But thought itself, so far as it reflects Reality, or objective Truth, transcends time and belongs to eternity. Thus the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles is the juxta-posing of spatial objects in succession, but the demonstrated truth that the three internal angles equal two right angles is above time, provided tri-dimensional space represents ultimate reality. If not, then the relative truth about the three angles would have to be further related, by a temporal

succession of spatial elements, until the eternal truth was demonstrated in n -dimensional space or Infinity.

And this inseparability of matter and motion, space and time, has its ground in the ultimate rational intuition of the unity of substance and cause, directly *felt* in the *thinking, willing* subject; in virtue of which Infinite Substance is recognized as the Eternal Cause, and Eternal Cause as the Infinite Substance of all things.

Unity.

The category of Unity becomes the ground of the great scientific doctrine of the Cosmic Order, as the Absolute Reality, in which all inter-relation of substances and inter-action of causes find a coherent rational harmony. Again, no experience or experiment has ever revealed this unity, but only illustrates it. It is only the self-identical, *feeling* subject, which estimates all values of the changeless and the changing, that makes the interpretation of objective Reality, as a total Unity, possible. Unless we had the *feeling* of a harmonious, organic unity within, we should never be able to see individual organic unities without.

On the plane of the sensible, the rational intuition of unity enables us to see individual organisms both as substances and causes in space and time. On the plane of the intelligible, rational intuition reveals the existent reality of these individual unities to be their coherent, rational, relation to the Absolute Unity.

When the category of Unity comes to its full expression as an interpretative principle of the ever-thinking, ever-willing, and ever-feeling, self-identical subject, it reveals, in rational intuition, Objective Reality as the One, Self-existent, Infinite Thought and Self-active, Eternal Will of the Cosmos. And that is God, in the transcendent Infinity, Eternity, and Unity of his adorable, self-sufficient, absolute Beauty, manifesting Himself through his World to Man.

Function of Sense and Logic.

In this ultimate, intuitional interpretation of Reality, sense with its phenomenal objects, and logic with its relational activities, having fulfilled their provisional functions in the world of space and time, are taken up into and become one with intuition, which sees Reality, in its manifold diversity and in the unity of all its relations, by immediate vision.

But to this end, sense and logic have been necessary means, as constituting an educative discipline, by which the subject, once aroused from the monistic slumber of nature and raised into supranatural, self-conscious otherness, or, in other words, born as rational spirit, might develop into the entire freedom of his self-realization, in coming to know the objective, trinal Reality of the Cosmos, as God, the World, and Man: God as Absolute Reality, the World as conditioned reality, and Man as the begotten likeness of God.

Sense affords man his first, dim knowledge of the object, as to the new-born child; logic with its relational activities affords the conditions of growth into manhood, by which the vagueness, confusion, and contradiction of sense are defined, related, and harmonized, and by which Reason is finally urged on toward the full maturity of intuition. Thus logic, as it were, is a pedagogue between perception and intuition, and is the necessary condition of rational unfoldment, through which man, the begotten of God, is led by gradual stages from the sensible to the intelligible, from phenomena to noumena, from appearance to Reality, from matter to Mind, from nature to Spirit. Thereby the limitations of perception have been overcome and transformed into intuition, and the real relations which logic has brought into view have become intuitionally rational, in the full envisagement of the Truth. Sense and logic, in the phrase of Hegel, have been *aufgehoben*, carried away, lifted up, and transformed into intuition.

Evolution Exists in the Unfolding Human Consciousness.

But the entire process, from infancy to maturity, has been informed and guided by intuition, until substance and cause, first interpreted by sense and logic as extended matter in space and successive motion in time, are transformed into Infinite Thought and Eternal Will, no longer extended in space and successive in time, but existent absolutely in an infinite here and an eternal now.

Infinite Thought has its existence in being the immediate effectuation of the Eternal Will; for while thought is not will, it is nevertheless one with it in being the manifested form which will takes. Eternal Will has its existence in being the self-sustaining Absolute Reality, as the ultimate ground of all emanation, creation, or manifestation.

The unfolding cosmos in space and time, therefore, which we have previously represented in its gradual stages of evolution, does not take

place in the Infinite Substantial Thought and Eternal Causal Will of the One Absolute Mind, or in Reality, but is the unfolding of the human mind, in space and time, under the conditioned forms of sense and logic. Thus, the law of gravitation and the law of evolution, which are the two great ideas of modern science, the one static, as the unitary law of all substances in space, the other dynamic, as the unitary law of all causal ends in time, do not represent the state and activity of Substance and Cause in Reality, but the state and activity of substance and cause as they appear to man, who sees them under the form of an evolving, phenomenal world in space and time.

The whole meaning of evolution, therefore, is the unfolding of man's consciousness, from sense through logic to the intuition of the Cosmic Concept, which is the Absolute Unity of the Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause, in order that man may reflect in himself the rational Unity of the Cosmic Thought and Cosmic Will.

In What Sense Man is Infinite and Eternal.

But this does not mean that man *in himself* is infinite and eternal, as Vedantism claims, in *identifying* man with the Infinite and Eternal Brahman; for no less clearly does he intuit *his dependence*, than he intuits the absoluteness of God. But in reflecting the thought and the will of the Cosmos, man is infinite and eternal, in so far as, by a likeness of nature, he is akin to the Absolute, and is thus rendered capable of *apprehending*, though not *comprehending* in himself the Infinite and Eternal. Although man is not God, yet he is akin to God, or in the beautiful thought of Christ, the begotten son of God.

The Cosmic Trinity.

It is for this reason alone that man, seeing himself as the unity of substantial causal mind, can behold in the world, under the conditioned phenomenal forms of sense and logic, a rational cosmic activity of Mind; and can see in God, the Absolute Mind, as the Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause of both himself and the world.

The World is the mediator between God and Man. The World proceeds from God, as the Word, or the Divine Logos, spoken to Man; and in being received and understood, is thus reflected back to God from Man. God is not the Logos, or Man. The Logos is not God, or Man; and Man is not the Logos, or God. Each has a distinct, divine individuality; and yet these three are *one*, in the Unity

of the same Infinite and Eternal Substance and Cause. For God has begotten Man as his son; and he alone it is who has uttered the Divine Word, by which the worlds are framed, and without which nothing has been made that is made.

The Phenomenal Transformed into the Real.

But when Man understands the Word, and thus reflects the Thought and Will of God, he is no longer looking upon the transient, phenomenal world of sense in space and time, for the flesh has now become the Word. The Word, as the Divine Logos, or rational creative utterance of God, in its first appearance to Man as the world in space and time, under the limitations of sense and logic, disappears; but, under the light of intuition, it is not destroyed, for it is transformed into the infinite and eternal creation of God. Nature has become Spirit; sense is no longer phenomenal but noumenal; logic has ceased to be a discursive, relational process in the understanding, and is now an immediate intuition of rational relations in Reason: nearness in space has become clearness of apprehension, and presence in time means dearness of affection. The manifold, changing order of Causal Becoming now merges into coincidence with the unitary, changeless Reality of Substantial Being; for the changing order of Becoming, as the necessary method of progressive advance toward rational self-realization, culminates in the changeless and harmonious Unity of Substantial Thought, which is constituted by the manifold and ceaseless activity of Causal Will.

But this conclusion of our theoretical interpretation of the object recalls us to the threefold and indissoluble unity of Reason, in which, except for the convenient purposes of logical analysis, there is no such thing as thought by itself (science), or feeling by itself (art), or will by itself (ethics); or in which there is any possibility of thought pursuing, as an isolated and sacred interest, some ideal of abstract Truth as Reality, apart from the values of feeling, and the consequent motives of will. For, by the very nature of Reason itself, thought invariably has value in terms of feeling which in turn, as invariably, gives motive to the will. Hence, our *theoretical* interpretation as such necessarily involves and compels us to enter upon the *æsthetic* and *ethical* interpretation of the object as well.

There is a consideration of great importance, however, which deserves attention before we proceed to questions of *æsthetical* and *moral*

interest; and that is the nature and limits of intuitional knowledge. The oversight of a question like this is the source of endless confusions and misunderstandings. Either too much is claimed, or too little; or cognitive activities of different orders are so run together and confused as to make any clear knowledge of the one or the other quite impossible. Therefore, we must now give some pains to a determination of what may be considered intuitive knowledge, as distinguished from that of sense and logic; and then finally seek to establish the claim of intuition to a knowledge beyond the experience of the visible world.

CHAPTER VIII.

NATURE OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

IF so much has been claimed for intuition, as the supreme power of reason in knowing the object, we would not therefore open the flood-gates of fantastic speculation and dreams, which Kant sought so valiantly to close. But in order to correct false and unsupported, metaphysical claims, we would not follow Kant in denying altogether the capacity of intuition to interpret the real object and know its nature.

We should prefer rather to distinguish between the respective functions of Reason, and the knowledge which they afford. Thus, while no amount of rational intuition can show us that the grass is *green*, because sense perception only can do that; no amount of sense perception can teach us that the grass is a *substance* of green *quality*, because rational intuition alone can do that.

We must be content to let each discharge its own function, and, instead of confusing, make clear to ourselves their true relation and the nature of the knowledge they afford. We have learned that perception is a limited form of intuition, and presents to us Reality, as it appears to sense in space and time; while intuition as such presents to us Reality itself in the spaceless, timeless regions of the Infinite and Eternal. Thus, while intuition includes perception, making it, as a rational function, not only intelligible but possible to begin with; it transcends perception and affords a knowledge of objective Reality, of which sense is utterly incapable.

A General Confusion between Perception and Intuition.

Perhaps what misled Kant was a sort of unconscious expectation, quite general in humanity, of finding Reality to *look* something like phenomena, of seeing the *Ding-an-sich*, much in the same terms as he could see the manifold of sense; and finding no means of thus seeing Reality, he denied being able to see it at all, as though the knowledge of Reality can not be regarded as valid, unless it can be

put into phenomenal forms. There has always been a stubborn tendency, not altogether unnatural to human curiosity, to reduce intuitional truth to terms of sense perception. We would see Reality with the eye of sense. That sort of naiveté Kant destroyed, but he neglected to replace an imaginary and impossible knowledge of Reality, by that which is true and possible on the higher level of rational intuition. We should try to make it very clear to ourselves that while the perceptual object is dependent upon intuition for its understanding and interpretation, the intuitional object is not visible to sense, but reveals itself only to the mind's eye.

Strife between Science and Religion, Based upon Confusion.

Failure to recognize this distinction has been a prolific source of confusion and strife between two of our greatest interests, science and religion.

The concern of science is knowledge of the phenomenal world, or visible nature, which it seeks to rationalize by the methods of discursive logic. Here it has fully established itself as a supreme authority. Of the supra-natural world of intuition it can say nothing, and, indeed, desires to say nothing. So long as science insists on its incapacity to give us knowledge of Reality, we shall concur; for its sole means of inquiry, sense and logic, can not, we are agreed, lead us beyond phenomena. But if, unfortunately, science shall presume to show us all the objective Truth that can be known, we shall demur, on the ground of that rational intuition which, though neglected by science, alone makes science possible. In fact, the suspicion will obtrude itself, because science neglects rational intuition, that in its own field of phenomenal knowledge its authority is after all only provisional and not final. For, in the end, we can never really know phenomena, their value and meaning, until we know something of that Reality of which they are a limited and conditioned manifestation. As much credit, therefore, as we are willing to accord to science, in its investigations of the sensible world, we can not for one moment permit it to restrict our knowledge to the sensible, however classified and rationalized it may be, nor will we grant to its results anything like finality.

On the other hand, the concern of religion is knowledge of the intuitional world. Its very being has its sources in the invisible, supra-natural realm of Reality. It has to do not with physics but

with metaphysics; not with quality and effect, but with substance and cause; not with rational succession in time, but with ultimate ends. And so long as religion claims its right to intuitional knowledge of the real man, the real world, and God, we shall concur, for intuition is the authority that can speak here. But when religion seeks to clothe Reality in the anthropomorphic garb of phenomena, we demur, in the name of religion itself, which, while it may lift up and transform the phenomenal world, can not descend or conform to it. For such descent and conformation it has often dearly paid.

Scientific Revelations in Religion.

Religion necessarily involves philosophy, or a theoretical view of the world. Without such a view, it would be but a confused mass of unintelligible instincts. But religious philosophy has been too prone to form itself upon a phenomenal, instead of upon an intuitional basis. It has again and again inseparably bound together the true and lasting objects of religion, viz.: God, the real world, and the real man, with the prevailing common-sense view of nature, and thus rendered such views sacred, as divine revelations. The result has always been inevitable. To science, belongs the phenomenal world, and science is progressive. Common-sense must give way before it and, in its light, is seen to be superstition, which is the attribution of objects and events to the wrong substances and causes. Even the learning and science of one age come to be regarded as so much ignorance and error in the next. Hence, the sacred revelations of religion, about the phenomenal world, are very likely to receive severe shocks from time to time. If religion has word from Deity that the world was made in six days, that the sun moves, or that animal forms were separately created, it is duty bound to protect information of such high authority from all question; so that when science begins to show æons of world-development, the central fixity of the sun, or the gradual evolution of animal forms, there is a bitter struggle, which always ends in the triumph of science, and too often, unfortunately for some minds, in irreligion.

In this last result, while science has its share of blame, the original gravamen lies with religion, or rather with the men of religion. For these men have made their sacred revelations about nature an integral and essential part of religion, and have so bound up the fate of the one with that of the other, that when science invalidates the

revelations, as it is in time very sure to do, the superficial suppose that religion itself has been invalidated. It is the case where the precious wine for them has been lost because the old bottles burst. From such a sorry blunder, men's appreciation of the Bible, the most valuable book in the world, has greatly suffered.

The Bible Suffers in the Hands of Its Friends.

The Bible, the one book preeminent for religion, for spiritual idealism, and indispensable for man's true progress and the right understanding of life, was written in widely different ages, and is therefore necessarily couched in the terms of the prevailing views of nature. Instead of distinguishing between the real content and the outer phenomenal expression, the defenders of the Bible have again and again laid an equal stress upon the outer form of expression, and upon the inner spiritual meaning; or, to use a fine phrase of St. Paul's, upon the letter as well as upon the spirit. Science, in its steady and irresistible progress, has disproved the phenomenal expression; and then, having forced upon them the alternative of taking the expression as literal, objective truth, or no Bible at all, men have had no choice but to reject or, at any rate, neglect the Bible altogether.

The Bible in its Substance and in its Form.

Two centuries of unnecessary and futile strife might have been saved, if men had taken to heart the wisdom of Spinoza, who saw the essential and lasting message of the Bible to be true piety and love to one's neighbor, as distinguished from the historical and phenomenal forms in which that message is expressed.

But men are coming to see it now, men of religion and men of science, and it is largely due to just such critical and historical considerations as Spinoza pointed out long ago, in his "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus."

It matters not where we take the Bible, in its oldest and crudest epochs of tribal monolatry, or in the culminating Gospel, there is one law of life upon which all else depends, viz.: supreme devotion to God and, in consequence, right action toward one's neighbor. Yahweh, at first conceived as the all-powerful, tribal War-God, comes in time, with the development of Israel's moral consciousness,

to be recognized as the Creative Will of Eternal Righteousness, and then, in the fullness of time, as the All-enfolding, Universal Father of Love; from which it always remains true that the only condition of life for man is, first, a complete submission to the Almighty Power, then, perfect obedience to the Divine Law of Right, and, finally, absolute love to God and to man.

With this ultimate and eternal message of the Bible, in its crudest or in its most advanced form, it makes no difference whether the world was created in six minutes or in six millions of years, whether life was supernaturally formed or evolved, whether the sun moves or stands still; all that is a matter of procedure in the phenomenal world, with which science has to deal, and effects the interests of religion in no essential point.

A Question of Method, not Cause.

A good example of the superficial confusions, arising out of the belief that the fate of religion rests upon the order of phenomena, is that concerning the spontaneous generation of life. It is supposed that if life has not been supernaturally introduced into the world, then there is no need for God; so that if a true abiogenesis can be discovered in nature or demonstrated in the laboratory, then God may be dismissed as no longer useful. As a matter of fact, biogenesis or abiogenesis has nothing whatever to do with the essential demands of religion, theoretical or practical, viz.: the existence of God and the supreme duty of love to God and to one's neighbor, but concerns merely the method by which Reality manifests itself in the phenomenal world; and that is a matter for science alone, leaving the interests of religion wholly untouched. When the man of religion is disturbed by questions of biogenesis or abiogenesis, he has no true and firm hold on religion. He might well learn something from the profound wisdom of the Yorkshire peasant lad who, when asked what life is, replied: Life is sum'at God pours into a man. Not even Mr. Spencer with all his abstract, descriptive formulas could do better; for, in the end, he would have to say that life comes from that "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed."

So also when the man of science supposes that the answer to questions of biogenesis or abiogenesis may support or nullify religion, he is not clear as to the self-chosen limits of science. He is dealing simply with the methods of procedure among phenomena, and in no

way touches upon that deeper problem of the "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed,"—that is the business of religion.

But while the man of science, as such, is in no way concerned with religion, the man of religion is deeply concerned in science, for the more truly science reads the phenomenal world, the more fully does he show how the ultimate Reality, or God, reveals himself therein. The unfolding history of science has always given wider and nobler views to religion, and the time is present when religion may become science, because science becomes religion, in the very act of showing truly how Reality manifests itself in the phenomenal order of things. This does not mean that science in itself will ever become religion, for there is no possibility of finding Reality by searching through the phenomenal; there is no such thing as "through nature up to God"—Kant made that clear—but, recognizing Reality as the ground of phenomena, beginning with God as immanent in nature, then the world takes on a new meaning, indeed its only true meaning; it is transformed into a sacred revelation, because it has become luminous with the Divine Presence. The order of procedure is never through nature up to God, but from God down through nature. We can never understand God by knowing nature; but nature we can understand, and only understand, by knowing God.

Error of Describing Reality in Terms of Phenomena.

But if religion has suffered because it has attempted to dictate the course of the sensible world, it has perhaps suffered more in attempting to portray the intelligible world in terms of sense. It has tried to show how Reality *looks*. It has seemed to believe that because God manifests himself in nature, he therefore can be known in the forms of nature. This is as irrational as to suppose that a man—a Plato or a Napoleon—can be reduced to and expressed in terms of his body. The child had to learn that Alexander was called great, although he was not like a steeple tall, nor could he strike the stars with his head.

Yet men have often fallen into the anthropomorphic error of trying to picture the things of God, the supra-natural world of Spirit, in terms of sense and logic. Anthropomorphic, man must be, in the sense that it is only through the reason within him that he can know and interpret Reality at all; but the error of anthropomorphism

consists in imposing upon the realm of substantial, causal Reality, intelligible to intuition alone, the terms of the conditioned, sensible, phenomenal world of perception and logic. It is clothing Infinite, Eternal, and Incorruptible Spirit in the form of finite, temporal, and corruptible flesh.

A Natural Curiosity to See how Reality Looks.

This tendency, which is almost universal, has a fascination for certain minds. The theosophical attitude, especially, is one which presses forward to *see* how Reality *looks*. The experts in theosophy, it is claimed, behold, in proportion to scientific and spiritual advancement, the *look* of things on the ascending planes of objective existence; and can see even mortals, according to their respective characters, with auras of streaming red, yellow, blue, or green.

We find the same thing, with not so much of an attempt at being exact and scientific, however, in the apocalyptic literature of the Old and New Testaments, where a Daniel, or an Ezekiel, or a John show us invisible things, or coming spiritual events, in a highly dramatic, sensible form. Medieval mystics caught beatific glimpses of heaven, and the immortal Dante has drawn for us exceedingly circumstantial and elaborate pictures of hell, purgatory, and paradise.

While this tendency of applying the terms of sense perception to invisible or future Reality is so inveterate in the human mind, and therefore in some way justified; we must share the conviction of Kant that the phenomenal world of space and time has no terms capable of expressing to us the significance and exalted greatness of Reality. Or to use the Apostle's fervid expression: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for them that love him." For such things, sense is incapable—they can only be apprehended by a much higher order of cognition. Hence, the Apostle adds: "But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God" (I. Cor. ii, 9-10). St. Paul does not mean here, we must be assured, that since sense is unable to show us Reality, that therefore the Spirit comes in with a sensible picture of the Divine World. He is holding clearly the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible order of ideas, and asserting that the intelligible is known only in intelligible—not in sensible—terms.

Nevertheless, this does not wholly settle the business of the theosophist, or the revelator, or the mystic, for their hold is too deep and persistent to be neglected, or not to have some solid foundation in the nature of things.

Truth in Sensuous Symbolism.

Though they may not be able to convince us that their sensuous pictures of Reality are valid, if they can show us that they are *symbols* of Reality, we shall be impressed; for, since true phenomena must always be manifestations of Reality, the things of the flesh ought to have some significance for interpreting the things of the Spirit. And we are quite carried along with the good "Rabbi Ben Ezra:"

"Let us not always say,
 'Spite of this flesh to-day
 I strove, made head, gained ground upon the
 whole!'
 As the bird wings and sings,
 Let us cry, 'All good things
 Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now,
 than flesh helps soul!'"

So that we shall be content to find a true relation established between the intuitions of sense and the intuitions of reason, in some such way as the poet uses his metaphors.

Hence, when the theosophist tells us that a man of anger and malice emanates a flaming red aura about him that carries discord and injury wherever he goes, we shall be inclined to turn the red aura over to some Helmholtz or Tyndall for examination who, as scientist dealing with objects of sense, may settle the objective claims of the phenomena; but, even if he could not find the red aura, it would serve admirably as a metaphor; for, from a universal experience, we can determine for ourselves that the man of anger and malice does indeed breathe out some sort of positive, malevolent influence that causes discord and injury wherever he goes.

Or, if we are assured that the Hindu adepts commonly converse with each other on great themes, when thousands of miles apart; however alluring and desirable the thing may be, we turn the matter over to some London Psychical Society for scientific verification, and, profiting by what is suggested, content ourselves in the meantime with what we can do, that is, with the humbler and more commonplace—though often rather difficult—task of trying to say something

valuable, by the ordinary means of communication now at hand, to our next door neighbor.

When, again, St. Paul tells us that Christ has risen from the dead and, therefore, we shall rise from the dead; though not unmoved by the prospect, we shall have to refer the historical fact and the future possibility to the scientific historian and physiologist. But, when making a figure out of the event, he urges us therefore to rise into a new spiritual life, to seek those things which are above, and to sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus, he makes a direct and irresistible appeal to the universal, moral ideals within, which intuition reveals to us all.

In the last chapter of Revelation, John describes for us "the Holy City Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God." Its walls, four square, are of precious stones, its gates of pearl, its streets paved with gold. It has streams of crystal and the tree of life, and its light is the glory of God. As thus presented, it is an imaginary picture of an object of sense, and we have no other guarantee of its validity than the authority of the revelator. We have no possible means of verifying his account. But the visible greatness and splendor of the Celestial City had a deep significance for St. John, as he saw it; for it implied the necessary fulfilment of certain conditions which are appreciable to the moral reason of every man. He concludes his picture by saying: "Blessed are they that wash their robes, that they may have the right to (or the authority over) the tree of life, and may enter in by the gates into the city. Without are the dogs, and the sorcerers, and the fornicators, and the murderers, and the idolators, and every one that loveth and maketh a lie" (Rev. xxii, 14-15).

There is nothing ambiguous and uncertain about that. It amounts to an axiom for the moral nature. It is as apodictic to the conscience as two and two make four is to the intellect. From the realm of the good, with its harmony and peace, all evil, with its impurities, its hatreds and its dark chaos of discordant falseties and lies, must of necessity be forever shut out. What heaven may be or look like, in sensuous or any other kind of terms, admits of all manner of dreams, but the condition of attaining it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end, as clear and unmistakable as the sun in his noon-day meridian.

In the same way, we have in Dante the presentation of the unveri-

fiable pictures of sense imagination, coupled with rational truth, which is at once intuited by every sane man. When, for example, in his lugubrious journey, with his good master Vergil, through hell, he enters the fifth descending circle, he arrives, he tells us, at the borders of the murky, turbulent Stygian lake, where, he continues:

“ Intent I stood,
To gaze, and, in the marish sunk, descried
A miry tribe, all naked and with looks
Betok’ning rage. They with their hands alone
Struck not, but with the head, the breast, the feet,
Cutting each other piecemeal with their fangs.
The good instructor spoke: ‘ Now seest thou, son!
The souls of those, whom anger overcame.
This too for certain know, that underneath
The water dwells a multitude, whose sighs
Into these bubbles make the surface heave
As thine eye tells thee, where so’er it turn.
Fixed in the slime they say: “ Sad once were we
In the sweet air, made glorious by the sun,
Carrying a foul and lazy mist within:
Now in these murky settlements are we sad.”
Such dolorous strains they gurgled in their throats
But word distinct can utter none!”

(Hell, VII, 112-129. Cary’s trans.)

Here again, whether the material picture is true or false, we have no means of knowing—we may or may not believe it according to personal inclination—but the lesson it conveys is unmistakable and clear. We at once see that anger envelops the mind in a dark mist which shuts out the clear light of reason, and that an angry man is like one plunged in a muddy pool, so confused and blinded that, instead of using his hands, which were created to serve his head, he madly dashes against others with head and breast and feet, not knowing what he does and “gulping meanwhile the muddy lees.” (v. 133).

This Dantesque symbol of a moral condition finds a complete actualization in war, the apotheosis of anger. Doubtless, without having anything of Dante’s description in his mind, when General Sherman looked on the actual fact, he exclaimed with refreshing directness and truth: “War is Hell!” Dante tells us why. It is anger that chokes and blinds men and, depriving them of reason, casts them into destructive and bitter strifes.

Standing apart, detached from any selfish interest in two nations at war, we see a wild confusion of blood, agony and tears. Men

tear and destroy each other like savage beasts. The fœculence in men's nature is stirred from the bottom, and brutal vices celebrate their shameless orgies. The tapster, the gambler, and the courtesan bask in the cretinous smiles of the army. When it is all over, it is found that it might have been settled on rational principles, which had to be admitted, after all, at the outcome.

Swedenborg.

But what if, instead of constructing figures out of the sensible, to symbolize the intelligible, such as these we have just been considering, or such as Bunyan employs in his beautiful allegory of the Pilgrim's Progress from this world to the next, we should rather, with Goethe, regard the whole visible world itself as a likeness of the invisible; as a shadow, it may be, but a veritable shadow of the substance of things? Would it not then gain for us a deep significance, as always pointing to something of greater value beyond itself?

The figurative language of poetry implies this view, and various religio-philosophical beliefs, throughout antiquity, have expressed it. Nowhere, however, has it received so full and positive a statement as in Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) who reduced it to an exact science, and made it the basis of his entire revelation, as a more complete and final exposition of the ancient wisdom.

The Doctrine of Correspondences.

He saw the visible world, under the limitations of sense, as a counterpart of the invisible. Every object and event, therefore, in the natural world has for him its correspondent object and event in the spiritual world. In so far, he was one with Plato who saw things as shadowy copies of thoughts, or with Spinoza who saw things as the other side of thoughts.

The relation between the two he naturally conceived as discrete and not continuous. That is, we do not ascend by successive stages from the phenomenal to the real, as Leibnitz would lead us to suppose. Because, to make that possible, the two realms would needs be of the same quality, whereas they are of different quality—as Kant maintained: so that, to derive any meaning about the real by viewing the phenomenal, we must know the parallel correspondences between them. But this, it will be seen, requires knowing the real, as well as the phenomenal. And Swedenborg claimed what Kant denied,

an intuitive understanding, by which the real is known. Only he did not claim it as a universal capacity of the human reason, but as an exceptional and supernatural opening of his individual, spiritual understanding by the Lord, for the special purpose of enabling him, by means of the key of correspondences, to reveal the Divine Truth to man.

Thus he came to see the realities of the spiritual world and their correspondent forms in the natural world; and in the same manner the third and highest world, as well, the celestial.

But although he describes for us the spiritual world in terms of sense, under the forms of space and time, he must not be charged with an anthropomorphic lowering of Reality to the plane of phenomena, for he again and again warns us that spiritual things are not *in* space and time, but only *appear* so because of their correspondence to natural things. So that with the key of correspondences, the natural world takes on a tremendous significance, because through it we are in a position to understand the mysteries of Reality.

Visions of the Spiritual World.

The extent, exactitude, and rationality with which Swedenborg carried out these correspondences has convinced many enlightened minds as to the authenticity of his spiritual visions, which he claimed to enjoy uninterruptedly the last twenty-seven years of his life.

According to his own account, once his spiritual eyes were opened, he entered the spiritual world, where he saw and conversed with angels and devils, all of whom were once men, and with many persons, known to fame in the ancient and modern worlds; and where he was authorized, as the last great prophet of the Church, by the Lord himself, to make known to man the Divine Wisdom and Love, announce the descent of the New Jerusalem in spiritual form from heaven, and inaugurate the third and final dispensation of the Christian Church in human history.

He saw heaven and its three degrees; hell with its three degrees; and the region of spirits where the newly departed paused to find, as it were, their bearings, either upwards toward the heavens or downwards toward the hells. He found that every spirit and every angel and devil was in his own place, for which the state of his understanding and will fitted him.

Our seer beheld the entire Cosmos in the form of a man, the

Grand Man; and each of the three heavens, as well as every angel; and each of the three hells, as well as every devil, he saw in the form of a man: only the heavens and the angels were perfect in their beauty, while the hells and the devils were repulsive and deformed.

He not only saw sights and heard sounds, but perceived odors in the spiritual world, which in the heavens and hells, respectively, correspond to either delightful aromas or nauseating stench in the natural world.

The Infinite and Eternal God, who is God-Man, he saw, not in his Celestial Absoluteness, in the third and highest world of all, but in his first, creative emanation in the Spiritual World, as a Sun, whose outstreaming light and heat give life to and sustain all things; whence, as an ultimate, or outmost, emanation, appears our natural sun, whose light and heat give life to and sustain our natural world. As the ultimate—that is always the outermost or furthest—creation of the Lord, our natural sun and natural world, however, must be regarded as dead, because being, as it were, the outer quality and effect of things, they have no substantial causal reality in themselves; but nevertheless they have great meaning for us, when we understand and act upon their correspondences to the Spiritual World.

The Bible Written, according to Correspondences.

The secret of this correspondence, the angels pointed out to Swedenborg, is to be found in the Bible; for this Sacred Book is written, word for word and letter for letter, in the scientific language of correspondence. Thus instructed, in the true interpretative science, he was enabled to unlock from the *natural* meaning of the Bible, its hidden correspondent *spiritual* and *celestial* meanings. Indeed, with this key, he was able to discover that all the Bible, as we know it, is not the Divine Word, inspired by the Lord. Such books as Job, Esther, Ezra, Proverbs, the Song, the Preacher, in the Old; and the Acts and the Epistles, in the New Testament, he found to be profitable for instruction and edification, but were not the Word, in all its exact literalness and with all its authority of inerrant Revelation.

The Spiritual Message.

Now, as no man can objectively verify these visions of Swedenborg for himself, his acceptance or rejection of them, as veridical or not, is largely a matter of personal inclination or temperament. But

this does not end the matter, for the great seer made these visions the outer form of a spiritual message which was the master concern of his revelations, and which it will be all the more worth considering because he himself was always appealing directly to the rational intuition in every man, rather than to the credibility of his *arcana celestia*.

As the prophet of the third and final Christian Dispensation, or the New Jerusalem Church, he saw fulfilled those terribly dramatic predictions of the Apocalypse, not as a literal judgment and destruction of the world, but as a series of momentous changes in human consciousness, as the passing away of the old order of ideas, giving place to new. The new heaven and the new earth meant for him a new state of thought, new conceptions of life, in place of the old, which had been judged and cast into the lake of fire.

It was the unfolding of the Divine Providence in history, by which civilization has entered upon new and higher stages of progress. Here is a more advanced method of interpreting history than the method of sense and logic, which laboriously gathers the obvious, external events and seeks to rationalize them; for it is the method of intuition, which sees the real causes of historical change and progress in the ideas and thoughts of men, in their relation to that deeper, invisible world of substantial causal Reality. As compared with such a more rational and penetrating method of interpretation, the ordinary method of science appears naively superficial.

The Ritualistic, the Dogmatic, and the Spiritual Church.

But the profound significance of this view concerns more especially the Christian Religion, the unfoldment of which stands for the Divine Guidance of man in history, and which now must receive an intuitive interpretation.

Heretofore, the Church had been ritualistic and dogmatic; it must now become spiritual. The Ritualistic Church, which had lasted up to the Reformation, belongs to the externalism of sense, and secures salvation for man, in a future sensuous world—that is, a world like this, without its defects—by the ceremonial rite, by doing external things. These works, or means of grace, are supposed to have merit in themselves, or to have some sort of talismanic power, and, being regarded as “divine service,” are thought to be pleasing to God.

The Dogmatic Church, which is that of the Germanic Reformation, rises to a higher plane than the Ritualistic Church, for it rejects all external works as inefficient, and makes salvation a matter of individual faith, or belief in the true doctrine. This brings religion from without and fixes it within, upon the plane of discursive reasoning. It is now a matter of the true logic.

But if the ritualistic religion of sense does not express the true meaning of the Christian consciousness, neither does the dogmatic religion of logical doctrine. We must rise to the spiritual religion of intuition, where the good works of ritual and the true faith of doctrine are transformed into their real meaning. Spiritually, or intuitionally seen, the good works that secure the approval of God are not external acts of worship, and are not even the deeds of charity, but the inner volitions of good-will which spring from supreme love to God and to one's neighbor; while the true faith is not a matter of accepting as true an intellectual conception of metaphysical realities, but an immediate understanding and realization of the Divine Wisdom, or Truth.

Swedenborg's claim to be the prophet of this New Church, or new dispensation in Christian history, does not rest upon any authority he cites, nor even upon the validity of his visions; but upon the simple, rational intuitions of spiritual truth which even the simplest can understand.

The Divine Unity as Wisdom, Love, and Power.

What he did of the first importance was to reduce the entire Cosmos, visible and invisible, to a unity which rests upon the one, all-comprehensive, absolute, immanent, yet transcendent, Spiritual Reality, God.

He taught that God is Love itself, and Wisdom itself, and Life itself as his manifested, proceeding creative Power. That is, the Divine Essence is Love, and the form which Love takes, in its manifested Life and Power, is Wisdom or Truth.

The Law of Spiritual Progress.

By reason of this fundamental doctrine, he reduced the whole spiritual life of man to the unity of one all-pervasive law.

As man is created in the divine image and likeness, he is endowed with an understanding, capable of receiving the Divine Wisdom,

and a will, capable of reflecting the Divine Love, and by so doing, of entering into the Divine Life and Power.

Thus, to use one of his correspondences, God, who is like a sun in the spiritual heavens from whom all things proceed and by whom all things are sustained, pours out through all worlds the light of his Wisdom and the warmth of his Love, and in proportion as man turns to, and receives in his understanding and reflects in his will, that Wisdom and Love, he is redeemed and advances in the Divine Life.

God never shows favor, never turns aside, never changes; for he is eternally the same; but man, by reason of his moral dignity, that is, his freedom, may turn aside from the understanding of truth and choose evil instead of the will of good, thus descending to the hells of spiritual death. These hells, while existent, have no life in them, because they in no way reflect the Divine Love and Wisdom; and hence belong to a realm of unreality. In the world of God's creation, there is no evil.

Relation of the Will and Understanding.

Man's salvation, therefore, is not a matter of "divine service" in any form of ritual, nor is it a matter of believing in the true, orthodox, metaphysical doctrine about God; but it is an intimate and immediate reflection and realization of the Divine Wisdom in the understanding, and of the Divine Love in the will.

The will of a man is his life's love, and is therefore, the center of his character, and so determines his spiritual direction upward or downward. It involves a tremendous responsibility and is fraught with the most momentous consequences; but that constitutes his greatness as a moral being; and while it makes possible his descent into the hells, it is also the only condition that makes possible his ascent into the heavenly, and then into the celestial life.

If the life's love or will is of self and of the world, man descends, and his understanding is darkened; if, on the other hand, it is love to the neighbor and to God, man ascends and his understanding is illumined.

Therefore, the first great requirement is to give up all evils as sins, because they are free choices of the human will against the Divine Will of Eternal Love.

The understanding, however, of the Divine Wisdom or Truth is also of the first importance, for that makes plain the path which love

to the neighbor and to God must take. Hence, rational doctrine is necessary for the sake of rational life.

But if, through pride of intellect, the understanding be made primary, it happens that, while it may be enlightened, the will remains perverted. Men may assent readily enough to the truth, and even pride themselves on teaching it; but if their life's love or will is evil, that is, directed toward self and the world, for self-glory or worldly ambition, all their understanding of Divine Truth will only drive them further from God and, finally, go out in darkness. It is dangerous to know the truth and not to do it. It is here where the inadequacy of doctrinal religion reveals itself, for men may be very learned and very orthodox, but not at all imbued with the Divine Love in their wills, which is the very core of religion.

On the other hand, if the life's love has been right, directed toward man and God, even if the understanding, as in the unlearned, has been dark, it will in time be illumined by the light of the Divine Wisdom and be made correspondent to the will of good. Thus we often find a humble, unlettered man whose transparent honesty and sweetness of character not only wins him a general respect among his neighbors, but seems to give him an air of intelligence and refinement. Being really good is the highest aristocratic distinction, perhaps because it is not only so rare but so difficult. Mark the honors which Jesus obtained from his fellow men; it was because he was genuinely good. Much of our human goodness is sham goodness, because it rests upon some hidden, ulterior, selfish motive.

Nothing is greater in Swedenborg than his penetrating analysis of and profound insight into the nature and relation of intellection and volition.

Origin of Evil in Human Error and Sin.

As a consequence of man's freedom, Swedenborg found the origin of evil, in the world, as possible in human understanding and will, and not in the Divine Creation, which is always perfect and good. Whether that evil takes the form of noxious plants and animals, calamities, destructive storms, and disease, in nature; or of error, oppression, and wrong-doing, in human society, he traced it finally to the hells (all devils were once men) or found it in the darkened understanding and perverted will of evil men, who are in conjunction with the hells. Just as men may open their minds and hearts to the in-

flowing Divine Wisdom and Love, so they can bring themselves into sympathetic union with the error and sin of the infernal world, and thus obscure and pervert life both for themselves and those with whom they have to do.

Simplification of Religion.

Never before had Christian doctrines been so stripped of their extraneous and obscuring metaphysics, nor religion made so rational, so simple, so direct, and so irresistibly brought home to the business and bosoms of men, as a natural law of spiritual life and progress.

Arbitrary, anthropomorphic doctrines, such as an expiatory atonement, with the imputation of sin or of righteousness: foreordination to heaven or hell, with or without merit; justification by faith in a metaphysical creed, based on a historical fact; and physical death as a finality in determining eternal fate, he either set aside or wholly transformed. For heaven and hell are not places in space but places or states in consciousness, which are reached in accordance with exact spiritual laws governing the understanding and will, so that the fate of each depends upon himself, rather than upon any supernatural arrangement made for him.

Unfortunately, his deeper, truer message has been too much overshadowed by those strange, unverifiable perceptions of imaginary sense; but although his direct influence may have been small, he foreshadowed with singular clearness and exactitude what was to come.

Predictions Fulfilled.

He saw the changes that were going on in men's thoughts as the real forces in history, and from that standpoint showed not only what was happening in the world but also what was to happen.

In two main features, especially, the general consciousness of Protestant Christendom has been modified as he predicted. In the first place, it is no longer regarded that the true Christian life is constituted by intellectual assent to the orthodox creed, but rather by love to God and to one's neighbor. Swedenborg's saying was: Religion is life and the life of religion is to do good (not works of charity, but the will of good, welling up from the bottom of the heart, in devotion to God, and in service to others). He was not indifferent to the true doctrine or the necessity of understanding the Truth. On the contrary, he emphasized that necessity, but he insisted that

the acceptance of the doctrine must be very much more intimate and effective than intellectual assent; and that is possible only when the doctrine is true, and so can be really appropriated as an integral part of life itself.

It is in making the doctrine true and effective that, in the second place, Swedenborg foreshadowed the coming change in the Christian consciousness. The supernatural, dualistic view of religion which generally prevailed at his time—and in certain circles still prevails—has given way, before an advancing science, to the doctrine of divine immanence, that is, to the conviction of one all-pervasive Power throughout all things, according to which the minutest atom and the mightiest world are governed. In consequence, it is coming more and more to be seen that the Christian life is subject to spiritual laws as regular and exact as any of those which are found in the natural world. The same Power that moves in gravitation and chemism illumines the mind and inspires the heart. In a word, Swedenborg's teaching that in proportion as man turns his understanding and will to receive and reflect the Divine Truth and Love, he advances in the spiritual life, is coming to be received as the law of spiritual progress.

Advantage in Making the Distinction.

We have been trying to draw a sharp distinction between the intuitions of sense imagination, which rest upon the simple authority of the seer and are for the most part ambiguous and wholly unverifiable, and rational intuitions, which make a direct and verifiable appeal to the consciousness of every man. And the wisdom of doing so is seen in the fact that we are thus saved from a very grave error into which too many fall.

Finding the pictures drawn, bizarre, improbable, common-place, or, at any rate, unverifiable, men are inclined to reject the seer's entire message as worthless. Their vision is obscured to the fundamental content and the source out of which, as symbols, the pictures have risen, viz.: the intuitions of rational truth, which they neglect at the peril of their own souls.

The pictures of heaven and hell which a John, the Revelator, a Dante, or a Swedenborg have drawn may, with indifference, be accepted as true, doubted and referred to more complete evidence, or rejected altogether as false; but the rational truths that heaven, the abode of light and life and goodness stands forever barred to

those who are unclean and who make and love a lie; that hate plunges men, as it were, into a muddy pool of darkness and confusion where they senselessly tear and beat each other; and that to reflect in the understanding and will the Wisdom and Love of God is life, can no more be questioned or rejected than can existence itself, because they are directly and intuitionally discerned by reason as objectively valid.

Without in any way attempting to cast discredit upon a refined supra-normal sense intuition, which may be capable of an indefinite further development—for it must be confessed that our present senses are very limited and crude, and in no way cover the entire field of possible sense intuition—we must beware of regarding as legitimate the attempt to picture the world of intelligible Reality, appreciable only by the intuitions of reason, in the conditioned, sensible terms of spatial, temporal phenomena, interpretable by sense and logic—unless sense and logic can verify the pictures drawn.

Fundamental Ground of the Theoretical Interpretation.

In conclusion, we must demand the ultimate ground of our theoretical interpretation of the object. What right has the self-conscious subject to take upon himself the presumptuous task of knowing and understanding the objective Cosmos? In a word, it is the right which asserts itself in the so-called ontological argument, as employed to prove the existence of God.

The argument is very old and has had many vicissitudes. It has had eminent advocates and, at least, one very eminent opponent, Kant, who denied its validity.

Anselm, the celebrated theologian and Archbishop of Canterbury, in the beginning of the twelfth century, stated the argument incompletely, but yet suggested its essential meaning.

He said in effect: I have an idea in my mind of a perfect being. Now, existence is a necessary attribute of perfect being, therefore, perfect being is not simply an idea in my mind, but must also exist in reality. The weakness of the argument lies in resting the fate of God's existence upon the logical analysis of an idea in my own head. On such a basis, I myself may be the perfect being in question. The value of Anselm's argument lies in what it necessarily implies, viz.: some sort of rational relation between the knowing subject and the known object.

Descartes expanded and strengthened the argument by introduc-

ing the rational intuition of cause. This idea of perfect being in my mind, whence comes it? Certainly not from myself, from other men, from nature, or from experience in general, for I look in vain for the idea of perfection from any such sources. Therefore, it must be placed in the mind by the Perfect Being, or God, himself, whose existence as the origin of it is thus established.

Kant regarded all this as so much school logic, and sought to show that an idea in the mind proves only the presence of the idea in mind and not objective existence. I have an idea in my mind of a hundred Thalers in my pocket, but alas! that does not actually put the Thalers there. No matter how many noughts I add, in my mind, to my cash account, my actual capital is thereby in no way increased. Hence, the argument, Kant maintained, was only an analysis of a subjective idea and, therefore, added nothing to our knowledge of objective reality. The argument, he would say, can be made valid only by an intuition of the object; but since he denied rational intuition, which alone could give the object, and admitted sense intuition only, which can not give the object, he had to look upon the whole argument as void.

Hegel, however, showed clearly the inadequacy of Kant's criticism. The idea of a hundred objective Thalers is simply a sensuous image which may or may not be realized, or its objective validity must be tested by sense perception in actual experience. But the idea of an existent perfect being is a unique and ultimate idea of reason itself, and is of the nature of a direct and necessary rational intuition that needs no proof. It stands clear in its own light and asserts its own finality and validity.

Kant was always right in asserting that we can never establish the objective validity of a concept by simply analyzing it. It remains merely subjective and empty until a synthesis can be made in virtue of an intuition of objective fact. And he was right in refusing to admit the objective validity of any concept based on sense and logic, unless experience could give it objective content through a possible sense perception.

But he was wholly wrong in denying rational intuition as the ultimate faculty of the theoretical reason in directly seeing objective reality. His arguments are always admirable up to the point of his conclusion, and there they break down because they deny the intuition that makes any conclusion possible.

There is no proof of the existence of God, or of any object, for that matter, because the existence of the object precedes proof, and is beyond it. We should look for none, because it needs none. Any object—God the ultimate object—is directly seen to exist; all argument and “proof” only serve to bring out that object into clearer light. Our question is never, therefore, Does God exist? but, What is his nature? And Kant himself, by a masterly analysis, has amply shown what that nature must be as the sum of all perfections.

Basal Character of the Ontological Argument.

It is in India that we can find set forth the basal character of the ontological argument. In the Upanishads, and the Vedanta resting upon them, the argument does not begin with the idea of perfect being but ends with it. It begins with the simple rational intuition of the self, as over against the non-self, and as similar to, because interpreting it. The heat in my body is the heat in the sun, the self hidden in my heart is the self in all things, the reason in me is the reason in the world.* When the Hindu thinkers eliminated from the inner reason its limitations and contradictions, they found its fundamental and permanent character to be perfect knowledge and a consequent perfect happiness. They therefore concluded that the objective reason of the Cosmos, or Reality, is perfect knowledge and perfect happiness. Instead of resting here with this rational kinship established between subject and object, the Vedantins, it is true, carried on the abstraction until the subject was lost by absorption in, or rather by identification with, the object. But up to this point, they consistently grounded their thought in the ontological unity of subject and object, in virtue of which it is always and only possible for subject and object to come into rational relations.

Their final identification of the two grew out of the exclusive application to Reality of the intuition of unity. The Hindu sages saw so clearly the reality of the One and the Infinite that their vision became obscured to the equal reality of the Many and the Finite, or they failed to see that the intuition of the One and the Infinite necessarily involves, and in fact has its reality in, the equally valid intuition of the Many and the Finite. Diversity and difference do not abolish unity, but establish it. The Infinite One transcends by *including* and not by *annihilating* the Finite Manifold.

*Khandogya-Up. XIII. 7-8; XIV. “Sacred Books of the East,” Vol. I.

The real nature of the ontological argument is not, as Anselm and afterwards Kant took it to be, a mere *a priori* analysis of a concept in the mind; nor is it primarily an argument from cause, as Descartes regarded it, though that more nearly approaches its true nature; but its essential character is that which the Hindus gave it. That is, it is not an argument at all, but a direct rational intuition, developed and brought out in an unfolding rational experience, of the essential unity of nature in the knowing subject and the known object, and is the *deepest and only ground upon which all rational life rests*.

Rooted Deep in the Nature of Reason.

How fundamentally deep is the intuition of kinship between subject and object is seen in the first, naive attempts of primitive man to know and master nature.

Anthropologists describe for us certain forms of imitative magic, practiced among primitive peoples, which consists in imitating some action of nature, with the practical aim of making the rain to fall, or of averting the storm, or of securing the prey.

These practices are based upon a deep, instinctive intuition, such as we find in children, that all things are alive and act like human beings. The savage magician, believing that the powers within himself are like to those at play in the world about him, be they gods, or demons, or spirits of the dead, imitates their actions, and expects the same results which they produce. The rain-maker or rain-avert, for example, who is a highly important individual in the community, illustrates well this sympathetic magic.

In one case, he throws water toward the sky to help out the rain-god's supply; or he artificially makes clouds out of smoke; or, taking water in his mouth, he squirts it about here and there, as if it were falling rain; or, to produce the same imitative effect, he pours water through a sieve.

In the other case, to stop the rain or avert the coming storm, he throws burning sticks into the air to dry it, at the same time puffing and shouting like the roaring wind as if to drive away the clouds; or, keeping himself very dry, he carries about with him volatile substances and blows powdered lime toward the coming rain, as if to absorb the moisture in the air.

In discussing certain phases of the early Roman kingship, Professor J. G. Frazer, from whom the above instances have been cited, be-

lieves he has sufficient grounds for thinking "that the early Latin kings personated the great god Jupiter and mimicked him by attempting to make rain, thunder, and lightning; further that they went through a form of sacred marriage to insure the fertility of the earth; and lastly, that they often passed for sons of the fire-god by Vestal Virgins, who were deemed the fire-god's wives."*

In all of such actions, the celebrant is imitating nature, or rather the invisible powers back of nature, under the profound and fundamentally true conviction that he can secure similar effects from similar causes, because he is essentially like those powers whom he imitates; or perhaps because he believes that by *imitating* the supernatural powers, he can provoke them to *imitate him* back, just as he has been provoked, in the first place, to *imitate them*.

We may be inclined to smile at the savage magician's crude logic and absurd practices, but after all, his original, deep, instinctive intuition is inerrant, viz.: that somehow the intelligence and power in things about him are like to the intelligence and power within him; an intuition, indeed, which though it be unanalyzed, unaccounted for, or unacknowledged by our most advanced scientists, is nevertheless the very foundation upon which science rests, by which it is rendered possible at all, and from which it wins a right to claim objective validity.

The primitive magician is in embryo our modern scientist, and if his instinct that the reason in nature is akin to the reason in him is not valid, then the scientist has no guarantee for the results of his investigations.

Indeed, the savage instinct has a wider scope than the modern scientific doctrine. For the magician becomes the priestly king who adds to his science and art, religion, as if he asserted that to know and master nature is to come into fellowship with God, who reveals himself in nature as its supreme master. In fact, this is what science implies, for science but reads the thoughts of God, and thus gives to art the means and possibility of mastery, because man is like God and can know and do the same things.

This instinctive imitation, growing out of a fundamental likeness of nature, plays a much more influential role in our entire life than we suppose. Upon it based the only possibility of education. The child's rational development, beginning in his first infant babblings,

*"Early History of the Kingship," p. 229. See Cap. VII.

is a direct and instinctive imitation of his elders. In his boyhood, he prides himself on imitating his father or big brother, who has become the ideal of his admiration; and his whole future is an imitation of some one whom he regards above and beyond himself. And what in general is man's entire rational development, in his sciences and arts, but an instinctive and progressive imitation of God! As God thinks and acts in nature, so man seeks to think and act. It matters not how childish and crude these imitations may be, they are at any rate for him the only possible conditions of a progress toward ever making his thought and deed like the thought and deed of God. And this whole imitative process alone grows out of the ultimate, rational datum that man, in his essential nature, is akin to God.

Meaning of Mythology.

This same fundamental intuition of likeness lies at the bottom of all mythologies in which the great forces of nature, in their benevolence or malevolence, in their harmony or strife, are conceived as grand supra-normal men or gods. The eighteenth century, in the superiority of its enlightenment, looked upon these past forms of human culture as base superstitions, wholly false. The nineteenth century, however, with its wider outlook and broader sympathy, came to see more and more that below the ignorance and superstition, the false and crude reasoning of primitive man, there was a deep underlying truth. And that truth is that the reason in man is the reason in the world.

Man as the Divine Son.

The broadest and deepest form of the ontological attitude of mind is ethical rather than theoretical, and comes to us from the Hebrew genius, which conceived man as a son of God, created in the divine likeness and image; not, however, a natural son, as widely conceived by pagan antiquity, but a spiritual son, who, therefore, on the basis of his kinship, is able to reflect in himself the divine nature; who can come to know God even as he is known of God.

It is alone on this basis that the subjective, theoretical reason in man, as the organ of a scientific and philosophical interpretation of the objective world, both in its appearance and in its reality, has its reason to be. And this reason to be it justifies, by asserting itself in rational self-consciousness, as the subjective interpretative mind,

answering in terms of sense, logic, and intuition, to the objective, creative Infinite and Eternal Mind of the Cosmos. Though Kant did not recognize the true meaning of the ontological argument, he understood its comprehensive character. For the other two arguments for the existence of God, which he took into consideration, viz.: the *cosmological*, which concludes from the contingency of the world to a Necessary Being as Sufficient Cause; and what he called the *physico-theological*, more commonly known as the *teleological* argument, which reasons from the evidence of design in the world to a Designer, Kant recognized as essentially resting upon the ontological argument.

But their motives arise in different faculties of reason. While the ontological argument springs from the intuition of likeness in general, between subject and object, and involves the whole reason, the cosmological argument springs from the likeness in cause, the ground of which is the will, and is absorbed in the teleological argument which springs from the intuition of unity, arising primarily out of the feeling of value, which demands of the will a harmoniously purposed end.

The cosmological and teleological arguments we are about to bring under the interpretation of the æsthetico-practical reason. The true ethical argument which springs out of the intuition of *cause*, as *good-will*, Kant did not develop, and we shall bring it under the interpretation of the ethical reason.

It has been necessary to go so extensively into the theoretical nature of reason and its interpretation, because only thus could we, in the first place, determine whether there is any relation between subject and object, such as to justify any interpretation whatsoever. And now that we have established such a relation as being that of rational kinship between the mind of man and the mind of God, we are greatly furthered in our æsthetical and ethical considerations. For we now have a right, on the basis of the ontological likeness between subject and object, to expect to find in the object certain real elements that correspond to æsthetic and moral demands within ourselves.

II. INTERPRETATION OF THE ÆSTHETICO-PRACTICAL REASON.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WORLD, AS A RATIONAL ORGANISM, REVEALS ÆSTHETIC DESIGN.

WHEN we were studying the æsthetico-practical reason, we found its essence to lie in the fact that the rational subject, capable of feeling value in the object he comes to know, wills to repeat whatever pleasure or profit he finds in it, for his welfare or happiness; and does so by setting up definite, rational ends, to be pursued by every means which his intelligence is able to command.

Thus arise all the arts; first, the domestic, mechanical, and economic arts, having to do with the objects and satisfactions of sense; and, then, the fine arts which, rising to the realm of rational ideas, seek to express the highest ideals of truth and goodness, the beauty of which can alone meet the demands of reason for the perfect satisfactions of happiness.

Does the Object Feel and Will toward Rational Ends?

With this æsthetico-practical nature, by which he evaluates things and wills to carry out his purposes to some, definite, ideal end, what interpretation can the rational subject put upon the object before him? If, as a theoretical being, he finds himself able to understand the object, and is therefore justified in regarding the object, like himself, rational mind; can he in like manner discover in the object reasons for concluding that it also like him feels, and wills toward definite, rational ends?

That is the specific question which, in our æsthetico-practical interpretation of the object, we must seek to answer.

We must not forget, however, that the fate of the question does not rest with a consideration of the mere phenomenal aspects of the object, though they are necessarily involved. In our theoretical interpretation, we could not stop at the outer, manifold, visible sub-

stances and causes of experience, with their qualities and effects, but had to carry them back to the one, invisible Substance and Cause which is the Real and Ultimate Ground of all existences and actions. That is, we could no more regard the world of sense as the real object, than we could regard the body of a man as the real subject. Thus the phenomenal, objective rose seen, is not the real object, any more than the phenomenal, seeing eye is the real subject. It is the living intelligence back of the eye, of which the eye is only a means to an end, which is the real subject that sees; to which the living intelligence back of the rose, of which the rose is a phenomenal manifestation, makes its appeal.

The Real as well as the Phenomenal Object Concerned.

In like manner, when we ask: Does the object feel and will? the question does not concern the outer form of nature as the grand object before us, but the underlying Substance-Cause, the inner, living, objective Mind that manifests itself through-out the cosmos. It would be as superficial to regard the visible world as feeling and willing, as it would be for a man to suppose that it is his mere hands and feet that feel and will. In fact, there is a universal distinction drawn between dead and senseless things, and what is called sentient being, by which it is meant that only when we find some sort of intelligent life do we have feeling and consequent volition. In general, all that the outer forms, which the object or the subject may take on, can be regarded as standing for is so much phenomenal manifestation of the back-lying reality, in which lies whatever intelligence and will there may be.

Yet the outer form, within the conditions to which it is limited, must give some evidence of the nature of the reality it manifests. Have we reason, then, to believe that there are evidences of feeling and will in the objective world of nature, to judge by the feeling and will which we ourselves experience and express in all the purposive designs of our invention and art?

Evidences of Feeling in Nature.

We need not go as far as the old fable writers in finding plants that think and speak; but we must admit from observation that plants show feeling in a subtle form of sensitiveness. They reveal a sort of gladness in prosperity and fruitfulness, when their surroundings

are favorable; and, on the other hand, seem either to rouse themselves for struggle, shrink back with pain, or perhaps die, when beset with adversity. Without at all supposing that these organisms experience feeling in any such developed way as man does, we must yet admit that they act as if they felt a favorable or unfavorable environment, very much as we do, under similar conditions. Besides, many of the activities in our bodies are on a level with those of plants, and however unconscious we may be of them, we can hardly go so far as to say that merely on that account those activities represent no feeling.

Feeling in Animals.

But, even if we deny feeling to nature, as it manifests itself in the plant kingdom, it is clearly evident in the animal kingdom. It is doubtful if a single man could be found now to hold the Cartesian view that animals are mere automata and do not feel. In fact, so strong has the opposite opinion become that, as already remarked, we regard ourselves under a sort of moral obligation toward animals, because of their capacity to feel.

We have as yet developed no sense of duty to enlighten them, or increase their happiness. No St. Francis rises among us to preach to the birds and fishes, but our conviction grows stronger and stronger that we ought not to inflict upon them pain or allow them to live in misery. We may not agree with the Hindu that the animal is possessed by a human soul on its upward way, and therefore not subject to the uses of man; or go so far as Gotama who, as reported in one of the Gataka stories,* gave up his life to prevent a famished tigress from committing the heinous sin of devouring her own young; but we grow more and more kindly toward the animals and refuse to permit them to suffer.

Now, it is evident that this tendency arises from our interpreting a part of objective nature in terms of our own subjective feelings. That others feel pleasure and pain, whether they be animals or other men, as I, the observing subject, feel pleasure and pain, is purely an interpretative inference, and is based on the same intuition of similarity that leads me to infer that because nature shows the same rational processes which we find within our own minds that, therefore, it is rational.

* "Sacred Books of the Buddhists," Story of the Tigress. Vol. I, trans. by J. B. Speyer.

But if nature in some of its parts, which we are capable of understanding, shows feeling, it must be that nature as a whole, or rather the Ultimate Ground of nature, manifested throughout the whole, has the power of feeling—at any rate, up to the level of the feeling revealed. How much more Objective Reality, or Ultimate Being, feels we may never know, but that it feels as much at least as an animal or a man does, is an irresistible conclusion, or else we have an effect without a sufficient cause or must regard a part as containing more and other than the whole.

In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as much as the Infinite Cosmic Mind exceeds in rational knowledge the finite, subject mind, so much also does it surpass it in feeling.

Evidence of Will in Nature.

As to will in the object, the matter stands more obviously clear. Will is the causal energy in us to do, and is the one cause which we directly know. Let us always keep ourselves clear from thinking of will as a sort of entity or rational thing that is one *part* of our nature. When we speak of will in us, we mean simply the whole rational nature acting. That which acts, therefore, we must necessarily regard as in some way showing causal will, as in ourselves. The first explanation of things which primitive man gave for the events going on about him, viz.: intelligent spirits or beings like himself, rests upon the deepest and most inerrant intuitions of reason.

He was indisputably right in seeing causal will in nature. His mistakes were due to immaturity of thought, which permitted him to see many contending causes rather than the One, Ultimate Cause of all. With reflection, however, it came gradually to be seen that, instead of clashing or acting independently, these causal agencies in nature inter-acted harmoniously; until among the Greeks, for example, a beautiful hierarchy of gods was established. Then, of necessity, rational intuition pressed the conclusion still further, until the cosmic cause was conceived as one, or as a World-Soul, moving all and forming all.

This conception of One, Supreme, Causal Will, as sufficient for all the inter-acting cosmic events, differs in no essential from the modern scientific conception, as expressed by Mr. Spencer in his "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed." Only in modern times, so extensive and detailed has been the examination of nature as

to raise the notion of the One, Causal Will of the universe to its sublimest aspects.

Not only the more obvious objects which we see everywhere moving about us are impelled by this primal energy but the firm earth and the "fixed" stars are in perpetual motion, and even the deadest and dullest things under our feet, the dust of the ground, is charged with mighty energies.

Omnipresent Energy.

Planchette, the celebrated physicist, tells Raphael, who seeks some sufficient power to stretch the omniously shrinking talismanic "Peau de Chagrin," that "All things are motion. Thought is motion. Nature rests on motion. Death is a motion whose range is as yet little known to us. If God is eternal, we must believe that he is ever in motion; God is perhaps motion itself." And fifty years after Balzac wrote his weird, mystic tale, our physicists are proving to us that matter is motion.

At any rate, if we are to think of the one Infinite Substance in the World-Ground as Intelligence, we can no less think of the Eternal Cause in the World-Ground as Will.

Perhaps it may be said that it does not necessarily follow that the omnipotent, and the omni-present world-energy is will; it may be a force like gravitation, or chemism, or electrical energy. But then, again, will is the only power we directly know as an energy to bring things to pass, so that the various forces we see displayed about us in the world can only be thought of as divers forms of will, and our only means of designating these forces is to describe them in terms of will—there is no other possibility.

While, as in the case of intelligence and feeling in the Ultimate Reality, we may, it is true, think of the Omnipotent World-Energy as *above* what we understand by will, we can not think of it as *below* will, in its nature.

Well, then, the æsthetico-practical reason can do no other, in its interpretation of the object, than to recognize in the object that confronts it, feeling and will.

Evidence of Purpose in Nature.

But thus far we have only begun. For as suggestive as it may be to find ourselves convinced that the object feels and wills, our chief

interest is to know whether the objective will, manifested in nature, shows a purpose, moving toward some, definite, rational end. This is the burden of the so-called teleological argument, or the argument from design.

When man turns from his own rational inventions and artistic efforts, springing from the æsthetico-practical nature within him, to the grand, objective Cosmic Process, going on without and around him, he finds on every hand forms of finely adjusted inter-action, and the most felicitous adaptations, constituting one vast, harmonious plan. A plan which indeed, he may not be able to fathom in its whole extent, but which, nevertheless, clearly reveals itself to him, as a majestic, rational purpose of the Cosmic Will, moving toward some great end. He can draw no other conclusion, for there is no alternative. If he wishes to suppose that there is no design in nature, then he must deny that nature is rational, but such a denial means that science is irrational, and consequently that all scientific effort is so much futile trifling.

The Teleology of Evolution.

We have but to turn to our description of the evolutionary process to see how plainly there stands out before us a rational, cosmic plan. First, there is the inorganic world rising out of apparent chaos into the most exact rational form; and then there follows the assertion of inter-cosmic individualities in living cells, which aggregate into plant and animal organisms, through ages of evolution, until self-conscious man is reached. And so inter-related and inter-adapted are all these evolving forms that not only the one without the other could not exist, but all seem to rise stage by stage toward man, as the end of the whole process, who with or without divine right, at any rate, assumes the right to subordinate all to his own interests. Just *what* the specific purpose in the whole evolutionary process is, as already intimated, we may not now presume to know, but we must know *that* the purpose is there, or stultify the reason within us.

Artistic Aspects of Nature.

Inventors and artists as we are, it is impossible to look upon the objective world-order without beholding in it, first, a vast inorganic mechanism of infinite complexity; and, then, a grand, purposive, living organism which, taken in its totality and unity, presents itself

as a sublime, cosmic work of art. The least we can say is that, aside from any question of purpose in the world, it is, at any rate, so adapted to us, or we are so adapted to it, that its art value for us is inexhaustible, a value that deepens and refines with our own development.

The mere looking at nature presents the vision with an infinite variety of exquisite forms and colors, both in plant and animal life, swarming in the air, in the sea, and upon the earth; while the commonest objects which pass unnoticed, a granite pebble or the wing of a moth, would, for a moment's trouble, show us worlds of beauty. And what of the countless forms which never come under the eye of man and which would mock the pencil or brush of the most gifted genius! Agassiz used to say that God must love beauty, for he has made so much of it that no eye but his own can see.

The more general aspects of nature, however, are, though too much neglected by dull eyes, constantly pressing themselves upon us for admiring approval. The heavens by day or night, whether in calm or storm, are an ever-changing panorama which not only inspires the psalm of the bard and the wisdom of the sage but arouses in the humblest, emotions of wonder and adoration.

Who has not stood in adoring ecstasy at that hushed and rapturous miracle of the dawn, or watched the departing glory of the sun, as if the expectant soul were about to be led into the ineffable splendors of paradise.

Not even music, the softest and most heavenly, can express the delights of a June morning when the calm, clear heavens, the balmy, odor-laden air, and the earth, joyous with the burden of her fruitfulness, all seem listening in breathless, ecstatic silence to the birds singing among the trees. What painter has ever caught that half-light of a Summer evening, in its pensive, winsome charm, as it lay across fields and woods, while the meadow lark and bobolink sing of love? And even crabbéd December, with its invigoration, with the leafless branches of the wood, outlined in delicate tracery against the dull sky, and the crisp, white snow under feet, is not wanting in beauties of its own.

Who would essay to describe those majestic guardians of the earth, fitting types of God's steadfastness, the everlasting mountains, supporting the floor of heaven with hands of glistening snow, lest they offend the purity of angels; and thrusting their feet down into the

lush verdure of fertile valleys, or standing knee-deep in the cool waters of some unfathomed, crystalline sea?

And what a mysterious, awesome spell in the sublime immensity, restless lethargy, and irresistible power of the illimitable ocean! Now serenely spreading its ample robes of emerald, amethyst, sapphire, and burnished gold to the gaze of the approving skies, now petulantly flinging its tatters of crested foam into the visage of sullen clouds; now whispering its melodious mysteries along a thousand shores, to wake in the heart of lover and bard echoes of eternity; now shouting its appalling rage in titanic thunders, as if bent on crushing the world, or storming the immovable parapets of heaven.

Nor do the gentler and less compelling aspects of natural beauty leave us unmoved. The forest road with its coolness and shade, its deep, druidic mysteries, and its æolian murmurs; the plains with ripening harvests, a-ripple like some golden sea; the verdant hills and downs, covered with grazing herds; or the farmer's cottage beneath the elms, at the valley's turn, just where the brook leaps its rocky barrier, singing a perpetual monody of triumph and joyous life.

But when we turn away from any particular aspect of nature, and lift our thought to contemplate the vast total, in which we see the inter-play of forces and things, with the nicest adjustments and most exact adaptations, where atom joins to atom and star answers to star, all moving together in order and proportion, without loss, without haste, without delay, forming a self-sustaining, unitary, harmonious whole, in one, divine, cosmic symphony, the imagination is overwhelmed by a sense of the most exalted sublimity and beauty. We get for the first time an impression of how it is possible for the sublime, because of its proportion and harmony, to be beautiful; and the beautiful, because of its infinitude to be sublime.

Subjective Pleasure, Correlate to Objective Beauty.

But perhaps the attentive reader may exclaim: all this æsthetic appreciation of nature is but the subjective response of the intelligent observer's feelings—which differs with every individual—and has no correspondent in objective nature itself! Most assuredly it is the subjective response of the observer's feelings, but it is his æsthetic, appreciative response to the *given object*, just as much as his knowledge of the object is a theoretical response, and stands as much for something *objectively real*.

Just as my theoretical cognition of the red rose is not merely subjective but represents an objective appeal, so my æsthetic feeling of its beauty stands for more than what is *merely* subjective but represents value in the object as known to me. That is, in general, with reference to nature, while my thought of it may be quite false and blurred, and my consequent, correlate feeling quite confused and inadequate, it is as much for me an *object felt* as an *object known*, for the feeling is but the invariable, æsthetic, appreciation of one and the same object presented to thought. So that if nature, as an object known to me, presents itself as beautiful, it of necessity presents itself to me as an objective work of art.

The Human Artist Imitates the Divine Artist.

As if recognizing his fellow, the artist is forever imitating the Master's work in nature; and we can not help divining that just as back of the visible, human artist, there is his invisible intelligence and will, so back of the phenomenal cosmos, there is the One, Infinite Intelligence and Eternal Will of the Supreme World-Artist.

And God must take joy of his work! The poet, the sculptor, the painter, tell us that the free play of their power, in the sense of successful accomplishment, gives them the deepest satisfaction, and constitutes the highest reward for their labors. Can we think otherwise than that the artist's happiness, in his imitative creations, is but a gleam of that infinite joy which the Omnipotent Creator had, when he laid the foundations of the world, while "the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy!" (Job xxxviii, 7.)

Contrast in the Human and the Divine Artist.

The objection is often plausibly made that such a view destroys the infinitude of God, by representing him as dependent upon, or conditioned by, the material he uses, as in case of the human artist. The objection, however, is unconvincing, because it fails to recognize that, in inferring from the human to the Divine Artist, the *contrast* as well as the similarity is drawn between man and God.

Man, it is true, as finite, is dependent, conditioned, limited, and so is restricted to and by the materials he finds at hand; but God, the Infinite and Unlimited, as intelligence itself and will itself, is both substance and cause; the Unconditioned and Unrelated, and for that reason and at the same time the Ground of the conditioned and

related. He is the artist who, in following his designs, creates his own materials.

And yet the human artist too, when we regard him in his entirety, while in one aspect limited by the finite conditions imposed upon him; in another aspect, that is, in the essential nature of his intelligence and will, has something in him absolute that reveals his kinship with God.

Plausible Fallacies in Objections to Purpose.

In general, the plausability of the various objections to the teleological argument rises out of an entire misunderstanding of the argument. On the one hand, men claim to exalt the methods of the cosmic intelligence and will so far *above* the methods of human intelligence and will as to make the divine purpose utterly inscrutable; or, on the other hand, they plunge into the opposite absurd error of reducing the cosmic intelligence and will so far *below* human intelligence and will as to render the conception of any rational design in the world impossible.

The Divine Intelligence not Beyond Human Comprehension.

Paley's old argument about finding a watch on the sea-shore and concluding to the design of an intelligent watchmaker, has been rejected as applying to our interpretation of nature, on the ground that it represents God simply as a great watchmaker. This form of the argument has sometimes been contemptuously called the carpenter theory of the universe. Under the old dualistic, supernatural conception of the world, according to which God is represented as standing outside of the world and designing it as a man would design a watch or a house, the objection is sound. But then it only attacks the crude conception of the divine method and form of activity. In the larger, monistic view of immanence, according to which God is ever present in the world as its inner effectuating energy, the essence of Paley's argument remains untouched, viz.: that adaptation and design seen everywhere in nature, reveal intelligent purpose in the World-Ground, at least as clearly as man's works of invention and art reveal intelligent purpose in him.

It is true, we no longer think of nature as a mechanism but as a living organism, unfolding from within, a view which entirely invalidates anything like mechanical externalism; but it only reveals inner adaptation and design within the whole, as more intimate

and deep. It is the design of a rational thought or Idea, unfolding in the unity of all its related parts.

Biology Reveals Purpose.

Strange as it may seem, biology, the very science which, during the past half century has been supposed to invalidate design in nature, in reality is the science which most unequivocally implies and illustrates its presence. For biology is peculiarly the science which reveals a free and purposive activity toward an end, as contrasted with the mechanical necessity of physics and chemistry.

The essential character of living organisms is just their release from a fixed, mechanical compulsion and their freedom of choice, in adjusting themselves to each other and adapting themselves to the natural environment, as they unswervingly pursue their supreme, individual aims of self-preservation, and self-propagation. And when the whole range of life is taken into consideration, it is found to be dominated by a steady impulse of self-progression, which gives aim and meaning to, and constitutes what we call, evolution.

What connects the individual's purpose with the general purpose is that his free choice, in guarding faithfully his own aim of self-preservation and self-propagation, makes possible those favorable adjustments that result in a self-progression, which inaugurates an advance in the entire plan and contributes to its furtherance. That is, not only does each individual follow a definite plan, but life, taken in its entire range, is seen to move steadily forward and upward toward higher and more complex organic forms, along a path of free choice which is invariably followed in the purposive interests of the whole outcome, and which ultimately culminates in the self-conscious freedom of man.

It is exclusive occupation with the wide individual freedom within the whole plan, departure from which is always rigorously punished by failure, that has led investigators to overlook the meaning of the entire, comprehensive purpose, and has permitted them, at times, to conclude to a vague, fortuitous, unguided chance in the development of life.

Darwin and Design.

Darwin's great book, "The Origin of Species," which has so often been cited as a proof against design in nature, nowhere touches the

real essence of the teleological question. The title itself is inaccurate and misleading, for Darwin nowhere deals with the *origin* of species—except in so far as he regards certain original forms to have been set in nature by the hand of the Creator—but entirely occupies himself with the *genesis* of species, or with a description of how one species rises out of another species by reason of certain inter-acting, natural events.

The argument is well known but may with profit be briefly reviewed. It is observed that nature produces more living forms than she can or cares to support. Hence, among these there results a struggle for existence which terminates in the survival of those that have excelled their competitors in winning a livelihood, and in adjusting themselves to their surroundings.

In this way, nature is constantly selecting out the best for survival; or, we might say, that the survivors are best, because they succeed best in adapting themselves to nature such as she proves to be.

Teleological Ideas Involved.

Now it must be evident in such expressions as these that ideas of purpose are constantly being used, although their meaning is blurred and neglected. In the first place, when we run the vague abstraction, "struggle for existence," down to its concrete meaning, it stands for the *specific* struggle of *concrete* organisms toward *definite* ends. There is no such thing as a struggle for existence in general, but there is a struggle of particular individuals for particular forms of existence which they seek to maintain and propagate with great fidelity, and often against great odds. If any individual, be it the lowest and simplest cell or the highest and most complex plant or animal, can not win out over its competitors, or find an environment favorable to its specific purpose, it goes down. We must not, however, lose our heads in the general swirl of "the struggle for existence," but clearly recognize that what has happened is that a particular individual, in the specific circumstances surrounding him, has been unable to bring his definite purpose to fruition.

But now, the reason why the individual goes down introduces, in the second place, another idea of purpose, expressed in the term, "natural selection." That is, not only the struggling individual has a definite purpose, but nature also has a definite purpose, to which the individual must conform; for when we once more free ourselves from the vague ambiguity of the abstraction, we find concretely that nature,

while allowing a wide range of choice to the individual, has nevertheless pretty definite preferences as to what she will select or allow to survive. Nature will not pass "any old thing" that happens to come along, but sets up standards of excellence upon which she insists. The concrete situation we find to be that each individual is making his best endeavor, in competition with others, to win the favor of nature.

*Accidental Variation, Genesis of Species, and
Evolutionary Advance.*

Thus far, however, we have not yet got in sight of anything like the genesis—to say nothing of origin—of species, or anything that even suggests it. For we have only a mutual adjustment between the purpose of the struggling individual and the selective purpose of nature, choosing out the best as survivors. Once the adjustment is made, we might go on forever in the attained *statu quo*, unless something happened to introduce a change.

Well, this change does come, in the Darwinian "accidental variation" which, in its turn, must run the gauntlet of struggle and selection. If by its fitness the accidental variation enables the individual to stand the test and survive, then heredity will hand it on and perpetuate it. So that in the course of time—necessarily a very long time—these surviving, accidental variations will accumulate to the extent of giving us a new species.

But we are not yet in sight of evolution, even if, as is not at all evident to the Lamarckian or Weismannian, we have a complete description of how one species may grow into another. For evolution is not the mere *change*, but the *rise* of one species into another; its peculiar meaning is that of an unfolding progress toward higher and more complex forms. And for this definite, concrete advance, accidental variations, conserved and handed on by heredity, in no way accounts. For instead of permitting accidental variations, *as* mere accidents, so far as we can see, nature will not only approve *only* those variations that meet her definite plan, but reveals her plan to be an approval of those variations which move steadily toward higher levels.

What we really have before us, in the whole range of concrete, biological evolution, is, on the one hand, the struggle of life with its definite purpose of self-preservation, self-propagation, and self-

progression; and, on the other hand, the selection of nature which has a definite purpose of guiding and leading on that struggle to rational self-conscious existence in man.

Even if we supplement Darwin's theory with Lamarckian and Weismannian elements, and should succeed in getting a complete description of this entire process in terms of intelligible laws, our result would be quite free from problems of design, except in so far as we might introduce questions as to whether the whole intelligible plan is the outcome of mere chance or of intelligent purpose. Darwin's labors had nothing to do with these questions. His great merit was in showing how the successive, rising order of living forms on the earth—which had long been surmised as a progressive evolution—might be regarded as an evolution, according to great rational laws immanent in nature, rather than the result of supernatural interference in the course of nature.

Method of Evolution Reveals Purpose.

And yet, while his work was nominally concerned with the method of procedure rather than with the causal purpose, it has nevertheless, together with all evolutionary investigation since his day, not only confirmed but enhanced the real meaning of intelligent design. For what biological evolution makes more and more clear is, first, that the living organism's struggle for existence is the expression of a definite purpose to overcome the incoherence and change, involved in the struggle, by finding a harmonious adjustment to nature, which thereupon shows her approval, when that harmonious adjustment has been attained, by conferring the coherence and rest of surviving life; and, secondly, that nature's approval reveals her purpose as becoming more and more significant and generous, the more largely the individual's life partakes of her fellowship; for, in proportion as he does so, he not only more fully shares her favors but gains the power and the right to dominate those below him. Nothing can be more evident, as we look from the lowest to the highest forms of the evolutionary scale, than that life struggles forward not only toward higher organic complexity, but toward intelligent consciousness and then rational self-consciousness, and that nature reveals her purpose to be an approval of those self-conscious; forms of life which, by reason of their intelligence, are better fitted for the struggle, and so are better able to survive.

When, finally, man rises into self-consciousness, there is forced upon him a rational understanding of those purposive lessons of struggle for existence and natural selection, which he observes in the orders of creation below him. He is dominated by the same deep, ineradicable, and purposive instincts of self-preservation, self-propagation, and self-progression; and he finds that, in order to maintain these individual interests, he is forced into the same struggle for existence, and his fate must be determined by the same inexorable, natural selection.

The Design of Natural Continued in Rational Evolution.

But what divides him immeasurably from his animal predecessors and constitutes him man, is that, having been raised to self-consciousness, his problem now becomes supra-natural or rational. So that his struggle for existence is now a self-conscious struggle for *rational* existence, in competition with self-conscious, *rational* beings, in order to adapt himself to the demands of a *rational* selection, which reveals itself as above nature. Therefore, his supreme aim becomes a rational self-realization, to effect which he must come to know and act upon his true relations to his rational fellows, and to the rational cosmos.

And, endowed as he is with an intellectual, æsthetic, and moral reason, he comes to discover that, through his sciences and arts, he overcomes the struggle with the environment and enters into harmonious accord with the selective, purposive demands of the Cosmic Truth and Beauty; but not until, through his ethics, he has overcome the struggle with his fellows, and has entered into that harmonious, moral accord with them which is based upon the demands of the Cosmic Goodness.

Now, while this whole scheme of things, with its inner, mutual inter-actions and inter-adaptations, is infinitely above any of man's petty designs, it nevertheless constitutes for man an intelligible, rational plan, moving toward some great end, or rather reveals itself as a grand, cosmic organism, unfolding to its full self-realization; and if the objector refuses to see in it what we mean by design, as a product of intelligent will, based on rational values, he himself must declare what it is, and that too so clearly as to win the approval of reason. If he wishes merely to make objections in general, or evade the problem altogether, then there is nothing more to be said, for by that very fact he drops entirely outside the range of rational consideration.

The Divine Intelligence not Below the Human.

But the second sort of objector, who seems to be overwhelmed by the fear of belittling the Divine Being by interpreting him in terms of reason, instead of putting him too high for comprehension, succeeds in committing the extraordinary irrationality of reducing him to non-intelligent, unconscious force, and then refuses to see any purpose at all. That is, although a feather, a gnat, or even an atom of iron reveals an adaptation and a design, before which the best work of man is the crudest bungling, the reality or causal ground behind the feather, the gnat, or the atom is regarded, in point of intelligence and will, below man.

It would be as sane to believe that Newton's "Principia" was the product of a mollusk. Granted that we had the "Principia" without knowing its origin or anything of its author, we might not conclude *how* great was the author's intelligence, but we would be obliged to conclude that it was great enough, at least, to produce the work before us.

Much more so, in interpreting the nature of the one, causal will back of the world, are we forced, in the light of man's own inventions and art, to conclude that its order, law, and harmonious unity show an intelligent will, at any rate, up to the level of man's. Indeed, the rational purposes of the Divine Intelligence must go as far beyond those of man as the Infinite rises above the finite.

While the old anthropomorphism, which "changed the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man," is irrational, it remains that, in the light of reason, "the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity." (Rom. i, 20-23.)

The Essence of the Teleological Argument.

The essence of the teleological argument then is that, to judge from the feeling and will in ourselves, which enables us to evaluate things, adapt means to ends and carry out rational purposes, the Cosmos also, which everywhere shows order, adaptation, rational plan, must rest upon intelligent feeling and will like our own—always, however, be it remembered that feeling and will in themselves are absolute, and not to be confused with the restricted forms they take on in the phenomenal life of man.

In speaking of a great purpose, revealed in nature, as in the grand scheme of inorganic and organic evolution, we must recall the analogies of the theoretical interpretation (p. 286). That is, it can not be taken to mean that the Divine Reason, as intelligent will, unfolds itself in time as phenomenal activities in space, but rather that the whole process is the unfolding of the conditioned mind of man, under the limitations of time, as it interprets the Eternal Mind. It is our human way of coming to know the One, Absolute Cause.

The reader will not fail to recognize that, in these teleological considerations, we are always, at last analysis, resting upon the ontological attitude, to which in the end all interpretation, as we anticipated, must come back. The feeling and will in the subject, which evaluates, designs and executes, interprets the activities in the object as the result of creative feeling and will. It is again reason answering to reason; it is the inner, real man, hearing the voice and beholding the form of God, through his outer manifestations.

We Demand to Know the Nature of the Motive.

Up to this point the teleological argument is incomplete. While the æsthetico-practical interpretation enables us to know *that* the Cosmic Will has a great purpose, moving toward some lofty end, it does not in itself inform us *what* the nature of that will is, what the motive, or what the possible end of that purpose.

And yet reason demands to know the purpose of things, as affording their final explanation. In other words, explanation, which is an understanding of the causal will that moves along the path of thought in pursuit of the values of feeling, can alone give ultimate satisfaction to reason. Can we hope to get such an explanation, or come to understand the rational purpose of our human existence?

We can but fall back again upon the ontological attitude and ask: If the reason within us knows its own ends and the motives prompting to them, is there not here the possibility of a further interpretation of the Cosmic Will?

When we ask what is the ultimate impulse that drives us to act, we shall find that it is the will to secure æsthetic values for ourselves, or to confer them upon others. At bottom, it is an egoistic or an altruistic affection, which reveals the fundamental essence of life to be the moral will. Whether we desire it to be so or not, we find it to be the inseparable condition of our existence that, consciously or un-

consciously, we *will* to do in our own interests for our own benefit and pleasure, or in the interests of others for their benefit and pleasure.

We must then submit the purpose of the Cosmic World-Order to an ethical interpretation, in order to see if the ethical reason can furnish any clue to *what* the divine purpose is, or *why* the object is as it is.

III INTERPRETATION OF THE ETHICAL REASON.

CHAPTER X.

THE ETHICAL PROBLEM STATED.

WE recall how Kant, finding himself unable to attain Reality through the theoretical reason, turned to the ethical reason, in which he was confident that he had found the conditions of an assured faith in the objective existence of Reality. While we have dissented from his negative result, which denies the capacity of thought to know the truth; we assent to his positive result, which asserts the power and greatness of the moral will—although we can not regard his argument as an adequate statement of the interpretative function of the ethical reason.

He opened the subject, but did not develop it to its rational conclusion. When he said that the universal, imperative Ought within us, incapable of fulfillment in the phenomenal world, necessarily demands, if it is to have any meaning, a world of Reality in which it *can* be realized, he was uttering a profound truth, but did not make the most of it. He left it as a theoretical inference, whereas he should have brought it out into the light of a direct, ontological intuition of likeness between subject and object.

When I say that the object will not deceive me, but will fully respond to the moral nature within me, the rational subject, I am simply taking the ontological attitude over again, as in the case of the theoretical and æsthetical reason, and asserting that the moral reason in the object is calling to the moral reason in me. So that when we make this ontological attitude the basal ground of the ethical interpretation, we are really but carrying out and completing what Kant had already begun.

We are not, however, in any sense regarding it with him, as an argument for the *existence* God, which is at once given to rational intuition; but as an interpretative means of determining the *nature* of God.

We have found that man, as the moral subject, beginning with the naive egoism of self and passing through the altruistic struggle of law and justice, finally arrives at his full ethical development, in a universalism of good-will, streaming out to benefit or please others.

When, therefore, he turns to the great cosmic object that confronts him, man's deepest concern is to know whether that Absolute Unity of Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause, which presents itself to his theoretical and æsthetical reason as Truth and Beauty, is equally an Absolute, Infinite, and Eternal Will of Goodness. This is the last supreme question which, as rational beings, can engage our attention. Is God good?

The Goodness of God, the Deepest Concern of Man.

If God is not good, in some such way as Jesus represents him in his Gospel, then nothing is worth while. We should have no certainty that our sciences could be relied upon, as presenting a steady and permanent order of things; chaos would, at any moment, be as natural and justified as rational law; and even if we could find passing joys and pleasures in life, they would be merely the accidents of chance, and have no guarantee in the reason of things. Our greatest undertakings and our highest artistic efforts would have no value, for we could never rely upon their completion, or rest in their assured worthiness.

On the other hand, if God is good, then everything is worth while. Science at once gains a dignity and permanence based upon an Absolute Objective Integrity. Even the sorrows and misfortunes of life are brought under the guidance of a Wise Providence, which makes all things work together for good to them that love God; and not only the loftiest but also the humblest tasks rise in value and worthiness, while the lowliest artisan, as well as the most inspired artist, finds his place, as a co-worker with God, in the accomplishment of a great end.

That the moral interpretation of Reality is our supreme interest, grows out of the nature of reason itself. For we have learned, in discussing the threefold unity of reason, that ethics includes science and art, gives them what meaning they have, and is indeed the fundamental ground upon which they rest. Science is the path we must follow, in order to carry out our moral purposes of bestowing the pleasures and beauties of art upon others. That is to say, all Truth

is Beauty, because Truth is the outer form in which Goodness manifests itself.

The Cosmic Order Implies Goodness in the Cosmic Will.

The application of this dictum to the Cosmos is at once evident. The rational inter-relations among all things, which we call the objective truth, constitute a harmonious unity, or what we call Beauty. That the Causal Power, Energy, or Will upon which the Cosmic Truth and Beauty rest is Goodness would seem to be an inevitable conclusion, axiomatically simple in its nature. That is, the Causal Will of the Universe is Eternal Goodness, because it manifests itself in the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth.

The Christian consciousness, however much it may at times have obscured this great doctrine, has formally at least always regarded it as fundamental. And we might, indeed, consider our ethical interpretation complete, inasmuch as the rational purpose in the Cosmos which our æsthetico-practical interpretation brought to light, is revealed as a purpose of Eternal Goodness; were it not for the fact that experience seems to cast discredit upon such a conclusion, and thought may doubt it.

Optimistic and Pessimistic Views.

We can not blink the very evident fact that, however well ordered and beautiful, in the main, the world in which we live may appear, it brings upon us innumerable evils, such as disaster to our fortunes and disease to our bodies, and finally the last and ultimate ruin of all our human interests in death. If we can not go to the extreme of saying, with the pessimistic Schopenhauer, that this is the *worst* possible world, it would seem like a superficial mockery to say, with the optimistic Leibnitz, that it is the *best* possible world.

The situation, we may suppose, is rather that which presented itself to the mind of John Stuart Mill. It seemed to him that the Causal Will back of the universe, taken on the whole, is benevolent, but, in view of the actual course of events, is somewhat thwarted in its purposes. And yet such a view has a certain flippancy or irreverence about it that does not comport with the greatness of the subject. We must think of the Ultimate Reality, or God, as the Omnipotent Causal Will, and to regard him as incapable of carrying out his de-

signs would abolish all rational efforts; for in such a case, we should be dealing with a possible chaos in place of a possible cosmos.

It were better, with certain forms of theology, to consider evil as included, in some inscrutable way, in the Divine purposes of good. We could then bear evil with fortitude and patiently wait for an explanation, or rejoice in it as some of the saints and martyrs have actually done. Indeed, to some minds the Christian religion has presented itself as a religion that exalts and sanctifies suffering as something peculiarly divine and beautiful.

Reason Protests against Evil, as Arising out of Error and Sin.

But aside from the plain fact that the Christian religion makes the peculiar claim for itself of redeeming men from all suffering, reason protests, practically and theoretically, that suffering is neither divine nor beautiful. Instead of regarding evil as a good imposed by a wise providence, men invariably seek to escape it. What we call civilization and progress largely consists in the escape of evils to which the past was subject.

And when we view the matter theoretically, we find that the sufferings of mankind all run back to two sources, viz.: ignorance of, or error about, objective nature; and wrong-doing, injustice, or sin in human history. Error is an opposite of truth, sin is an opposite of goodness; and it is impossible for reason to see how God, whom we must think of as Ultimate Truth and Ultimate Goodness, should introduce into his plans some positive entities which are the opposites of truth and goodness.

We can, for the time being, therefore, do no better than to agree with Lotze, who had given many years of observation and thought to the subject. He believed as firmly as Kant in the Goodness of God, but when he turned to the world of nature and the world of history, to examine the facts and the actual course of events, he found the objective truth which science and philosophy discovered therein, not to be in harmony with a belief in the Divine Goodness. Thus, between the interests of our ethical reason, which must demand of the Cosmic Will that it be good, and the interests of our theoretical reason, which is forced to admit the presence of evil and sin in the Cosmic Truth, there is a chasm which reason can not now bridge. We can only hope some day to find a solution. What God ought to be as

the Will of the Cosmos (Goodness), he does not actually manifest himself to be as the Thought of the Cosmos (Truth); so that our æsthetic interests are denied or abolished in finding discord, in place of harmony, and misery, in place of happiness (Beauty and Life).

The momentous significance, then, of our ethical interpretation lies in the attempt to solve this stubborn mystery of theodicy, by reconciling all the interests of reason, in showing how Reality, as the will of Eternal Goodness, is manifested in the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth.

The Natural Course of Procedure.

Our line of procedure has already been clearly marked out for us. That is, we have but to know the true ethical meaning of our theoretical, and of our æsthetico-practical interpretation of Reality, in order to get the moral significance of the world. In other words, since we have been led to look upon the world as a manifestation to us in space and time, under the conditions of sense, of the Infinite and Eternal Thought and Will, in its totality and unity of Substance and Cause, and, therefore, as a rational, harmonious order of Beauty, what must be our conclusion as to the ethical nature of that Infinite and Eternal Energy from which the whole proceeds?

Responsibility for Evil.

Before we begin, however, to consider the ethical meaning of our theoretical and æsthetical interpretations, we must clear away a grave ambiguity, as to the responsibility for the evil in the world, which by vitiating the beauty of the world, seems to cast discredit upon the goodness of the world.

When we cast our eye over the present condition of the world, or contemplate its past, in respect to the evils which afflict mankind, we shall find that they arise from two sources, nature and history.

There are destructive storms and floods, earthquake shocks and volcanic eruptions, plagues, famines, and noxious plants and animals, which impose upon man disaster and misery, seemingly without other origin than the inexorable decrees of nature herself.

Evils Arising in Human History.

But far more prolific is the brood of evils that swarm out of man's relation to man, which constitutes the content of what we call history.

The page of history seems to be a dark record of man's inhumanity to man. And if in our present state of society, we were to eliminate all the suffering due to the oppressive tyrannies of the strong, the vices of the weak, the falsehood, perfidy, and injustice, the bestial lusts, the greed of gold, and the ill-will, arising from the bitter struggle for material pleasures and gains, we should find the remaining evils, attributable to nature, reducible to an almost negligible minimum. Indeed, many of the evils which we charge up against nature as acts of God, can be traced back to human ignorance, error, and wrongdoing. Especially is this true of the appalling accidents which are due to criminal neglect and economy; and of loathsome diseases, due to gluttony and lust. The responsibility for all such evils we must throw upon man, and not lay them to the charge of nature or the objective world which we seek to interpret.

Is Nature Responsible for Man's Error and Wrong-Doing?

But, perhaps, a somewhat indignant objection will be raised. Is not man, with all his defects and weakness, his ignorance and brutality, it will be asked, after all a product of the objective, natural order of world-development? Have we not learned that the roots of his being run back to the very beginning of things? Has he not come up out of nature, and does he not resume in himself all her processes? Are not the vital and conscious forces in him but inheritances of plant and animal life? Do not the organs of his body repeat the animal structure and give evidence of rudimentary left-overs from lower orders of life? In his impulses, tempers and dispositions, does he not simply repeat his animal progenitors? Does he not in his very countenance show the gluttony of the hog, the stupidity of the ox, the sullen pertinacity of the ass, the slinking cowardice and meanness of the hyena, the poisonous cruelty of the serpent, the imbecility of the sheep, the lubricity of the goat, and the fatuous flippancy of the monkey? So deeply and intimately is he bound up with nature, so completely is he a product of nature, must we not in the end, recognize that, in all his ignorance and brutishness, he is what he is, in virtue of his origin in nature? So that, after all, ought we not to carry back the elemental stupidity, greed, lust, cruelty, and ill-will in him to his bestial ancestors; and agree with Lombroso that all the vices and crimes of humanity are atavistic, or due to the natural, instinctive animalism out of which man has not yet emerged?

To all of these rhetorical questions we must reply: It is true that there are masses of men who do not yet seem to have risen above a state of animal consciousness, except to be conscious of the self; and are driven by irresistible animal instincts in their actions. But we are interested in *man as such*, whose peculiar characteristic is his self-conscious, *rational superiority to nature*. He broaches the subject of evil, and asks who is responsible. And the moment the question arises, that moment man has entered upon a higher order of ideas which lifts him above nature.

*Man Rises above Nature into a Rational Responsibility
of his Own.*

If we have learned how intimate is the relation of man to nature, we have been able to do so, in virtue of the momentous fact that he has come to self-conscious otherness, as a rational being, over against nature. His interests are no longer confined to the natural realm, because he has risen to the supra-natural realm, where he is not helplessly carried along as a thing by the monistic stream of events, but recognizes himself as a free rational individual who is to carve out his own destiny.

Man has persistently made this proud claim of his superiority to the objective order of things, and has always assumed the responsibility of his own thoughts and deeds. Thus, have not men praised Prometheus for stealing fire from the gods; and marched in festal procession to honor Triptolemus, who taught them to draw with the plough their nourishment from the earth? Did they not offer sacrifices to Aesculapius, because he showed them how to cheat death; and make Hercules a god, because he did so much to alleviate the ills of mankind?

Why do we commend a Luther, a Cromwell, a Washington; and condemn a Philip, a Charles, an Arnold? It is because men, instinctively and without question, regard themselves and others as responsible for what they do. Were they not thus responsible, praise and blame, estimates of merit and demerit, would never arise, or if they did arise, would be meaningless.

The Dignity of Being Responsible for Error and Sin.

Man has always somehow asserted the dignity and worth of being responsible for his own mistakes and wrong doings. It is a heavy

burden and indeed sometimes hard to bear; but from the moment he wakes from the monistic, cosmic dream and becomes an other, a self-conscious, supra-natural, rational individual, he steps out into the free, intellectual, and moral responsibility of determining his own career. Weak and helpless as he is, at first, a mere naked bantling, cast out upon the shores of time, to meet alone, it may be, Gorgon terrors and contend with Titanic foes, he is nevertheless a man, who in time comes to feel himself to be a companion and fellow of the gods—if not indeed himself a god, though in the germ.

And if to reach the goal of full stature, by his own intelligence and moral strength, he must needs wander and suffer pain, would he on this account ever renounce his birthright as a free rational man, give up his own destiny as an individual intelligent and moral being, and sink to the level of the instinctive animal, in order to avoid the pangs of struggle? No, he will bravely face the tragic sorrows of the conflict, in order to be himself. In spite of crushing defeat, or blasted hopes, or misfortune and loss, though the very earth be removed and the mountains cast into the sea, the mysterious, prophetic voice ever sounds through his soul: Son of man, stand upon thy feet; thou art but little lower than God, who hast crowned thee with glory and honor, and given thee dominion over the works of his hands.

And he becomes all the more determined because nature, which has first cast him forth into the conflict, has at the same time imparted to him her secret of a progressive unfoldment, which means not only a struggle for existence *against* others, but a struggle for reconciliation *with* others.

Man Assumes the Responsibility of his own Thought and Will.

We have seen elsewhere (p. 28) how the farther the animal moved away from the necessity of mechanism and cosmic instinct toward an independent and free individuality, the more eager were its attempts to return to oneness with its environment; so man who, as a self-conscious, thinking, feeling, and willing reason, having become a true individual and other than the cosmos, now recognizes his destiny to be a rational self-realization, by which he comes to think the Thought and will the Will of the Cosmos, in order that, thus reconciled with it, he may enter into its harmonious feeling of beauty and happiness.

Why, in order to reach this supreme consummation, man should be compelled to pass through the struggle of his rational development at all, involving, as it does, the possibility of his errors and sins, is a question that belongs to the following book on the Pedagogy of Pain. At present, we wish to make clear to ourselves that man, in view of his rational dignity and worth as a free intellectual and moral being, assumes the responsibility of his own error and sin, as no essential part of the real object before him, but as so much subjective mistake in thought and perversity of will, which it devolves upon him to overcome and destroy.

In seeking, then, an ethical interpretation of the object, we must save ourselves the confusion and embarrassment of laying at the door of nature the evils for which man himself must stand sponsor; and thus prepared, we may with some freedom turn to inquire concerning the ethical meaning of the theoretical and of the æsthetical interpretation of the world in which we live.

CHAPTER XI.

ETHICAL MEANING OF SCIENCE IN NATURE.

THE antagonism between the theoretical view and the ethical view of the world is nowhere more strikingly seen than in the difference between the spirit of science and the spirit of poetry. Science and scientific philosophy are wholly theoretical in their interests, caring for nothing but the objective truth of things; while poetry, deeply ethical as well as æsthetical in its interests, seeks to find the harmonious beauty of a living goodness among things.

They represent two distinct attitudes toward the world, and by seeing their relation, one to the other, whether really hostile or friendly, we may get to know what moral significance, if any, the theoretical interpretation of the world has.

The Poetical View of the World is Ethical.

That which gives life to the poetical view of the world is a deep conviction, such as that which is expressed in the Hebrew Psalmists and Prophets, who portray the world as a manifestation to man of the creative, sustaining Wisdom and Goodness of the Eternal. "The earth is full of the glory of Yahweh."

Nor was the Hebrew—though exceptional in his simple, pure monotheism—alone, in seeing nature as a divine manifestation. One of the most widely spread primitive myths, or poetic interpretations of nature, was the belief that the over-shadowing canopy of heaven was the father, and the earth was the mother of mankind, while all nature was full of living presences, ready to hear and help. In the beautiful mythology of India and Greece, the sky, the air, the earth; rivers and seas, mountains and valleys, forests, and plains were the dwelling places of divine beings who, placable and beneficent, watched over and guided man.

And even when all the gods of antiquity are swept away and great Pan is dead, at the hands of science, our modern poets still sing of a living presence in nature, akin to man.

Shakespeare makes his exiled Duke confess that the woods of Arden

are "more free from peril than the envious court," and finds even in "the icy fang and churlish chiding of the winter's wind," at any rate, freedom from flattery, and genuine councils of good.

"And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in the stones and good in everything."

(As You Like It. II, 1.)

Everyone knows Lowell's beautiful rhapsody on June in Sir Launfal's vision, how

"Heaven tries the earth, if it be in tune,"

and how

"Every clod feels a stir of might,
An instinct within it that reaches and towers
And, groping blindly above it for light,
Climbs to a soul in grass and flowers."

The Poet Finds Love the Law of Nature.

Readers of Browning will remember how in "Saul," conceived and uttered much in the spirit of the Hebrew Psalmist, the poet represents the young singer, David, seeking for some warrant of a love that might save his king from the black despair into which he had fallen, and at last finding this warrant in the power, wisdom, and beauty of nature, God's handwork. The shepherd bard, every faculty in him tasked to the highest, discovers perfection on every side, in the kind he imagined, and "God is seen God, In the star, in the stone, in the flesh, in the soul and the clod." But just as much as nature reveals a power, wisdom, and beauty infinitely above his own, so it reveals a love, infinitely above his own. "And thy love fill infinitude wholly, nor leave up nor down, One spot for the creature to stand in!" So intense and startling was the glory of this vision that to the young singer, the whole universe seemed to throb with the rapture and tumult of a deep emotion; and it was only strugglingly that he got back to his sheepcotes, through the wonderful night. At dawn the glory was still seen and felt:

"In the gathered intensity brought to the grey of the hills;
In the shuddering forest's held breath; in the sudden wind thrills;
In the startled wild beasts that bore oft, each with eye sidling still,
Though averted with wonder and dread; in the birds stiff and chill
That rose heavily as I approached them, made stupid with awe:
E'en the serpent that slid away silent—he felt the new law;

The same stared in the white humid faces, upturned by the flowers;
 The same worked in the heart of the cedar and moved the vine bowers;
 And the little brooks witnessing murmured, persistent and low,
 With their obstinate, all but hushed voices—E'en so, it is so!"

With not so much fervor, Goethe in effect represents nature as having a divine significance, where, in Faust, the Earth Spirit exults that he is ever weaving, at the loom of time, the living garment of God.

Wordsworth Finds Nature Wise and Good.

But lovers of Wordsworth will doubtless claim that he, more than any other, has made us appreciative of the moral values in nature, which for him everywhere breathed a life of purity, wisdom, and goodness.

When he would invoke the spirit of Milton to restore to England, at that hour "a fen of stagnant waters," her "ancient dower of inward happiness," he could think of no simile more convincing than:

"Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart
 Thou hadst a voice whose sound was like the sea
 Pure as the naked heavens, majestic, free."

It is a question whether anything else has ever been written that reveals so deep, sympathetic, and intimate appreciation of nature as his "Lines" above Tintern Abbey. The poet frankly professes himself to be a "lover" and "worshipper" of Nature. And yet it is always nature as *interpreted* by him, that is, as a something so deeply allied to his own spiritual being as to bring him a message full of meaning and power. Even past memories of "beauteous forms" come back to him "amid the din of towns and cities," to tranquilize and restore his troubled mind. But still more, he owes to them "another gift of aspect more sublime," which pervades him as a blessed mood,

"In which the burthen of the mystery,
 In which the heavy and the weary weight
 Of all this unintelligible world,
 Is lightened:—that serene and blessed mood,
 In which the affections lead us on,—
 Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
 And even the motion of our human blood
 Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
 In body, and become a living soul;
 While with an eye made quiet by the power
 Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
 We see into the life of things."

With Age Comes Deeper Insight.

The poet finds that with growing years, nature gains a deeper and better meaning. Let the ecstatic pleasures, which in his youth he found in the external forms of nature pass away, he will not complain, because other gifts have followed with abundant recompense.

“For I have learned
To look on Nature, not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth; but hearing oftentimes
The still, sad music of humanity,
Nor harsh, nor grating, though of ample power
To chasten and subdue. And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through things.”

Here the poet has read the deeper meaning of Nature by seeing in and through her outer forms his true fellow Spirit.

But although a larger and more mature experience has revealed something far greater in his beloved mistress than the superficial, sensuous delights of youth, yet in these he sees symbols that have led him on:

“well pleased to recognize
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchor of my purest thoughts; the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being.”

Of one thing he is sure, amid his own varied experiences—he knows “that Nature never did betray The heart that loved her.” And this her integrity and worth is so great that amid the disillusionments and sorrows of life, she brings consolation, instruction, healing, and benediction; for

“’tis her privilege,
Through all the years of this our life, to lead
From joy to joy; for she can so inform
The mind within us, so impress
With quietness and beauty, and so feed
With lofty thoughts, that neither evil tongues,

Rash judgments, nor the sneers of selfish men,
 Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor all
 The dreary intercourse of daily life,
 Shall e'er prevail against us or disturb
 Our cheerful faith, that all which we behold
 Is full of blessings."

It is little wonder then that the poet should remind his sister, to whom the lines are addressed and who shared with him the appreciations,

"that I, so long
 A worshipper of Nature, hither come
 Unwearied in that service: rather say,
 With warmer love,—oh! with far deeper zeal
 Of holier love."

Science Hushes the Voice of Poetry.

But at the very moment when Wordsworth was giving to Nature so full and living a poetico-moral significance, the spirit of science was banishing from men's minds all thought of any meaning in nature whatever. The age of a new enlightenment had come, the age of analysis, of observed fact, of strict induction; and the whole mysterious wonder and infinitely varied beauty of nature, so significant to the poet, sunk to the level of a ceaseless mechanism of matter in motion. Her inexorable and steady ways refuse all placation, and are deaf to our most earnest prayers. Cold and impenetrable, she seems to return no voices of tenderness and mercy, as of yore, to our deepest and most insistent calls. Not only had the gods and their messengers of the ancient world been banished; not only had the friendly sprites and fairies of our own immediate past fled from fountain and wood; but, for us, God and his angels have been driven from the world. There are no sacred spots; the fires have been quenched in every hallowed shrine; ocean, forest, mountain, and over-shadowing blue are no longer peopled by living sympathy and help; and we look out weak, unfriended and orphaned upon a blank and empty universe of illimitable spaces, overwhelming powers, inexorable law and order, which we can not placate, can not understand, and can not love.

The effect of this new, theoretical scientific view of nature, as a vast mechanism of impersonal and immutable law—a view slowly forming from the days of the Renaissance—was at no time more deeply felt than in the middle of the last century. For, to the older view of a

mechanical nature, there was added the mechanical view of man. Biological studies had led to the conclusion that man himself is a product of nature, physically and mentally, that is, not only his body and brain, but his intellectual and moral being are but the outcome of material and mechanical laws. Feuerbach's German pun—untranslatable into English—to the effect that "Man is what he eats" (*Man ist was er isst*), expressed a widespread conviction. Gravitation and evolution became the symbols of one all-inclusive, necessary order of things, that swept both body and soul, nature and history, into a non-moral, inescapable, fatalistic destiny.

We can easily understand how such a view oppressed the muses; and how the seers and poets, the only truth-tellers between God and man, were for a time crushed under the weight of the new, godless, non-moral, scientific *Zeitgeist*.

The Poet's Light Darkened by the Scientific World-View.

There seemed something almost like ironical mockery in the fact that the Laureate successor of that other Laureate, who found Nature so full of living wisdom and goodness, should himself feel the bitterness of living in a heartless order of law and mechanism.

It will be remembered how Tennyson, in his well-known elegy, "In Memoriam," bewails bitterly the premature loss of his friend. He had been startled from his old optimism by the pitiless course of things which brought him so much sorrow, and offered him no consolation. That which troubled him so deeply was the awful discrepancy between what *we want* God to be, and what *nature reveals* him to be.

"Are God and Nature then at strife,
That Nature lends such evil dreams?
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life;

"That I, considering everywhere
Her secret meaning in her deeds,
And finding that of fifty seeds
She often brings but one to bear,

"I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar stairs
That slope through darkness up to God,

"I stretch lame hands of faith and grope
And gather dust and chaff and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope."

Yet no! the cruel, inexorable facts confront him, and an access of despair beats down even this feeble hope.

" 'So careful of the type,' but no,
From scarped cliff and quarried stone
She cries, 'A thousand types are gone;
I care for nothing, all shall go.

" 'Thou makest thine appeal to me;
I bring to life, I bring to death;
The spirit does but mean the breath,
I know no more.' And he, shall he,

"Man, her last work, who seemed so fair,
Such splendid purpose in his eyes
Who roll'd the psalm to wintry skies,
Who built him fanes of fruitless prayer,

"Who trusted God was love indeed
And love Creation's final law—
Tho' Nature, red in tooth and claw
With ravine, shriek'd against his creed—

"Who loved, who suffered countless ills,
Who battled for the True and Just,
Be blown about the desert dust,
Or seal'd within the iron hills?

"No more? A monster then, a dream,
A discord. Dragons of the prime
That tear each other in their slime
Were mellow music match'd with him.

"O life, as futile, then, as frail!
O for thy voice to soothe and bless!
What hope of answer, or redress?
Behind the veil, behind the veil!"

(lv-lvi.)

The Poet Reinterprets and Vitalizes the Scientific World-View.

But no mechanism, no invariable order of outer laws, no agnostic theories of non-moral necessity, could long obscure that inner, divine light by which the poet lives; and though for a moment he gropes in gloom, he soon emerges from the fevered phantasmagoria into health,

soundness of mind, and clear vision. Out of the sorrow and struggle, he sees arise a higher type of man, in harmony with a new and higher world, a race

“Of those that, eye to eye, shall look
On knowledge; under whose command
Is Earth and Earth's, and in their hand
Is Nature like an open book;

“No longer half akin to brute,
For all we thought and loved and did,
And hoped and suffered is but seed
Of what in them is flower and fruit;

“Whereof the man, that with me trod
This planet, was a nobler type,
Appearing ere the times were ripe,
That friend of mine who lives in God,

“That God which ever lives and loves,
One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.”

(cxxxi.)

Here the poet comes to see clearly in Nature and in History, or the life of man in the world, the manifestation of a divine plan; he sees the mechanism of law subordinated to the deeper and all-inclusive meaning of an evolution which is moving toward a great end.

The Prophet of Chelsea and his Significance.

But perhaps nowhere else do we have, as in Carlyle's "Sartor Resartus," so conscious and complete a portrayal of the bitter sorrow inflicted upon the soul by the new, scientific interpretation of the world, and its painful struggles through stages of transition until it comes to better and higher views of life, by reinterpreting the new message.

Teufelsdröckh, our hero, has been shaken out of his naive happiness by to him the bitterest of disappointments, and he must needs question anew the meaning of life and seek therein some consolation and help. Unfortunately, he has lost all hope, upon which "properly speaking man is based," because the cold mechanism of nature and a logic-chopping, utilitarian morality have shut him out from hope.

"For as he wanders wearisomely through this world," his supposed biographer tells us, "he has now lost all tidings of another and higher.

Full of religion or religiosity, as our friend has since exhibited himself, he hides not that, in those days, he was wholly irreligious: 'Doubt had darkened into Unbelief,' he says, 'shade after shade goes grimly over your soul, till you have the fixed, starless Tartarean black.'" The faith he once had is now dead, or at best he can only think of an "absentee God, sitting idle, ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside of the Universe, and seeing it go."

The Old View Gone, but the New Profit and Loss Philosophy Rejected.

Gone is his old sense of Duty, as a divine messenger and guide; but still he scornfully refuses to accept the new accounts of duty, as trivial and mean—as a "Profit and Loss Philosophy, speculative and practical," that the Soul is "synonymous with Stomach," and that Duty is "but a false Fantasm, made up of Desire and Fear, of emanations from the Gallows and from Dr. Graham's Celestial Bed." "Foolish Word-monger and Motive-grinder," our hero exclaims in contempt, "who in thy Logic-mill hast an earthly mechanism for the Godlike itself and wouldst fain grind me out Virtue from the husks of pleasure—I tell thee Nay!" If happiness is to be gained in that way, "with Stupidity and a sound Digestion, man may front much. But what in these dull unimaginative days, are the terrors of Conscience to the diseases of the liver! Not on Morality but on Cookery, let us build our stronghold: then brandishing our frying pan, as censer, let us offer sweet incense to the Devil and live at ease on the fat things *he* has provided for his Elect!"

The Everlasting No.

To this meaningless chaos of sensible fact had the new theoretical world-view of science brought our poor, broken-hearted Teufelsdröckh. His once fair world now lies in ruins about him. "Thus," remarks his editor, "has the bewildered Wanderer to stand, as so many have done, shouting question after question into the Sibyl-cave of Destiny and receive no answer but an Echo. It is all a grim Desert, this once-fair world of his; wherein is heard only the howling of wild-beasts, or the shrieks of despairing, hate-filled men; and no Pillar of Cloud by day, and no Pillar of Fire by night any more guides the Pilgrim. To such length has the spirit of Inquiry carried him."

So dead and meaningless has the world become to him that he has

not only lost faith in himself, in his fellow men, and in heaven, but he can not even have the sense of companionship growing out of a belief in the Devil.

"Some comfort," he exclaims, "it would have been, could I, like Faust, have found myself tempted and tormented of the Devil: for a Hell, as I imagine, without Life, though only diabolic Life, were more frightful; but in our age of Down-pulling and Disbelief, the very Devil has been pulled down, you can not so much as believe in the Devil.

"To me the Universe was all void of Life, of Purpose, of Volition, even Hostility: it was one huge, dead, immeasurable Steam-engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference, to grind me limb from limb. O, the vast, gloomy, solitary Golgotha and Mill of Death! Why was the Living banished thither, companionless, conscious? Why, if there is no Devil; nay, unless the Devil is your God?"

Thus the stern Prophet of Chelsea reached his Everlasting No, under the scientific analysis and criticism which robbed nature of any ethical meaning, and made it simply a material, objective fact.

The Inner Voices of Truth and Duty Still Heard.

But the seer, no less than the poet, was unwilling to rest here, for certain inner voices made themselves heard above the meaningless, mechanical roar of the external world, and they could not be misunderstood.

In spite of the woe which the Inquiry had caused him, our sufferer "still loved the Truth and would bate no jot of his allegiance to her." "Truth! I cried, though the heavens crush me for following her: no Falsehood! though a whole celestial Lubberland were the price of Apostasy." And the same unswerving devotion he maintained toward Duty, and for her he would with passionate readiness, if need were, leap into the infernal Fire. "Thus," he says, "in spite of all Motive-grinders, and Mechanical Profit-and-Loss Philosophies, with the sick ophthalmia and hallucination they had brought on, was the Infinite nature of Duty still dimly present to me: living without God in the world, of God's light I was not utterly bereft; if my as yet sealed eyes, with their unspeakable longing, could nowhere see Him, nevertheless, in my heart He was present, and His heaven-written Law still stood legible and sacred there."

Frees Himself from the Everlasting No.

In the strength of this inner conviction, his manhood rose up within him to defy Death and the pangs of Tophet, and all that the Devil and Man might do. He shook base Fear from him forever, felt strong of an unknown strength; a spirit, almost a god. And from that hour the temper of his misery was changed; "not Fear or whining Sorrow was it, but Indignation and grim, fire-eyed Defiance."

"Thus," he declares, "had the Everlasting No (*das ewige Nein*) pealed authoritatively through all the recesses of my Being, of my Me; and then was it my whole Me stood up, in native, God-created majesty, and with emphasis recorded its Protest. Such a Protest, the most important transaction in Life, may the same Indignation and Defiance, in a psychological point of view, be fitly called. The Everlasting No had said: 'Behold, thou art fatherless, outcast, and the Universe is mine (the Devil's);' to which my whole Me now made answer: 'I am not thine, but Free and forever hate thee!'

"It is from this hour that I incline to date my Spiritual New-birth or Baphometic Fire-baptism: perhaps, I directly thereupon began to be a Man" ("The Everlasting No").

The Satanic School Still Lingers.

But, though he had freed himself from fear and doubt by Indignation and Defiance, and thus won his own freedom, he has not yet secured complete inward rest. The old Satanic school was not yet quite thrown out of doors, though it had been given notice to quit. He was ceasing, though not entirely ceasing to eat his own heart and clutch around him outwardly on the Not-me for wholesome food. Cities, tilled fields, and books engage his attention; Travel, reading, thought, and Experience, the grand spiritual Doctor, were slowly improving him.

At last, it might be said that "Legion or the Satanic School, was now pretty well extirpated and cast out, but next to nothing introduced in its room; whereby the heart remains, for the while, in a quiet but no comfortable state."

The Center of Indifference.

He still felt himself overwhelmed by the immensity of things, reduced to a sort of *caput mortuum*. But while "wretchedness was still wretched" he could now, at any rate, "partly see through it and

despise it." What seemed to impress him most deeply now was the utter futility of the highest mortal effort, always inadequate and inefficient. In this inane Existence, he could see in the greatest, only Shadow-hunters or Shadow-hunted. What if the Boy Alexander had conquered a planet, there was a whole Solar System, nay, a whole Universe untouched. The eternal stars have looked calmly down from their serene spaces upon thousands of human generations, all as noisy as our own, and have seen them swallowed up by Time, and there remains no wrack of them any more.

"Arcturus and Orion and Sirius and the Pleiades are still shining in their courses, clear and young as when the Shepherds first noted them on the plain of Shinar. Pshaw! what is this petty little Dog-cage of an Earth: what art thou that sittest whining there? Thou art still Nothing, Nobody: true; but who is Something, Somebody? For thee the Family of Man has no use; it rejects thee; thou art wholly a dis severed limb: so be it; perhaps it is better so!

"‘This,’ says our Professor, ‘was the Center of Indifference I had now reached; through which whoso travels from the Negative Pole to the Positive must necessarily pass.’"

Wanderings and Temptations in the Wilderness.

But on his way to the Positive Pole, he must meet Temptations in the Wilderness, whereby he settles once for all, whether the Clay shall be vanquished or vanquish. Happy he who can and does courageously meet this struggle and win his way to Light and Freedom. "Our Wilderness," he says, "is the Wide World in an Atheistic Century; our Forty Days are long years of suffering and fasting; nevertheless, to these comes an end. Yes to me was given, if not Victory, yet the consciousness of Battle, and the resolve to persevere therein, while life or faculty is left. To me also, entangled in the enchanted forests, demon-peopled, doleful of sight and of sound, it was given, after weariest wanderings to work out my way into higher sunlit slopes—of that Mountain which has no summit, or whose summit is Heaven only!"

Self-Renunciation Frees Him from Dream-Shadows of Unreality.

And as he grew way-weary and life-weary in the struggle between the shadows of Hope and the haggard spectres of Fear, some benign

nant Upper Influence cast him into a healing sleep, when lo! "the heavy dreams rolled gradually away, and I awoke to a new Heaven and a new Earth. The first preliminary Moral Act, Annihilation of Self (*Selbst-toedtung*) had been happily accomplished: and my mind's eyes were now unsealed and its hands ungyved."

As he sat there on "the high table land" with open vision, both Nature and Man were transformed before him. "Beautiful it was to sit there, as in my skyey Tent, musing and meditating; on the high table land, in front of the mountains; over me as roof, the azure dome, and around me for walls, four azure-flowing curtains—namely, of the four azure winds, on whose bottom-fringes also I have seen gilding. And then to fancy the fair Castles that stood sheltered in these mountain hollows; with their green flower-lawns, and white dames and damosels, lovely enough." Or he pictured the straw-roofed Cottages with their homely, humble labors and joys, or whole Towns and Villages filled with their varied, human activities, as lying spread out before him.

Nature Transformed into the Father's House.

Often also from his sunlit slope, he continues, "could I see the black Tempest marching in anger through the Distance: round some Schreckhorn, as yet grim-blue, would the eddying vapors gather, and there tumultuously eddy and flow down, like a mad witch's hair; till after a space, it vanished, and in the clear sunshine, your Schreckhorn stood smiling, grim-white, for the vapors had held snow. How thou fermentest and elaboratest in thy great fermenting vat and laboratory of an Atmosphere, of a World, O Nature!—Or what is Nature? Ha! why do I not name thee God? Art thou not the 'Living Garment of God?' O Heavens, is it in very deed, He, then, that ever speakest through thee; that lives and loves in thee, that lives and loves in me?

"Fore-shadows, call them rather fore-splendors, of that Truth, and Beginning of Truth fell mysteriously over my soul. Sweeter than Dayspring to the Shipwrecked in Nova Zembla; ah, like the mother's voice to her little child that strays bewildered, weeping, in unknown tumults; like soft streamings of celestial music to my too-exasperated heart, came that Evangel. The Universe is not dead and demoniacal, a charnel-house with spectres, but godlike, and my Father's!"

This discovery of a profound and beneficent meaning in nature, seems to have given our wanderer also a new and more kindly view of his fellow men. If nature really proves to be the Father's house where he lives and loves, then man must recognize in his fellow men, who in common share nature with him, his brothers, as children of one Divine Father.

Man Transformed into a Brother: The Everlasting Yea.

"With other eyes, too," he says, "could I now look upon my fellow-man; with an infinite Love, an infinite Pity. Poor, wandering, wayward man! Art thou not tried and beaten with stripes, even as I am? Ever, whether thou bear the royal mantel or the beggar's gabardine, art thou not so weary, so heavy-laden; and thy Bed of Rest is but a Grave. O my Brother, my Brother, why can not I shelter thee in my bosom, and wipe away all tears from thy eyes! Truly, the din of many-voiced Life which, in this solitude, with the mind's organ, I could hear, was no longer a maddening discord, but a melting one; like inarticulate cries, and sobbings of a dumb creature, which in the ear of Heaven are prayers. The poor Earth, with her poor joys, was now my needy Mother, not my cruel Stepdame: Man, with his so mad Wants and so mean Endeavors, had become the dearer to me; and even for his sufferings and sins I now first named him Brother" ("The Everlasting Yea").

Every Age Demands a Reinterpretation of Life.

It has been worth our while to quote the "Sartor Resartus" at such length because it portrays, in a peculiarly characteristic way, the history of an earnest mind in the midst of transition and change. In a word, the Sartor is a profound and striking allegory of those spiritual stages through which man must pass in every age of progress, when old horizons are lost, old landmarks disappear; and when, out of the confusion, tumult, and chaos, a new world must be created. We have presented to us the story of Edenic innocence and happiness, the fall and redemption, in the specific forms which those great experiences have taken on in our own era.

Of that era, aside from the *progress in human society*, the one, mighty, all-absorbing influence that has dominated and controlled the thoughts and actions of men, has been *science*. The peculiar work of science has been both destructive and constructive—de-

structive of the old view of things, and constructive of a new, theoretical interpretation of the world.

In the accomplishment of this work, the rôle which science for a time assumed was that of a fallen angel, cast out of heaven for treason against God; and, in order the better to defeat the purpose of his sovereign, taking on the subtlety and wisdom of the serpent. Science at first promised man that if he but ate the forbidden fruit of knowledge he would, on his own account, become like God. Accepting this promise as true, man ate, and behold! his eyes were opened; but alas! he only saw his own nakedness and weakness, and found himself cast out of the security, peace, and happiness of his naive faith in God, into a world of scientific Enlightenment, which he found to be a world of sophistication, of doubt, of struggle and pain.

Science as a Fallen Angel and Tempter.

And now this Satanic Science that had promised him so much, had appealed so persuasively to his self-assertion and intellectual pride, had been so dogmatically positive, suddenly changes his garb, now cringes, now cajoles, or becomes shamelessly and truculently agnostic. He begins now to claim that he never promised knowledge of Reality, which is knowledge of the Truth; he had always only held out the hope of knowing the empty appearance of things. And so, unfortunate man is left to wander in toil and suffering, without a soul, without a God, or what is the same thing, with an unapproachable, unknowable God, and with a degraded sense of Duty, which is only a mean bargain of utility or pleasure. And all that is left him, with his infinite yearnings for Truth, for Beauty, and for Goodness is the dead mechanical world of phenomena, vast, overwhelming, and meaningless, evolved, according to changeless, implacable laws, out of matter in motion, a world which fills no real wants and permits of no ultimate escape.

Thus the proud and rebellious spirit of the Satanic, theoretical reason, by means of false and iridescent promises, that could never be fulfilled, lured man out into the barren and dreary wilderness of illusion, the dark, cold regions of the "Everlasting No," and the "Center of Indifference."

The Prophet's Guidance.

It is through this wilderness that our Prophet leads his pilgrim to the Promised Land of the "Everlasting Yea," where the Holy

Shekinah of God ever shines upon the sacred altar, in the temple of his perpetual presence.

And he is able to do so, because he is driven inward from the contemplation of the mere externalism of things, with its law and order, as if truth were to be found there, and is compelled to listen to the voices of Truth and of Duty within. Whereupon the world and man are transformed, the one into the Father's house, the other into a friend and brother.

We have already learned that so long as we confine ourselves to the externalism of phenomena, we can never know Reality. Phenomena have meaning alone when they are recognized as the manifestations of Reality. Never can we know God by studying nature, any more than we can ever know man by studying his outer phenomenal forms. But recognizing nature to be a conditioned revelation of God, it at once becomes intelligible and full of significance.

Science Becomes an Angel of Light.

It is when we thus view nature as the handiwork of God, that the theoretical interpretation of science takes on an altogether new and higher ethical meaning. The world now ceases to be a meaningless appearance of the Unknown, and becomes a rational Divine Word spoken, by the Creative Intelligence, to the interpretative intelligence of man; and science, once a mocking spirit of denial, which led us out into the wilderness of temptation and want, is now suddenly transformed into an angel of light which, like Dante's Vergil, emblem of human wisdom, while it can not lead us *within*, can, at any rate, conduct us *to* the celestial gates of Truth.

Arbitrary Supernaturalism and Rational Immanence.

What has really happened is that the old view of supernaturalistic dualism has broken down and been replaced by a doctrine of immanent unity. It used to be thought that God lived up there in the supernatural world, with its beauty and perfection, while man lived down here in the natural world, vitiated by defect and subject to all manner of painful vicissitudes. So that man's only hope of escaping the frailty and evil of the natural world, was to gain, if possible, the special favor of God by prayer, ritual, or creed. If he could only meet the right conditions, he might expect God to interfere supernaturally in the natural course of events, to rescue him from mis-

fortune or further his plans, and finally to bear him off at death, to the security and happiness of the supernatural world.

How great was the change and how painful the disturbance, when science slowly compelled a new interpretation of the world, may be easily imagined. Who, or whatever God may be, as the Ground of the World, he could no longer be thought of as supernaturally apart from the world and arbitrarily interfering with its natural order, from time to time, at the request of man; but must be regarded as everywhere and always present in the world, revealing his immanent power in its fixed and regular order of rational law, immutably the same, whether operant in dew drop or constellation.

Warning against Friends and Foes of Scientific World-View.

While this new scientific, theoretical interpretation of the world involves a profound change in men's thought of and attitude toward life, we must not allow its real significance to be vitiated either by the religious opponents of the scientific consciousness, or by its self-chosen individual advocates.

Men of religious faith will cling tenaciously to traditional dogma, supposing it has divine authority; and, not knowing what has really happened in the world, defend positions which have long since been undermined, while frankly, though superficially, accepting the results of modern science. They stand in the inconsistent position of opposing science, so far as it is related to their dogmas, and yet being compelled to accept its very obvious results. Indeed, they live in two quite different worlds.

On the other hand, we can not allow the real meaning of scientific doctrine to be identified with the opinions of individual scientists, who, however useful in some special field, may be very narrow and limited in their view of things in general; who, indeed, may be entirely ignorant of the meaning of science, and its place in the whole of man's spiritual interests.

The water-bug perched upon his ripple and supposed to be endowed with scientific capacity, may write the formula of the curve along which his ripple moves; but may know nothing of the rhythm of the wave, the swing of the billow, the onward sweep of the tide, the orbital, annual, and precessional movements of the earth, and the drift of the sun, with his train of planets, through the trackless heavens. Scientific men have been getting more and more modest,

but there have been those during the past century who have made much noise and have displayed the narrowness and dogmatism of the scientific water-bug, who insists on reducing the universe to his ripple-formula. Indeed, there is a prevalent type of agnostic modesty that amounts to a very dogmatic and boastful self-assertion. It admits readily enough its ignorance, or its knowledge of only appearances, but it very boldly asserts that its way of knowing is the only way to know anything, and refuses, even to investigate regions of knowledge to which its water-bug formula does not apply.

The scientific specialist is the soldier under orders, who may play his part bravely and well, without at all knowing the plans of the great campaign in which he is honorably engaged.

Well, then, without being misled either by the religious opponents of the scientific consciousness, or by its specialistic advocates, let us seek to find what ethical significance the new theoretical interpretation of the world by science really has, by considering the meaning of the great ideas which it involves.

Science Based on the Kinship of Reason in Man and in Nature.

Preeminently, the first great idea is that which is necessarily involved in the very existence of science itself, viz.: the rational identity of intelligence in man and in nature. To begin and continue, science or the knowledge of nature, must simply be the response of thought in the human mind to the thought in nature. In nothing has science more brilliantly vindicated herself than in the demonstration of the kinship between the subjective and objective intelligence. Indeed, it is to science that we owe this demonstration. Nature is no longer an inscrutable, inexplicable mystery, a foreigner, uttering unintelligible sounds wholly strange to us, but a friend and fellow who speaks our language, and pours into our ears magic secrets and tales of undreamed wonder.

But here comes back to us our poetico-ethical interpretation, which we had supposed science had destroyed, viz.: that sense and fellowship of kindred minds by which nature becomes to us once more the dwelling place of a friend, and we eagerly listen for those voices that may reveal to us the pathway of Truth.

But while the world thus becomes once more luminous with living intelligence, we can no longer picture nature in mythic or poetic fancy,

as filled with gods and nymphs, angels and fairies. And we shall not regret the loss, for as beneficent and friendly as all this made nature seem, yet it left our world vitiated not only by the uncertainty of arbitrary caprice, but by the intrusive presence of devils and malicious imps. We can now not only be sure that there are no irrational powers about us, but that all the voices we hear and understand have a clear and unmistakable meaning of good. Thus while the old poetry of nature is dead, a new cosmic poetry, born of science, is rising to life and beauteous utterance.

Unity of a Great Cosmic Order.

Therefore, we turn so much the more readily to science, which has now given nature back to us as living, intelligent, and intelligible, because of the second great idea with which she has familiarized us, viz.: that of monism, or the unity of one great rational cosmic order.

There is perhaps no greater service which science has rendered us than this, because of its wide bearings and implications. All pluralisms and dualisms have been swept into one grand, monistic unity—a notion primarily springing out of the æsthetical reason, but which, nevertheless, science develops, confirms, and brings out into clear light.

Think now of Reality as we may, be it matter or mind, it is one and not two; and one, not in the sense merely of one substance but in the sense of one rational, causal order of things. If, in experience, we must still think of matter and mind as being distinct, they are nevertheless so intimately related that one must be reducible to the other. We have already seen that that other is ultimately mind, as being the only substance and cause we know.

Whether we regard the cosmos under the symbol of gravitation, as a supreme static order of permanent substance, in which no matter is destroyed, though transformed; or under the symbol of evolution as a supreme order of progressive cause, in which all motion is conserved or transmuted, it is forever one, wherein all is related to each and each to all. The deep and comprehensive significance of this monistic world view is expressed, in the main, by two words, *immanence and law*.

Immanence and Transcendence.

Whatever may be the backlying Reality, call it God, the Unknowable, or the Infinite and Eternal Energy, it is forever present in the

world, as its substantial and causal ground. It is no longer possible, according to the old dualistic deism, to divide the world into two distinct and arbitrarily related orders of existence, the supernatural and the natural. God may *transcend* the natural order, or as Mr. Spencer is pleased to put it, the "Infinite and Eternal Energy" may be unknowable, but he is at the same time *immanent* in the world, even to its minutest details, because he is that "from which all things proceed."

We would not presume to deny the real distinction between the natural and the supernatural, implied in Mr. Spencer's Unknowable, and we must admit, with Kant, that the supernatural order (the *Ding-an-sich* or unknown x) is so transcendent that no amount of looking at the natural order will ever enable us to attain it; yet, at the same time, the natural order is a manifestation to us, however limited, of the immanent supernatural order, which is thereby revealed to us.

As much as we may commend Kant and Spencer for exalting the transcendence of Reality, our science compels us to recognize the immanent presence of Reality in the phenomenal world, so that the *Ding-an-sich* of the one, and the Unknowable of the other, is not something unknown in the sense they meant, that is, as something entirely shut off from our knowledge; but is being revealed to us, under the limitations of space and time, in proportion as we truly know nature and her ways.

It is at once evident what a deep moral significance the doctrine of immanence gives to nature—a significance which Tennyson has admirably expressed in his "Higher Pantheism."

"The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills and the plains,
Are not these, O Soul, a Vision of Him who reigns?

* * * * * * *

God is law say the wise: O Soul, and let us rejoice,

For if He thunder by law, the thunder is yet His voice.

Speak to Him, then, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,
Closer is He than breathing, nearer than hands and feet."

It was precisely this meaning which the ethical consciousness of the Hebrews gave to God's omnipresence. They did not, it is true, think of nature in the modern, scientific sense as pervaded by great, immutable laws; but they thought of it, as sustained and controlled throughout its entire extent, by the ever-living God of Righteousness, whose moral integrity was expressed in immutable law. Indeed, it is

clear that the Hebrew ethical conception is what gives ground and meaning to the theoretical conception of science.

It is this conception of the One Infinite and Eternal Reality as manifesting itself in the world of phenomena, according to a fixed order of rational law, that gives the scientific view of the world so much theoretical cogency and practical force.

Permanent Order of Law.

There is no caprice or haphazard, no inexplicable, irrational event. Nothing happens accidentally, except to our ignorance, because all things and events are related each to each and all to all, according to unvarying laws.

The consequent practical advantage is immense. If we discover that oxygen and hydrogen, or that chlorine and sodium, in certain proportions, compose water or salt, we know that we can always depend upon it. If stones fall at such a rate per second, if heat produces motion and motion heat by an exact law of transmutability, if copper wire opens the gates to electricity and glass shuts them—when we meet any of these conditions, we can invariably count on the results.

The great practical value of these natural laws, as well as their moral significance, lies in this fact that they can always be relied upon. What the poet Wordsworth said comes back on the lips of the scientist: Nature never betrays the heart that trusts her. Only science is not content with a sort of sentimental faith, but wants the clear evidence of demonstrable knowledge.

Immutable Law Seems to Rob the World of Ethical Meaning.

But is it not just here, in the presence of this universal reign of law, that science seems to drive all ethical meaning out of the world, by reducing the entire course of events to a fatal sequence that denies all freedom, and moves steadily on with an implacable indifference to all our conscious efforts and prayers?

We can no longer comfort ourselves by appeals to ministering angels or to a supernatural Deity, for the very forces and laws in which we find ourselves entangled are the manifestations of that one Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. There is no way of escape, and, overwhelmed by our misfortunes and sorrows, we must submit. Was it not the scientific, all-inclusive mechanism of

nature that plunged Teufelsdröeckh into his Everlasting No, that turned the heavens into brass for him, and the whole world into a death machine, ruthlessly grinding on? Did it not wring from the Poet Laureate the despairing cry that nature, "red in tooth and claw," and no longer careful of the single life or the single type, heartlessly proclaimed all is going, all must go?

In the grip of an inexorable and inevitable necessity, does not man see his moral dignity, with his old sense of infinite value, and his insatiable hunger for joy, sink to the level of a worthless phantom or mere subjective fancy in the crashing game of destiny?

Immutable Law Gives the World an Ethical Meaning.

But when the first poignancy of hopeless bitterness has been assuaged, the mind grows calmer, to view the situation, in which it finds itself placed, and lo! out of the darkness and storm, there rises, faintly at first, a rainbow of promise and hope that steadily grows until it spans the whole heavens. Our old world, so fair and good, that had been transformed into a system of heartless, impersonal laws, is now retransformed into a new world, plastic to our touch and placable to our prayers

For, in passing from the old dualistic supernaturalism to a monistic immanency, we have come, under the guidance of science, to a new heaven and a new earth, wherein the universal reign of law is the expression of one, immanent intelligence, akin to our own. When the old order began to pass away, it seemed as if the heavens were rolled together like a scroll, as if the elements melted with fervent heat, as if the very rocks and hills were falling upon us; but a voice from the midst of the throne proclaimed: Behold, I make all things new, and, lo! there rose before us another world, more beautiful in its harmonious unity, answering to the call of intelligence, and moving in order according to the invariable laws that express the Will of the One Immanent Mind.

The Moral View of the World Comes Back, Transformed and Elevated.

So that we have not lost our moral view of the cosmos but really for the first time gained it. If science has taken from us the supernatural and desecrated the sacred shrines on mountain or in temple; if it has abolished our prayers and petty personal whims, it has

filled the whole world with the light of the Divine Presence, has taught us to hear the solemn voices of Sinai and behold the holy Shekinah of the Temple in every spot, and to know the entire frame of things as a perpetual answer to our every prayer.

We are now, as never before, living in a world that responds to our intelligent understanding and willing obedience. Nothing is more striking than the emphatic reiteration of Jesus's ethical view of the world, by the modern scientific theoretical view of the world.

Neither in this mountain, nor yet in Jerusalem shall men worship the Father. For God is a spirit and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and truth. There are no favored spots, no arbitrary conditions, by which the divine favor is limited. Everywhere that men turn to seek God in the spirit of truth, they find him manifested.

This is precisely the meaning of science. You would enter into the mysterious power of nature? Understand her pervasive, rational laws and meet their conditions, and you will find nature always responsive and always the same.

We have already seen (p. 351) how Bacon expressed the spirit of modern science, which is that of the Christ in the Garden. The deepest utterance of science, in its attitude toward nature and her laws is: Not my opinion or my preference, but thy truth and thy law. Meet nature anywhere with knowledge and obedience, and there you will meet the power and life of that Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed.

Here is a new secret of life, a new "open sesame," that reveals the treasures of the world. It is the Divine Answer to all prayers. Know and obey me, think my thought and do my will, and I shall open the windows of heaven and pour you out a blessing such as there shall not be room to contain. When we sum it all up, we shall find that the deepest teaching of science is that man, akin to the Intelligence, immanent in nature, gains power and life in proportion as he knows the thought and obeys the will manifest in nature.

Freedom by Obedience.

Thus the inexorable, immutable reign of law has been wholly transformed in its meaning. Instead of binding man in the chains of an implacable fate, it sets him free and shows him the way of self-realization. To be free, as we have learned, is not to do as one pleases,

but to fulfil the highest law of one's own nature; and that highest law is objectively expressed for man by the intelligent Will, immanent in the Cosmos.

Strange paradoxical truth! If you would *rule, serve*; if you would *command, obey*; if you would be *free, submit*. The mastery over nature is won by obedience to nature; for the living self, that knows nature, is akin to the living Self, that rules in nature. The universal, changeless law of the Cosmos is the law of your own inner being.

So that the implacable steadiness of outward things, that at first seemed to deny our freedom and abolish the moral significance of the world, is the very thing that secures our freedom, and establishes the ethical order of the objective universe.

Wisdom in Denying All Personal Preference.

In the presence of this truth, how petty and mean become the ignorant whims and preferences of my individual requests!

Shall I ask that the sun stand still on some Gibeon, and the moon in some valley of Ajalon, until I have taken vengeance upon *my* enemies? Or shall I expect the hands of the dial to be turned back and the stately goings of the cosmos to pause in order to prolong *my* life?

The possibility of such personal, arbitrary requests being met would throw the world into disorder; for all others, as well as myself, might also possess the power of getting the regular course of things interfered with for the sake of some individual preference.

Nothing would, for the time being, please the actuary more, when his accounts fail to balance, than a convenient change in the multiplication table. But he would have to grant the same privilege to his employer, who might take it into his head to pay him on the basis that two and two make five.

In fact, the essence of the complaint against nature's implacable laws, as indifferent or non-moral, is the short-sighted, human desire to subject her changeless ways to individual preference. Men charge nature with indifference to their interests, or even with malevolence, because they can not pay their debts on the plan that two and two make five and collect their bills on the plan that two and two make three.

False View of Prayer.

And even in their highest religious moments, men take the same narrow selfish attitude toward God, whom they regard as the Author

of nature. Two contending Christian (?) armies, each offers up this prayer: O God, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Prince of Peace, help us this day to kill the most men. For it is thus alone that the victory can be won, and men never pray to be beaten. The triumphant army offers gratitude on the basis that its prayer has been granted, because it is taken that God approves its cause; while the defeated army humbles itself in sackcloth and ashes because its prayers have been denied, either as a chastisement for being wrong or as an evidence of loving discipline. In this religious frame of mind, man must perforce bow to the will of heaven, as being always just.

But to the decisions of nature, which in reality acts as God acts, men feel free to offer protest, too seldom thinking to ask the always disconcerting and often painful question: Are we sure we are right in what we want or what we do? A delegation of clergymen, who once waited on Mr. Lincoln, expressed the pious hope that God was on our side. To which Mr. Lincoln rejoined that, for his part, he wanted to be sure that we were on God's side.

The World not Subject to Personal Interests.

Fortunately, we do not live in a universe subject to any personal whims or momentary interests. If I stumble on the curb, gravitation does not ask who I am, in administering the harmless contusions that follow; nor if I trip on the edge of some lofty precipice and fall headlong a hundred or a thousand feet to my inevitable physical ruin. Shall I demand that gravitation be suspended for my behoof? The moment my request were granted, the universe would be thrown into destructive chaos.

The absurd irrationality of expecting that the objective system of things can be brought into adjustment to my personal preferences or conveniences, instead of adjusting my subjective condition to the objective system of things, lies in the fact that, since every individual would have an equal personal claim on the universe, there would be no such thing as learning the objective truth, profiting by a moral discipline, or counting on the reliability of things in general.

The impossible absurdity of such a state would show itself in the most insignificant circumstances. My neighbor, in order to save a mean dollar, tries to shingle his kitchen roof. A clumsy fall, and a consequent suspension of the law of gravitation, to save his precious bones, means that just when I would lay the foundations of my habi-

tation, the stones, instead of clinging solidly and heavily to the earth, as they ought, if they are to be of any use, would, in the least gust of wind, airily float around like so many feathers in the summer breeze.

Looking at the whole matter from beginning to end, we shall find that, in spite of momentary inconveniences or sufferings, our ultimate welfare is secured not by subjecting gravitation to us, but by subjecting ourselves to gravitation; and then we shall find in that submission, which by each new obeisance climbs to the feet of God, that we have become masters of the world.

The Moral Integrity of Gravitation.

Have you ever thought how *moral* gravitation really is? To be really moral is to act steadily and consistently, by a universal rule, for the welfare of all. Apply that test to gravitation and to yourself, and you shall see which is the more moral of the two. Gravitation neglects nothing and shows no favors. It equally holds the dew drop and the North Star. Gravitation is never a snob. It never kicks the man on the round below or licks the boots of the man on the round above. Like God, it commends and condemns all alike. It rebukes the king as well as the beggar, and equally sends the rain upon the narrow field of the peasant, and the broad domains of the prince. It is a symbol of that all-pervasive, all-inclusive goodness of God that, without favor, pours sunshine upon the evil and the good.

Instead, then, of complaining about the implacable, non-moral indifference of nature, it would be well for us rather to pray that we may become moral even as gravitation is moral. And gravitation is only a representative symbol of the steadiness and reliability of all the mechanical and chemical laws that are revealed in substantial existence.

Nature Answers All Our Prayers by Answering None.

Nature then, instead of showing indifference or malevolence toward us by inexorable insistence upon her ways, on the contrary, reveals thereby, without respect for the person of any man, the widest benevolence and the most inclusive universal goodness. By granting every request of the subjective, personal ambitions, selfish aims, and vagrant caprices of her children, nature would sink from a cosmos to a chaos, and instead of being a great nourishing mother, with lessons of truth and goodness for all, would become a vacillating,

sentimental wanton, without integrity, and incapable, in the long run, of granting any prayer or securing for us any lasting good.

As it is, fortunately, nature does not stoop to our ignorance, folly, and selfishness, but would lift us up to her wisdom and goodness. It is her invariable and inexorable steadfastness that not only illumines our minds with the never-changing truth, but that alone guarantees our safety and secures our well-being. She does not answer any of our prayers, because she has already answered all of our prayers. Nature has done everything for us and offers everything to us; it is our turn now to do something, and prepare ourselves worthily to receive what is already bestowed.

We should, therefore, rejoice rather than complain when baffled and beaten back by nature, as those who are instructed and disciplined in the ways of life, as those who bear patiently chastisements which, though grievous for the moment, afterwards bring forth the peaceable fruits of "rightness" to those who are exercised thereby, and finally led into the sure paths of intelligent understanding and obedience.

*Law of Progressive Evolution: Transcendence by
Subordination.*

But law has a far wider and deeper meaning in nature than is expressed in the steadiness and permanence of such an order as gravitation reveals. For it includes also the rational order of a progressive unfoldment toward some great end. That is, it is a law of evolution. And here at once we find ourselves released from mere submission to a permanent, fixed order, and are lifted to the life of progressive advance, moving toward the accomplishment of a purpose, to which all else is subordinated.

That is, when we turn from those phases of nature which present the integrity of mechanico-chemical laws, fixed and immutable, to those phases of nature which present an unfolding development, we have before us, in successive order, first a law of evolving life, then of conscious life, and finally of self-conscious life. Each stage is a progressive transcendence, by subordinating all that precedes.

Thus when life enters upon the scene, with its progressive advances, it introduces a higher law which, however, in no way abolishes gravitation and chemism, but completely subordinates them to its transcendent goal. The oak, it is true, seems wholly to disregard gravitation by slowly lifting its bulk above the earth toward heaven,

and to defy chemical affinity, in the various compounds which it ruthlessly tears apart for its uses. And yet, in pursuing its higher aim, that is, in carrying out its life-idea, it depends implicitly upon the permanent and steady ways of gravitation and chemism, by which it balances and proportions its form, and secures its growth and development.

In like manner, when consciousness emerges, in the progressive order, it subordinates all the laws of gravitation, chemism, and vitality to its higher purposes. And so also, when self-consciousness at last appears, and lifts itself above the natural into the rational order; without in any way changing or abolishing the laws of nature below it, the self-conscious subject exercises the most wide-sweeping dominion over them, in subordinating them to its rational ends. It was in this sense that the Hebrew Psalmist represented God as having made man to have dominion over the works of his hands.

Evolution Reveals an Ethical End.

Now this law of evolution in nature, by which the higher, in subordinating the lower to its uses, moves toward a great end, reveals the deepest meaning of an ethical purpose, namely, the ultimate benefit of full, self-realization for those involved in the plan. We have seen, in looking at the unfolding process of evolution (p. 105), that such terms as "struggle for existence," "the survival of the fittest," "the weak go to the wall," which are vulgarly supposed to give the entire meaning of evolution, represent, in fact, only certain superficial phases of the entire process. Because, as we found, as deep as may be the *selfish* struggle for existence, deeper still is the far more significant *unselfish* struggle to confer life and protection upon others.

We see, throughout the entire range of evolution, an instinctive affection or volitional impulse of good-will, that finally culminates in human society as the law of a universal love; we see the most lavish self-renunciation to give life to others and to protect the weak, until they are fit to meet the struggle for themselves; and we discover that fitness, in the end, to be constituted, not by physical hardihood and strength but by mental and moral worth.

In the progressive law of evolution, then, as it reveals itself to the theoretical reason, we have in nature the highest expression of the ethical reason. Within the process, there is everywhere seen that out-streaming, self-sacrificing affection, or good-will which gives

itself to benefit or please others; and the plan, as a whole, stands for the ultimate freedom of a rational self-realization which, as the end of man's rational development, is that harmonious beauty of life, constituted by thinking the Thought and willing the Will of the Cosmos.

*Though Wholly Theoretical, Science Reveals an Ethical
Meaning in Nature.*

Science, as such, is wholly theoretical in its interests. It only cares to know what is the objective truth; that the thing exactly corresponds to the subjective thought; and that there shall be no inner logical contradiction. These requirements met, it is entirely indifferent as to whether the world turns out to be a cosmos or a chaos.

But in meeting this theoretical demand, science finds the world, as a matter of fact, to be a cosmos, or in other words, a rational order of things which is constituted by the integrity and reliability of permanent laws, both as an immutable order and a progressive unfoldment. Hence, our confidence in the reliable integrity of nature is so deep that even if so great and universal a law as gravitation should break down, we should not lose confidence in nature, but, recognizing a mistake somewhere within ourselves, we should look for a larger, more inclusive, and more permanent law.

Doctrine of Cosmic Order Rests Back upon Ethical Intuition.

Now, when we ask what this conviction and confidence rests upon, we are certain that it is not due to a complete scientific knowledge of the facts, for our actual knowledge of nature has no more than touched the surface of things; and we are as certain that it does not come from any demand of the mere theoretical reason, for that, being quite indifferent as to how things turn out, is concerned neither one way nor the other.

What it rests upon, as we learned in discussing the Categories, is, first, the æsthetical reason which evaluates the universe as a harmonious unity, or cosmic order, of objective beauty; while this, in turn, more fundamentally and ultimately rests back upon the ethical reason which, as a causal, out-streaming will of good, demands, as a supreme end, that all things be conserved, and that every interest be held sacred.

One would hardly expect to find a close affinity between the profound ethical interpretation of life by the Hebrew Prophets and

Psalmists, and the theoretical interpretation of life by modern science. But strange as at first sight it may appear, no two other things in the world are more intimately related, or so closely parallel. The One, Living, Omnipotent and Omnipresent God, of the Hebrew, is the One Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed, of modern science.

The revelation of God everywhere in nature, in his immutable wisdom and goodness, enlightening and saving man, in proportion to his knowledge of and obedience to the Divine Law, is the Hebrew form of the scientific doctrine of immanence, rational law and order, and man's progress by knowledge of and obedience to that law and order. With the appropriate change in terms, the Psalms might be made the liturgy of the religion of modern science. (See Psalms xix, cxix, cxxxix and cxlvii-viii.)

Science Reiterates the Utterances of the Ethical Reason.

The great ideas, then, with which modern science has familiarized us, viz.: the identity in man and nature of that intelligence which, immanent in all things, manifests itself according to universal, immutable laws, in one cosmic order, in which no atom of substance is destroyed and every impulse of energy, or cause—all moving toward some great end—is conserved, are no other, at last analysis, than declarations of the ethical reason.

All that scientific investigation, experiment, and induction can do is to illustrate and confirm these great doctrines, *provided* they are true; and the confirmation has value alone *if* they are true. *That* they are true, is an ultimate intuition of the ethical reason.

Thus it is that science, as a theoretical interpretation of nature, presents to us, as her greatest teaching, a cosmic order of permanent and reliable laws, the deepest meaning of which is moral integrity; and a progressive unfoldment toward a great end, the deepest meaning of which is a purpose of good that includes the self-realization of all. That science does not set out ostensibly to teach this lesson, in no way affects our obligation to her for forcing upon us, as a necessary outcome of her tireless investigations, a conclusion so rational and so significant: a conclusion that means nothing less than that the *scientific* interpretation of nature reveals itself ultimately as an *ethical* interpretation; or, in other words, that the Order of Truth proves to be a manifestation of the Order of Goodness.

CHAPTER XII.

ETHICAL MEANING OF ART IN NATURE.

IN all our inventions and arts, the will employs the resources of scientific knowledge, with the purpose of constructing something of use or beauty for our benefit or our pleasure. While the individual artist may be, as already suggested (p. 173), wholly indifferent to others or egoistic, art itself, in the very nature of the case, has precisely the same aim as ethics. For art is simply the realized or accomplished purpose of the will of good, streaming out to benefit or please others.

When, therefore, we ask: What is the ethical meaning of our æsthetico-practical interpretation of the world? it is impossible to find any other answer than that the Causal Will which produces a Cosmic Order of Beauty or, as we have called it, a Master Work of Art, must be a Will of Eternal Goodness. Here the Supreme Master Artist, who is the One Ultimate Reality behind all things, is seen to include and conserve within his beneficent designs, every created thing. The world, as we know it, in which no atom and no impulse of energy goes lost, in which all objects and events are inter-related and interact in such a way as to constitute a harmonious, rational whole, can find its sufficient ground in no other power than that of Goodness.

The Goodness of Nature Confirms the Teachings of Jesus.

Such a conclusion is, in fact, a reiteration of the teachings of Jesus. Jesus spoke of God, who in Mr. Spencer's accurate and abstract phraseology is the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed, as Infinite and Eternal Love, the Father of Mankind, and the Creator and Sustainer of all things, who not only counts the stars, clothes the flowers of the field and feeds the birds of the air, but grants our prayers before they are offered, and guards our interests, even to the hairs of our heads.

Although to our ordinary consciousness, absorbed as we are in worldly trivialities, the great significance of Jesus's teachings goes quite unheeded, yet reflection will show us how they are confirmed by the evidences of goodness in nature, displayed on every hand. We have seen what immense art value the world has for man, in affording visions of great beauty and sublimity (p. 397-9). To this we must add that joyous sense of existence which seems to have been poured in superabundance into the heart of every sentient creature; and that lavish benevolence of nature in producing the useful means of food, shelter and protection for all. And it is not unworthy of remark that there must be some deep beneficent meaning in that order of things which provides that the discharge of every function, which seems to exist only for the humble uses of the material economy, is attended with pleasure. So far as we can see that delicious sensation, attendant upon a draught of cool water, has no necessary connection with the mere uses of the organism, but is a pure gift of benevolence on the part of nature.

How Goodness Expresses Itself.

It is impossible to conceive or imagine the Eternal Will that energizes in all things, the Absolute Cause from which the cosmos, visible and invisible, proceeds, as any other than good. A harmonious order, the supreme mark of which is the Beauty of a self-sustained unity, expressed in and guaranteed by immutable, rational and, to us more and more, intelligible laws, is that which constitutes in itself the very quintessential meaning of goodness.

We have no other way of conceiving what goodness is than by recognizing in our own thought and action the constant endeavor, first, to use all our knowledge and skill in the creation of those arts which secure our well-being and happiness, and, then, to share our uses and enjoyments of the useful and pleasing objects of life, according to the will of universal good, with all others.

Well, this is what we find in our æsthetico-practical interpretation of the cosmos. Since the manifested Cosmic Truth of the world (*being, substance*) presents itself to us as the harmonious Order and Beauty of the world (*unity of life*), the Absolute Reality or God, at once transcendent to and immanent in nature, necessarily reveals himself to the kindred intelligence of man as the Omnipotent Will

of Eternal Goodness (the *sufficient reason* for all *becoming* and the *causal ground* of all things).

When, therefore the saintly John, who very deeply caught the spirit of the Master said: "God is Love; and he that abideth in love abideth in God, and God abideth in him" (I John iv, 16), he was announcing the profoundest and most priceless truth which man can know, a truth which, as we see, reason forces upon us from every point of view, intellectual and æsthetic, viz.: that "the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed" is the Creative and Sustaining Will of Infinite and Eternal Goodness. He, therefore, who wills the good, dwells in God and God dwells in and manifests himself through him.

The Stubborn Persistence of Evil.

While the mind, predisposed to religious sentiment, might readily accept such a conclusion as satisfactory and final, there still persist those stubborn protests of a universal experience, to the effect that nature is not all harmony and beauty and worth, but often displays discord, ugliness, worthlessness, and consequent misery and pain.

The objects of nature, it is said, can not be intended for the welfare of man by any Causal Will of Goodness in nature, because many things are not only useless but positively harmful. Man may adapt himself as best he can to nature, but nature is in many points not adapted or adaptable to man—except perhaps to baffle and afflict him.

Relieving nature entirely of the responsibility which rests upon man because of his wrong-doing, the cruelty and injustice and social disorder that arise out of his lust and ill-will, the objector still insists upon it that in the cosmic order, as seen in the mechanical, the vegetal, and the animal worlds, innumerable evils beset and thwart man in his rational purposes.

The earthquake shocks, volcanic disasters, and calamitous storms, on sea and land; worthless, destructive, and poisonous plants and animals, bring in their train innumerable ills which invalidate nature as a beautiful work of art, designed to meet all human needs. Besides, it may be added, even if we admit man's responsibility for the evils in the social organism, it will be found that his moral obliquity, in the first place, is largely due to those natural evils such as accidental mechanical defects or deformity of body, or to diseases having their origin in subtle inner derangements, caused by the invasion of

poisonous animal or plant life from the surrounding natural environment.*

In the presence of all objections, tending to invalidate our main conclusion, viz.: that nature, as a supreme work of art, reveals an immanent purpose of good, we must constantly bear in mind the meaning of two considerations which, indeed, amount to two fundamental principles of interpretation: first, the relativity of the phenomenal world, and the progressive unfoldment in our knowledge of it; and, secondly, the rightful claims of the known over the unknown.

Bearing of Relativity upon the Problem of Evil.

We all agree that the phenomenal world, conditioned as it is in space and time, and seen under the forms of sense and logic, is not the real world. Hence, we can not hope to form an ultimate judgment of it, until we see it in the light of Reality. Just as man fully recognizes his rational superiority to the life of his body, which can only be understood from the standpoint of reason, so he recognizes that to know the phenomenal world in any adequate sense, he must see it under the aspect of the back-lying Reality.

It is not impossible, therefore—indeed, it seems to have been the lesson of a universal experience—that, in the light of the real, the phenomenal may show its purposed value in revealing, by its conditioned limitations, the ultimate and transcendent value of the real. At any rate, it is by reason of the recognized relativity of the phenomenal world that science has been led on from the mere outer appearances of sense to the more valid knowledge of rational ideas. Thus, too, art has been raised from the crude pleasure of gross, immediate sensation, to the more refined and subtle enjoyments of emotion; while ethics, in like manner, has risen from a naive selfishness to the larger order of law and justice. That is, the entire phenomenal world, being a preliminary and provisional stage of rational existence,

* We are here forced into the presence of that intimate relation between the natural order and the moral order, which for the moment we are endeavoring to keep apart. In the end we shall see that they can not be kept apart, for they are indissolubly joined. If we find that the malevolent activities of nature disturb and pervert our moral life, so we shall find that our lust and ill-will cast disorder into and pervert nature. War, for example, is a great outburst of human lust and ill-will which works itself out in the devastation of smiling fields, the destruction of prosperous cities, and the dissemination of disease, suffering and death. But for the time being, the reader understands, we are endeavoring to keep these two intimately related things apart, for we wish to question those evils which nature of her own will seems to impose upon us.

can not be taken by itself as having any final significance. It always points to something beyond, and can alone be estimated and judged from the standpoint of that beyond, as being indeed no other than the Reality of which it is a conditioned and limited manifestation. It may be, God intends that the whole phenomenal world should break down, just in order that we should be forced upon the eternal values of the ever-existent Reality in Him.*

Possibility of Error in the Process of Rational Development.

But, in addition to this relativity of the phenomenal to the real, is the relativity of all human knowledge which, in its development toward maturity, involves all possible error. Man's entire rational life is an *unfoldment towards self-realization*, so that his thought at any given moment—say the days of Ptolemy—does not necessarily correspond to the actual objective order of phenomena in the midst of which he lives. The entire conception of the world, at any given epoch, although held quite generally by the learned, has again and again proved, in the light of subsequent knowledge, to have been mixed with all sorts of subjective error. And aside from these prevailing communal errors, the individual is subject to mistakes all his own. Let him therefore correct his own private errors by learning the authoritative views of the wise, such as the latest teachings of science; but even then these teachings are extremely inadequate and incomplete and always contain the possibility of subjective error.

Therefore, we are not in a position, at any given time, to pass a final judgment upon the æsthetic value of the world. Moreover, experience has abundantly shown that the more man's thought comes into correspondence to the actual objective order, the more, on the one hand, the phenomenal reveals its limitations and insufficiency in the presence of Reality, and the more, on the other hand, it comes to subject itself to his rational control.

So that, as his science has carried forward knowledge from sense to the rational coherence of logic; as his art has lifted enjoyment from sensation to emotion; and his ethics raised egoism to justice, the phenomenal world has grown larger, better, and more completely subservient to his rational dominance.

* As a supra-natural being, it seems to be meant that man should find no lasting satisfaction in the *phenomenal* order, as incapable of meeting the demands of reason for ultimate Reality.

We can not doubt, therefore, that if he will continue along this path of advancing intelligence to intuition, where the phenomenal gives way to the real, that is, the relative is seen under the aspect of the absolute, he will find, in the true meaning of the phenomenal and relative, that the incoherent, erroneous and inadequate, which they involved, disappear, in the light of the true, the beautiful and the good; because they were simply due to his ignorance of the true, his disobedience to the good, and his consequent inability to evaluate the beautiful. For the man whose thought is vitiated by error, and whose will is perverted by wrong motives, is never in a rational position to appreciate, at its true value, what is really and objectively beautiful.

As this approach to the real, through the phenomenal, will receive fuller treatment in the following book, on the Pedagogy of Pain, we dismiss the subject at present to take up that second and consequent principle referred to above, viz.: the claims of the known over the unknown.

The Unknown Explained by the Known.

In spite of a constant and vicious tendency to confuse and obscure the known by emphasizing the unknown, we must insist that the only true principle is either to drop the unknown altogether, as something unsolved or insoluble; or, if we bring it into the range of vision, to explain it so far as we can by the known. The opposite tendency of casting discredit upon the known because of the obscurity and inner contradiction of the unknown is wholly irrational.

Thus, to take a simple example. My fondness for shad is somewhat checked by the bones. So far as wholesomeness and taste are concerned, the bones are inexplicable and flatly an evil, and would better be away entirely. Two choices are open to me, provided I have no vegetarian scruples about eating the flesh of animals. I may, in view of this evil of the bones, reject the shad altogether as bad, and refuse to eat it. Some few people make this choice. Or, in view of the "goodness" of the fish for food, I may be willing to take the trouble of removing the bones. This choice I find to be that of the great majority of those who are fortunate enough to live in the neighborhood of waters where the shad abounds. So I shall feel justified in regarding the shad of use to me, *in spite* of the inexplicable and troublesome bones. Or, in other words, because I do not know

any use the bones have for me, I shall not discard the fish altogether, which as food has a use.

But, being of an inquiring turn of mind, I am not satisfied to recognize merely the things which have an evident use for my welfare and pleasure, but want to explain, if possible, the useless. In the case of the shad, my course is clear. The only possible explanation I can hope to get of the, as yet apparently useless, bones, must be found in the perfectly clear light of the known uses of the fish for food.

What begins to emerge as I turn this matter over in my mind, is the notion that, while the bones are of no conceivable use to *me*, they may be of indispensable use to the *fish*. In fact, I find that the fish could not get on without them, if it was ever going to be a fish at all. Hence, while I shall never find the bones of use to me as food, they are after all of use to me, in making fish-food possible. It looks very much as if nature, in order to give me the fish for food, gave the fish bones. At any rate, whether there is a purpose or not, I know and use the fish as food, and no longer take the bones as an inexplicable evil, but see in them a necessary means to a desirable end; and I am now willing to take the trouble of dealing with the bones for the sake of the food.*

This trivial illustration may serve to indicate what our attitude ought to be towards all those things in nature which either have no use or, so far as we know, are harmful, by suggesting how what may seem as an evil from a narrow point of view, appears as a good when a broader view is taken; and how what is known must be our guide when dealing with the unknown.

Nature, Known to be a Cosmic Order, Reveals Goodness.

Thus, when we take nature as a whole, we find it to be a vast system of law and order, a great harmonious cosmos, or, as we have called it, a master work of art. If we do not know this much about the world, we do not know anything. Not only has the rational in-

*If I now go further and insist on knowing why fish do not grow without any bones, I am passing beyond the range of legitimate inquiry, and demanding to know why things are at all. I might as well ask why I care to eat the fish or eat anything. If I could only abolish eating altogether, then no question of food, good or bad, would trouble me. But since things are what they are, my only business is to understand and use them. So if I find the fish good because it is of use to me, I find also that the bones, which at first seemed to be an inexplicable evil, are a good because they are of use to the fish.

tuition of poet and philosopher in the past, taken it to be such, but the all-compelling science of the modern era has more and more confirmed the view. In fact, if the world is not a cosmos in which all things are inter-related according to rational, intelligible law, and related so as to form a harmonious unity, then science has no meaning nor any reason to exist at all, and all our discussions become futile trivialities.

Upon the truth of the cosmic order, then, so clearly known, we can not allow discredit to be cast, by reason of certain evils which seem to elude our understanding; but rather in the light of *it*, we should seek to find some rational account of *them*. That nature is ethically good or, in other words, that the phenomenal world, because of its harmonious beauty, is a manifestation of the Real Will of Goodness, is the solid rock upon which we can rest our feet, while we seek to understand that in nature which seems to us evil.

In view then of the relativity of phenomena and of our knowledge of phenomena, and in view of the clearly known cosmic order, suppose we look at some of those mysterious evils in nature that afflict us.

A Visitation of God.

Let us begin with one of those appalling disasters which so unexpectedly and unavoidably come upon men, and which we call the "visitations of God."

It so happens, let us say, that two outer planets come into conjunction with our earth and exercise such a powerful pull upon it as to dislocate the upper crust along the line of an old fault at the base of a certain mountain range. The consequent slipping of the edges and the settling down of the earth masses, under the influence of the internal, gravitative force, into a new position of equilibrium, constitute what we call an earthquake. Unfortunately, in our supposed present instance, a populous city had been built upon this fault and, in the readjustment of the dislocated edges, is thrown into ruins, and a thousand human lives destroyed. The whole world stands aghast, and reflects upon the frailty and, perhaps, the vanity of human life; or, it may be, that some regard the calamity as the destruction of a wicked city by an offended Diety. To the people immediately concerned, it was indeed the end of the world, the final cataclysm of all things; for they suffered not only the loss of their

fortunes but of their lives, and, in terms of their interests and feelings, it was the ultimate doom of the Last Judgment.

But when we look at this appalling evil from the point of view of the entire world, it presents itself as quite insignificant, if not negligible, as something far less than the wrinkling of an apple skin in the winter store. Taken all in all, the earth is not appreciably affected, and the human race, as a whole, has suffered no real injury.

Nevertheless it *is* a blasting evil to those concerned, and the only good in it which the survivors can see is a lesson of how to be forewarned, or of how to avoid in the future the points of danger, and the folly of insecure constructions. But while the wit of man may devise means to escape or to mitigate the evil of earthquakes, that does not prevent them, and they remain a constant threat to man's security and welfare. Shall we then after all be compelled to regard earthquakes as evils, inherent in the objective course of nature?

A Question between Personal Interests and Cosmic Order.

When we take into account that it is an incident in the workings of the great law of gravitation, we see that the earthquake is not, at any rate, an irrational accident, but an entirely explicable element in the whole ordered frame of things. Would we be willing then, at the critical moment, is the crucial question, to suspend gravitation for the sake of saving the unfortunate city and its inhabitants? Our answer must be affected by the consideration that the hurt which they have received is after all only physical—their intelligence and moral character have in no way been affected; and we have on our hands the problem of balancing the physical hurt of these people over against throwing the whole universe into disorder. Of course, miracles are now out of the question, because we have passed beyond dualism and supernaturalism to monism and immanence. We are now living in a world of law and order, where favor is shown to none and where the benefits are alike for all.

As much then as we are bent on saving these particular people from harm, we are inclined to pause before resorting to measures which would annul all law and order, and turn the cosmos into a chaos. In fact, for our ultimate welfare, we must insist on leaving the world a cosmos. *That*, we can understand as a universal and indispensable good; *that*, taken all in all, we can see, is best for everybody, and we shall wait for further enlightenment on those incidental evils that

afflict us and which, as yet, we do not understand and can not manage.

Consequently, we should rather say that, instead of its being an evil that the earthquake happened, it would have been a portentous evil if it had not happened. It would have indicated a dangerous "hitch" in the cosmic order. And when we take into consideration the fact that man belongs ultimately to the realm of Reality, upon which rests the phenomenal order, we can easily understand that his master concern is not the avoidance of passing, phenomenal incoherencies and disorders, but the assurance of a Reality that immutably manifests itself according to rational law in a harmonious cosmos.

But for that very reason, just because the world is a cosmos and has revealed to us so much good, we shall be justified in hoping that an enlarging experience, a clearer thought, and a more obedient will may more and more lead us beyond the relativities and limitations of our present understanding of things, and show us how not only to avoid all natural evils, but to subordinate and turn them to good. For the present, until we understand them, we must lay the bones at one side—and eat the fish.

Much the same sort of considerations may be taken with reference to the evils found in the vegetal and animal kingdoms.

Noxious Plants.

The useless weeds that invade our fields and gardens, the poisonous plants that endanger our lives, and the noxious microbes that assail even our blood, are evils so far as we now know them. But we know, at any rate, that they are incidents in the working of a great cosmic law—not this time the law of gravitation, but the law of evolution. They all fit into the scheme which has produced our flowers, our grains, and our fruits. And we could not think of endangering these by abolishing evolution, just in order to get rid of those evils which for the time being are inexplicable. And yet we will not supinely accept these evils, for there is our experience of advancement in the past, in which the useless or the harmful has, with a larger knowledge of nature, been subjected to our welfare; and we can reasonably expect that, with a still more advanced understanding of the world, the worthless may prove to be useful, and even the harmful turn

out to be beneficial. At any rate, as it is, we shall not, because we find a bone, choke upon it, or throw away the fish.

Dangerous Animals.

In like manner, we must deal with unexplained evils in the animal kingdom. Poisonous insects and snakes, pests of various kinds, and beasts of prey—and even whole tribes of savage, unprogressive man—seem, to our present knowledge, either harmful or utterly worthless. But they all come in as incidents in the chain of that great progressive law of evolution, and that we know has produced not only the useful domestic animals and the highest types of mankind, but bears all the marks of a rational purpose, moving toward some great end.

Reptiles of all kinds, however repulsive, seem to be a preliminary, necessary step toward one of the most attractive, beautiful, and symbolically significant products of evolution, the birds. It is possible that if we should be entrusted with the power to destroy, for our momentary convenience, all the reptiles; in destroying the reptiles, we should destroy the possibility of having the lark, the robin, the nightingale, and the humble but indispensable barnyard fowl.

Who would think of giving up the dog, that faithful, sagacious, almost human friend of man, just because of the slinking hyena or prowling wolf? We find no use whatever for the hyena and wolf, but so far as we know, the dog has use for them in order to have become, in the whole line of development, what he is, at times a very noble and useful animal or, at any rate, an affectionate and intelligent, dumb companion.

In a word, then, while we do not know the purpose or the use to us of many events and objects in nature, which experience shows us to be necessary incidents in the play of those great laws of gravitation and evolution, we do know that those great laws are absolutely indispensable to our safety and welfare, and reveal the immutable integrity of one, beautiful, harmonious system of law and order, out of which we spring and in the midst of which we live and move and have our being. And it is in the light of this which we know to be preeminently good, that we must view those things which appear to us, for the moment, to be evil.

But of natural evils there is a much wider and more advanced view, growing out of the relativity of human knowledge and the ambiguity of the yet unknown, taken in connection with man's mental and moral freedom. It has been observed that, with growing knowledge, not only many evils in nature, once thought so objectively real, have entirely passed away; but nature becomes increasingly beneficent. The crucial question, then, for man becomes: How much of his false thought and consequent wrong volition has he been, all the time, obtruding upon nature as something real? We have agreed that, however great the struggle and pain involved, a free intellectual and moral responsibility is alone worthy of man as a rational intelligence. It is freedom alone that makes progress possible; it is responsibility alone that makes progress valuable; and it is the sense of a free responsibility that urges man to attain the goal of progress, which is the freedom of self-realization, in opposition to the bondage and limitations of mistaken thought and wrong will.

Evil, Projected and Objectified Error and Sin.

In view of this rational freedom in man, the natural evils of life take on a different aspect. Thus, my false thought about and my wrong volition toward nature lead me to project my subjective errors and perversities into the objective order of things, and then take them to be real. And they are real to me so long as my error and perversity last.

This view was set forth, in a large way, by Swedenborg as expressing a great spiritual law. He regarded all noxious and useless plants and animals, as well as all natural calamities, as having their origin not in the real order of nature, but in the false understanding and darkened will of free, intelligent beings. The errors and sins, not only of men, but of the devils in the hells, he taught, were objectified in the various forms of evil we know in human experience. The biting, stinging insects, the poisonous asps and snakes, the unclean vermin, the cunning fox, the fierce cruelty of the tiger, and the like, are all projected and objectified analogues of the senseless gossip, the malicious slander, the envy, jealousy, hatred, perfidy, cruelty, and oppressive injustice manifested in rational beings.

Whatever weight we may give to such a doctrine, as a whole, it expresses two very evident facts. First, so long as men remain

ignorant and perverse, they do not attain the reality of their true being. Instead of coming forward, as the realization of their rational nature demands, they stop back, as it were, at the animal stage, where they show in their tastes and activities, and even in their very faces, the characteristics of animal types. Secondly, ignorance, error, wrong-doing, ill-will do project upon nature evils for which man, and not nature, is properly responsible.

Effect of Mental and Moral Qualities on the Environment.

It is a matter of common experience that the error and perversity of man produces those objective conditions in nature which we call disease. The indolence, ignorance, error and wrong-doing of whole communities have brought those objective conditions which again and again produced the epidemic pestilences that scourged the Middle Ages. One of the most loathsome and tenacious diseases that afflict civilized man can almost with certainty be traced to its origin in the unspeakable vices of the Neapolitan court.*

Nor are we lacking in more modern instances. The diseases that prey upon children, and that most dreaded white plague, consumption, ravage the crowded tenement districts of great cities, such as Paris, London, or New York, because of the lack of air, light, warmth, and wholesome food, conditions which directly grow out of poverty. And when we look for the ultimate cause of poverty, which brings in its train ignorance, vice, and disease, we shall find it in the fierce and selfish struggle for supremacy in the commercial and industrial world. These poor people are largely pawns in the game played by the great.

We can not absolve the poor man from his share of folly and vice, but when to that is added the oppression and injustice of the strong, we may be justified in saying that the diphtheritic, scrofulous, and tubercular germs that ravage the poor man's hovel are largely indirect creations of the vanity, unsympathetic hardness, and selfish ambition of the rich.

We shall have to recall a previous suggestion, in recognizing that intimate relation between man and nature, wherein we see the quick and subtle response nature makes to man's thought and action. So that we must constantly be on the guard against judging what nature

*Symonds, J. A., "Renaissance in Italy: The Age of the Despots," Cap. IX, Charles VIII, p. 504.

really is in herself, until we have eliminated all of man's errors and wrong-doings from the problem.

But whatever account we give of the evils in nature, whether as real, but still unexplained parts of the cosmic organism; or whether they have no more reality than as objectified forms of our own error and perversity, it always remains true that they are the effects of perfectly rational causes, that is, the results of fixed laws, expressing the order and permanence of one, great, harmonious system, the deepest significance of which is that it manifests, as a cosmic order, the causal will of universal good.

Beneficent System of Law Brings Evil to Light.

How rational laws, in a beneficent system, can result in evil is illustrated in everyday experience. Thus, acquired habits, whether good or bad, follow the same law of association; in the one case, applied with intelligence to a true intellectual or ethical development; in the other case, misunderstood or defied in the interests of some weakness or low pleasure.

Or if we regard the larger law of heredity, we shall find that it is the very guarantee of progress, and for that reason, at times, imposes upon us the cruelest of evils. The father can hand down to his son, or a whole generation can transmit to its successor, the most precious gifts of mental and moral culture; or, on the other hand, by reason of the same beneficent law, be compelled to entail a dragon's brood of individual or social evils. It is just the steadiness of all such laws, which when misunderstood or disregarded, bear with such painful weight upon us, that makes it possible for us to rely upon the order in the midst of which we live, and to learn with certainty how to avoid the evil and to secure the good. The evil, we must understand, is never in the law, but in the error and wrong which the law chastises.

In general, then, whether we regard the world from the standpoint of the theoretical reason and find it to be a unitary system of immutable, rational laws; or from the standpoint of the æstheticopractical reason and find it to be a cosmic order of harmonious beauty, the moral significance is the same, viz.: that the causal energy from which all things proceed must be a Will of Good, a Will that disregards no interests, and conserves all real, existent things.

Our moral interpretation of the cosmos, however, does not ultimately rest upon these formal considerations, but upon the direct, rational intuition that the Eternal Will of Good, which creates and sustains all things, is akin to the will of good in us, which streams out to benefit and please others.

We should fall far short of the ethical interpretation of the world, if we stopped simply at the logical inferences drawn from the theoretical and æsthetical views of nature. Such inferences are perfectly valid, and belong as preliminary steps to the true, ethical interpretation; but the essence of the ethical interpretation goes back to that ontological attitude which rests upon the immediate intuition of the rational identity of subject and object.

The Real Ethical Interpretation, a Direct Intuition.

The ethical interpretation, at last analysis, is therefore like the theoretical and æsthetic interpretations, a call of reason to reason; and is the direct recognition that the Will of the Cosmos is akin to the will of the self, and that the Will of the Cosmos establishes the moral law of self.

Because I love others and employ whatever knowledge (science) and skill (art) I may be able to command to give them benefit or pleasure, I know that God loves others and employs all the resources of his Truth and Beauty to bestow blessings upon all. And when the objective cosmos gives me unmistakable evidence that God, in his Truth and Beauty, is infinitely and eternally greater than I am, I must conclude that his Goodness is infinitely and eternally greater than mine. But I am not jealous, nor is my pride wounded, for, under the circumstances, I feel a profound sense of security and peace.

It was here that Kant fell short of the true ethical argument. He drew the very valid inference of man's immortality, upon the basis of the unfulfilled moral ideal; an inference equally applicable to the intellectual and artistic nature, and always making a strong appeal; but, at best, it is only a *theoretical* deduction. What we want for the ethical interpretation, on the other hand, is a direct declaration of the ethical reason itself. And this declaration it makes. Recognizing its own deepest and most essential character to be that of an out-streaming will of good, it can regard the causal energy of the cosmos as no other than the Will of Eternal Love.

The Ethical Interpretation of Israel.

It is this truly ethical interpretation of Reality which peculiarly characterized the efforts of Hebrew genius. As Israel morally developed from his first crude, naive egoism, through the practice of duty, obedience to law, or endeavor after righteousness, to the Gospel freedom and life of love, his interpretation of God, the Supreme Creative Will, rose, first, from that of an Arbitrary Wilful Power, to that of a Righteous and Holy Sovereign of the Universe, and then, finally, to that of the Infinite Father whose changeless, outstreaming, Eternal Love creates and fills all worlds.

This direct ethical interpretation which Israel gave to Reality strangely parallels and completes the ethical meaning of our theoretical and æsthetical interpretations, which we have found to be necessary rational inferences. Our theoretical view of the world which reveals, in the cosmos of inexorable law, an immutable moral integrity, corresponds to the Hebrew Law; our æsthetical view of the world which reveals, in the cosmos of harmonious beauty, a creative and sustaining will of good, streaming out to include and benefit all, corresponds to the Gospel, with its comprehensive Divine Love.

Comprehensive Character of Religion.

The interpretation of life culminates with the ethical interpretation of Reality, because ethics, as we have learned, includes and grounds science and art. And since Israel, who has given us the ultimate ethical interpretation of Reality, identifies it throughout with religion, we may be justified in summarizing our results by making them an expression of the ultimate religion of reason.

That rational instinct that led Israel to identify religion with an ethical view of Reality is inerrant, and springs out of the nature of reason itself. Religion can have no other meaning than that of a conscious, rational relation to the Ultimate Reality. And whatever that relation may be, theoretical or practical, it will always, in its deepest ground, be ethical, that is, be a conscious, volitional relation between kindred intelligent beings.

This fact has the profoundest significance, and finds historical embodiment in the early centuries of our era. Israel was not devoted to science and art—indeed, had no genius for them—but when the culminating effort of his ethical genius, viz.: the Gospel, was, through

the Apostle Paul, brought into contact with the scientific and artistic culture of the Græco-Roman world, it assimilated science and art to itself, and thus opened a new and higher era of progress for mankind.

On the other hand, we might say that it was the Hellenic science (philosophy) and art that appropriated and mastered the Gospel; but here we should be reversing the true relation. Hellenic science and art were given a new life and meaning by the ethics of the Gospel, while the Gospel thus received an appropriate form of expression for its purposes of good.

It is because ethics is the ground of science and art that the Græco-Roman culture, with its master concern of science and art, could never have saved the world; while the Gospel, which is the sum and substance of ethical Reality, not only gave new life and meaning to the Græco-Roman world, but transformed it, by grounding all the real elements of its culture in the Divine Purposes of Eternal Goodness.

CHAPTER XIII.

RELIGION.

THAT which encouraged us to undertake an interpretation of life was the discovery that we live in the midst of a great system of rational laws, intelligible to reason. The supreme law that presented itself, and of necessity included all other laws, was that of evolution which seemed to express the deep Cosmic Causal Will, as moving in a progressive order toward some great end; or which gave us the impression of a great rational, purposive notion or idea, unfolding from its implicit to its full explicit form.

In this process, we saw the vague, the homogeneous, the simple, becoming clear, heterogeneous, and complex; the inorganic rising to the organic; and the organic culminating in the rational.

The Rise of the Organic.

What first emerged from the long evolutionary process was the great mechanico-chemical world-organism, which presented itself as a Grand Cosmic Individual. But what aroused our deepest interest was the profoundly significant fact that within this grand cosmic organism there began to assert itself an inter-cosmic individuality, faintly adumbrated in the crystal, but first really expressed in the living cell.

The peculiar characteristic of this individual living cell we found to be, first, the assertion of an independent, microcosmic cycle of its own, as opposed to, and yet in conjunction with, the great cosmos; and, secondly, the maintenance of that relatively independent cycle, through the deep inner instincts of self-preservation, self-propagation, and self-progression. While self-preservation and self-propagation seemed to be concerned largely with the interests of the single individual, self-progression seemed to demand the aggregation of single cells, working together in a communal group, for the formation of a higher and more complex organic unity, which constitutes the true organism as the harmonious inter-relation of the many in the one.

And thus, as we observed, the process went on, developing individuals, rising in quality and increasing in complexity, through an infinite variety of plant and animal forms, until man appeared, as the culmination of the whole.

Paradoxes.

We noted how that, by a strange paradox, the individual organisms, as they increased in complexity, became at once more independent of and yet more dependent upon their environment; because they came into more extended relations with it, or into contact with it at an increasingly greater number of points. Consequently, we saw how that, while the individuals seemingly strove more and more to assert their freedom from the great Cosmic Individual, yet, at the same time, by as deep an instinct strove to come back into complete, harmonious reconciliation with it.

The Psychic Advance.

The essence of this progressive self-assertion, growing independence, and final reconciliation, lay in the psychic content, revealed in the process itself. In the plant, we could only discover a vague sort of sensitiveness; in the animal, however, to sensitiveness was added consciousness of the object; while in man, sensitiveness and consciousness rose to self-consciousness.

This last step bore within itself the most tremendous, tragic consequences and possibilities. Before it was taken, all were wrapt in the peace and contentment of the cosmic unity. No individual lack was felt, and no individual desire unsatisfied in the Edenic abundance and harmony.

Rational Man, the First True Individual.

But with self-conscious man, we have, as it were, the first born of nature who, as such, is both honored and burdened with the heavy responsibility of his own destiny. He has become an other in the cosmos, the first true individual; and if, with growing knowledge, there are moments when he feels his lonely helplessness, as a wanderer and exile upon the earth; he, at any rate, also feels a sense of value in and for himself, feels that he has risen above the mere instinctive life of nature into the supra-natural region of self-conscious reason. If at times, rebellion in his heart, he is led to defy the gods, snatch from

heaven their secrets, and in spite of them build himself a kingdom in the world for his own security and welfare, and the proud display of his own power; he nevertheless, weeping, yearns for that other kingdom, from which he dimly feels himself to have been thrust out, and for which he vaguely anticipates that he is ultimately destined. Or, in other terms, man, rising self-consciously above nature, as a free rational individual, recognizes beyond nature that other Rational Individual, with whom he is sure that it is his ultimate destiny to come into supreme reconciliation.

Man Seeks a Rational Reconciliation.

In some sort, man is already one with the cosmos, whose mechanical, chemical, vital, and conscious unfoldments are summed up in himself. But, *as* man, his self-consciousness having raised him to the supra-natural plane, he now enters upon a new and higher order of rational evolution which involves all the forms of intellectual, moral, and æsthetic culture, and leads in the end to that freedom of self-realization which is a final reconciliation with the Truth, the Goodness, and the Beauty of the Cosmos.

The Threefold Reason Interprets the Object.

As reason is threefold in its nature, being distinctly theoretical (science, philosophy), æsthetico-practical (invention and art), and ethical (moral codes and governments) we at first found within it, confusion and conflict, but this state proved to be due to rational tribalisms and immaturities; and, in view of the fundamental unity of reason, we found in the end that science shows the true path which ethics ought to take, in its purpose of conferring the pleasures and benefits of art upon others.

When the rational subject turned to interpret the objective world, recognizing within itself the distinction between the inner supra-natural reason and the outer natural organism, it saw the object not only as the natural world, but as the rational, Substantial, Causal ground of the world, or God.

No sooner, however, had we begun an interpretation of the object, than we were thrown back upon the subject, in order that, by first knowing its methods and processes, we might better determine the validity of its objective knowledge. Two fundamental and ultimate conditions of knowing the object presented themselves in the knowing

subject. First, to be interpreted, the object must be reduced to terms of the subject, or, in other words, the interpretation is a call of reason to reason. In the second place, the subject approaches the object by the three progressive stages of perception, of logic, and of intuition, which are respectively the functions of sense, understanding, and reason.

Reason Responds to Reason.

Since all perception, as well as logic and intuition, turned out to be pure mind activity in the subject, we were compelled to recognize that the objective appeal must also be mind activity. Hence, there was no other conclusion than that Reality, both in itself and in all its manifestations in the sense-world of space and time, is Mind and the activity of Mind.

Reality, as Substance, we found to be Infinite Thought, which presents itself to sense as matter in space; Reality, as Cause, we found to be Eternal Will, which presents itself to sense as energy or motion in time; and Reality, as Unity, we found to be the totality of all relations, in the harmonious perfection of an Absolute Beauty, which presents itself to sense in the varied substantial and causal unities of the world.

Progressive Advance in Knowledge of the Object.

If the interpreting subject thus discovers the object to be Mind, it does so, as we found, through the three progressive or ascending stages of perception, logic, and intuition. We saw how it is that *perception* affords us our first knowledge of the object, while *logic* rationalizes the data of perception and opens the way to the intuition of Reality. So that, in the phenomenal world, we have a limited and conditioned manifestation of Reality, in space and time as it appears to sense, rationalized by the understanding. In the light of intuition, the phenomenal is transformed into the real world-order, as the conditioned revelation of the One Absolute Infinite and Eternal Reality, or God.

Thus our theoretical interpretation of the object ended in the recognition of the One Absolute Ground of all objective existence, as the Unity of Infinite Thought and Eternal Will, manifested to sense and understanding, under the conditions of space and time, in the phenomenal world of nature; and manifested to rational intui-

tion in the conditioned reality of the spiritual world, as an ever-existent revelation of God to man. But as our thought of the object invariably has value, in terms of feeling, which as invariably give motives to the will, we were compelled to view the object also in the light of the æsthetic and ethical reason.

Æsthetic and Moral Interpretations.

Looked at from the standpoint of the æsthetico-practical reason, which estimates values and invents and constructs the benefits and pleasures of art, we found that the world presents itself as a supreme work of art, which not only affords man the utmost pleasure and supplies his ever-growing needs, but reveals the harmonious, unitary purpose of the Infinite and Eternal Mind.

When the subject, as a moral being, asked the ethical meaning of the theoretical and æsthetical views of the world, we found that the rational law and order throughout the cosmos reveal the immutable reliability of moral integrity, and that the harmonious unity of cosmic purpose, moving toward a great end, could have its ground in nothing else than in the Causal Will of Eternal Goodness. Therefore, the Infinite Truth of the world is the Absolute Beauty of the world, because it is the objective form which Eternal Goodness takes in order to confer the blessings of an abounding and perfect Life upon all.

Capable of thus interpreting the Absolute Mind and its manifestations, man, we could but admit, is revealed as a rational intelligence akin to God and destined, in the full attainment of his rational maturity, to reflect within himself the Thought, the Will, and the harmonious Unity of God.

*Evolution, an Unfoldment of Man's Consciousness in
Reflecting God.*

The entire process of rational evolution in nature and history, by which man comes to the freedom of self-realization, we saw could not be a process in Absolute Reality, for which Truth, Goodness, and Beauty constitute the ever-existent Substance, Cause, and Unity, but in the unfolding consciousness of man who rises, intellectually, from sense to logic and from logic to intuition; ethically, from egoism to altruism (law, justice) and from altruism to universalism (love); and æsthetically, from sensation to emotion and from emotion to hap-

piness; and by so doing comes into reconciliation with the Thought and the Will of God, and enters into the enjoyment of the Life of God.

Thus the Divine Father, who is Truth itself, and Goodness itself, and Beauty itself, has uttered, in the rational world-order phenomenal and real, the Divine Logos, through which He manifests himself to Man, the Divine Son, who, in proportion as he reflects in his understanding the Truth of God, and in his will the Goodness of God, enters, throughout his entire being, into the living Beauty of God.

The True Meaning of Religion.

Here, at last, we come upon the true meaning of religion—religion as it must present itself to the modern scientific consciousness. Religion, as we have come to see it, is the total, conscious relation of the rational subject to the rational object.

It is therefore not exhausted in the works of ritual and ceremony. This is what it appears to be to sense alone, and has value and meaning only in so far as it symbolizes the backlying doctrinal truth.

Neither is religion adequately expressed in the faith of dogma and creed. This is what it appears to be to logic alone, and has value and meaning only in so far as it presents truly, in theoretical and doctrinal form, the ultimate, concrete, living Reality.

Nor is religion merely the undifferentenced ecstasy of divine vision. This is what it appears to be to intuition alone, and becomes religion only when it takes the concrete form of rational doctrine, expressed and symbolized in the ritual of a true, harmonious life of outstreaming goodness.

Religion is ritual, doctrine, and life, but the ritual must express the doctrine and the doctrine must rationally explain the life. It stands for the total relation between God, the Divine Father and Man, the Divine Son, expressed through the World, the Divine Logos. It is the entrance upon a conscious enjoyment of the harmonious Beauty of Life, as the manifested form of Infinite Truth, which has its ground in Eternal Goodness.

Religion is thus the unity of science, ethics, and art, and brings all the interests of Reason, intellectual, moral, and æsthetic, into complete union. To know God is to love God. That is, the Truth reveals itself in its adorable Beauty. To love God is to know God. That is, to will the Cosmic Will is the basal condition of enlightenment, or opens the final possibility of thinking the Cosmic Thought. To

know and to love God is to enter into and enjoy his Life and Beauty; for his Truth is the Life and Beauty of all things, because his Truth is the objective manifestation of his Immutable Goodness.

"Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us that we should be called the sons of God. Therefore, the world [on the plane of sense and understanding] knoweth us not, because it knew him not. Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be. But we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him for we shall see him as he is. And every one that hath this hope in him, purefieth himself, even as he is pure." (I John iii, 1-3.)

An Unfinished Task.

But our task is not yet done. However lofty our interpretation of life may be, life as it actually is in daily experience, after all, weighs so heavily upon us that at times we question its worth altogether. We ask with the brooding Dane:

"Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The sling and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take up arms against a sea of troubles,
And, by opposing, end them?"

Hold what philosophy we may, so concrete, so real, so intense are the sufferings, to which we are subjected, that there are circumstances when it seems like "a consummation, to be devoutly wished," if we might in some never-waking, dreamless sleep, end

"The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to. . . .
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
The pangs of despis'd love, the law's delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes,
When he himself might his own quietus make
With a bare bodkin?"

But it is not so simple a matter for the gloomy Hamlet, or any of us, to free himself thus from his misfortunes; because the whole problem is not settled on the earthly scene where it arises. Hence he is checked in his impetuous haste to end it all by an act of peremptory violence. "Who would fardels bear," he exclaims,

“To grunt and sweat under a weary life:
But that the dread of something after death,—
The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns,—puzzles the will:
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?”

(Hamlet III, 1.)

Hamlet, however, does not state here, in the cowardice of conscience, the entire reason that gives him pause. For what really restrains him is the deepest rational conviction of mankind, viz.: that this phenomenal and relative life does not express the whole meaning of man's existence.

All Things to be Brought Under the Aspect of Reality.

Therefore, since evolution reveals to us how the phenomenal moves forward toward the real, and the relative toward the absolute, we can not pause in our interpretation, until we view the phenomenal and the relative under the aspect of the real and the absolute. For we have an inkling that by so doing the irrationalities that now seem to belong to the otherwise rational cosmic order, will disappear.

At any rate, we are very sure that our limited, erring knowledge, seen as mistakes in thought; our selfish and perverse volitions, seen as defects of will; and our consequent discords of feeling, can not be taken as ultimate and real criteria for the interpretation of life. That we are ever disturbed and confused by them, may very easily be due to the fact that we stop short of the mind's total and mature self-realization.

The perceptions of sense must rise through the logic of the understanding to the intuitions of reason; the instinctive egoism of self must develop through the altruism of justice into the universal will of good; and the pleasures of sensation must refine to emotion and culminate in a real happiness, before we shall be able to see any true significance in the phenomenal and relative life we lead in the world of sense. It is only from the standpoint of rational intuition, intellectual, moral, and æsthetic, that we can catch some glimpses of rational meaning in the unfolding process, which brings with it the mystery and the burden of suffering; or can see a divine purpose of good in the Pedagogy of Pain.

BOOK V.
THE PEDAGOGY OF PAIN.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE final interpretation which Reason puts upon Reality is that of the Divine Trinity—the Father, the Son, and the Word. God, the Father, who is the perfection of Absolute Life and Beauty, because he is the Infinite Truth, revealing the will of Eternal Goodness, utters the Word, or manifests himself in the rational World-Order to Man, the Son, who in his thought, will, and feeling, receives and reflects the Divine Truth, the Divine Goodness, and the Divine Life and Beauty.

In this Ultimate Reality, there is and, from the nature of reason, can be no discord of error (false thought) or sin (wrong will), for Reality always means that harmonious unity of all relations, always indicated by the approval which feeling confers upon the coincidence of thought and will; and, in virtue of which, Goodness reveals itself in the Beauty of Truth.

Ideals of Racial Genius: the Hindu.

This conviction, not in its entirety it is true, has been held by the great culture peoples of antiquity. The three greatest civilizations of the past, the Hindu, the Greek, and the Hebrew—the last two of which have, especially, in a very direct way formed our modern culture—did not reach totality and maturity; but did, at one point or another, according to their racial genius, attain an ultimate interpretation of Reality.

Thus, for example, the Aryan mind, including the Hindu and the Greek, with its preeminent theoretical genius, interpreted Reality, without so much as a question of doubt, to be Truth, which in itself constitutes the harmonious, all-inclusive Beauty of the Cosmos. Hence, for the Aryan, the supreme aim of life was to enter into a perfect understanding, and in consequence into a perfect enjoyment, of the Truth. The attainment of such a goal constitutes freedom and self-realization, according to the Aryan theoretical mind.

If we look into the Vedanta, which may be regarded as the noblest

product of Hindu genius, we shall find that Brahman, who alone is Ultimate Reality, is conceived to be, as the Highest Self or Paramatman, perfect knowledge and consequently perfect bliss—that is, the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth. Hence, man's one rational aim is to know Brahman, or to know himself to be one with Brahman; whereupon he enters into a life of never-ending happiness.

The Hellenic Ideal of Truth and Beauty.

Although in a different form, Plato, who while not the most logical and systematic, may be regarded as standing for the loftiest reach of the Hellenic mind, came to essentially the same result. For him, man's supreme concern is to know the Truth, because the Truth is the harmonious Beauty of life; and the goal of all spiritual endeavor is attained when, with perfect joy, man may at last gaze upon the ineffable Beauty of changeless Truth.

In like manner, Aristotle, who regarded happiness as the ultimate good, found its source to lie in the exercise of the *intellectual*, rather than of the *ethical* virtues. In his "Nicomachean Ethics," he points out how the activities of the moral virtues, such as justice, courage, temperance, are quite human affairs, arising out of our relations one to another, and having no divine element in them. Indeed, he regards moral virtue as, in some respects, actually the result of physical organization and closely associated with the emotions, so that it amounts to no more than a sort of social prudence. Consequently, the moral life is entirely human, and its happiness is human.

But the problem of happiness stands far differently when it comes to the speculative or intellectual virtues, which have their origin in the exercise of reason, and are, therefore, entirely free from all fortuitous and irrational elements of emotion.

That perfect happiness is a species of speculative activity, Aristotle satisfies himself by a reference to the serene life of the gods, of whom we think as being preeminently fortunate and happy. Now what sort of actions do we attribute to the gods—just, courageous, liberal, temperate actions? When we go through all the categories of virtue, it will appear that whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of the gods. The only other forms of activity left to the gods are speculative, and these are indeed alone worthy of them, and capable of affording them happiness.

Therefore, the more human activity can be brought to resemble that

speculative activity of the gods, the more will it result in happiness; and that too, not accidentally but in virtue of the fact that rational speculation is an ultimate good in itself, because coextensive with happiness.

Aristotle's conclusion is that the ultimate happiness or supreme goal of life, which he is looking for, is the happiness of speculation, for that is the happiness of God who, as the Infinite Reason or Mind, eternally rests in the never-ceasing, blissful activities of contemplating the Truth. (Bk. X, Cap. 8.)

The Hebrew Ideal of Righteousness and Life.

When, on the other hand, we turn to the Hebrew ethical genius, we always find the Ultimate Reality to be regarded as the Eternal Creative Will of Goodness; in consequence of which, it is recognized that the happiness of self-realization can alone be secured by a perfect obedience to that Will of Goodness. The supreme truth for the Hebrew is not what it is for the Hindu and the Greek, viz.: a theoretical knowledge and æsthetic enjoyment of objective Reality, but the Divine Law of Righteousness, to know and obey which is life eternal.

The Aryan would *think* his way to Reality as Truth and, thinking it, enter in to its harmonious Beauty. The Hebrew would *will* his way to Reality as Goodness and, willing it, enter into the joy of a perfect Life. In other words, while the one bends all his efforts toward thinking the Divine Thought, the other bends all his efforts toward willing the Divine Will, and each finds the complete æsthetic satisfaction of rational freedom and self-realization; the one, in the Beauty of Truth; the other, in the Life of Goodness. If the one stood for the scientific and philosophical attitude toward Reality, admirably expressed in the Socratic Gospel of True Thinking: Know the Truth and you will do the Right; the other stood for the ethico-religious attitude toward Reality, admirably expressed in the Gospel of Jesus, as the Gospel of Right Willing: Do the Right and you will know the Truth.

While each of these great ideals of antiquity *formally* includes the other, *practically*, they remained one-sided and incomplete. Neither of them, taken alone, can satisfy the entire demands of reason. They must be brought to the unity of a theoretical, moral, and æsthetic interpretation of Reality, in which it may be seen that God, the Absolute

World-Ground, is Eternal Goodness, manifesting himself to man through the World-Order, by the path of Infinite Truth, as the perfect and living Beauty of the Cosmos.

Hebrew and Hellenic Ideals United in Christianity.

This unity was effected in the early centuries of our era, by the confluence of Hellenic thought and Hebrew piety, in the formation of the Christian consciousness. The earliest and most beautiful expression of this total, rational ideal, we have in that noble and exalted prologue to the Johannine Gospel. Its author, whom we may think of as some brilliant Alexandrian, of the early second century, seems to have united in himself the spirit of the Hebrew ethical, and that of the Greek intellectual culture. He accepted Jesus as the Messiah, and, as such, saw in him the embodiment of God's Holy Will in human history, as the revealed purpose of Eternal Love. With only this conviction, however, he would not have essentially differed from all other Christianized Hebrews. But the distinction of his genius lay in the fact that he identified this embodiment of the Divine Goodness, product of the Hebrew ethical idealism, with the objective Truth, that is, the rational World-Order, or Divine Logos, product of the Hellenic intellectual insight. Jesus, as the Son of the Father, and as the typical man, is thus looked upon as the Love of God, objectively incarnated as the Truth of God. We have, as it were, Hebraism hellenized and Hellenism hebraized.

While Plato faintly foreshadows this doctrine in his recognition of the Beauty of Truth, as resting upon the idea of the Good, he, or the entire Greek race, never conceived the Hebrew doctrine of God as the Almighty Creative Will of Unchanging Righteousness, much less the Christian doctrine of the Father, as Eternal Outstreaming Love.

Christian History, an Unfoldment of Truth and Goodness in Reason.

It was in the Johannine prologue, that the Hebrew and Greek genius came to anything like rational unity, in which the reason of man found its noblest, most harmonious, and most comprehensive expression. For, as the real order of objective Truth in the world is declared to be one with the Divine Will of Good, the Hellenic spirit of science and art, which would know and construct a world of harmonious beauty

for man's welfare and happiness, becomes just the objective embodiment or actual form required, for the realization of the Hebrew Kingdom of God on earth.

The entire unfolding of the Christian consciousness, which constitutes the meaning of history, from the time when St. Paul made universal the religion of Jesus, has been the endeavor to master, in thought and life, the unity of Truth and Goodness; to see how, to use a medieval antithesis, reason and revelation, or to use a modern antithesis, how science and the interests of religion, with its ethical ideals, may be brought into harmony.

Indeed, the whole meaning of modern civilization, with all its strivings, conflicts, confusions, national and inter-national tendencies, conscious or unconscious, is that irresistible cosmic compulsion which is driving history on to the fulfillment of the Johannine prologue, by transforming the world through science and art into the realized Kingdom of God on earth, with its law of universal good-will.

Return to Earlier Ideals Impossible.

While it is evident that the Greek scientific element and the Hebrew ethical element have not yet been brought to anything like a complete, rational unity in the Christian consciousness, they are nevertheless there, so indissolubly joined that they can never be separated, and that, too, because they constitute together the total striving of Reason toward freedom and self-realization.

It would be a grave historical, as well as philosophical error, to suppose that Christianity is simply the Gospel, as a product of the Hebrew ethical genius, and intended to secure man's moral reconciliation with the will of God. For it necessarily involves the Greek intellectual ideal of knowing the objective Truth. It thus offers the ultimate goal of man's entire rational evolution, by which he comes not only to find his art to be the perfect embodiment of his science, because his science is the objective expression of his ethics; but also to understand that Reality, or the objective Cosmic Truth, in its harmonious unity, is Absolute Beauty, because it is the manifestation of Eternal Goodness.

The cry which is sometimes heard: Away with Greek metaphysics and let us get back to the pure Gospel, is therefore wholly meaningless and rises out of an entire misunderstanding of what the Christian

consciousness really is, and what the Divine Providence has done for man in the developments of history.

To sweep away Greek metaphysics from Christianity would mean to sweep away that rational, truth-seeking Hellenic spirit which is so brilliantly embodied in our modern science and philosophy, would turn us back eighteen centuries, and rob us of the most valuable lessons of time. In fine, it would be a denial of all rational attempts to understand and interpret life. It were better to have an imperfect, immature, or confused metaphysics than no metaphysics at all. For to have no metaphysics at all means to have no science, and no attempt to form a rational doctrine of objective truth.

All the doctrines of the Christian church, which are the attempt of the Hellenic theoretical spirit to understand, explain, and interpret life, as seen in the light of the Hebrew ethical genius, are not essentially false, but essentially true. We do not want to sweep them away in their entirety, for that would be an utterly irrational iconoclasm; but we would sweep away that blind and stubborn dogmatism that seeks to imprison Reason forever in the formulas of one age, so that the underlying truth of Christian doctrines may be restated in the light of our larger and wider modern scientific thought; with the hope that possibly the Hebrew element of Goodness and the Hellenic element of Truth may at last be brought into such a rational and complete unity, as to represent the total Absolute Beauty of the Cosmos.

Universality of the Rational Interpretation of Life.

The outcome, then, of our threefold, rational interpretation of objective Reality, to the effect that the Cosmic Truth constitutes the Cosmic Beauty, because it manifests the Cosmic Goodness, is not an individual or private interpretation, but, in one aspect or another, was the ultimate teaching of the great culture races of antiquity, and, in its entirety, expresses the full meaning of the Christian consciousness. And, in like manner, our conclusion that man's freedom and self-realization, or, to express it otherwise, the goal of his rational development, is to reflect in his threefold rational nature the Thought of the Cosmic Truth, the Will of the Cosmic Goodness, and consequently enter into the harmonious life (evaluated in feeling) of the Cosmic Beauty, was held, in one aspect or another, by those great races of the past, and forms, in its entirety, the Christian Ideal of Eternal Life.

If we again look back to those two great racial geniuses, the intellectual Aryan and the ethical Hebrew, we shall find that they not only set up the *positive* ideals of Truth and Goodness, as the only conditions of freedom and self-realization, but also viewed the goal from a *negative* standpoint, as a rescue or salvation from evil, from the discord, weakness, and suffering arising out of confusions, mistakes, perversities, and wrongs.

And each, in perfect accord with his master interest, formed a conception of the nature of evil. While philosophy among the Greeks attained something like the fervor and meaning of religion in such men as Plato, who yearned to behold the spiritual Beauty of the Truth, it was in the main characterized by that cold, detached, logical spirit with which we are familiar in modern science, and which was so typically embodied in Aristotle.

Salvation from the Evils of Error or of Sin.

Therefore, if we would know all that the pure theoretical reason can do in the way of offering religion to man, we must turn to the Hindu phase of the Aryan genius, which made religion and science (knowing the truth) synonymous. It is with perfect justice that the higher religions of India have come to be called Wisdom-Religions. That is, there is no question of a moral reconciliation with God, as the Eternal Cosmic Will of Goodness, but the entire concern is to *know* God, as the Infinite Truth, and knowing God to enter into his perfect happiness.

The conception of evil from which man would be rescued is inevitable. It is that which stands in the way of knowing the Truth, it is *ignorance* and *error*, and these are the prolific sources of all pain and misery.

As ignorance and error—not knowing—are always due to sense, or to the acceptance of sense knowledge and sense pleasure as real, the Hindu recognizes that his first concern is to clear away this sense illusion, before he can hope to attain to the Truth, or be saved. His first attempt to do so is a very determined asceticism, which often takes the form of the most painful inflictions of self-torture. By thus humbling and renouncing sense, it is hoped that man may be able to rise to spirit. Then, attaining an idealistic interpretation of the world, the Hindu mind recognizes that sense is a state of consciousness rather than a physical condition of the body, and therefore seeks to rid himself of that false and illusory state of consciousness. Such

a result can alone be reached by mental concentration and progressive spiritual development, in virtue of which, the earnest devotee ultimately aims at realizing in himself the Truth and the supreme happiness arising out of the enjoyment of its ineffable Beauty.

This is the religion of the pure theoretical mind, it is the religion of the scientist and philosopher, and answers the question: What shall I do to be saved from the confusion and pain of ignorance and error? by saying: Know the Truth and you will enter into the harmonious life of Beauty.

On the other hand, the ethical Hebrew, whose aim always was perfect obedience to the Eternal Will of Goodness, found *sin* to be the barrier in his way, and the source of sin, to be self-will, as opposed to the will of God, which is necessarily the only law of man's life. Hence Hebrew salvation is for the saint who, being released from the sins of self-will, wins pardon, redemption, reconciliation, atonement with God, and the consequent joy of eternal life.

As a natural result of this attitude, we never find anything like asceticism with the Hebrew, in his purity; for as he views life, the source of evil is not *error*, arising out of the illusions of *sense*, which must be suppressed and overcome, but *sin* which is the stubborn assertion of self-will. Hence, he repents, turns about and reforms, makes restitution, atones for his sin by sacrifice, in order that he may secure atonement with the objective Will of God. That his *thought* is not in accord with the Cosmic Thought, is not the master concern with him. What really troubles him is that his *will* is not in harmony with the Cosmic Will.

Salvation Must Be from Both Error and Sin.

It was not until the Hebrew was touched by Greek culture that he began, in any clear, rational sense, to see that another element is involved in salvation, viz.: the escape from error and its results, through a scientific understanding of life. We have this Hellenic truth-seeking spirit coming to incipient expression in the Wisdom Literature of the Ancient Scriptures, especially that of the Apocrypha.

But in St. Paul, as we shall more fully see on a later page, it receives a very frank acknowledgment in what he calls the "flesh," the "carnal mind," which for him is not only the source of blinding error, but—what gives it its fatal significance—is the very occasion of sin, the one bitter source of all man's sorrow and death, and the barrier to

his reconciliation with God. This Pauline conception of carnal error was doubtless a part of that general conviction, growing in the early Church, as it came more and more into contact with the larger Hellenic world, and so repeatedly expressed in the Johannine Gospel and Epistles, which emphasizes the necessity of a *gnosis*, or a knowing the Truth, as both the means and the end of salvation. Indeed, if we read the teachings of Jesus aright, although it seems that the interests of scientific or philosophical understanding were far from his intent, we shall find that he was deeply imbued with the Hellenic spirit of knowing and teaching the objective Truth. He is constantly telling his disciples to banish the false conceptions and errors they cherish concerning God, nature, and man, and to think of these great objects as they really are. God is not a severe and merciless Judge, exacting the last penalty, but a forgiving and gracious Father; nature is not a realm of danger and suffering, but the manifestation of the abounding love of God; and man is not a hostile opponent and enemy, but a friend and brother.

So deeply involved is this enlightenment, this revealing of objective Truth, in the whole structure of the Glad Tidings of Jesus that some students of comparative religion have gone so far as to deny that Jesus was a Hebrew, or, if he was, to assert that he drew his thought and inspiration from the Aryan theoretical mind of India, rather than from the Hebrew ethical mind of Palestine. While this judgment is right, in so far as it fully recognizes the importance of the Aryan element in the Gospel, it is wrong in its explanation of the fact—wrong historically and philosophically. Historically, there is not the slightest evidence to show that Jesus ever visited the east or came into contact with Hindu teachers. Philosophically, the evidence is still stronger that Jesus drew no elements of his teachings from India. The sum and substance of his Gospel is Hebrew, that is, it rests upon the fundamental conception that God, the Ultimate Reality, is the Creative Will of Eternal Goodness, and purposes, through his providences in nature and history, to redeem man from his sin. Since, as we have learned, thought ultimately rests upon will, Truth upon Goodness, or science upon ethics, it was inevitable that, when the Hebrew ethical genius culminated, as it did in Jesus, it should unfold a corresponding theoretical view of objective Truth.

At any rate, we find in the Gospel and the Apostolic Church all the influences that opened the way for and subsequently made possible

that unification of the Hebrew and Hellenic mind in the Christian consciousness, by which man can no longer regard salvation as an escape from sin alone, or an escape from error alone, but as an escape from *both* error and sin. The rational necessity for such a complete salvation is evident. Reason, in its totality and maturity, must not only will the Good, it must also know the True. In reality, as we have seen, man can not fully will the Will of God, until he thinks the Thought of God, or think the Thought of God, until he sincerely wills the Will of God. For thought is the expression of will, as will is the dynamic power of thought.

*The Church Contains, but Does not Fully Express the
Ideals of Reason.*

However imperfectly the theoretical and ethical elements of reason may as yet be united in the Christian consciousness, they have both, from the beginning, been equally emphasized by the Church as a whole. If you would be saved, the Church has always said, you must not only lead the right life, but you must banish all heterodox error from your mind and accept the true doctrine. The inadequacy of the Church does not lie in any tribalism, for it provides for reason in its totality of thought, will, and feeling, by *negatively* demanding the avoidance of both error and sin, if man would escape suffering and death; and by *positively* setting up the goal of both Truth and Goodness, if man would realize in himself the joy of Eternal Life.

The failure of the Church thus far lies rather in a rational immaturity. That is, it has never reached that rational point of view where it has been able to understand the real relation existing between the scientific and ethical elements that constitute its entire life. In no branch of the orthodox church can it be said that doctrine and practice have been brought to anything like rational unity. This is by no means an assertion that no Christian lives consistently in the main with his convictions; but it is the assertion that there is no clear understanding of any real connection between the official doctrines, which must be held in order to secure salvation, and the daily life and practice, which are to show the fruits of salvation.

This state of the case is very obvious in both the Catholic and Protestant branches of the church. The good Catholic may leave the matter of the true doctrine to the priest, or to the Church in general, content that somebody knows what *is* the right thing to believe.

His concern is to follow the practices which the church authority prescribes, and to make his orthodoxy the unshaken conviction that that church authority is divine and final. The Protestant began by insisting that the individual rationally know the true doctrine, but, in the course of time, he has come to regard it as a special mark of meritorious tolerance to say: It matters little or nothing what you believe, so long as you live right. Here the necessity for the understanding of the true doctrine is quite overlooked altogether, though there is a deep and stubborn official conviction that the true doctrine must be held, although its connection with practical life can not be seen.

The reason for this discrepancy between the science and the ethics of the Church is not far to seek. All the doctrines of the Church were formed ages ago, in accordance with an immature, supernatural, dualistic world-view. They can not be expected to correspond to objective Reality or form a body of objective scientific truth, as it is, with every generation, more fully revealed to us. Of necessity, if our doctrines do not stand for objective Truth, they can never be brought into unity with a real ethics.

Scientific as well as Moral Saintship Demanded by Reason.

But although the Christian consciousness, in its entire meaning, has not yet come to full expression in history, it nevertheless contains the promise and potency of man's full rational freedom and self-realization, regarded as the Life and Beauty of reflecting the Divine Truth and the Divine Goodness. Man's rescue or salvation, therefore, from the sufferings of evil is not only the renunciation of sin (perversities of will), but the banishment of error (mistakes in thought). Taking man in his maturity and totality, it is not enough for him that he will the Will of God; he must also think the Thought of God, for the unity of Reason makes it clear to us that error always stands in the way of our willing what is really good, and that sin always stands in the way of our thinking what is really true. We can never too much impress upon our minds that what it means to be a Christian is not merely the attainment of the Hebrew moral saintship, as expressed by Psalmist, Prophet or Apostle, but is also the attainment of the Aryan (Hindu and Hellenic) scientific saintship, as expressed in the philosophy of India and Greece. It devolves upon us to *know* and *understand* God, as *Truth*, just as much as we are under the necessity

of ultimately *willing* the Will of God, as *Eternal Goodness*. And not until we see how the Truth of God, as revealed in the world of nature and of history, is the very expression of the Goodness of God, shall we be able to see the perfect unity of the Hebrew ethical and the Hellenic theoretical elements in the Christian consciousness.

It is easy enough to understand the supreme value of that glorious harmony of Beauty which is the outer form of Truth, because it manifests Goodness; and to appreciate that perfect happiness which inevitably follows knowledge of the Cosmic Thought and obedience to the Cosmic Will; but what place can we find for error and sin, for all those mistakes in thought and perversities of will which invariably produce the discord and ugliness of pain, sorrow, and death?

Is Pain an Element of Reality?

We must repeat our dissent (p. 85) from that eminent thinker, Professor F. H. Bradley, in regarding pain as a possible element in Reality. "The idea of a painful universe," he says, "seems in the end, to be neither quite meaningless nor yet visibly self-contradictory. And I am compelled to allow that, speaking strictly, we must call it possible" ("Appearance and Reality," p. 535).

He reaches this conclusion, although he admits that all experience points in one direction, namely, no fact suggests that pain is compatible with unity and concord. Yet he continues to opine that, in that indefinite supplement from the unknown, other conditions may exist, invisible to us, which throughout our experience modify the action of pleasure and pain, so that, after all, pain might be compatible with harmony and system.

But he himself in the end refers us to something far more reliable than experience and conjecture. He seeks a test for Reality, as the Absolute Ground of all things, and reaches a conclusion which we can regard as nothing short of being rationally axiomatic. "Ultimate reality," he assures us, "is such that it does not contradict itself; here we have an absolute criterion" (Ib. 136).

He however fails to apply this test to feeling, and thus overlooks two simple psychological facts. First, feeling, viewed under the aspect of ultimate Reality, can not contradict itself any more than can thought; and pain is a contradiction in feeling. Secondly, feeling is not something by itself, but only has existence in being the rational subject's evaluation of thought and will; and indeed, is the final test

of true thought and right will. It is impossible to see how a coherent rational cosmos in its Reality could have in it any occasion of producing pain, which is the æsthetic dissatisfaction arising out of theoretical or ethical incoherence. If pain, which is simply a discord in feeling, is consistent with a unitary cosmos of coherent thought and will, as constituting objective Reality, then we are utterly at sea and have no criterion for anything whatever.

But we are not reduced to any such irrationality. Our æsthetic evaluation of the objective Truth of Reality is the supreme happiness arising out of its harmonious Beauty, and our confidence in it reposes, undisturbed, upon the Eternal Will of Goodness which the Beauty of Truth manifests.

Some Account Must Be Given of Error and Sin.

But if this is our interpretation of objective Reality, when and how do error and sin, the very opposite of true thought and right will, as evidenced by the discordant suffering they invariably bring, enter upon the scene.

Error, we must think, is simply a *mis*-take in thought, a wandering from the path of objective Truth; analogously we must think of sin as simply a *per*-versity of will, or a turning away from the order of objective Goodness. Neither have any objective reality, but are merely the *false* and *wrong* attitudes of the rational subject toward Reality.

Thus when man once gets a glimpse of the universe as Copernicus, Kepler, or Newton saw it, he can no longer regard the old Ptolemaic view as standing for Reality or objective Truth, though it once did to his mind. So also, when he sees in the light of the Gospel the dignity and worth of man as man, and consequently recognizes the only real government to be based on simple manhood, in the fellowship of intelligence and character, for mutual benefit and pleasure, those past social forms of paternalism, monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy or, in other words, privileged and prescriptive authority, fade from his mind as false and unreal conditions of human association; for he must recognize in the Kingdom of God, wherein the will of God is done on earth as in heaven, the only objectively real, social order for man.

Yet however *subjective* and *unreal*, in their nature, error and sin may be, they are *actual* enough in our experience, and prove to be the

prolific sources of all those evils of discord and suffering from which we would fain escape.

We are under obligation, therefore, to give some serious attention to such considerations, as the nature, the actual existence, the results, the natural inertia, the genesis, the relation, the discipline, and, if it may not seem altogether irrational, the rational purpose involved in the subjective actuality, of error and sin.

CHAPTER II.

ERROR AND SIN ACTUAL, THOUGH UNREAL.

PERHAPS it will be more readily admitted that our mistakes in thought than that our perverse volitions are, in their nature, only subjective; and so correspond to nothing in objective reality. It will be said: Of course, error is our own affair and has no place in the real object; thus, when we discover that the groaning of the ghost was the fitful moaning of the wind through a broken pane in the attic, the once objectively real ghost disappears into nothing, as a subjective illusion: but sin is a different matter, for the objective nature of sin, it will be urged, just consists in being the perverted, selfish will.

Sin as Unreal as Error.

But it is to be hoped that we have not learned in vain that it is just as rationally necessary for man to will the (objective) Cosmic Will as to think the (objective) Cosmic Thought, if he would come to freedom and self-realization; and, since the Cosmic Will is Eternal Goodness, as the Cosmic Thought is Infinite Truth, the wrong, perverted human will is just as much a subjective *volitional* illusion as the mistaken, false human thought is a subjective, *mental* illusion.

Yet, it will be stubbornly maintained that, while man's sin corresponds to nothing in the objective Cosmic Order of Goodness, it is *real*, at any rate, so far as he is concerned. Have we not concluded, however, that, as a moral being, man's only real law of action is that of universal good-will, because the only objectively real society is the Kingdom of God, where the will of God—love thy neighbor as thyself—is done on earth as in heaven? In what sense, then, can a perverted will, directly opposed to the will of goodness, be said to be objectively real? Hegel has instructed us that it is only when a thing comes to the expression of its inner notion, or realizes its idea, can it be said to be objectively real. "Therefore, he is led to say, "a bad man is an untrue man, a man who does not behave as his notion or his vocation requires." ("Logic," § 213, p. 354. Wallace's Trans.)* That is, the real man is the Ideal Man, in his moral, as well as in his intellectual

* See also under Qualitative Judgment, pp. 304-5.

self-realization. So that, in so far as actions, as well as thoughts, conform to that Ideal they have objective reality; so far as they do not conform, they are simply subjective, or unreal, and belong to the realm of intellectual and moral illusions.

Views of Descartes on Error and Sin.

We have in Descartes essentially the same views. In considering the doctrine of God and Reality, and the unreality of all evil, which is error and sin, Descartes declares God and his creation to be the sum total of all that is real. On the side of thought, he concludes:

"XXIV. That God is not the cause of errors. God is absolutely veracious and the source of all light; hence, he can not deceive us or be the cause of our errors." On the side of will, he concludes that:

"XXIII. God, by an act that is one, identical and the simplest possible, understands, wills and operates all, that is, all things that in reality exist; for he does not will the evil of sin, seeing that this is but the negation of being." Therefore, whatever error we may have in our minds or whatever sin we may cherish in our hearts, it can not be attributed to God, or found in his objective creation. Hence, speaking of our errors in general, which "depend less on our understanding than on our will," Decartes concludes:

"XXXI. That our errors [and perforce our sins] are, in respect of God, merely negations, but in respect of ourselves, privations."*

Here we have a distinction of great value. So far as objective Reality (God and his creation) is concerned, our errors and sins are blank nothings, or have no existence whatever; but so far as we are concerned, in our unfolding, rational development, error and sin have actual existence, the nature of which, however, is only that of *privation*—a failure to come up to knowing the truth or to willing the good. However actual they are in our experience, or however real they may seem to consciousness, they are, nevertheless, only blurred, defective, or distorted views of things, misunderstandings or false interpretations of real objects; they are oppositions to the right objective order, wrong impulses, misdirected volitions.

Significance of Negative Terms.

This privative character of error and sin is quite universally indicated by the negative terms employed to designate them, as if

*"Principles of Philosophy." Part I., Veitch's translation.

language contained the deposit of a great unconsciously developed philosophy.

Error is a wandering *away from*: it is a *mis*-take, that is, an acceptance of the false thing; it is a phase of ignorance or *not*-knowing.

Sin is a *dis*-obedience, a *not* listening; it is a *trans*-gression, a treading *across* the law rather than going along with it; or it is a *per*-version, a turning the *wrong* way. In the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, where sin receives its most complete designation, as an infraction of the Righteous Law of God, a breaking into the whole Divine Order of things, it is described as a *distortion*, a *making crooked*, an *ungodlikeness*, a *not hitting the mark*, and terms of a similar negative character.

Two Extremes Avoided.

If we get the distinction clearly fixed in mind, between error and sin, on the one hand, as absolute unrealities, and, on the other, as relative realities, or actual existences for our experience, we shall be better prepared to avoid two extremes; in the one case, overestimating and, in the other, underestimating the nature and power of error and sin.

On the one hand, recognizing that truth and goodness alone have objective reality, and that all our intellectual mistakes and moral perversities are subjective illusions, we are greatly encouraged to continue the war upon error and sin, because, we are assured, all unreality must be brought to utter destruction in the light of Reality. Error and sin can not forever tyrannize over us, because sooner or later truth and goodness will bring to naught their hollow pretenses and sophistical chicaneries.

But, on the other hand, knowing that error and sin are actual to, and therefore have reality in and for our experience, we shall not regard them with flippancy, as superficial illusions, easily banished from the mind like the dreams of the night; but fully recognize how deeply and tenaciously they exist as facts in our human consciousness, and so the better be prepared for the uncompromising struggle.

Men Live in Different Actual Worlds.

The history of the individual and the history of the race illustrates again and again how fixed and actual error and sin are, and yet how they, in time, melt away into the nothingness of subjective illusion, before the advance of a rational development.

Perhaps there is no better way for us to understand how this can be

than by considering how different are the actual worlds in which different men, different races, and different generations live, and have lived.

It must be evident that we all live in the same objective world, and yet each one of us lives in an actual world, different from the others, and created out of his own subjective attitude of thought and will. He can not possibly change the objective world, as it *really is*,* but he can change it for himself, and those with whom he has to do, by his subjective interpretation of it. There is a very literal sense in which he thinks and wills his world to be whatever it may be to him.

The savage, the civilized, the peasant, the king, the miser, the spend-thrift, the sensualist, the saint, the fool, the scholar, the scientist, the poet, the inventor, the tradesman, the miserably poor, the well-to-do, the luxuriously rich, the child, the youth, the man, all live in different worlds of their own creation, depending upon how they think about and act toward the same real world.

In like manner, the world has taken on different forms through tribal, national, and universal human interpretations. The Hebrew lived in another world from that of the Greek, and not even the Spartan and Athenian lived in the same kind of world.

So also the entire human race, in its progressive development, has passed from one actual world to another, irrespective of what the real world has been all the time. When we say that the world changes with progress, we do not really mean the *world*, but that *man* changes. The world is the same, the change is in man's better and larger understanding of it, and the consequent response it makes to his more enlightened and obedient appeal.

Thus, what terrors once surrounded our ancestors! On the mountain, in the forest, upon the sea, a thousand malicious spirits of evil threatened; and how the angry, capricious gods scourged them with disaster and suffering! We now look upon nature as a harmonious, ordered world, calm, faithful, beneficent. The very forces that once seemed so capricious and malevolent are now the obedient servants of man, aiding him to till his fields, weave his garments, warm and light his abode, bear his burdens, and carry his messages. What has changed? Objective nature? Assuredly not; but simply the in-

*Not that the real objective world is a mere, permanent, *substantial* fixity, merely to be known as it is; for it is as much a fluent, *causal* activity, plastic to man's intelligent and obedient approach. But the objective conditions on which it responds to him are what they are, and can not be changed by anything he can do.

terpretation of things, by which subjective error in the mind has been cast out and replaced by a better understanding of the real object.

Progress is a Change of Mind.

What we mean by progress, intellectual and moral, is, negatively, on the one hand, the correction of mistaken thoughts about, and the abandonment of wrong volitions toward, nature and man; and, positively, on the other hand, the attainment of truer thoughts about, and the practice of better volitions toward, nature and man. Our progress has been entirely a matter of approaching *scientifically* the objective Truth, and *ethically* the right human form of social fellowship, or objective Goodness; and the change has been brought about wholly by a subjective change of thought and will on our part.

The beneficence of the change, in enhancing the value of life, can not be overestimated. In proportion as man has dropped his subjective errors about nature, he has been released from those debasing fears and superstitions which have so darkened his mind, confused, misled and troubled him; while, coming to know more of the objective truth, he has felt himself more and more at home in a world whose blessings of accord and well-being he shares. The face of Truth, seen through the mists of ignorance and consequent fear, lower upon us, frowning and bodeful, but seen with the clear eye of knowledge, grows more and more beautiful and beneficent.

And in the same way, ill-will toward our fellow men brings out ill-will in return; justice calls forth justice from them; while good-will wins their love, whether we look to the past or present, or whether we consider the individual or the tribe. As our own subjective perversities of will disappear, human society in its objective reality becomes more harmonious and beneficent.

The Dynamic Power of Thought and Will.

And these considerations bring us face to face with a not altogether unknown fact (p. 453), a fact of tremendous importance in all its practical bearings, viz.: that as we change our subjective thought and will, external things change.* We can almost make *our* world

* Not *real*, external things, be it again understood, but external things as we have made them "real" to ourselves by our own subjective interpretations of and attitudes toward them.

whatever we want it to be. Thought and will are dynamic. Thought never merely remains thought, for it always corresponds to some object or is itself the object, which invariably possesses value in terms of feeling, and consequently gives motive to the will. And the will is never simply will by itself, for it is the intelligent subject acting, in view of the perceived value in the object, to realize or objectify a thought as a clearly perceived purpose. It is, indeed, the dynamic power, always involved in the inter-play of thought, feeling, and will; or, we may say: it is the dynamic power of thought alone, which the concomitant feeling transforms into will, that has changed the face of nature for man, constituted human history, and produced all that we understand by the term civilization.

Thus, for example, in our own country where objective changes have been especially rapid, we clearly see the power of the idea. Men still living used to call that vast territory, west of the Mississippi River, the Great American Desert. Not a cultivated spot relieved the dull monotony of its endless undulations. It was swept by destructive tornadoes, and over it roamed vast herds of wild beasts and tribes of wilder men; and, amid toil and great danger, hazardous adventurers for months wearily traversed, in slow ox cart, its wilderness wastes, toward the alluring fields of gold.

But where now, after a generation, is the desert, the thundering legions of bison, and the treacherous onslaught of savages? They have utterly disappeared; for thought, aroused to action by desire, has transformed the desert into a garden of incredible fertility which, blooming like the rose, supports in prosperity its teeming millions. A thousand towns and cities, with their factories and shops, with their churches, schools, and colleges, mark the centers of industry, commerce, and education. Palaces of luxury replace the laborious cart, and, drawn with the speed of the wind, traverse in all directions the once desert plains, bearing men in ease and comfort to their destinations; while the once vacant air, is filled with the whisperings of those who defy distance, and speak with each other, through leagues of space, as friend with friend.

The whole face of nature has been changed, even nature herself has approved and turned her austerities into blessings. The planted forest and cultivated field have lured the plenteous rains, and softened the fierce rigors of the tempest. If some lonely traveler who, half a century ago, fell a victim to the treacherous arrow of his red foe, could

rise to life again, he would behold about him a new and another world.

And the whole transformation is due to the *dynamic power* of *thought* which, having its value in *feeling*, is *willed*, and thus brought to *objective actuality* in the world.

Or, to take a less palpable, though much greater and more significant instance; consider what the thought of Jesus concerning man has, in the course of time, effected in the world. That man, not as he appears to be on the surface, but as he really is, is the son of God, and that upon the reality of this objective truth, all political and social relations must be based, in order to establish the Kingdom and the Will of God on earth, is his great—in fact the greatest—contribution to what we call the progressive development of human history, and indeed *constitutes* the *whole meaning* of history.

Obscured, perverted and opposed, as it might be, by human ignorance, vanity, and selfishness, it nevertheless continued to work like leaven in the great unleavened mass of humanity. Under its influence, slaves were raised to serfs, serfs were made freemen, and freemen became citizens in the mutual fellowship of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

And, as unrealized as this supreme idea may yet be, it is still the one great dynamic power of human progress, giving to all our interests of science and art the only true significance they have. The idea does not simply remain an idea, or spread from mind to mind merely as an individual subjective persuasion, but works itself out into vast transformations in the objective world. Wars and rumors of war are stirred, conquests are made, empires rise and fall, cities are built, distant lands are won and peopled, all by the expansive power of this idea. Not only does it change men's whole views of life, it changes their whole actions in life. Deep, unobserved, irresistible, it has moved on, and is still moving on, to its realization.

Error as well as Truth is Dynamic.

But our gratification, which the historical lesson affords, that the inner thought of man brings about beneficent changes upon the earth may be somewhat lowered when we recognize that the dynamics of thought and will can work *evil* as well as *good*, and it will always work evil, when the thought is false and the will perverse.

If, as we have seen, men live in different worlds which are their

own subjective interpretation of the real objective world, how supremely important it is that, however incomplete and inadequate those interpretations may be, they, at any rate, be not obscured and vitiated by the illusions of error and sin.

But no lesson of history is more painful and deep than that man has repeatedly regarded his mistakes in thought as true, and his perversities of will as good, and then objectified and projected them, as if they were real, upon the real world. In other words he has created an unreal world of evil out of hand for himself, and lived in it rather than in the world of objective reality.

Destructive Power of False Ideas: the End of the World.

The close of the tenth century saw in western Europe the greatest turmoils and destructive disturbances imaginable, in human society. The very foundations of the deep seemed to be broken up. Men sold their houses and lands for a mere song, or gave them to the Church, and went wandering penniless with their families through streets and open fields; industry was paralyzed, the natural currents of trade dwindled or were diverted into unproductive channels; and, as always in such widespread social disturbances, the worst passions were unloosed, while folly, vice, and crime strode ravening and unrebuked through the land. Human society seemed to be utterly disrupted and cast into a raging, chaotic maelstrom of anarchic confusion. And the cause of it? Ignorance, or a mere subjective condition of false thought about reality, which corresponded to nothing in the object, but which nevertheless was projected, as if it were real, and imposed on the real world!

Men at that time believed in two worlds, the natural and the supernatural. And the supernatural which was considered both good and evil was constantly invading the natural with its miraculous wonders, in order to gain the mastery. One reassuring conviction was held, viz.: that the good would ultimately triumph over the evil; but the effect of this reassurance was more than overcome by the equally strong conviction that the ultimate triumph was to involve the whole natural order of things in the most indescribably appalling catastrophe.

As the year one thousand approached, there wanted not fanatical, but withal sincere prophets, who, resting upon the Apocalypse (Rev. xx, 7ff) which speaks in clear and unmistakable terms about the thousand years and its disastrous termination, predicted the speedy

approach of that dread Dies Iræ, when the sun should be darkened and the stars fall from heaven; when the heavens themselves should be rolled together like a scroll, and the earth, after witnessing orgies of carnage and blood, melt with fervent heat; when the books would be opened, both quick and dead summoned before the awful judge, and every man sentenced either to eternal bliss, or to the tormenting flames of fire and brimstone forever.

With our saner views of nature, as a reliable and permanent order of cosmic law, it may be hard for us to realize into what indescribable terror such predictions would throw simple and unenlightened people. And yet, perhaps every man can remember the impressionable days of his boyhood, when the prophecy of some old, half-witted crone, that on the coming thirteenth of August, at precisely 2:15 p. m., the Lord would appear and the world would be destroyed by fire, filled him, as the sultry, sickening hour approached, with the gravest apprehensions, in spite of reassurances from his elders.

To the mind of the child, these things are real, and quite possible. The medieval mind, in general, was in its childhood state, narrow, ignorant, and superstitious, so that the approach of the thousandth year, with its awful threatenings, had its inevitable effect. Every thunderbolt, in a world that hardly reached beyond the horizon, was a summons; every shooting star, a premonition; every trembling of the earth, the fatal beginning of the direful end.

In Spite of Man, Nature Still Beneficent.

And yet all the paroxysms of terror and all the chaotic disorders of society were merely the results in feeling and action of mistakes in thought, illusions that had no correspondent in reality. Nature, as of old, was as productive, calm, and beneficent as ever; seed time and harvest came and went with the rolling seasons and yielded their increase; the flocks multiplied; the forests chanted their matutinal hymns of praise; the untroubled birds built their nests and reared their young; the eternal hills stood firm; and the hoary ocean beat its deep-toned, never-ceasing monody upon the shores.

“The moon did with delight
Look round her when the heavens were bare;
Waters on a starry night
Were beautiful and fair;
The sunshine was a glorious birth,

The cataracts blew their trumpets from the steep;
 The echoes through the mountains thronged.
 The winds came from the fields of sleep,
 And all the earth was gay;
 Land and sea
 Gave themselves up to jollity."

(From Wordsworth's "Ode.")

It was man alone, "the beauty of the world, and the paragon of animals," man the rightful master of the earth he inhabits, who cringed and cowered before his own base errors and superstitions which he objectified and projected as real, and which covered, with a pall of impenetrable gloom, the calm, sweet, benignant face of Reality.

Or, if we recall that baneful madness of witchcraft, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we shall see how fatal are the results of error, or mistakes in thought, about the world, which are invariably projected into some form of action. The belief in witchcraft was not simply a confused strife of ideas in the mind, or rather it did not simply remain that: it cruelly tortured and put to death thousands of innocent victims; it tore parents from their children and children from their parents; it desecrated the sacred precincts of the home; it defamed the purity of maidenhood; it respected in its ravages neither age nor sex; it turned joy into misery; and, while it never made any one better or happier, it rendered all insecure, and inflicted upon many thousands the cruelest sufferings.

Our knowledge of nature, it must be admitted, is still very primitive and crude, but when we consider the incalculable benefits which it has conferred upon us in banishing much of the ignorance of the past and giving us some faint glimpses of the truth, we are almost ready to credit Say with inspiration when, in his distress, he reminded Cade that "ignorance is the curse of God, Knowledge the wing wherewith we fly to heaven" (II. Henry VI., iv, 7).

Modern Illusions Made Real; A Financial Panic.

Let us not be too hasty, however, in congratulating ourselves because of our superiority over the past; for we also have stubborn illusions of our own to deal with. Every man of experience knows how his own mistaken opinions or judgments of men and events have led not only to grave embarrassments, but, at times, to wrong and misfortune.

Those great financial panics, which seem to recur with every generation, admirably illustrate how an error in the mind of the community,

a mere subjective illusion shared by everybody, may come to be objectified into actual disorders, failures, hardships, and often great suffering.

The chairman of the New York Clearing House made the statement not long ago that fully ninety-five per cent. of the business of the country is done on credit. This stands for a normal condition of things, and represents a necessary and wholesome confidence men have in each other. On the actual cash in the world, business on a large scale could not be done. Great enterprises could not be undertaken or carried through; the resources of the country could not be developed; and foreign trade would be reduced to comparatively narrow limits. Men must have credit; then all goes well.

But let this natural confidence be disturbed by some untoward accident. At the moment when, what we may call, the financial nervous energy is at low ebb, some great bank in London or Paris or New York collapses; and fear like a poisonous contagion spreads over the world. Men who own the money begin to call it in from the currents of trade, where they have entrusted it. Men who do not own the money, but need it in their business, can no longer borrow to meet their pressing obligations. In consequence of this destruction of credit, merchants fail, factories close down, clerks are discharged or reduced in pay, workmen are turned out of employment, and trade is reduced to the merest necessities. Men have to give up their homes, children are taken out of schools, or invalid wives are brought back from mountains or sea-shore. The tailor, modiste, and hatter can not sell their coats, gowns, and hats, and so can no longer buy the butcher's best cuts or the grocer's luxuries. That is, down to the smallest and most insignificant details, all goes wrong; and men bewail their misfortunes which involve not only irritating trivialities, but humiliation, actual suffering for the necessities of life, and often disease and death.

Nature Does not Share Our Unbelief and Fear.

But all the while, in objective reality, there is nothing wrong; the skies are just as bright, the rains are as refreshing, the soil as fertile, the crops as abundant as before. There is just as much actual money in the world, just as many men and women with stomachs to be filled and backs to be covered, with as many needs and desires for luxury; and men are just as capable, efficient, and honest as ever.

All that has happened is that a subjective error, an illusion, running into panic and fear, has expressed itself in action and become the actual fact of experience. But that is quite enough to produce all the resultant misfortune and suffering which men find only too solid and real, and which they would spend their most earnest efforts to avoid.

Thus, constantly, we are creating out of our false thoughts about objective reality, an unreal world which we objectify, project and superimpose, as objectively real, upon the real objective world.

Wrong Volitions Make a Wrong World.

But if history and experience show us how our subjective mistakes in thought take the forms of evil in the objective world and obscure it in its reality from our view, history and experience show us even still more clearly how our subjective perversities of will get objectified and imposed as real, upon the real world.

We have already been led to admit that the overwhelming preponderance of evil from which men have suffered, and still suffer, is the outcome of human lust and ill-will (p. 415) which is a going against the true objective course of things, a stubborn and self-asserted determination to follow individual preference and personal whim. Indeed, it is a universal conviction that wrong doing, springing out of passion, envy, pride, and selfish ambition is the prolific source of confusion, discord, and suffering in the world, a conviction that is confirmed on every page of history, as well as made evident in daily experience.

The strife of princes for their crowns, the intrigue of courts, the mere jealousies of king's mistresses, the accursed greed of gold, the overtowering ambition for place and power, however lofty or lowly the coveted goal, the dishonesty and deception in dealing, great and small, the brutal injustice and cruelty, the poison of slander and calumny, and all the petty vices that have marked, through all time, the actions of men have again and again turned the fair earth into a hell of tears and sorrow, and always obscured and distorted the real meaning of life.

We sometimes stand aghast at the record of man's inhumanity to man, and scarce dare to dream of what a paradise the world would be, could the whole shameful account be blotted out and the causes of it be destroyed. Could we mortals but plunge into some lethal stream and forget it all, by utterly abolishing its springs in our evil hearts,

we might with Dante, enter the gates of heaven! But, as it is, history seems to be the long drawn out annals of public and private vice and crime, with the sum of all vices and crimes, Gorgon-headed war, spreading its devastations and terrors everywhere. Forgetting for the time being, all the good in man and absorbed in this awful record of evil, we might well exclaim with Montesquieu: "Happy is the people that has no history."

In the presence of such considerations, that which we are to impress most deeply upon our minds, if we are to profit by the invaluable lessons of history, is that the whole baneful record of wrong doing has no other cause than man's perverted will, or a turning away from the true objective course of things, the Cosmic Will; and no more corresponds to objective reality than the ragged edge of a storm cloud follows the unswerving directness of the sunbeam that touches it with golden beauty.

Just as error is a wandering away from the real path of true thought, so sin is a wandering away from the real path of right willing, and is a *pure subjective illusion*, answering to *nothing* in the *real objective world*. But all of its activities, nevertheless, much more so than in the case of error, because the very nature of sin lies in the will and is sure, sooner or later, to get itself carried out, are projected as actual fact upon the objective world, and then taken to be real.

And thus men keep on living in the actual world of perverse will, under the illusion that it is the real world. We can not, it is true, make the *real* world other than it is—we can only discover it and find our true relations to it; but we do will, and so create the *actual* world in which we live, in such a way that its existence or non-existence depends entirely upon our subjective attitude.

"Realism" Actual but not Real.

We can now understand what is the nature of the artist's, the novelist's, or dramatist's "realism." He likes to regard himself as one who has penetration and skill enough to see and portray the "real" world, in all its sordid, repulsive details. Some ghost-like terror of an ineluctable heredity, winding its pitiless claws around the agonized heart of a mother; some brilliant coquette, vacillating between her vanity and her lust, now granting and now denying the passions of her deluded lovers; some scene of sordid wretchedness, amid degrading poverty, loathsome vice and human degeneracy, in the purlieu of a

Paris or a London; some mujik's hut on the steppes of Russia, with its brutal ignorance, superstition, and pitiful, helpless misery; some prison house with its flotsam and jetsam of outcasts, and so on, *ad nauseam*, are presented as the "realities" of life. But we understand now that these are not realities, though they are cruel actualities; and we begin to see that the only value in their portrayal is the power to uncover these plague spots of the diseased human will; and, by revealing the irrational unreality of their horrors, to drive us to healing and reality. We are brought face to face with human conditions as they *ought not* to be, and human conditions as they ought not to be are, however actual, unreal and rest upon, and have their origin in, nothing but subjective illusions, which we objectify and project into experience as if they were real.

That actuality is not always reality, is trenchantly pointed out by Hegel in drawing the distinction between what is merely *correct* and what is *true*. He shows how it is that the knowledge of a certain order of external things may be *correct*, but may not at all be *true*. Such knowledge may be regarded as true only when it has some place in, or represents, some real aspects of the whole order of objective Truth (p. 284), which, as the Idea, is constituted by the harmonious, rational relations of all things. (See "Logic," pp. 52, 324-5, 352. Wallace's Trans.)

It is precisely so with goodness. Human moral relations, as they *ought* to be, that is, rising out of an objective good-will, are the only *moral realities*, because they alone are in harmony with the objective Causal Order of the Cosmos.

Comparison of Past and Present Goodness, Encouraging.

If we have reason to feel some satisfaction at our intellectual progress, as seen in the banishment of many past subjective, illusory errors about, and in the attainment of a truer understanding of, the real objective nature; in like manner, we are justified in celebrating—modestly at any rate—our ethical progress in the exclusion of much injustice and wrong from, and the introduction of better moral relations into, the order of human society, and thus approaching objective moral reality, which is nothing less than the Kingdom and the Will of God on earth.

Thus, in comparison with our happier times, we should not regard human society in Rome as real, let us say, in the days of Nero. The

great Empire had spread its laws over the world; laws, it is true, that ostensibly carried protection and justice to all. But in Rome itself, where we have a right to expect to find Roman law working out its universal beneficence, the majority of the people were slaves; and the freemen without means were in even a more pitiable condition than the slaves; while the comparatively fortunate few, for the most part, were grasping with an intense egoism after power, place, and pleasure. Those who ruled politically or socially were guided by an inveterate selfishness, the goal of action was self-indulgence, and the rule of action was to do as one pleased.

The gods were dead, except as magic names to sway the superstitious fears of the vulgar; for even the Pontifex Maximus, High Priest and Sacred Hierophant of Religion, could wink at the altar over the holiest mysteries; moral sanctions for the people were consequently relaxed, and those few who were serious had to withdraw into a stoical indifference, or be tossed about amid a score of oriental mystic cults.

The noblest of them all, Seneca, finding the conditions surrounding him intolerable, voluntarily took the only door of escape left open to him—self-destruction.

Now, such a state of society was painfully actual enough, and by some cultivated Gallio or Pliny of the day, would be regarded as most real, when compared with the illusory, fanciful dreams of Jesus about the Kingdom of God on earth, and the fraternal law of universal good-will, as the only social reality.

But time has a magic wand, and we—although as yet only mildly imbued with the spirit of Jesus—can not, in view of our wider justice, greater public and private security, freer and happier conditions, regard the social and political world of Nero as real. It was rather a condition of confusion, discord, and suffering, arising out of lust and ill-will, the wanderings and perversities of selfishness, which were projected into actual experience, and regarded as something objectively real.

If by some mystic spell, one of us should be plunged back into that world; as he again and again ran counter to the prevailing actualities, he would be heard continually saying: This is not a true state, this is not a real government for rational, moral beings. Indeed, some of the finer spirits of the time felt deeply that the prevailing Roman world, in its actuality, *was* an illusion.

Or, suppose we recall that picture of France, drawn by Arthur

Young, before the Revolution. A nation burdened with debt, groaning under unjust tribute, while men, like black beasts of burden, were crushed by toil to make holiday for a Sybaritic King, and to settle the score for his nameless extravagances and debaucheries—a king who, in his more lucid moments, saw the coming flood, but bated not one jot of his degenerate pleasures, because, as he boasted, the portending destruction would come when he was gone.

How much nearer to social and economic reality is the France of today, in which no men as black beasts bend to their labors, but where every man is free to cultivate his own acre, and frugally support his wife and children in quietness and peace.

We have the noble spectacle in our present world of a great people, shaking off the lethargy of centuries and beginning to wake to visions of political and social Reality. With penetrating intelligence and devoted courage, the Russian patriots are demanding the abolition of an unreal government, unworthy of human beings; where a vast majority of the people, without voice or defender, ignorant, untaught, undisciplined, unshepherded, but oppressed and exploited, give up the fruits of their labor to a handful of pampered aristocrats, who are glad enough to live on the toil of their subjects, at the same time, despising them as canaille, to be used, if need be, for cannon food, when towering pride, ambition, or aggressive lust demands the royal game of war.

All Moral Illusions not yet Banished.

But, if we had to recognize that, in spite of our intellectual advance in banishing past illusions about the real objective world, there are still lingering errors that impose themselves upon the Truth; so also, in spite of our ethical advance, we must admit that we still cherish volitional illusions that disturb and pervert the real order of human society.

For example, we like to boast in America—and not without some color of justice—of our progress over the past, and our political advance over other peoples; but it would be superficial folly to lay the flattering unction to our souls that we have, with all our civil liberty, reached anything like true social and economic reality; that is, a condition of human fellowship that can be called ethically real, or correspondent to the objective, harmonious, cosmic law of universal goodness.

We have indeed deeply imbedded in the national consciousness the principle of political equality and freedom, but that only serves to emphasize more clearly our industrial, commercial, financial, or economic servitude. The production of wealth, its accumulation, and its distribution are factors in our civilization which have as yet been brought into nothing like rational harmony, representing rather the irrational chaos of a competitive, struggling egoism.

In a country of unexampled resources, where all start even, with the understanding that man is man, and where there is professed the sacred doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity, there emerges at the end of a century an economic condition in which a thousand men, or one sixtieth of one per cent. of the entire free electorate, own over sixty per cent. of all the country's wealth; in which single families spend five hundred thousand dollars a year, and then do not exhaust their income, while the average laborer, if he keeps well and can get work earns five hundred dollars a year, or one-tenth of one per cent. as much, and thus walks from day to day on a thread above the abyss of hunger and pauperism. And this is to say nothing of that margin of respectable poor who proudly and hopefully struggle on to the point of exhaustion, or until they lose their grip and fall into the hopeless ranks of careless degeneracy.

Irrational Economic Discrepancies in a Republic.

There thus grows up in a republic of free men the widest and most incongruous divergence between the rich and the poor, between the favored and privileged, and the unfavored and unprivileged. Equality and fraternity cease to be—except in name—and liberty becomes an impossibility. Equality in intelligence, force of character, and skill, and, consequently, in economic value and earning capacity to the community? Most assuredly not! no one ever believed that. But equality of opportunity, in a free and unrestricted field, up to the measure of each man's native capacity and merits. And such a condition as that does not exist economically among us. There has indeed been the liberty of an open, unrestricted field in which the strong, the fortunate, the cunning, could prey upon the weak, the unfortunate, the simple; but this is not liberty, this is the destruction of that liberty, for which men fought in order to free themselves from the oppressive restrictions of a natural selfishness; and it is a reversion to the license of the primeval slime of competitive, brutal animalism

against brutal animalism, and is not the co-operative fraternity of human association or of rational moral beings.

Such wide economic discrepancies are rationally and morally absurd in a Republic, the very genius of which lies in its power to develop, not the material fortunes of favored individuals, but the intelligence, character, and skill of all its citizens, as self-respecting, competent, and free men; and to destroy those old false, traditional limitations and barriers of fortuitous circumstance and privilege that inevitably distort and degrade the fortunate as well as the unfortunate in body and mind.

The falsity and unreality of the situation does not consist in the existing material discrepancy, but in the inner mental and moral differences which are always being produced by the growth of clearly marked classes, based upon wealth values—classes, on the one hand, that feel themselves superior, heaven-appointed almoners and stewards of the Lord's treasures, justly entitled to their divinely decreed rights, and classes, on the other hand, that begin to recognize their inferiority; and either sink to the level of a fawning, cringing, mean servility, or to the still lower level of a shallow, impudent snobbery and base toadyism.

Such distinctions are absurd anachronisms and wholly incongruous in a Republic, where the true ground of an objective and real human fellowship is recognized to be the principle of manhood. Where such an instrument as the Declaration of Independence could ever come to utterance, and find concrete embodiment in such a man as Abraham Lincoln, a society of glaring economic contrasts between extreme wealth and extreme poverty, enervating luxury and brutalizing penury, can no longer be regarded as having objective Reality, or as corresponding to the true order of the Cosmic Will.

The Old Political Feudalism.

The inner contradiction of our American feudalism, under a democratic form of government, lies upon the surface and tends to pass into an economic monarchy. In the old days, while the feudal princes owed a nominal allegiance to the central power of the king, they did very much as they pleased. They could debase or enhance the value of the currency in their domains, raise the tolls on roads and bridges, increase the market tax, or seize, for plausible reasons, the treasures of the prosperous merchant at their pleasure. They

made the laws, construed and executed them, according as passing interests demanded. Or, with favoring time and place, they gathered such forces as they had and preyed upon each other, while the people bore as best they could the burdens and harrassment of offence and defense. There was plenty of law to govern these matters, but it was the law of the Barons, by the Barons, and for the Barons. We look upon such a political condition as false, outworn, and wholly passed away; and pay our highest honors to those heroes and patriots who, by the sacrifice of their fortunes and lives, swept away such oppressions and bequeathed to us the sacred blessings of liberty.

The New Economic Feudalism.

But while those old political inequalities have passed away, are our actual, economic conditions, at present, much different? It is true our modern feudal Lords, or Money Barons do not *directly* make the laws, control the courts, change the value of the currency, raise the tolls, or suppress the petty merchant; nor do they gather a force and *directly* invade the territory of their neighbors.

And yet, although they do not use the same means, they have a way of accomplishing the same ends. Voters can be made to stay away from or go to the polls for a consideration; legislators can be brought to see a measure under various aspects, when the circumstances are favorable; and judges have been known to enjoy sudden prosperity by the happy turn of a decision. In other words, laws can be made, construed, and executed in deference to the wishes of the American Money Barons. While rivals can be choked out of existence by cutting off the supply, or blocking the way to the general demand.

Nominal allegiance, it is true, is acknowledged to the central government of law, but the most astute legal ability of the land, is retained to clothe irresponsible privilege with the garment of obedience, woven out of logic-chopping sophisteries that confuse the letter of the law with its spirit.

Perhaps, however, there is no more heavy burden laid on the community than the internecine strife among the Barons, which it must endure as best it may. When war is declared by some Fuerst von Eisenbahn on some Duc Chemin de Fer or Baron von Kohlenburg; when some Prince Moulin d'Acérye, Duc d'Huile de Terre, Marquis Jehan de Gras Boeuf, and Baron Plunk von Getreide fare forth in their several guises on general conquest, there is little concern what

fields they trample on or what peaceful homes they devastate; and the people pay the costs, and adjust themselves to what allegiance they can when the war is over.

Economic Feudalism Moves toward a Co-operative Centralization.

But these powerful Lords, soon recognizing the folly of their destructive competitive struggles, form various alliances, offensive and defensive, among themselves. Eisenbahn, Chemin de Fer, and Kohlenburg see that they make most by co-operation. Perhaps Huile de Terre and d'Acierye form a compact, while Gras Boeuf and Plunk von Getreide sign a treaty of non-interference.

Our economic feudalism is evidently moving out of its earlier, cruder stage of individual, destructive *competition*, toward a more productive and rational *co-operation*. Whether the end shall be an economic monarchy, no one at this moment knows, but the common people—a term coming to mean the great mass of helpless, exploited economic subjects—becoming restive under the weight of individual aggression, look with gravest concern on the movement toward the monarchical centralization of economic power.

Order Emerges out of Disorder.

In this whole unfree, unequal, and unfraternal chaotic jumble of economic feudalism, there are two phases to be clearly distinguished: one, confused, irrational, and destructive, the other, clearly making for rational order and a true economic development.

There is, on the one hand, the fierce competitive struggle among politically free individuals, great and small, on no other basis than the *lex talionis*. Deception, subterfuge, chicanery, petty fraud, corruption of the law, the poker-morality of the so-called high finance, with its expressionless sphinx-like face and fox-like cunning, the heartless greed of gold, the swine-like squealing and crowding at the swill-trough of material gain, the graft, the bossism, the soap-bubble stocks to beguile, with their iridescent, flimsy shimmerings, the weak minded and unwary, are the natural products of the commonest and vulgarest sort of animal lust and ill-will, sharpened and directed by human artifice and, however actual, have no more meaning, as the expression of an objectively real human society, than the troubled dreams of a drunken sot.

On the other hand, amid this inextricable confusion, the economic system is slowly integrating and clearly taking on the form of great industrial and commercial organizations, which prove the efficiency and rationality of co-operative combination. Men can not only reduce their toil and increase their output by working together with, rather than against, each other, but by such a fellowship of labor they can best win the secrets of nature and control her resources.

In fact, the only true conception of life, as individual or social, is rational organization, or that harmonious co-operation of the various constituent elements, by which each comes to its complete realization, in working together for the welfare of the whole.

Politically considered, human society has worked through the evolving phases of its organization, until it has attained the goal of civil liberty, or a government of the people, by the people, and for the people; but *political* freedom can not really come to its full significance or long maintain itself, until society has won *economic* freedom; and economically considered, society is still in the early stages of its integration.

Economic Freedom, the Demand of Historical Advance.

The great world-problem of our modern era is economic. It is not of our human contriving. It is cosmic, and has been forced upon us by the irresistible advance of rational evolution. It is not simply economic, but scientific and moral, and goes back for its immediate cause to the Renaissance and Reformation, and for its remote cause to Hellenism and Hebraism.

Before the Renaissance, the poor and unfortunate could be consoled by the "sacred, revealed" doctrine of the Church that the world at best is a howling wilderness, and that man's real affluence and happiness is to be found after death in the world beyond.

Before the Reformation, the oppressed and wronged could be consoled by the "sacred, revealed" doctrine of the Church that it mattered little what society is here and now, for the oppressive cruelties and injustice of worldly rulers would in time be escaped for the Kingdom of Heaven *in Heaven* hereafter. So far as government was wise and good, it was regarded as divinely established and therefore never to be desecrated by change, or the thought of change; and every man was to regard it, as a most sacred, religious obligation, to be content with that lot in which it had pleased a wise Providence to place him.

But the Renaissance destroyed forever that old *theoretical*, and the Reformation abolished forever that old *ethical* dualistic supernaturalism; for the Renaissance showed that the world is a glorious abode for man, provided he knows its objective laws and obeys them; and the Reformation showed that the Kingdom of Heaven is a possibility on earth, when the dignity and worth of every man is fully recognized as *man*, on the basis of his intelligence, character, and capacity of service.

And the Renaissance and Reformation are not two independent movements, but two distinct phases of the same movement, the lofty significance and inescapable obligation of which now imperatively demands the attention of our thought and the obedience of our will.

The Imminent Question.

What, in these premises, my Brothers, are you going to do? You can not dodge the issue, it must be squarely met. The vast and undreamed of resources which a growing scientific knowledge of nature is more and more laying bare before our astonished eyes: how shall we share them among ourselves? That is the supreme question of the hour; and, while upon the surface, it is an *economic*, at bottom it is a *moral* question.

We shall never answer that question on the plane of selfish struggle; nor shall we ever answer it on the plane of justice, which is but a balance of selfish struggling interests. It will be answered alone when we rise to the level of that one objectively real, ethical principle, which is an outstreaming will of good towards all. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

If we look about us with anything like penetration, we shall see that, economically, we are just struggling out of the primitive stage of selfishness, and that the form which our economic society is taking on is that of a feudalism, with its uncertain and confused notions of justice. In consequence, the body economic suffers from various diseases of congestion and depletion, plethora in one part and anæmia in another; so that we stand in great need of good doctoring. But we may as well make up our minds that no amount of *outside* doctoring, with pills of law and potions of social schemes, will ever adequately strike to the cause of our inveterate ailments. What we need is an inner healing for the individual, by which the whole man will be transformed from a struggling animal, endowed with the sel-

fish shrewdness of human cunning, into a *real man*, endowed with the rational intelligence of God.

Superstitious Illusions, the Result and Cause of False Conditions.

It would be both superficial and unjust to deny that the American feudal Money Baron, like his Medieval prototype, is often a wise, good, and beneficent man, exemplary in private and public life. But he is a despot, nevertheless—sometimes a tyrant, and the system of which he is a part is not only false, because it is irrational, inadequate, and outworn, but also cultivates in him superstitions about himself and others.

He is led to believe that his position and power are an expression of his individual merit and desert alone, and that his wealth represents what he has really *earned* in the community. In general, it may be said that the smug justification of worldly success, on the basis that men, by a sort of heaven-born financial genius, earn enormous sums, rests upon no other fallacy than that of a very common-place ignorance, self-conceit, and egoism, which is the rudimentary left-over from the confused animal consciousness. In reality, the possession of great fortune, when not inherited, is as much due to *fortune*, over which the individual has no control, and to *communal co-operation*, as it is to the individual's intelligence and efforts.

The caprices of fortune to which, in our actual state of knowledge, every man is subject are, so far as our present problem is concerned, negligible; but the relation of the individual to the community, his service to it and his merit in it, is in every way subject to rational discussion.

Co-operation Produces Wealth.

Economically considered, not one dollar could be earned, were it not for the co-operative labor of every ditcher and sapper in the community; and, though the directing mind is on a very much higher plane than that of the average worker, and, therefore, entitled to a larger reward, the difference between the stomach's capacity and the integument's possible endurance of weather changes, in the one case and the other, is not so great as to entitle the one to an income which he can not spend, even with the most profligate extravagance, and

the other to a wage that keeps him and his natural dependents on the margin of laborious penury and starvation.

This difference was perfectly consistent in those old, outworn, superstitious monarchical, aristocratic, or oligarchical forms of government, but is wholly incongruous in America, where the basis of universal free citizenship is the rational dignity and worth of simple manhood.

As much pride as I may justly take in my shop or my factory, the sobering reflection should not be absent that it would have little earning capacity, were it not for the shops and factories of my neighbors; and none whatever, if it were not for the labor of every busy worker in the community who helps to create and distribute the wealth of the whole, and who, therefore, as a man is entitled to such returns as enables him to live and support his family in the self-respect and dignity of a free citizen.

If in a Republic, such as ours, we were to ask what is the highest service rendered to the community and, therefore, the highest earning capacity in the community, we should not be far astray in recognizing that these conditions meet in the Chief Magistrate of the nation. Men may *get* more, but from the point of dignity, responsibility, and value of service, they can not be said to *earn* more than the President of the United States.

It is often said that the great corporation lawyers are worth the vast annual retainers which they are reported to receive; in other words, that they earn incomes very much greater than that of the Chief Executive of our nation. It is true, they may be *worth* what they get to the corporations which, out of their excessive earnings, can well afford to retain the most brilliant legal acumen, to muddle the courts and confuse legislation; but do the corporations earn what they get?

The facile answer always is that corporations do not make great earnings, as the meager returns to stockholders too often proves. But such a condition is largely due to the unintelligent or dishonest conduct of the corporation. Various inside corporations are formed which scratch each others' backs and fritter away the legitimate earnings of the investors, or the real capital involved is fictitiously swelled until the natural returns dwindle into nothing.

The intelligent and honest conduct of the greatest corporation in our country shows, in addition to great salaries paid to its higher officials, dividends far beyond the average earning capacity of in-

vested money. Besides, the stock gradually accumulates in the hands of a comparatively few men who are thus rendered fabulously wealthy. And, aside from the merit of a certain business shrewdness, these earnings are entirely the product of natural monopoly and communal co-operation.

Men Seek the Power in Money.

To the popular superstition that excessive wealth is *earned* by individuals, must be added that other superstition, to the effect that, since it is the first necessity to develop the resources of the country, the man of tremendous genius who can do it would not undertake the arduous task without the *promise of great reward*. To deny this reward, it is said would be to cut the nerves of energy and enterprise, which would leave us all very helplessly floundering about in a primitive, unprogressive stage of civilization.

There is however a modest consideration which cannot be overlooked in the presence of such a claim. It is that the development of the real resources of the country, the things of necessity, comfort, and luxury for which people are willing to pay, has been and always is, due to two classes of men who, while, on the average, they earn a respectable livelihood, have no relation to those swollen fortunes upon which our feudalism is based. These men are the scientific discoverers and inventors, and the actual workers. These it is, who open up nature's resources, develop them, and create our economic wealth. Those who reap the great rewards are the middle men, the promoters, the financiers who manipulate the resources others have uncovered and developed. Let us grant the value and indispensable service of these men in the economic body. Some of them, indeed, have an ability that may be regarded as a genius for finance. They have keen insight, sound judgment, and capacity for organization such as may be found in the great statesman or general. But even so, they are only one of the contributing elements in the communal effort and are not entitled, therefore, to a monopoly of the communal product.

Besides, to believe the money makers themselves, they would put forth all the energies of their genius, even if the financial returns were not so enormous. For they tell us that at bottom it is not the money they care for, but the power of money which they love to wield.

We shall resent for them the mean implication that it is for the vul-

gar display and enjoyment of luxury, or for the exquisite satisfaction of arousing the envy of their fellow men. Let it be for the pure love of power and for the sense of rule. This is generally regarded as a noble ambition and worthy of cultivation in those who are competent.

But all this can best be secured, that is, power in its reality which consists of the gratitude, the applause, the admiration, and the obedience of his fellow men—the highest, best prized, and noblest rewards a man can win—without trampling on the rights of others, or subjecting them to a condition of economic serfdom.

The Republic of France or of America is not going to fall into ruin because, for the comparatively small money reward offered, no able men can be induced to assume the arduous responsibilities of its Presidency. When the extravagant individual claims of feudalism broke down, kings of the following centuries found no difficulty in securing baronial lords who were willing to serve as ministers or courtiers. It is the honor of distinguished service; it is the approval of others—in a monarchy, of the nobles, in a democracy, of the people—that man most prizes as his highest reward.

So it was that when the superstition of kings, with its divine honors, went to ruin before the advance of true government, France and America could find men to rule, as capable, or more capable, than those of old, though the money reward was comparatively insignificant, because of the honor involved in being the First Citizen among equals.

There can be no doubt that in the world today, there are many able men who, for the satisfaction of possessing real power and genuine honor, would rather be the President of France or the President of the United States, than to be the Czar of Russia, the Kaiser of Germany, or the half-democratic King of England, in spite of their vast incomes.

The Honors of a True Economic Rule.

In like manner, if we were to sweep away the fierce and bitter struggles of our economic feudalism, the irrational contrasts of state between rich and poor, the jumbled chaos and waste of industrial relations, there would not be wanting able men who, rather than wrest from their unwilling competitors and discontented subordinates an enforced acknowledgment of their power, would gladly assume the

honors and responsibilities, such as those of a chief magistrate or a great general, in order to co-operate with all the economic forces that go to build up and maintain the welfare of the whole community.

It is only thus when each, according to his ability, shall render this service to all and for all, that economic freedom can be said to approach civil freedom, or rather the economic state become one with the political state, as, throughout all its relations, a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Reality, the Goal to Be Attained.

As it is, we must make clear to ourselves that our present civilization, here in enlightened and progressive America, is confused and irrational, and that, while it is *actual*, it is not objectively *real*. So long as men are actuated by lust and ill-will, and all the consequent vices of envy, jealousy, strife, hatred, revenge, and perfidy, culminating every generation in the great, communal arch-crime of hell-born war, they are departing from the true objective cosmic order of reality and weaving out of the hallucinations of their perverse volitions, a phantom world of unreality, which they objectify and project as real, and impose upon the real objective world.

The real objective world of human society reflects the Cosmic Will. It is governed neither by selfishness, nor by the balanced egoism of justice, but by the law of universal good-will, which is the law of God, "the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed." It is the Kingdom of God and the Will of God on earth as it is in heaven.

Realizable? Most assuredly, because, first, whatever is conceived by man, as a true rational ideal, is always realizable, since, as thus conceived, it already lies potentially in reason; secondly, because experience teaches us that great progressive changes for good have already been made in the developments of history (p. 110); and, thirdly, because the present condition condemns itself as unreal by its irrational absurdities of confusion, and misery—and therefore, to be destroyed.

We must not yield to that easy and comfortable inertia of conservatism which conforms or submits to any given order as ultimate, on the basis of present satisfaction, convention, authority, or the permanence of a fixed and unalterable human selfishness. We must ever remind ourselves of the historical meaning of that great word

evolution, in the light of which we mark the beneficent and progressive developments of the past.

Man Has the Potency of Good Within.

And we must equally remind ourselves that human nature is much more than selfish; it is also deeply unselfish. Man is as good as he is bad. Crushed down, baffled, oppressed, driven to desperation by misery, or the fear of misery, he has displayed at times only the cruder, elemental instincts of the brute. Free him, throw open the gates of opportunity to the development of his normal powers, and there emerges the nobler and higher man.

The reader has been sadly misled if he supposes that there has been presented here a picture of man as only covetous and egoistic. The picture of lust, greed, and selfish meanness is only that of the illusion of his errors and sins, his mistakes in thought and his perversities of will. Within him there has ever revealed itself the reality of an unselfish devotion and unconquerable goodness that have ennobled his life. And the reality of a genuine inner goodness emerges more and more into realization as the old order changes, giving place to new.

We must conclude, then, that we spend our lives in an *actual* world of intellectual and moral *illusions*, which we take to be real, but which in reality are only the objectified phantoms of our own mistakes in thought about the Thought of the Cosmos, and of our own perverse departures of will from the Will of the Cosmos, which is unchangeably the Cosmos, because it is the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness.

It would be impossible to picture the glory of the world—the world of nature and of man—the mere joy of living, the happiness of mutual service and appreciation, and the sense and dignity of intellectual and moral worth, if men could banish from their minds and hearts the illusions of their own subjective errors and sins, and reflect full in consciousness the Beauty of God's Truth and of God's Goodness.

But that is the Ideal Goal; and the rational, purposive unfoldings of the Cosmic Evolution, without variableness, neither shadow of turning, moves towards its realization.

CHAPTER III.

THE NATURAL TENACITY OF ERROR AND SIN.

BUT we must ask: If error is only subjectively mistaken thought, and sin only subjectively perverted will, neither of which corresponds to the Thought and Will of Objective Reality, how is it that men cling to them with such stubborn tenacity, as to objectify and crystallize them into the confusing painful facts of actual experience? This question is not so difficult of answer as might at first appear, because it presents phases of the human consciousness which are more or less explicable on the ground of certain natural, or we might say, rational elements in our false thoughts and wrong volitions.

Error and Sin not Regarded as Such.

In the first place, men do not generally regard their errors as errors, or their sins as sins. No one could hold error if he knew it to be such, for when error is discovered to be error, it necessarily disappears. While this can not be said of sin, that is, while men do wrong, even when they know their actions to be wrong, yet for the most part they believe their actions to be right and so justify themselves in what they do.

The Greeks who condemned Socrates, and the Jews who condemned Jesus, believed that Socrates, and Jesus taught error and misled the people about the highest sort of truths, the truths of religion. Hence, being sure that Socrates corrupted the youth, by filling their minds with error about the gods, the Athenians justified themselves in forcibly stopping him. In the same way the Jews *knew* that the ideas of Jesus about God and man, the law, and the Kingdom of Heaven were entirely false and misleading, while their own ideas stood for the truth. Consequently, they felt themselves to be right in sending him to execution according to their law.

We sometimes become very scornful and indignant at the superstitions and wrongs of the past, as if men intentionally believed lies and committed wrong, and as if we should have done differently under similar circumstances. Whereas the spirit of Jesus expresses

the right attitude when he said of his persecutors: Forgive them, they *know not* what they do.

Persecution, Well Meant.

Those, for example, who tortured and put to death others for heresy were perfectly consistent and justified from their standpoint—provided the trial was honestly conducted. They regarded their beliefs as divine truth, based upon the revealed word of God, confirmed by reason, supported by the consensus of mankind, and authorized by the infallible, inspired church. Consequently, that truth for them was of infinite value, for it was the only way of salvation; so that when any man doubted or denied it, he doubted or denied God, and endangered his own soul forever. If he publicly expressed his doubt or denial, he spread in the community a poison of error, that subjected others to the gravest peril. What else was there to do but to torture the heretic's perishable body to save, if possible, his imperishable soul; and, if failing in that, to destroy him utterly, and thus prevent him from bringing eternal ruin upon others? His judges were, generally speaking, honest and capable men, and sincerely believed that they acted upon the truth and did God's will. St. Paul tells us that, in persecuting the early Christians, he thought in all good conscience that he was doing God's service. It was only when he discovered that his ideas were wholly false that he saw how great a sinner he had been.

We must let the past bear the responsibility for its own errors and sins; our obligation is to learn the lesson it brings. And that is one both of humility and gratitude. We should humbly admit that simply believing our thought to be true or our action to be right does not necessarily make the one true or the other right. And to those heroic men of great insight and moral courage who not only saw error but were brave enough to oppose it, who, coming to know the truth, valiantly stood up for it, we owe the deepest gratitude, a gratitude that can best be shown by renouncing, as they did, error and sin, and throwing our whole weight on the side of truth and goodness.

Error and Sin, not Entirely False and Wrong.

In the second place, error and sin are so stubborn because they are partly true and right. Error is not all false and sin is not all wrong.

Or to mitigate the seeming contradiction of such a statement, it were better to say that error is an obscured and confused view of truth, and sin is an obscured and perverted attempt to do what for the time being is regarded as right. Thus error is always some sort of interpretation of objective reality, is based upon given facts, and is for the time supposed to be the truth. In the case of witchcraft, for example, the same objective facts obtain today as obtained in the sixteenth century, such as lunacy, hystero-epilepsy, and various forms of hallucination. There are still wretched, lonely old men and women, living apart from their kind, crushed by some disease, sorrow or wrong; irascible and impossible of fellowship; and about whom the village peddles its gossip. They are teased now as then by unruly children, they threaten vengeance, call down some ominous curse upon their tormentors' heads; and coincidentally some child falls into a fever, or a sudden death occurs in a neighboring family. Once a causal connection was established between the two series of events, and the facts were taken to prove the possession of a devil. Now there is thought to be no more causal connection than between the baying of a dog at the moon and a subsequent misfortune. The difference is not a difference in fact but in theory, that is, a difference in the interpretation of the fact, based upon a different way of looking at the world. We naturally believe that our interpretation of the facts comes nearer to the objective truth of the case than that of three or four centuries ago, and severely condemn it; but we must never forget that men had plenty of objective evidence to support their views, and that had we lived in their times we should, in all probability, have shared their beliefs. And what should always moderate our sense of superiority and the emphasis of our condemnation is the fact that the better view we hold now is due to no individual, personal merit of our own, nor is it the accomplishment of our day and generation; but the accumulated result, painfully reached after much struggle, of many generations and many men, some of whom had to stand bravely out for progress against the same kind of narrowness, ignorance and prejudice which we often show today against any discomforting change in our, to us, satisfactory interpretation of things.

Enlightened by the experiences of the past, we should always be ready frankly to question whether or not our explanation of given facts corresponds to objective truth or reality, or whether it is not,

after all, mixed with subjective error which confuses and obscures the real order of things. Nor can we overlook the consideration that we have not ultimately settled the question any more than they did, by, an appeal to conventional views, the consensus of all experience, the testimony of our senses, or the authority of the "word of God." If experience teaches us anything, it teaches us that all these points of reference have again and again shifted, and there is no reason why they may not shift again.

Sin Perverts a Good Impulse.

Then, as to sin, all the nameless impurities and wrongs of lust and ill-will in man, go back and rest upon what is originally pure and just. Those primal instincts of self-preservation and self-propagation have no taint of evil in them, until man perverts them into low ideals of lust—lust for food, lust for sex, and lust for worldly pleasure and power. At the abundant table of life, where God sits, the Almoner of all good, man in his covetous greed, eats and drinks unworthily to the damnation of his own body and soul.

Besides, those deeper sins of ill-will such as anger, jealousy, envy, are not without basis in some sort of right motive. Anger, fierce and hot, has often been an elemental power to correct many a wrong and teach many a lesson of justice. From school boy fights up to revolution and war, man has learned that, by imposing upon others, he arouses anger and brings down upon his head deserved retribution. If man will not learn the lesson of justice through reason, then, like a stupid brute, he must be approached through his integument, and be literally thrashed into decency and right doing. As long as men do wrong, other men will grow angry, and by the ethics of the integument correct that wrong; and while we prefer the appeal to reason, we must be grateful for the humbler benefits of force.

Or, if we take jealousy, we find it to be a perverted sense of a genuine appreciation for another. I want and stand in need of the Master's regard; only I can not further my genuine interests in that particular by feelings of ill-will toward a beloved disciple who evidently enjoys that regard.

So it is with envy, which is the perversion of a right desire to emulate the superiority of another. Cleon has a thousand acres, he has health, intelligence and success. Have not these things value, and shall I not desire them? But I shall not get forward by seeking to

dispossess him of them. Nor am I bettered if with ill-will, I either begrudge him his good fortune, belittle his merits, or think to salve my envious spirit by calling it sour grapes and pride myself on a superior morality of renunciation. Envy is the perversion of a right imitative desire for the best gifts we see in others, gifts which we frankly appreciate and admire, and which we should seek to possess for ourselves.

Thus we might go through all the sins which men commit and find at the bottom of them, as an element of their tenacity, some impulse of good that has been perverted by an egoistic self-will.

Error and Sin Based upon Individual Rights.

In the third place, the tenacity of error and sin arise from the fact that they are expressions of the individual in his capacity as a rational being. They are, so to speak, personal possessions to be defended as belonging to one's self. To stand up for one's opinions and to do what one believes to be right, is a sort of necessary intellectual and moral self-preservation. It would be the poorest excuse of a man who did not have enough self-assertion and character to hold firmly to his convictions and defend them, as being what he considered to be the truth.

There is no reference here to that aspect of self-assertion where men know their opinions to be wrong but still cling to them out of mere vanity, the unwillingness to back down, the lack of courage to confess their mistake or to change their mind; or where, out of some financial or social interest, they defend their business or profession, in order to maintain a comfortable and approved standing in the tribe to which they belong, be it commercial, political, or religious—but rather to that sacred individual right, which every man, as an intelligent being, has to his own convictions.

So that as long as a man regards his ideas to be true, he ought to hold and defend them tenaciously, and bravely throw them out into the world of free discussion, always fully conscious, however, that his believing them to be true does not make them true, and always ready to be shown his error and brought to a knowledge of the truth.

Much more so is a man justified in advocating his own actions. His will is himself and expresses the very essence of his being. How essentially the will is the man is seen in the universal respect men demand for their own and accord to others' motives. With im-

punishment, we suggest that another is mistaken, but we are trifling with danger, if we deny his honesty of purpose or good faith by calling him a liar.

But as sacred as this right is of expressing and defending one's own volitions as having good intent, it is just as necessary to be ready to admit and renounce a discovered wrong and turn with determination to the right. Here is where the true nature of sin reveals itself. All departure from the objective Cosmic Will, be it in plant, animal, or man is transgression, and brings its inevitable results; but when, in self-conscious man, it comes to be known as a wrong and is stubbornly cherished in the sole interests of self against the interests of others, or in defiance of the divine law, it is sin in the proper sense of the term; and deserves, and, in time, receives condign punishment.

There is a confusing sentimentality that regards punishment for sin as a mere result, meant to discipline and reform. While this is true as far as it goes, there is a clear distinction to be drawn between the results of transgression, as something disciplinary and reformatory, and the results of sin, as having in addition a punitive character, as merited deserts which, indeed, are always welcomed as such by the highest moral natures. When St. Paul became conscious that his past (well meant) transgressions were sins, he bewailed himself on that account as the chiefest of sinners, and could not find words enough to express his gratitude to God for his infinite mercy of forgiveness and reconciliation in Jesus Christ.

So far then as every man holds to his own thought and action, as an expression of his individual rational personality, he is entirely justified. His deepest concern, however, is always to know whether his thought is true and his action right; and in no case is he ever justified in regarding that the rights of his rational individuality entitle him to hold the false and do the wrong.

Error and Sin Are Communal.

In the fourth place, error and sin are so stubborn because they are more than individual, they are communal. We all hold together the same errors as being true. The voice of the people, or public opinion, is not always the voice of God, but it has with the vast majority of men the power and authority of the voice of God. A single man who stands out against the general conviction tempts the thunderbolt.

To say nothing of the irresistible psychic influences, conscious and

unconscious, which from infancy to manhood, have essentially formed and deeply fixed his ideas, his tastes and indeed his whole character, a man is little aware of how much, when he is supposed to think and act for himself, he is actually moved and led by the popular mind, expressed in a thousand ways through the press, the pulpit, the academy, and even the fugitive gossip of the street. It matters not how large or small the mental world in which he lives may be, a New England village, a western mining camp, a latitudinarian university, an orthodox Salamanca, a center of legitimate business activity, or of wild speculation, a church circle or a band of rogues, the society of the privileged and the rich, or that of the dispossessed, the miserable and the poor, the general sentiment of his group will be the all-powerful public sentiment for him. If that sentiment is true, he will profit by the truth, if it is false, he with all others will regard it as true and share with them the consequences.

The Power of Communal Error.—Witchcraft.

We shall see in those witches of the sixteenth century, again, the power of communal error. Everybody, learned and unlearned, believed in them; it was not the peculiar fancy of the few, or the superstition of the multitude. It may all seem very absurd to us now, but it is well to recall with Mr. Leckey* that our better communal views are the result of the gradual disappearance of the old errors under the light of a very slowly growing scientific progress. In those days, however, it was perfectly understood on every hand that the world was constantly being invaded by Satan and his imps, who could arouse destructive storms, blight the harvests, and strike man and beast with disease and disaster. And no one doubted that human beings who wished to do so, could sell themselves to the devil in order to command unearthly powers of ill, in the service of their malice or vengeance.

So it was that people of uncanny habits, hystero-epileptic patients whose diseases took on protean forms of inexplicable mystery, especially old, ugly and wretched hags, with a sharp tongue and spiteful temper, were all likely to be suspected of being witches. In fact, many of them claimed, under the sway of the popular belief, to be witches. They boasted of having made a bargain with Satan, in order to take vengeance on their enemies, strike them with lightning,

* "History of Rationalism in Europe," Vol. I, 115-116.

bewitch their children, make barren their wives, ruin their fields, or even shipwreck them upon the high seas.

Should not persons of such diabolical power and animosity be suppressed? Had not Moses said: "Let not a witch live"? (Ex. xxii, 18.) Nobody doubted the facts or the theory to explain them. The only question was: Are the accused guilty? And when the accused were tortured many of them not only confessed to being witches but implicated others, telling the most circumstantial stories of disgraceful orgies at the Witches' Sabbath in some church yard, or even in the sacred precincts of the church itself, where the horned and hooped Devil, in *propria persona*, sat enthroned on the very altar of God.

And was it all imagination? Had not children vomited nails and crooked pins, had not women given birth to monstrosities, had not witches been actually seen, by numberless credible witnesses, astride broomsticks, sailing through the moonlit air, or taking the form of black cats or were-wolves? And an accused witch could not even prove an *alibi*, for she could leave a counterfeit simulacrum of herself in bed, while she went where she pleased.

Consequently, these pestiferous creatures, minions of the Devil, enemies of God and man, were haled to the courts, tried and when found guilty, which was nearly always the case, strangled and burnt; or, with thumbs and toes tied together, thrown into the water where, if they sunk, they were considered innocent, or if they floated, were considered guilty and so executed.

We may now regard the whole witchcraft horror as a subjective illusion, based upon a mistaken view of the world, but to the men of that day it was the objective truth, and, as honest, intelligent men, they could do no other than they did. From time immemorial men had believed in witches and witchcraft, so that in those great psychological upheavals in men's minds, involved in the Reformation and the Renaissance, it was not unnatural that the belief should take on especially virulent forms; and upon those who had the welfare of society at heart it devolved, as a sacred duty, to seek by every means, within their state of knowledge, to suppress the evil.

Men of as high character, learning, and good sense as, let us say, a President of the United States, a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a Senator, a College Professor, a Medical Authority, or a Bishop, regarded witches to be as objectively real as we now regard microbes to be objectively real. Pope Innocent VIII, King James, Sir

Matthew Hale, Sir Thomas Browne, and men of like character never doubted for one moment the truth of the error. The flower of piety, and the integrity of learning, jurisprudence, and culture were as earnestly bent on suppressing this sinful traffic between the Devil and his human servitors, as we are in stamping out yellow fever germs, or in purifying a city's water supply.

For a man in that day to doubt the objective reality of witchcraft was to lay himself open to being called a fool or a heretic, who stubbornly refused to be convinced by the universal experience of mankind, the lessons of history, the consensus of science and philosophy, the direct evidence of his own senses, and the "word of God." Tremendous array of evidence this! and yet it was all summoned, with the most cogent arguments, by the ablest men in support of witchcraft.

How then could it ever enter the mind of the average man to dispute this all-pervasive communal error, much less oppose it? We ought freely to recognize our great and lasting obligation to such men as Reginald Scot and Bekker, who courageously braved the universal error, prejudice, and superstition, in order to show how ignorance is indeed the curse of God and knowledge the wing wherewith we fly to heaven.

Economic and Political War, Communal Sins.

When we turn to our perverse volitions, we find that their communal character makes them even more stubborn than error. For in the nature of the case our actions are all social and necessarily involve others besides ourselves. We have as examples of great communal sins, economic war, commonly called competition, and political war.

Thus all men together rush pell-mell into the struggle for worldly gain, and all considerations but those of profit are set aside. Men even boldly say: There is no sentiment (they mean there is no *morality*) in business, and so steer their course not by what is right in itself, but by what is opportune, prudent and legal; and they do this because to do otherwise would involve financial loss. Occasionally some honest man, caught in this communal maelstrom of wrongdoing, will, in a moment of confidence, confess that he is heartily sick of the whole disgraceful struggle, where men secretly deceive or openly betray, where they misrepresent, undermine, show no

mercy, or boldly profess the pitiless creed of selfishness, under the specious and shallow doctrine of the survival of the fittest. He confesses that he would gladly do otherwise or withdraw; but, if he would live, he must follow the current, and do as others do, he must fight with their weapons. And all this is intensified by a well-nigh universal tendency to estimate a man's *worth* by his *wealth*, or by the ambition of making a show in the world of society.

War Results from the Failure of Reason.

In the same way, we are swept into the communal sin of war. Diplomacy with its finesse, its cunning, its opportunism, fails to resolve some inter-tribal question of boundary or tribute; and the prejudices of racial or religious differences add to the surcharged passions, until finally the storm breaks, in what we childishly call, in the words of our inspired poet, "the pomp and circumstance of glorious war." First, reason has failed us, and then we descend to the level of brutal force. The most pitiful feature of it is that instead of feeling deeply humiliated at the failure of reason and the necessity of resorting to force, we are proud of it and regard our deeds as noble. The appeal is made to our deep, instinctive animal atavism and we rush at each others' throats like wild beasts. And then once started, war stirs in us all the dregs and feculence of lust and ill-will, all the boastful vanity and pride, all the obtrusive self-assertion and self-justification of which our poor weak humanity is capable. Fortunately, the passion beats itself out in time, and the destruction and misery involved teach us some valuable lesson.

Self-contradictions in War.

The utter rational absurdity of war is seen in its own inner contradictions. In the ancient world it was justified because the ethical standards were frankly egoistic. A rival state simply had no rights, except such as it could maintain by force. But in the Christian world, war has no place, either in theory or in practice. Had an inter-stellar inhabitant looked down upon our Civil War, he might have understood it on the old basis, as laid down by some Aristotle, but he would have been utterly confused on hearing men, on either side, offering prayers to the same Father in Heaven, in the name of the same Prince of Peace. Once the conflict was begun, he might see how men could not well pray to be killed themselves but must

pray for grace to kill others; and yet he would be utterly confused when he found on the battlefield all the skill of science and all the comfort of religion lavished to seize the disabled, bind and heal their wounds, set them on their legs again, and send them forth once more, with their death dealing machines, on their noble mission of destruction. To him the two things would not tally. If the appeal to reason has failed, and it comes to an appeal to force, let it be force; the more killed, the sooner it is over. Do not save the wounded enemy, that were not mercy but folly, it only prolongs the struggle which the sooner over, the better; hence, carry out the real meaning of war by killing at once every disabled foe, and thus eliminate as far as possible all reinforcements.

The Status of War when Justified.

But the reader will ask: Where men are still so crudely unjust and aggressive, can we hope to abolish war? Within the state, it will be said, there are unruly elements which must not only be checked by force but punished and suppressed. And, in like manner, since whole nations may be seized with an unjust ambition or a tribal passion for revenge, they must be met and opposed or chastised by defeat. Such a nation in such a mood is but a titanic criminal, with whom the law must adequately deal, as we would with a great overgrown boyish bully who needs, more than anything else, a sound thrashing.

Very well, let us frankly grant that war is still a necessity. But this does not end the matter, we must know upon what that necessity rests. We shall find that it rests upon the half-animal, half-human, non-moral state of what we call civilization. Man has as yet only partly drawn himself up out of his deep animal instincts, where atavistic survivals still sway his thought and action. He must still be disciplined, guided, chastised. The court of justice, as the appeal of reason, is not yet all-sufficient for the arbitrament of disputes between individuals, and there is still needed the constable and the jail, or the ethics of the integument. That is, for the most part we are living on the plane of sense, guided by the motives of sense, where we do indeed strive to maintain justice, and at rare intervals get a glimpse of the larger principle of goodness.

But suppose the nation decides that it is called upon to be the administrator of justice. In the first place, it must be sure that its

own action is free from the motives of self-interest, aggression or mere brutal passion; and, in the second place, sure of its own decision, it must recognize that its only function in the premises is the very humble constabulary one of bringing an open offender to the international bar. Indeed, this is coming more and more to be the general conception of war.

But what a change in the psychological attitude! Where is the boastfulness, the glory, the honor and nobility, supposed to be involved in the triumph? It takes on now the form of a humiliating necessity, the necessity of reducing an unruly bully or an incorrigible criminal. It is a confession that the luminous persuasions of reason have failed, and that we must descend to the primitive force of tooth and claw. It is a reversion and not an advance, an admission of weakness and not an assertion of real strength; and the suspicion must always obtrude that perhaps our luminous persuasions of reason have not been so luminous after all, have indeed been vitiated by a good deal of bluster and self-assertion in ourselves. As a man, I can thrash a boy into obedience, but in doing so, I have confessed my weakness as a rational man, and simply reverted to brute force. Admit the occasional necessity, if I must, but I can not be proud of it. I can not strut and take on airs or bedeck myself with brass buttons and gilt medals as honorable signs that I have thrashed the boy. I can only humbly confess with shame that I have not yet become fully a rational man.

Well, nations are only grand men, men in the bulk, they have no more and no less obligations or rational ideals than men. What is right or wrong for a man to do, in the end, is right or wrong for a nation to do. There is only one rational moral law, as universal and pervasive in the moral world as gravitation is in the material world. So that, when a nation feels under the necessity of giving its rival a sound thrashing, instead of boasting, it should rather feel the sting of humiliation and sorrow. But no, that does not appeal to the average man. He likes to boast, to strut, to swell himself out, to act and talk big, to assert himself in the eyes of others; and he does so the more readily because others approve and admire, they pay him the tribute of fear or reverence and call him a brave man. And so the whole communal consciousness becomes pervaded and vitiated by an approval of war and the warrior. Women with their gifts of beauty and love approve, ministers of the Gospel of Peace add their

blessing, and all men are carried away with the great blinding communal sin, or the will that perverts the Cosmic Will, which purposes that men should not, like animals, fight but, like intelligent beings, reason.

We in America are half-conscious of our subjective military hallucination, but in Europe, we still find the full somnambulistic sleep. Germany and France are two great armed camps, frowning at each other from across the Rhine.

The Atmosphere of War in Germany and France.

In Germany, the head of the state, the Kaiser, as his ancient Roman namesake, is a war-lord. He commands the legions and the legions rule the nation. His public appearances are always marked by the show of battle insignia, and the display of military power. Next to royalty itself, the army takes the first social rank, it is the Kaiser's *Liebling*, and its representatives fully indicate, by their bearing, their consciousness of superiority. The whole nation is born and reared amid the clash of swords and the glitter of helmets. From the cradle to the grave the Germans must needs think war, talk war, act war, dream war. At every turn, be it in the provincial town or in the capital, the citizen is confronted by bands of soldiers, in the *precise German order*, great argus-eyed Kasernen, or bristling fortifications, while, on every hand, are the memorials of dead heroes and columns of victory. To be in Germany, is to be imbued with the oppressive, all-pervasive communal spirit of war.

In liberty loving France, the military feeling is only less universal, if not so palpable. The army is the life and heart's blood of the people. Speak of the army, and you must assume an air of reverence. Utter a suspicion or a word of depreciation, and you approach the danger of apprehension for *lèse majesté*.

The young Frenchman, too, must learn the art of war and be ready at a moment's notice, during his prime, to leap to arms.

And what is the reason for the diversion of this vast expenditure of thought, effort and treasure into the channels of war? The positive conviction or the mean suspicion that the one, unless prevented by force, will seize the other's territory. Break the hallucinatory illusion; turn back to the plow and stop this great stream of diverted, intelligent energy! and those two great nations would rise to an unexampled honor and prosperity, never dreamed of before.

O but the discipline of the army and the crucible of war bring out the noble qualities of obedience, courage, devotion, and sacrifice in man! But that is beside the point at issue. Every situation in life gives opportunity for the cultivation of obedience, courage, devotion, and sacrifice; and experience in general bristles with occasions where these noble qualities may be elicited to their highest degree. Many a military hero, who, amid the mad rush of battle, dares "to kiss the blazing lips of the cannon," will cringe before the sneer of a loafer, has not the courage of his convictions before the effrontery of smooth convention, fails to discharge his simplest duties as a citizen, or refuses to sacrifice his least comfort for the welfare of others. In time of peace, moral obedience, courage, devotion, and sacrifice go begging for suitors.

Wherein the Greatness of Germany and France Lies.

Germany and France are not disciplined, elevated, and bettered by the crushing weight of their military establishments, but confused and retarded in their normal developments. That which distinguishes Germany, her learning, her music, and her admirable practice of obedience and order has no essential connection with the spirit of war. Whatever there may be of discipline, order, obedience, sacrifice in the German army is a product, in the first place, of the German intelligence and rational will, and not of war. All that makes Germany really great before the world, or that enables her to play her distinguished rôle in the development of civilization derives no inspiration or dynamic power from irrational forces that in their very nature must end in chaos.

And likewise in France, distinguished as she is for her keen intelligence, her artistic feeling and capacity, and the charm of her wit and human gaiety, the incubus of militarism only confuses and obstructs. What otherwise would come to its most brilliant development is checked and perverted by the spirit of war.

The only purpose war can serve is to chastise the low moral consciousness out of which it springs. Man always recovers from war as from a disease, which has been a systemic disturbance casting out organic evils, but which in itself always blocks advance, and for the time being holds back from normal development. This can not always be seen when the struggle is of short duration, but when it continues for years, its baneful influences, deadening and perverting

all progressive elements of civilization, have been felt for generations. The Hundred Years War crushed the beginnings of art and learning in France and England, and kept back these great nations for well nigh two centuries. The Thirty Years War not only devastated and decimated Germany and the Germans, but laid a burden of loss, disunion, and hatred upon the people for generations.

It is the very nature of war to bring about such results, a destructive, irrational force, wholly beneath and unworthy of rational man. And the spirit of war is maintained and encouraged by great military establishments which constantly imbue in the minds of the people an illusory glamor of self-assertion and power.

If we seriously wish to cultivate all the brilliancy of intelligence in us, further the interests of artistic accomplishment, or develop the highest forms of ethical and spiritual culture, the sooner we rid ourselves of the perverted, subjective, communal, hallucination of war, the better.

In deciding the merits or demerits of war, we must not be misled by concomitants which spring from human nature in general. The point at issue is: Is war in itself, with its hell of destruction and death, the rational means of settling differences between rational men? There is only one answer, and there can be no affirmative, for the illusions of perverse will can admit of no affirmation. And yet the great communal illusion stubbornly persists, and casts its hateful phantasmagoria of confusion, discord, and suffering, as something real, over the face of objective reality.

Adjustment to Environment for Self-Preservation.

The tenacity of both communal error and communal sin lies in a law of nature, as it were. Naturalists tell us that animals in their useful, protective adjustments to the environment, change their color to the very stocks and stones among which they live. What the animal does thus instinctively, man does more or less consciously. He changes the color of his mind to that of the psychic environment, and does so consciously or unconsciously for the purpose of protecting his interests. By this sort of deep rational instinct, men adjust themselves financially, socially, politically, and even religiously to the popular mind, in order to live.

But the essential, progressive character of the great law of evolution is not expressed in self-preservation alone, but in a steady self-

progression toward some great end; and it becomes necessary, therefore, to rise above the communal level to higher planes of thought and action.

The Great Leaders Rise above the Communal Level.

For this, only the strongest and best men are capable, men of the clearest insight and loftiest character, men whom we call geniuses, men who, against traditional habits and conviction, fight their way forward in the face of opposition, ridicule, persecution and even death. As we look back upon the progress of mankind from barbarism to civilization, we shall always find the progress due to those men whose historic names mark the stages of advance, and whom we call our reformers, our saints, our martyrs, our heroes. Their devotion and sacrifice have won for them some compensation in the universal honor which subsequent generations heap upon them.

Evolution Demands Self-Progression.

The peculiar nature of man, as a rational being, expresses itself in a progressive unfoldment of consciousness. As he is constantly making a theoretical interpretation and reinterpretation of experience, in order to know more and more fully the objective Truth of the Cosmos, or the Reality of Thought; so he is constantly making an ethical interpretation and reinterpretation of experience, that he may be able more and more perfectly to follow the objective Order of the Cosmos, or the Reality of Will. Therefore, it is that science, as an intellectual evolution, is constantly correcting our mistakes in thought and bringing us nearer to Truth; while history, as an ethical evolution of human society, is constantly eliminating our perversities of will which have taken on the forms of convention, custom, law, social institutions, and bringing us nearer to the objective Reality of Goodness.

Thus far, in our human progress, science has swept away innumerable ignorant superstitions that not only obscured our views of nature but imposed upon us limitation and suffering; and, in opening our minds to a larger understanding of the real object, has, at the same time, relieved us of many evils and given to us a wider enjoyment of and command over the world around us.

In like manner, history, as embodied in some French or American Revolution, has lifted from us the crushing weight of prescriptive

rights and divinely privileged kingships, and founded human fellowship upon the more objectively real and rationally ethical dignity and worth of individual manhood. So that man, in view of his rational evolution, can never be justified in compromising with popular error and popular wrong-doing for the sake of personal gain or comfort.

But, even if we find error to rest upon some element of truth, and sin spring out of some impulse of good, in themselves they both remain subjective illusions, corresponding to nothing in Reality, and are the sources of confusion, discord, and pain.

The will o' the wisp is a real objective light which I have seen and has its cause in certain objective conditions, but when I interpret it as the light of my home and am misled into the dangerous quagmire, I have committed the great error of taking a subjective illusion for objective reality.

When a man deeply injures me, he justly deserves punishment and in time will meet his deserts; but if I take into my private hands the vengeful settlement of the score, I am laboring under the subjective illusion of a volitional perversity; for if all were to follow my example, as they would be entitled to do, so far as my influence goes, instead of having an objective order of justice in the community, in which my interests would be safe, there would be social chaos in which nobody's interests would be safe. In other words, there is always the objective demand that the wrong-doer be punished; but that personal ill-will should carry out the sentence of a universal justice is the gravest of subjective moral illusions.

But while we may account for the tenacity of our mistaken thoughts and perverse volitions, because of certain true and good elements in them, we have to inquire how it is that those subjective unreal elements, that are only false and evil, ever come into being at all.

CHAPTER IV.

THE GENESIS OF ERROR AND SIN WITH THE EMERGENCE OF TRUTH AND GOODNESS.

THE fact of a mistaken identity, the presence of inherent elements of what is true and right, the personal assertion of the self, and the power of communal thought and action may account for the natural tenacity of our mistakes in thought and perversities of will; but if they represent no objective reality, how is it that they ever came into being to begin with?

In seeking to find the genesis, or in tracing out the natural history of error and sin, we must take refuge once more in that great conception of evolution of which so much has already been said.

We have learned that when man emerges from the evolving *natural* world-order, as a self-conscious and hence *supra-natural* being, he consciously takes up the course of evolution, going on about him, into himself and thus begins a *rational* evolution of his own. As reason is a trinal unity of thought, will, and feeling, man's rational evolution, we found, is constituted by the unfolding of his consciousness into a correspondence to or a reflection of the objective Thought, Will, and harmonious Life of the Cosmos. To think thus the Cosmic Thought, to will the Cosmic Will, and to enter into and enjoy the harmonious Unity of the Cosmic Life, we concluded, constitutes man's freedom and self-realization, the goal of his being; or, in view of his struggles and wanderings, constitutes his salvation, redemption, reconciliation, atonement.

The Three Progressive Stages.

This evolution of his self-consciousness, we also learned, is a natural process in mind by which his whole rational nature passes through three stages of unfoldment. As possessed of a theoretical reason, that is, as an intelligent mind or intellect, interested in knowing the objective truth, he begins in the realm of sense perception, rises to logic, and finally passes beyond logic to a rational intuition of the Truth. As possessed of ethical reason, that is, as endowed with affections or

heart, as we say, capable of streaming out toward others in good will, he begins on the plane of selfish egoism, rises to the level of altruistic justice, and ends by gaining the lofty height of the universal will of good. Concomitantly, in view of his æsthetic nature, his ability to estimate values in terms of feeling, he begins on the plane of sensation, which is the pleasure or pain of sense and self, rises to the plane of emotion, which is the pleasure or pain arising in the realm of logic and justice, and finally ends by attaining to the undisturbed happiness of freedom and self-realization, due to his rational intuition of the Beauty of Truth and Goodness. That is, his theoretical and ethical consciousness, having unfolded into a correspondence to the Thought of the Cosmos and the Will of the Cosmos, his æsthetical consciousness enters into the harmonious unity of the Cosmic Life.

It is along this ascending or unfolding rational path to freedom and self-realization that error and sin—and fortunately, as we shall see, their concomitant results and deserts—emerge into consciousness. It is evident, however, that they emerge not as an integral part of his real rational being, but as something privative, defective, immature, and that they emerge just at that point where he becomes painfully aware of logical contradiction in his thought and moral perversity of his will.

Great Value of the Middle or Discursive Stage of Progress.

It is, therefore, at the middle term of this process, at that abstractive, discursive, reasoning stage of logic in science and of justice in ethics, that error and sin become actual, though not objectively real, in the rational evolution of man.

At once is seen the indispensable, purposive function of this discursive middle stage in man's advance toward self-realization. As already indicated (p. 362) it soon reveals, looking back upon the naive plane of sense and of self, all the confusion and contradiction that make impossible anything like the knowledge of truth and the practice of goodness, upon that level.

But undertaking to construct a coherent, logical knowledge out of the perceptions of sense, and a consistent, logical practice of justice out of the egoism of self, the abstractive, logical understanding at first boasts of its success, then confesses its failure, and finally, in time, recognizes that all its rational activities point beyond itself, and ultimately find their ground in the substantial, causal unity of Mind,

revealed in direct, rational intuition, where at last Truth is seen to be the Beauty of an outstreaming Goodness. That is, the discursive, logical activity of the mind first arouses us from the innocent contentments of sense and self, and painfully convicts us of our errors and sins; and then, as a faithful pedagogue, leads us on to rational intuition where we see Truth, Goodness, and Beauty in their unity as Spiritual Reality.

The Emergence of Truth Reveals the Presence of Error.

It is in this unfolding, rational process, that mistakes in thought and perversities of will appear. But there is no evolution of error and sin. There is only the evolution of the realities, Truth and Goodness.

Intellectually, man begins in ignorance. When, with his development, he discovers specifically what his ignorance is, he has become conscious of error. But it is really the emergence of Truth, in his unfolding consciousness, which shows his advance beyond his previous stage of knowledge, and thus condemns and destroys it. If, like the non-reasoning animal—non-reasoning in a consciously individual sense—he had no rational capacity to know the truth, he would never know anything about error, any more than the animal does. It is because he is becoming more and more conscious of the truth, that his immature, inadequate, confused knowledge is revealed as error, and so disappears as such.

First logic has condemned sense and banished its errors, and then intuition condemns logic and banishes the falsity and inadequacy of its conclusions, in the light of Spiritual Truth. The only objective reality all along has been the Truth, the knowledge of which is slowly emerging, in consciousness, and condemning and destroying all knowledge other than itself.

A Growing Consciousness of Right Reveals the Presence of Wrong.

In like manner, man begins ethically as a transgressor of the moral law. That is, in his naive egoism like the animal, he does many things which an enlightened moral consciousness would condemn as wrong. But though he is thus a transgressor, he is innocent of any evil intent. He is, we may say, as yet non-moral. It is when, in his ethical development, a sense of right emerges that he sees his past actions as wrong. In the light of the moral law, of which he has become conscious,

upon the discursive plane of the understanding to which in his rational unfoldment he has advanced, his transgressions become sins. He now knows what he is about, and as, in experience, the moral ideal grows into greater clearness, the more completely is uncovered the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the more does the naive egoism of self, with its mere animal impulses and lusts, reveal its original total depravity.

Difference in Dealing with Error and Sin.

We are dealing here with something which more profoundly concerns the most intimate nature of man than error. For error, as blinding as it may be, disappears when discovered; but sin, being an expression of will, that is, of the very man himself, persists in a stubborn self-assertion. As men are less sensitive to being accused of false thinking than of wrong-doing, so they less readily admit evil will than mistaken thought.

So that when sin in the heart is uncovered by the moral ideal in the perfect law of right, it does not disappear of itself like error, in the light of truth, but stubbornly asserts its selfish interests and persists in maintaining itself. Hence, as sin, in the first place, is a free act of the rational will, it can be destroyed only by a free act of the rational will, wherein man's ultimate, rational destiny is decided by his own conscious and voluntary determination to stand against or for the moral law.

A Painful Dilemma Solved in Intuition.

It is this middle stage of ethical development to which the logic of the abstractive understanding has brought man, that the deepest, most inveterate, and most painful contradiction of his rational evolution declares itself. He has now received the most sacred revelation of reason, viz.: that he is a moral being and free, and at the same time, he has become helplessly conscious of his moral weakness and servitude.

As before, in the middle stage of his theoretical development, he discovered the rational necessity of his life to be a knowledge of the Truth or Reality, while logic seemed to condemn him to a science of phenomenal phantoms; so here, in the middle stage of his ethical development, he finds the inescapable categorical imperative hanging over his head, but no moral power to meet its demands—he hears the

awful voice of the Holy God proclaiming: "Cursed is every one which continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them" (Gal. iii, 10. Deu. xxvii, 26. Jer. xi, 3), while he only becomes the more wretchedly conscious of his moral weakness and incapacity (see Rom. vii, 19-24).

But as logic, revealing its own inadequacy, drives him on beyond itself to the *intellectual* intuition of Truth, as objective Spiritual Reality; so the law, revealing its own inadequacy, drives him on beyond itself to the *ethical* intuition of Goodness, as the objective reality of the Moral Reason in him, which no longer seeks selfish ends, nor vainly works to obey an external moral law, but freely streams out, as a full expression of his own rational nature, in a universal will of good, or love to all. Thus, in man's moral development, the moral law has condemned the egoism of self; while as a good, though austere, pedagogue it leads man on beyond itself to Love, as the full and ultimate expression of the Moral Reason.

Error and Sin Reveal how Intelligent and Good Man Is.

Perhaps, in view of such considerations, it will now not seem so startling to say that, in reality, the emergence of error and sin, in consciousness, during man's rational evolution, is not the emergence of something objectively real but is rather the emergence of Truth and Goodness, which are the expression of the Real Man, on his upward way to freedom and self-realization; and which, in the progressive unfoldment of his rational, inner Self, bring to light and condemn the obscure, the confused, the contradictory, the immature, the inadequate, and the self-willed. The appearance of error and sin in man's life, then, is an indication not of how stupid and bad man is, but of how intelligent and good he is. The stupidity and badness of error and sin do not lie in something objectively real in them, but in our thinking and willing them as real, by which we invariably objectify, project, and superimpose them, as something real, upon the real objective world.

We might say, then, that error and sin have no origin. For how can something that is objectively nothing be said to have an origin? But they have a natural genesis, and we must say that as actualities, bitter actualities in experience, they have that genesis in the progressive unfoldment of rational consciousness, as man moves upward toward

freedom and self-realization in reflecting, in his thought and will, the Truth and the Goodness of God.

Two Great Interpretations of Antiquity.

This rational evolution of man by which, *theoretically*, he rises from sense to logic and from logic to intuition; and, *ethically*, from the egoism of self to the justice of law and from the justice of law to love, during which error appears and is destroyed, and the self-willed assertion of sin is renounced and overcome, has been set forth by two of the very greatest minds of antiquity, Plato and Paul. And so clear, complete, and ultimate is their account of the matter that it is worth our while to consider, if only briefly and inadequately, what they said. Both were seeking a salvation from the painful confusions and contradictions of life. It was natural for the Greek, with his theoretical genius, to look for that salvation in the objective Reality of Truth, which he would find so ravishingly harmonious and beautiful that it must rest upon the ultimate Idea of the Good. And it was just as natural for the Hebrew, with his ethical genius, to look for that salvation in an objective Goodness, the Reality of which, as the ultimate Truth of God, would be attested by a joyous and abiding sense of Eternal Life.

They both agreed, in looking beyond the seen, for the ground of what they sought. As the one could not find the salvation of Truth in the visible *world of sense*, but must look to the invisible *world of intelligible Reason*; so the other could not find the salvation of Goodness in the visible *world of carnal selfish desires*, which he calls the "flesh," but only in the invisible *world of Spirit* where the sole law of action is an outstreaming Will of Good.

Plato's Story of the Cave.

In his "Republic," Book VII, Plato gives the natural genesis of error on the ascending path of Truth. Imagine a number of men, imprisoned at the bottom of a deep cave that slopes downward from the sunshine into the darkness of the earth. These men are bound with chains about the ankles and necks in such a way, that, not being able to turn around, they must ever look toward the dark background of their cave. And we must think of them as having been born in this condition and consequently of knowing no other state of life.

Behind them, far up the slope of the cave, there is a bright fire

burning and before it a long wall, on the top of which there are various puppets moving back and forth in all sorts of attitudes and motions. The more or less distorted shadows of the attitudes and motions are naturally cast upon the back of the cave and constitute the only objects which the chained men see. In a word, the shadows make up the world in which the cave-prisoners live and with which they have to deal. So they spend their lives in studying them, and in estimating, measuring, and judging all their attitudes, motions, and relations. Thus the sum total of their life's experience is this shadow-knowledge.

Now, imagine some wise man, who had the love of his fellow beings at heart, descending into the cave to release these imprisoned men. He begins with one of them, by striking the chains from his ankles and neck, and dragging him upward toward the fire and the real puppets on the top of the wall. Dragging him, be it observed, because the man himself is reluctant to leave a state in which he is very comfortable and well content.

How Truth First Pains, then Rejoices the Mind.

When he is finally brought to the fire, he is at first very much dazed and blinded by the light, and can not see the puppets at all, or very vaguely. But getting used to the light in time, he has explained to him, by the wise man, how his previous knowledge has been only that of shadows, and that the puppets are the real objects.

Delighted as he is by his new-found knowledge he, nevertheless, is still much confused and keeps constantly looking back at the shadows with which he feels so familiar; and by means of them is ever inclined to measure, estimate, and explain the puppets. That is, at first he can very much better understand the puppets in terms of the shadows than the shadows in terms of the puppets. But by pains-taking instruction, the wise man finally brings his pupil's mind around to where he reverses his method of trying to explain the puppets by the shadows, and explains the shadows by the puppets.

And now the wise man is ready to force upon his pupil the next painful step, for there is much more for him to learn, although he is very well content with, and, indeed, proud of his new enlightenment and superior knowledge. But the wise man, unwilling that he should remain where he is, seizes him again and drags him upward along the sloping cave toward the far-off opening where just a glimmer of sun-

light may be seen. In due time and with much difficulty, he gets him out of the cave into the full light of day. Now his pupil is indeed dazed and blinded, and covering his eyes as best he can, sinks moaning and helpless upon the ground. He would go back to his firelight and puppets. There he was comfortable and contented; there he could see and understand.

But his instructor is firm and urges him to look around. And as he obeys, little by little his eyes become accustomed to the new fierce glare; little by little his blindness and confusion give way, until, at last, standing upright upon his feet, he beholds all things and men, the earth and the heavens, in the full glorious light of the sun as they really are. He has now passed from his shadow-knowledge (sense), through his puppet-knowledge (logic), to a knowledge of Reality (intuition).*

A Missionary of Truth Meets the Inertia of Error.

But now that the man is freed from his cave and enlightened, he is seized with pity and love for his fellow beings, still chained in the darkness of the cave; and resolves with great enthusiasm, to descend and free them. Once arrived where they are, he tells them of the wonderful world of light and reality, how noble men are in form and bearing, and how true and beautiful everything is; and, then tries to explain to them how illusory, false, and unreal their dark, distorted, ugly shadows are, and offers to set them free. Much to his surprise and pain, instead of hailing these instructions and this announcement with joy, they are first struck dumb with astonishment, not at what he has told them but at his effrontery in condemning their learning and wisdom; and then they break out at him with anger, scorn, ridicule, and mockery. They call him an impractical idealist, a visionary fool, an empty-headed idle dreamer. "What! you tell

* It would have helped matters greatly and made it far easier for instructor and pupil, had the pupil, each time, become himself highly dissatisfied with his shadow-knowledge and then with his puppet-knowledge, and so chafed under the pains of its confusions and contradictions. But as he was very well content and undisturbed, his instructor had to use a sort of gentle violence, which was no other than the painful wounding of his pride, by convincing and convicting him of how ignorant and superstitious he really was.

But, after all, the advance has been made in the first place, because men have discovered so much confusion and conflict, first, in their shadow-knowledge, and so little reality in their puppet-knowledge, that they have been driven to look beyond for a knowledge which, by its consistency and coherence, would satisfy reason as being real.

us that these objects are not real! Any man of sense knows them to be real by his own eyes. Have we not spent all of our lives in measuring and estimating them, and so have our fathers before us; and do you presume to deny the common experience and wisdom of mankind!"

And to make good their words, they seize him and beat him, so that he would fain escape out of their hands. He came to give them freedom, but they make him a prisoner, and it becomes doubtful if he can even save his life.

*The Rebuke of Truth Always Arouses the Hostility
of Error.*

In passing it is worth noting that Plato is here condemning the men who had imprisoned and put to death his great master, Socrates, whose only crime was teaching men the truth; but that was enough, for truth always disturbs error and arouses its hostility.

We also know how men treated Jesus for no other reason than because he condemned their little, narrow, bigoted world, and offered them the light and freedom of a larger and higher one.

Meaning of Plato's Allegory.

It is perfectly clear that Plato has given us, in this noble allegory, those three stages of knowledge through which men must pass, if they would rise from the sensible to the intelligible, from appearance to Reality, from nature to Spirit (p. 470).

The men among the shadows are the men who know and judge all things only by sense, taking them to be real. All their values, therefore, they naturally estimate in terms of sense, and all their actions are dictated by motives of sense. And although they are, for the most part, inclined to sink into mere sensuality, they often acquire a great deal of shrewdness and cunning, in directing their lives with a reasonable degree of comfort and respectability. They are on the plane of common-sense, and are what Balzac calls *instinctives*. Their knowledge is of a kind, and serves its purpose so long as men stay where they are; but let them ascend to the puppets, and their shadow-knowledge is seen to be distorted, erroneous, inadequate, and misleading.

The men among the puppets are those who have risen far above the plane of sense perception to the plane of abstract reasoning. These are the scientists who seek to rationalize the data of sense by

logic. They investigate, inquire, analyze, classify, in order to know and understand the rational relations among the objects given in perception. These rational relations are the laws, forces, substances, causes of natural science, by which the sense data are explained; but they do not stand for objective reality any more than—and as much as—the puppets in the firelight, stand for real men and things, up in the sunlight.

When men stop here satisfied, we may call them *materialistic*, or, since they have learned that all objects are made up of sense perceptions, we may call them *sensationistic*. But when they recognize a reality beyond, the knowledge of which would be the truth which, however, they can never attain, because our only possible knowledge is sense, rationalized by logic, we have our so-called *agnostics*.

All of them, taken together, are Balzac's *abstractives*. Their knowledge is of a kind, and serves its purpose, so long as men are satisfied with discursive reasoning. But when they come into the sunlight of reality, their formulas of law, force, order, inter-action, and so on prove to be wholly inadequate, for they are like the puppets, that is, they have no reality in themselves; but, nevertheless, while only abstract, logical forms, suspended, as it were, in mid-air, they constantly and unmistakably point to reality beyond.

Finally, those who persist in climbing to the top of the cave, and thus make their way out to the full light of day, are those who look with rational intuition upon Reality. These are the philosophers and idealists—in Plato's sense—and are Balzac's *specialists*. It is only when men get here, that they can see how the shadows are cast by the puppets, and the puppets are copies, logically abstracted, of men and things in the real world; just as it is only when we attain to rational intuition that we can see how it is that sense perception is the content of logical form, and how the logical form is but a faint abstract copy of the real object in the world of Mind.

We have, in this cave-story of Plato's, the description of a universal experience in the development of the theoretical reason, in which, as we have before learned, logic first condemns the naive errors of sense, and then, confessing its own inadequacy, points forward to rational intuition, through which reason is finally saved, by coming to know the Truth.

Thus we see that error is not an integral part of man's real nature, but a subjective episode in the development of his consciousness which

comes to actuality, as logic reflects upon the immaturities of sense, and as intuition reveals the inadequacy of logic, which is a provisional organon of reason to lead thought from the knowledge of sense-phenomena to the intuition of Spirit, as the Ultimate Reality.

St. Paul's Experience of Moral Salvation.

Strikingly parallel to this process of theoretical development toward the Truth, is St. Paul's account of the process of ethical development toward Goodness. As a moral being, man begins on the egoistic plane of self. He may be considered, in this first stage of his ethical development, as non-moral; and so long as he remains in this state, can not be said, in a consciously individual sense, to commit sin.

But he is more than egoistic, he is also altruistic, and when his moral nature awakes, as it invariably does in coming into relation with his fellow men, he finds within himself a sense of justice—the categorical imperative or the moral law—to express which he constructs various moral codes, defining not only his rights and privileges but also his duties and obligations. This emergence of the sense of justice or the law, in his consciousness, is the condemnation which his higher moral nature now puts upon his past egoism or self-will, as sin. Man can no longer live at peace on the plane of selfish preference, for the law of right has entered and, without compromise, condemns his egoistic self-will as sin.

The Law Brings Sin to Light.

This is what St. Paul meant in saying: "I was alive apart from the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived and I died" (Rom. vii, 9). Before I had risen to a moral sense, I was happy and uncondemned in my naive, egoistic pursuits. Self and selfish interests absorbed me, and I knew no other rule of action. But when I grew in moral consciousness to the sense of right, that is, when the law came, then I recognized myself as a sinner, my happy contentment with myself was gone; and the more I became conscious of the law and its lofty demands, the more I saw that it condemned me, put me to shame, morally slew me. The strength of my sin I found to be the law (I Cor. xv, 56), not because the law in any way created my sin or encouraged it, but because it made me painfully conscious of how sinful were, and are, my selfish, egoistic actions.

St. Paul very clearly describes this painful change in moral conscious-

ness, and explains the meaning and function of the law. "Is the law sin?" he asks, "God forbid. Howbeit, I had not known sin, except through the law; for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not lust; but sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all manner of lust; for, apart from the law, sin is dead. And I was alive apart from the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died; and the commandment, which was unto life, this I found to be unto death: for sin, finding occasion through the commandment, beguiled me and through it slew me. So that the law is holy and the commandment holy, and righteous, and good. Did then that which is good become death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might be shown to be sin, by working death to me through that which is good;—that through the commandment sin might become exceeding sinful" (Rom. vii, 7-14).*

The Tragic Conflict.

But when once the moral law awakes within, then there is no more peace, no life, no salvation until the perfect law of goodness is fulfilled. And if, as is always the case, self-will continues to make its egoistic demands, there arises that tragic struggle so graphically described by the Apostle—a struggle which runs parallel with that of a logic demanding the truth, but incapable of attaining it.

"For we know," says St. Paul, "that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do I know not; for not what I would, that do I practice; but what I hate, that I do. But if what I would not, that I do, I consent unto the law that it is good. . . . For the good which I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I practice. . . . I find then the law, that, to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God, after the inward man: but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law

* Although, thus, before the troublous, condemning-law entered, I might think of myself as alive in my naive, happy egoism, yet, on the other hand, from the standpoint of the law, as I look back over my previous life, I see that I was dead in trespasses and sins, dead to those higher demands of my true moral nature.

It is to be feared that there are many people who are thus theoretically as well as ethically dead, both in their errors and illusions, and also in their trespasses and sins; because neither is their intellectual nature awake to the exceeding falseness of error, nor their ethical nature awake to the exceeding sinfulness of sin.

of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" (Rom. vii, 14-24.)

St. Paul is giving here—as was Plato in his cave-story—not merely an individual but a universal experience, and one which lies in the very nature of the progressive evolution of the moral reason. And while he speaks of this entrance of the law into his consciousness, as having slain him, yet he himself looks upon it as a forward step in the moral progress, not only of the individual but also of the race.

With his ethical development, it is inevitable that man should seem to have become worse, but he is really better—he only knows now how bad he is; whereas before he was morally blind to that fact, which is the first step toward progress. Here is a psychic event of the same character as that in the unfolding theoretical reason. As in the one case, error emerged, in consciousness, the moment logic, with its demand for coherent, rational relations, awoke and condemned the confusion and inadequacy of sense; so, in the other, sin emerged, in consciousness, the moment the sense of right, with its demand of justice, awoke and condemned the instinctive and misguided impulses of self-will.

Freedom from the Law Means the Service of Love.

Again we saw that, when logic discovered the errors and illusions of sense, it itself sought in vain to discover reality, being confined to phenomena only; and that intuition alone, recognizing the inadequacy of logic could lead reason to a knowledge of the Truth. In precisely the same manner, the moral law, while it reveals clearly enough the sins of self, is incapable of lifting us to the reality of Goodness. And here the Apostle guides us forward with absolutely inerrant step.

He saw that no law, no codes, no moral precepts of prohibition or command, could make any man really good or redeem the race. He saw that we must pass beyond that discursive middle term of advance to that third and ultimate stage of moral development, where no longer law but love, the fulfillment of the law, dominates the will.

In this he had wholly grasped the meaning of Jesus who had declared that "unless your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye can in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven." And Jesus did not mean unless you are more faithful and sincere in keeping the precepts of the law—they were faithful and sincere enough—but he meant unless you keep the law in a different,

higher way, unless the law becomes the outstreaming of your own heart in love to God and love to man, you can not enter the kingdom of heaven. This is the significance of his saying to Nicodemus: Ye must be born again.

So it was that Paul found the Gospel a Gospel of freedom, for by it we are discharged from the servitude of the law, and raised above the law into the realms of free grace.

The Moral Law, a Bondage to Be Broken.

We must very particularly warn ourselves against the popular impression that by freedom from the law, Paul meant simply freedom from ritual and ceremony. There was no dispute between him and his opponents on that point. The Jewish Rabbis of his day clearly taught that the essence of the law and the obedience which met the approval of God, was not sacrifice and rite, but the moral commands and prohibitions and their faithful observance (see Mark x, 17-20. Luke x, 25-27; xviii, 18-21). Paul plainly meant, as Jesus had before him, that we are freed from the *moral* law. When he said: By the deeds of the law can no flesh be justified, he meant: can not be justified by a faithful and conscientious discharge of moral precepts; because the just, that is, those who attain the full realization of their moral nature, shall live by faith, a faith that works by love. The Apostle is stating here nothing that is either arbitrary or mysterious. We have seen that the essence of the ethical reason is an outstreaming will of good to benefit or please others; hence, it can never come to its real expression, in making law and duty the motive of its activities. So long as it does so, it is a slave to law and duty. It is only when it acts from a spontaneous motive within itself, as expressing its own real nature, that it comes to complete freedom.

St. Paul makes his meaning very clear when, for saying that we are free from the law, he was charged with being a libertine or of teaching men that, now they are free, they may do as they please. He replied by declaring his absolute devotion to the law as pure and good, and forever obligatory; and yet he showed at the same time that the true way to keep the law is not to *keep* it at all, but to let it keep itself. That is, as already intimated, no earnest endeavors at discharging duty or obeying precepts can ever meet the demands of the moral consciousness for perfect goodness—any more than a logical knowledge of phenomena satisfies the demand of the theoretical reason for truth—

for it is only when the entire will is transformed and raised to the spirit of an all-inclusive divine love, that the moral man truly comes to be himself.

So that when, in his moral struggle, the Apostle cried out: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" that is, out of this inner tragic conflict, between my stubborn self-will and the holy law of good, he could triumphantly answer: "I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. vii, 24-25). True as it is that the Apostle sincerely believed and taught the sacrificial atonement of Christ, by which the penalty of man's sin is annulled, he means here something quite different. He means that he has risen above the legal stage of the moral consciousness into a new life, the Christ-life of perfect obedient love to God, in which he no longer does right because he *has* to, but because he *wants* to, as a son, living in the conscious favor of the Divine Father. Or more generally, his will has become one with the Will of the Cosmos, his moral freedom and self-realization is the law of Universal Good, or the Will of God.

The Lesson of Love in Daily Life.

How really simple and natural all this is may be appreciated, if we consider the moral judgments we are forming every day. Were we, for example, to choose between a friend who, with punctilious conscience, showered us with favors, not out of any sense of appreciative affection for us, but out of a sense of duty, inspired merely by his own feeling of honor and self-respect as a friend; or one who might lack both in knowledge and capacity to do for us what was always best, but who did all he could and knew how out of a pure disinterested affection for us, there is no question as to which we should regard as the true friend.

We sometimes see the anomaly of a man of sound integrity in the community and of unquestioned propriety in all his family relations, who provides generously for his wife, but does so rather out of a sense of duty or in obedience to conventional respectability than out of any deep affection for her. And, there, is to be found a bitterly unhappy woman; for she lacks that which gold can not buy, and which outweighs in value the wealth of the world.

The moral nature only finds its true expression in an outstreaming will of good, or love; and while duty is very noble, as compared with

the caprice of selfishness, it falls far short of the demands of the ethical reason, because it has not yet attained to the estate of real goodness. "The law is servitude, love is freedom," expresses the natural history of the ethical reason, when once it has waked from the primitive egoism of self.

We see then that the law, or the middle stage in ethical development, discharges the same important function that logic does in the theoretical development. It is the great pedagogue which, on the one hand, reveals the sins of self, in setting up the ideal of perfect goodness; and then, on the other hand, as inadequate and impotent in itself, points beyond itself to the new and higher life of universal good-will, or love, in which alone the moral reason comes to self-realization.

*The True Order of Moral Development for the Individual
and for Society.*

We can not too deeply impress on our minds this order of moral development in our efforts to better ourselves and others, taken as individuals or as society at large. No man can keep the whole moral law by observing precepts, rules of conduct, or, as we say, by doing his duty. For the keeping of the whole moral law, which is nothing less than the full realization of the moral reason, always goes above the head of doing one's duty. Not until the spirit of the law is incorporated in a man's life and becomes the ruling principle of his own will, as the will of universal good, can he be said to have entered the realm of Moral Reality, the objective Kingdom of Goodness, or the Kingdom of Heaven.

On the plane of duty, of right doing, of justice, which is represented by the Jewish Law, or the Kantian Categorical Imperative, man is still in the world of appearance, and as much removed from moral reality or Goodness, as he is still in the world of phenomena and removed from theoretical reality or Truth, while resting upon the plane of logic or discursive reasoning.*

* There has often been a superficial condemnation of the old theologians who used to say that morality not only can not save a man but is a positive hindrance in his way. The truth here expressed lies in the fact that morally good men pride themselves on their works, their "own goodness," as sort of self-made saints, and are consequently blind to real goodness which in its essential nature does not look to *receiving* anything, as reward or commendation, but finds its life and joy in *giving*. This is what Balzac means in saying that *abstraction*, though far beyond *instinct*, may be a curse when it stands in the way of *specialism* (p. 339).

In his moral development, as justice has revealed to man the sins of self, so the higher consciousness of a universal will of good, that is love, makes plain the inadequacy of justice, as being far short of the glory of God, in proclaiming the ultimate law of right: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, mind, soul, and strength; and thy neighbor as thyself.

We shall also deeply deceive ourselves, if we expect to improve and reform society by statute and the force of law. All the constitutions, all the laws, and all the measures of social regeneration in the world will not make one man really better. For, in the first place, better constitutions, better laws, and better social conditions are a result and not a cause. They have sprung from the inner life of the law makers, and, in so far as they apply to others, can at most only compel an outward observance of right.*

In the second place, the most perfect social condition of legalized justice (effected by law) would be but a state of balanced selfishness, with the moral will really still untouched. It is not until the will to be just, expressed formally in all our laws, loses every vestige of compulsion and becomes the free, self-chosen will of every individual to do good, that society is reformed, or transformed, into its ultimate reality as the Kingdom and Will of God on earth as in heaven.

Genesis of Error and Sin in the Emergence of Truth and Goodness.

Well then, when we look for the genesis of error and sin, we find it to be episodal in man's theoretical and ethical unfoldment toward the goal of freedom and self-realization, by virtue of which process the emergence of Truth and Goodness, in consciousness, condemns not only the errors of sense and the sins of self, but also the immaturity, and inadequacy of logic and justice.

* There is here no purpose whatever of denying or casting discredit upon the indispensable value and necessity of law, morally above the heads of people it is meant to rule. For in the family, in the state, in the school, and even in the church, those great institutions that surround us, it is evident that men can not be allowed to do simply as they please, but must be steadied, guided, and indeed controlled, until they have attained something like an inner, self-realized moral integrity. Besides, in man's progressive development, compulsory obedience on the lower levels of moral consciousness, to the law of right, not only arouses a wholesome fear of the law, but prepares the mind for reverence and then love for the law. But all the time, it must be regarded as ultimate, that moral development is not ended by any conformity to law or by the discharge of duty, but only by that love which fulfils and transcends all law, as itself being the Absolute Law of the Eternal Cosmic Will.

Thus, the presence of error and sin, demonstrates the presence of Truth and Goodness, and is a proof not that man is false and bad but that he is true and good. Man's mistakes in thought and perversities of will are evidences of his intellectual and moral greatness. If he did not fall into the one or wander into the other, during his unfolding experience, it would indicate that he still rested in the dull inertia of the animal mind; that he had not yet risen above the evolution of the natural world-order to become an other in the universe, as a rational, supra-natural being, fitted for a rational evolution of his own, toward the far-off intellectual, moral, and æsthetic goal of freedom and self-realization in the harmonious Beauty of Truth and Goodness.

At first, dead in error and sin, but alive, as he thinks, in his naive self-conceit and self-righteousness, he is slain by logic and law, and then revived and saved by intuition and love, in an atonement or reconciliation with the objective Thought and Will of the Cosmos. Or in other words, beginning in a world of sense and self as real, man goes forth into a logical and legal world of phenomena, whence he is compelled to advance to the Real World of Spirit whose harmonious Beauty is the objective form of Truth, manifesting Goodness.

CHAPTER V.

THE RELATION OF ERROR AND SIN:

THE ERRORS OF SENSE LEAD TO THE SINS OF SELF.

THE considerations just concluded, regarding the genesis of error and sin, have made evident to us an important phase of the subject into which we must now more carefully look, viz.: the intimate relation between our mistaken thoughts and wrong volitions.

We need not go very far to see that error and sin have exactly the same intimate relation as truth and goodness; for, as the latter stand for *true* thought, expressing *right* will, so the former represent nothing but *false* thought, expressing *wrong* will. That is, our whole question is settled by the unity of reason itself. Thought is not an isolated fact, or will an isolated act. What I *think*, at once has value for me in terms of *feeling* and inevitably determines what I *will*; and what I *will*, is invariably an indication of what my *thought* is, and the *value* I put upon it.

So that, since it is transcendently important that I *think* the Truth in order that, *feeling* its Beauty, I may *will* the Good, because, as we have learned, the Will of Good, as the ultimate ground of Reality, manifests itself in the Beauty of Truth; it is also of transcendent importance that I do *not think* error lest, with a *false estimate* of the object, I *will* wrong.

Thinking False Ends in Willing Wrong.

As important as is the law which Jesus laid down: Do the Will of God, as the only condition of being entrusted with the enlightenment, and consequent power, of Truth, with its necessary corollary: Do your own will and thus darken your mind with error; so important is also the law which Socrates laid down: Know the Thought of God and you will do the Good, with its necessary corollary: Be ignorant of, or mistake, the Truth and you will do wrong.

But as fundamentally true as both these laws are, when applied to ultimate Reality, it so happens, in the actual conditions of man's progressive development, that often men are found whose thought

is true but whose will is wrong; and men whose will is right but whose thought is false. Yet while this would seem to indicate that, in practice, we must continue independently to teach the good, but ignorant, man what is true, and to persuade the evil, but intelligent, man to will the good; nevertheless, we shall find, after all, how essentially fundamental is the Socratic doctrine, as explained by Aristotle in his "Nicomachean Ethics" (Book VII, cap. 5), viz.: that men who know, do wrong because they do not know *enough*. And we shall find that this agrees, in the end, with the teachings of Jesus who, although he laid his chief emphasis upon right will, was always urging his disciples to *think more truly about* life, in order that, avoiding error, they might *will to do better in* life, and who asked forgiveness for the men who crucified him, because they *knew not* what they did.

So that however much we may be justified in insisting that a man's will be right, as a condition of knowing the truth, we dare not fail to recognize that the quality of his actions in the world depends upon the quality of his thoughts; and, as those actions directly have to do with his own and others' good or ill, it is of the utmost importance that his thoughts be true to objective Reality, and not the mistaken, subjective illusions of his own mind.

Misled by Will o' the Wisp.

A man lost in the darkness of the night, and wearily making his way toward home, at last joyously catches a glimpse of the friendly light in the window, awaiting him. In a moment, his weariness is gone and, with a new strength, he hastens on, happy in the thought of soon greeting his loved ones, amid the cheer and warmth of home.

But he looks again and, with some surprise, observes that what seemed so near now glimmers in the far distance; and yet he is strong for any effort with such a promise and such a hope before him. The light now recedes, now advances; now brightens, now grows dim; the moments stretch into a painful hour, but he toils on until at last he finds himself sunk in a morass, and the light gone.

He is now more lost than ever, for he learns too late that he had been following a deceptive phantom. But at first he did not know that. He took the will o' the wisp to be the true light of home, set out by the hand of love to guide him through the darkness. It was, therefore, of the highest value to him, and he accordingly followed it. Had he known it for what it was worth, a mere illusion, he would

never have been misled. And it was an illusion to him because, while it was a real will o' the wisp, and so of no worth whatever to him, he mistook it for the real light of home.

Thus it is with all of us; we never follow what we *think* are illusions, but only what we think are realities. We always have some sort of science or knowledge of things, but it often turns out to be nescience or ignorance. What we took to be objective truth, and so, highly valued, proves to be subjective error, and the supposed reality, in the end, shows itself to be only *appearance* of reality.

Here we have the very essence of error laid bare. It is not merely taking nothing for something, but is the *mis*-taking an appearance for reality. It is the subjective *mis*-interpretation of the object as it *is not*, for a true interpretation of the object as it really *is*. And that is what constitutes illusion, such as invariably gives to feeling false values, and to will wrong motives.

A Question of Ontology and not of Logic.

Once convinced of this intimate relation between mistaken thoughts and wrong volitions, we shall see that our deepest concern is to avoid all errors about the objects with which we have constantly to do. And this, it will be observed, carries us far below mere questions of discursive reasoning to the much more fundamental questions of objective being. That is, our problem becomes *ontological* rather than *logical*. As necessary as it may be, as a matter of course, for the syllogism to be rationally consistent, it is still more necessary that its premises be true, for the best reasoning in the world is futile and worthless, nay, positively pernicious, unless it rests upon valid grounds. For the better the logic, the more inclined are we to rest in it, to the fatal neglect of the foundation upon which it is based.

Thus, when I say: All leaves are green:

These pages are leaves,

Therefore, these pages are green; the reasoning, or the logic, is infallible but meaningless, because the premises are both ambiguous and invalid.

I commit the fallacy of mistaken identity in using the word "leaves" in the *same sense* in both propositions of the syllogism, whereas it stands for *two quite different* things in fact. Then my major premise contains a simple fallacy of objective being, because all leaves are not green, even when they are freshly burgeoned in the spring or

faded in the autumn. Thus all our deeper questions of error go back beyond logic to ontology, or to the real nature of the things with which we are dealing. The man's logic who was misled by the will o' the wisp was correct; his fatal error was to mistake a flickering light of the mephitic bog-damps for the light of his home. It was a misinterpretation of the nature of the object.

We Seek the Fundamental Error.

Now, if we could only reduce all such errors to some one fundamental, ontological error, as we reduce all truths down to one great, all-inclusive, ontological Truth of Spiritual Reality, our problem would be greatly simplified. And, it may be surmised, this will not be very hard to do, judging by what we have already learned about Truth, or the nature of objective Reality (p. 364). Reality we found to be Mind; and, as a Unity of Substance and Cause, is Thought and Will, which are manifested to sense, under the conditioned, phenomenal forms of space and time, as matter and motion.

The Possibility of Ontological Error Lies in Sense.

Here lies the possibility of the Grand Error (the Adversary, Satan, the Deceiver) from which all others spring. For it is quite natural and, indeed, inevitable, at first, that we should take the simple, direct knowledge of sense as final; that is, regard the conditioned, phenomenal, or, as we usually say, the material world of matter and motion as substantial, causal reality—and act accordingly.

But the knowledge of sense is wholly inadequate, even when rationalized by logic, because it does not give us the knowledge of objective Reality which Reason, as itself something Real, always demands. The phenomenal world of sense and logic has meaning only when we see in it the manifestation to sense, in space and time, of the Ultimate Reality, Mind. But the moment we rest in the phenomenal world of matter and motion, as real substance and real cause in themselves, we begin our wandering amid illusions, which are but the subjective errors of our own minds.

No one, however, any more believes in such a real material world; and, consequently, any longer accepts the old dualism which divides Reality up into a world of mind and a world of matter, such as Descartes's philosophy presents. Modern thought universally reduces the ontology of the Cosmos to a unity, be it mind or matter; and, as

the old notions concerning matter have quite died out, all enlightened persons regard the nature of the Ultimate Reality as Mind.

And yet there was a truth underlying the old errors, and that still remains.

In spite of unity there is a real dualism. It is, however, no longer an *ontological* dualism, or that of two incommensurable substances and causes which, so to speak, have to be forced into union by an act of God; but is a *relational* dualism merely, or that of Reality and its spatio-temporal manifestation in phenomena. Reality is not phenomena, and phenomena are not Reality, so that there is a very clear dualistic distinction between them to be made; but it is a dualism which the One Reality itself sets up in manifesting itself in phenomena to sense perception, under the conditions of space and time.

Transformed Dualism Condemns Pantheism.

The denial of this dualistic distinction, in regarding the totality of phenomena as constituting reality, or in the identification of reality and phenomena, is the essential error of all forms of Pantheism and is the vice of a true monistic doctrine. The truth in Pantheism which always remains, is that Reality pervasively manifests itself in all phenomena, or is immanent in the world of space and time, as its rational ground; in virtue of which truth, the old dualistic Deism, with its fixed unbridgeable gulf between the supernatural and the natural, is overcome. But this does not raise the phenomenal to the level of the real, or make it the full expression of the real; so that it is essential to retain the truth always remaining in the old dualistic Deism, to the effect that Reality, although *immanent* in phenomena, in its fundamental nature *transcends* phenomena. Thus, while we still have a dualism, it is formal and not ontological, that is, the *being* of things is not dual, but the *form* in which it manifests itself is dual. For example, man presents two clearly defined ontological aspects, viz.: mind and body, and the tendency has always been to regard these as two, distinct entities, separable one from the other, and related in some mysterious way as if, to follow Descartes's doctrine, the immaterial soul were seated on the pineal gland in the material brain. Or there has been a tendency to regard the body as expressing the whole man. Whereas, man is *one* in being, but manifests himself *dually* as mind, in his reality, expressed in his body, phenomenally, in the world of space and time.

In What Sense We May Speak of the Material World.

The truth underlying the old materialistic view is that the outer world of nature is constituted of integrable and disintegrable elements (phenomenal substances in space) in dynamic, temporal relations (phenomenal causes in time), according to rational laws. And we may speak of the material world indifferently as synonymous with the phenomenal, or sensible, or visible, or natural world, as over against the real, or intelligible, or invisible, or spiritual world of Mind. But never, at the risk of utter confusion, must we employ the term, material world, in the old dualistic sense of being a second, real world of real substances and causes with its own independent laws. But the old materialistic error is repeated in another form by those who, while they nominally recognize mind as the only reality, take the phenomenal to be the basis of reality, rather than its conditioned outcome.

Atomism, An Old and Wide-Spread Superstition.

The tenacity of this error is due to one of the most inveterate and wide-spread superstitions of scientific thought, past or present, viz.: that of atomism. It is supposed that when a thing is reduced down to its simplest elements, that those elements constitute its fundamental reality. It is much as if we were to suppose that the reality of the machine were its cogs, wheels, cams, rods, bars, bolts, and pins. Whereas the reality of the machine is neither these separate, elemental parts, nor all of them put together, but it is the *rational thought* of the inventor, *embodied* in the machine, and the value to rational feeling of the work done by the machine, or the purpose accomplished by it. Without this creative thought of the inventor, and the appreciative estimate, through feeling, of its work, the machine would never have come into existence in the first place; nor if in some mysterious way it had, would it have any real meaning for us.

But men have thought that, by throwing nature into the hopper of analysis and grinding it down to a dust heap, they had found in these small irreducible particles, or atoms, the fundamental reality of the universe. But in accordance with the law that error always destroys itself, science discovers, as it pursues these simple, indivisible elements, that they become more and more complex and wonderful, and that, instead of being some sort of dull, inert material particles, they begin to show all the evidence of being mind activities. In-

deed, it has become the universal conviction among all enlightened scientists that they are some sort of mental elements.

But here is where the old atomic error shows its tenacity. The new atomism, it is true, is an advance on the old, for it has done with an *ontological* dualism and reduces all to mind, but it falls into the error of denying the *formal* dualism which exists in Reality and phenomena, by seeking to create a Reality out of quantitative groupings of phenomena.

The old atoms were minute, variously shaped and sized particles of matter in motion, which, in different combinations, according to law, built themselves up not only into the visible world, but also into the invisible world of thought and will. Mind and all its activities, according to this view, are simply specific forms of union among material atoms. Thought and will, like the bile, are secretions, and "man is what he eats."

The New Psychic Atoms.

But, once the old error of a real material substance is destroyed, the atoms take on a psychic form. They come to be regarded as minute psychological sense-impressions, of various quality in association, which in different combinations, according to law, build themselves up not only into the invisible world of thought and will but also into the outer visible world before us. This theory we call *sensationistic* monism, as distinguished from the old atomic theory of *materialistic* monism.

The utter rational inadequacy of such a view we have already learned. It is impossible to get out of sense percepts, in empirical association, even the simple laws of their own instinctive association, to say nothing of the logical relations of conscious thought, and the truths of rational intuition. No possible explanation of Reality can be made on the basis of phenomena, presented to sense and rationalized by logic, even if the phenomena are taken, as they must be, as forms of activity in mind. Reality is a datum of rational intuition, and is the only basis upon which phenomena can at all exist and have any meaning.

Theistic Idealism, the Noblest Outcome of Thought.

The most advanced and noblest outcome of modern—as, indeed, of all—thought is Theistic Idealism, by which is meant the doctrine

already stated in the threefold interpretation of Reason. Ultimate Reality, as Absolute Reason, in its power of Thought, Feeling, and Will, is Mind or Spirit; while the world of nature is a manifestation of Reality to sense, in space and time. So that nature is substantial and causal *in a phenomenal sense only*, and, therefore, can alone be understood as a conditioned manifestation of Mind, which is the Real Substance (as the Thought of Truth) and the Real Cause (as the Will of Goodness) of all things in the Unity of Life (as the appreciative feeling of Beauty).

Thus when Spirit (God) the Absolute Reality, which is Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, is recognized as immanent in Nature, matter disappears as real, into the manifested phenomena of mind; and when this phenomenal manifestation in Nature is truly reflected in the theoretical (science), æsthetical (art), and moral (ethics) consciousness of man, as it really is, the world is transformed into Spirit, as the Divine Logos, spoken by the Father to the Son.

Consequently, so long as nature is material or sensationistic, in the consciousness of man, the real objective world is veiled to him; but when, by rising from the perceptions of sense, through logic, to the intuitions of Reason, his consciousness becomes spiritualized, so that he enters the Real World, that is, understands the Divine, Creative Word or Logos, Man, as the Divine Son, answers back to the Divine Father in a harmonious Life of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

It is in the presence of this supreme, ultimate doctrine of Spiritual Reality that we become clearly aware of the great Arch-Error, the mother of all errors, or the ontological error of materialism, that is, of taking the phenomenal world of sense to be real, and thus, *theoretically* confused, of being led into all manner of false *æsthetic* judgments of value, and consequent wrong *moral* actions.

The Arch-Error of Material Reality is Idolatry.

This error of material reality is as wide as the human race and takes on varied forms. Thus, some men live on the plane of a naive sensualism, and either plunge into brutal sensuality, or adjust themselves prudently and comfortably to the world of sense and sense values; other men rise far above this and live on the plane of logical rationalism where they apply reason to sense, but to sense as something real; while still others *theoretically* accept Mind as the sole Reality, but *practically* think and act as if matter were a reality.

Were we to permit ourselves the mood of a Hebrew prophet, we might denounce all of these as so many idolaters, serving other than the one, true and living God, Yahweh, the Eternal Spirit. The first is a devotee of some sensualistic Astarte, the second worships some rationalistic Baal, the third honors Yahweh with his lips but, at the same time, falls into the idolatrous practice of setting up images of Baal in the grove, as the survival of some old superstition in him, or as a prudential concession to the religious sentiments of his neighbors.

This unfaithful idealist has less excuse for his idolatries than the sensualist or rationalist; for he has been led out of the Egyptian bondage of naive sense and through the desert of logic to the Promised Land of intuition; he has received the true oracles of Reality, of Spirit, and yet he hankers after the flesh pots of sensualism, or compromises with the rationalistic gods of the neighboring heathen. He has been enlightened to know that there is only one true God, Yahweh, the Eternal, but temporizes for some momentary benefit, or out of fear, and bows the knee to Baal.

But, while the prophet has truly characterized these idolatrous worshipers of Astarte and Baal, and the idealistic time-servers of Mammon, we dare not be so harsh as his intense narrow tribalism makes him, in his uncompromising denunciations. For most of these men believe they are right or at any rate do not know any better, and more than anything else need enlightenment. At the same time, we must admit the message of the prophet to be infallible in declaring that all these forms of idolatry are, in their nature, superstitions, since they involve the attribution of qualities and effects to false substances and false causes; and constitute the great theoretical sin of putting error in the place of Truth.

Errors of Sense Lead to Lust, and Lust to the Sins of Self.

But unfortunately we can not allow the matter to rest here with the theoretical sin of misunderstanding Reality, for we are inevitably carried over into the genuine sin of perverted will. Taking the material objects in the world of sense to be real, men necessarily regard the concomitant pleasures and pains, which they afford, as real, and hence pursue the ones and flee the others. The headlong pursuit after the pleasurable things of the world, we call the spirit of worldliness or lust—lust for food, lust for sex, and lust for worldly power.

The result is inevitable. Confused and misled by the arch-error

of taking appearances for Reality, men fall into strife over the possession of these phantoms, and out of the strife issue all the sins of egoistic ill-will, such as hatred, malice, revenge, envy, jealousy, perfidy.

Here we have the deep and indissoluble relation between error and sin. Error, concerning spiritual Reality, leads to lust for the unrealities of sense, and lust results in a strife that begins and ends in ill-will, which is the essence of sin. The Apostle James expressed this relation when, in carrying back temptation to lust, he said: "Then lust, when it hath conceived, beareth sin: and sin, when it is full grown, bringeth forth death" (James i, 15).

If we seek to account for all the confusion, discord, and suffering in the world, through all the generations of men, we shall find its source in the arch-error of sense, with its inevitable belief in the real values of sense. It is mistaking the phenomenal world of matter for the real world of mind, that has led and still leads men into all the sins of lust and ill-will. Look where we may, in the past or present, we shall discover nothing else than that this lust for food, lust for sex, and lust for worldly pleasure and power, as the direct product of material error, poisons all the currents of life, breeds all the unclean vices, arouses the cruel greed of gold and the vanity of worldly display, awakens every bitter strife, and lies at the bottom of every needless war, with its wild confusion of crime, blood, and sorrow. Truly, this ignorance about Reality is the curse of God, as much as true knowledge is the wing wherewith we fly to heaven.

Sense and Self are not Error and Sin, Unless We Rest in Them as Real.

It is not an error to begin our knowledge on the material plane of sense. In fact, we always must and do *begin* there. But it is the supremest of errors to *stop* there; for, in so doing, we take phenomena for Reality and are thus constantly led through a world of illusion. Besides, the inevitable practical results, as we have seen, are disastrous.

While our moral life *begins*, and must begin, in the merest egoistic motives of self, it is the essence of sin to *rest* there, for selfishness is the direct denial of the supreme moral law of love. But we shall always rest on the lowest moral level of self, so long as we rest on the lowest intellectual level of sense; because, as we know, the quality of our thought and the quality of our will run parallel.

So that when we rise intellectually from sense to logic, we rise morally from self to justice; and as logic must in time give place to the intuition of Reality, justice must give place to love, where there are no longer painful confusions and contradictions, but where the Thought of Truth comes to be seen as the expressed Will of Love. And that consummation is alone reached when sense gives place to Spirit, as the real object of our knowledge, for it is then that the ill-will of selfish egoism entirely gives way before the universal will of good.

As always, in matters of great spiritual doctrines, we shall find the wisdom of the ancients our best teachers, not because they are ancient, but because they brought to bear their entire genius in dealing with problems of this kind.

Gotama's Scientific Discovery.

It is Gotama, the great founder of Buddhism, who must be given the credit of having made clear, in a scientific way, the relation between error and sin. Convinced by observation that all life is suffering, he sought the cause and cure.

Life is suffering because it is an illusion of sense, having no reality in it, but taken to be real and eagerly sought after. And as men lust after the supposed goods of life, they come into bitter conflict, out of which arise all the sins of ill-will. Therefore, lust and ill-will are the causes of all suffering. The remedy is very simple. By destroying the error of sense, or by showing that the universal suffering to which all creatures are subjected, proves the visible world to be an illusion, the desire or lust of life is cut at the root, and thus the cause of ill-will is destroyed.

No chemist or physicist more scientifically traced out the exact relation among things than Gotama traced all those psychological relations by which he saw how the errors of sense lead to the sins of self.

Jesus and Gotama.

The striking similarity in the teachings of Gotama and of Jesus is nowhere more clearly seen than here. Jesus lays down, as a condition of salvation, the absolute renunciation of the life of sense: "Whosoever would save his life shall lose it: and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the Gospel's shall save it" (Mark viii, 35). But unlike Gotama, Jesus gives no *scientific explanation* of why

clinging to the life of sense is clinging to illusion, and that to live, in reality, it is necessary to renounce sense for Spirit.

Unlike Jesus, Gotama was absorbed in the negative salvation of an escape from suffering; while Jesus gave, as the supreme motive of salvation, the positive reality of self-realization, which is not merely an individual escape from suffering and the attainment of individual happiness, but that knowledge of the Truth and that practice of Goodness which render man worthy of becoming the son of God.

But, although the difference between the Aryan and the Hebrew views of salvation in general is that the Aryan, by seeking to remove error, looks to Truth, the Hebrew, by renouncing sin, endeavors to practice Goodness, we should greatly mistake the meaning of Jesus, if we overlooked the *theoretical* or *scientific*—we might say Hellenic—phases of his Gospel.

Theoretical Aspects of Jesus's Teachings.

It is true, the one condition of salvation which he laid down was supreme love to God, and love to man—indeed, with him, love is not merely the *condition* of life, it *is* life—and in this he was but repeating the law and the prophets, as understood by the best Hebrew thought of his day. But what we shall find, as the peculiar originality of Jesus, is his *new interpretation* of God, man, and the world. To remove all the cumbering cares and worldly desires from the minds of his disciples, to root out of their hearts the ill-will of resentment and hatred they felt toward their enemies and persecutors, he repeatedly taught them the Truth about Reality. He was, as it were, seeking to sweep away all the illusions that obscured the real world and led them into all manner of fear, weakness, and suffering.

He used no methods of philosophy or of discursive reasoning, it is true, for he taught with the direct authority of intuition, but what he taught had to do with our *theoretical* views of life, and by thus removing error and revealing the Truth, was meant to enable us more efficiently to *will* the good.

If you *know* that God is the Eternal Father of all men, that men are, therefore, brothers, and that the world is the place where God manifests his goodness, this change in the attitude of your *thought* toward God, man, and the world, will profoundly affect the attitude of your *will* toward them. Jesus saw, with the perfect theoretical clearness of any Hellenic or Hindu mind—and taught—that the barrier in

the way of salvation, or the freedom and happiness of complete self-realization, which is to be found in doing the Will of God, is the arch-error of sense, the superstitious idolatry of matter, the service of Mammon.

St. Paul's Doctrine of the Flesh and the Spirit.

When we turn to his greatest Apostle, St. Paul, we have precisely the same views presented. Only Paul, who as a young man at Tarsus came into contact with Greek methods of thought, was more or less imbued with those methods, and consequently was inclined to offer theoretical explanations of his convictions. He thus explained past history in its evolution toward the Gospel, and he explained the progress of the Gospel and its consummation in saving Jew and Gentile alike; he explained his moral experiences; and thus also he explained the source of sin.

We have seen how he traces the evolution of the moral consciousness from its beginnings in the naive egoism of self-will, through the struggle and suffering of the law, to its culmination in the universal will of goodness or love (p. 550). What, then, we ask, does he conceive to be this first state, what accounts for the painful struggle of the second, and how does he at last reach the victory that overcomes the struggle and brings him peace? We can find his answer in a single phrase: the *flesh*, and its conquest by *spirit*.

The first state is the instinctive life of the flesh, the mere exuberance of the animal nature, happy, undisturbed, uncondemned. In the second state, the law invades, the ethical reason awakes, the moral man is born. The light of the Spirit penetrates his consciousness and reveals the natural impulses of the flesh as lust, warring against the Spirit,—as self-will, rebelling against the law of God. Then, finally, when the flesh is slain and the Spirit triumphs, he can joyously serve God, no longer by the law of commandments but by the royal law of love. The lust and self-will of the flesh have been transformed into hunger for the Divine Truth, and into the free, loving Will of the Spirit.

The "Flesh," Which Wars on Spirit, is a State of Consciousness.

Now what in Paul's view, gives to self-will its strength and proves to be the center of its power, is the "flesh." "For in my flesh" he says, "is no good thing" (Rom. vii, 18). Although he had been so far

enlightened as to take "delight in the law of God, after the inward man," yet he found within him also a rebellious opposition thereto. "I see," he says, "a different law in my *members*, warring against the law of my *mind*, and bringing me into captivity under the law of *sin* which is in my *members*" (Rom. vii, 22-23).

But, in speaking thus of the flesh, of his members, in which is the law of sin, he does not mean his physical body as such, for that may be a holy temple of the living God; but he means a state of consciousness, which he calls, in a word, the "*mind* of the flesh," or the "*carnal mind*" which is "enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be" (Rom. viii, 6-7).

When he says, "they that are in the flesh can not please God," he evidently does not mean simply, being in the body, for he tells his *living* readers that they are in the Spirit, and elsewhere exhorts them, in view of the new spiritual life, to present their bodies a living sacrifice, holy, well-pleasing to God, which is their spiritual worship. (Rom. xii, 1).

By the "mind of the flesh" or the "carnal mind," then, the Apostle means that state of consciousness which lives on the plane of sense, takes the objects of sense to be real, and consequently makes them the motive for the selfish will.

When he rises to the middle stage of moral development, where the law enters consciousness, the spirit is declaring itself, and the fierce struggle begins between flesh and spirit, and does not end until one or the other triumphs; if the flesh, then death, if the Spirit, then life. "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh" (Gal. v, 17); for "they that are after the flesh do *mind* the things of the flesh, but they that are after the Spirit, the things of the Spirit" (Rom. viii, 5); and "the *mind* of the flesh is death, but the *mind* of the Spirit is life and peace" (Rom. viii, 6).

The contrast between the fruits of the carnal mind and the spiritual mind is unambiguous and diametric. "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousies, wraths, factions, divisions, heresies, envyings, drunkenness, revellings, and such like."

"But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance" (Gal. v, 19-23). And this last state is one of perfect freedom, for, "if ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law" (Gal. v, 18), and "where the Spirit of

the Lord is, there is liberty" (II Cor. iii, 17). But to attain this life of the Spirit, which, in the Apostle's phrase, is to be "of Christ Jesus," to have "the *mind* of Christ," it is necessary to "have crucified the flesh with the passions and lusts thereof" (Gal. v, 24).

St. Paul Unites the Hebrew and Hellenic Minds.

St. Paul is rendering us here a service of supreme importance, for, in giving an *ethical* meaning to the great *theoretical* arch-error of sense, by showing its inseparable relation to the great *ethical* arch-sin of self, he is revealing to us the intimate relation between the *theoretical* and *ethical* reason; or, still better, between the Aryan salvation of Truth and the Hebrew salvation of Goodness.

He shows us how sin, which is a self-willed disobedience to the Will of God, has its roots in the error of taking sense and sense pleasures as real, which is nothing other than an obscuration of the Thought of God; and is the folly of building on the visible things which are only temporal, instead of on the invisible things which are eternal. (II Cor. iv, 18).

Believing in the reality of the material or sense world, it is inevitable that men should lust after it, and lusting after it, fall into the bitter sins of strife among themselves over its possession. While it is no sin, but natural and fitting, for the *animal* to struggle for its selfish interests on the plane of sense, to which it is wholly confined; for *man*, it is unnatural and sinful, because his real nature lies on the plane of Spirit where, reflecting in himself the Truth and the Love of God, he becomes a partaker, with Christ, of the Divine Nature.

Error and Sin Become Manifest in the Evolution of Truth and Goodness.

So that if man would be saved in the full sense of that term (intellectual and moral, Aryan and Hebrew salvation), that is, come to freedom and self-realization, or the full stature of perfect manhood in Christ, he must free himself from the errors of sense, and so from the sins of self, in order that, *thinking* the Thought of God, he may *will* the Will of God, and thus enter into the *pure enjoyment* of the Beauty of God, which is the living form of Absolute Spiritual Reality, as Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness.

Our conclusion, then, regarding error and sin is that mistakes in thought and perversities of will become manifest in experience, as

something privative, immature, and hence unreal, in proportion as Truth and Goodness emerge into consciousness, during man's progressive, rational evolution toward his self-realization, in reflecting the Absolute Unity of the Cosmic Thought and Will: and that as *thought* must rise from the knowledge of sense, through logic, to the intuition of Spirit, *will* advances from the egoism of self, through the law of justice, to the universal love of all.

The Angel of Pain.

It lies in the rational nature of man to grow from infancy to the full stature of perfect spiritual manhood; he can not rest content upon the plane of sense and self, nor satisfy himself with his reasoned sciences of phenomena and his codes of justice; for reason demands that he push on toward the end of his rational evolution, which is the freedom and self-realization of a son of God. But, lest he forget his divine calling and lag on the way, he is ever attended by a faithful guide, instructor, and friend, who arouses him from lethargy and deadening ease, warns him against straying from the path, and drives him toward his goal.

That friend has indeed a cruel face, bears a whip of scorpions, and speaks in harsh, coercive terms; for he is no other than the Angel of Pain.

We have seen how unreal and illusory error and sin are, how they weave a phantom world of confusion and discord, and impose it as real upon the real world of beauty, truth and goodness, and how stubbornly they cling to sense and self. There must needs be an austere and incorruptible school-master who asks no favors, and who grants none; and who treats all alike with his enlightening and purifying Pedagogy of Pain.

Therefore, we must endeavor to see in the mystery of suffering a divine, purposive discipline that enlightens the mind and purifies the heart of man, in order that he may the more perfectly know the True, and the more faithfully will the Good; and, knowing the True and willing the Good, be fitted to enter the gates of Spiritual Reality and Eternal Life.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MYSTERY OF SUFFERING.

PLEASURE or happiness is the universal, conscious or unconscious, pursuit of mankind. No one has ever or can ever, by his very nature, set up pain or sorrow, as the aim of his life. And yet pain and sorrow have proved to be of the utmost value, in man's experience, to arouse, warn, develop, purify, and elevate him. He has been perfected through suffering.

What character has ever been built up, strengthened, refined, deepened, broadened, enriched, and tested in its devotion to truth and righteousness, without pain? In the restricted circles in which we move, we find that the men and the women of the broadest sympathy, keenest insight, greatest wisdom, deepest charity, are those who have been sorely tried in the crucible of suffering. And if we look into the larger world of human affairs, we shall discover that the great benefactors and leaders of men have been cruelly scourged by the pedagogy of pain.

On the other hand, those who are lapped in ease and luxury, to whom life is easy, who enjoy the constant sunshine of health, worldly success, and prosperity, rarely, if ever, attain the noblest reaches of character; and more often rest upon the level of dull common-place, sink into the hardness of a cold, unsympathetic egoism, or into the irrational degradations of mere sensuality.

History Teaches the Value of Pain.

Nothing is a more frequent and obvious lesson of history than the fact that the moment when struggle and adversity, which have developed some aristocratic class or dominant nation, cease, there sets in a mild decay of strength and character which, if it does not end in total disintegration, deadens and checks all further development and progress.

The ancient records again and again repeat this story. Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, and then, greatest of all, Rome grew to great power in the stern school of experience; then were turned into swine by the magic wand of Circean ease and pleasure.

And the modern records have no other tale. In France, successive sturdy and capable lines of kings, Merovingian, Carlovingian, Capetian, Bourbon, one after another died off or were supplanted, largely because of the slow poison of luxury that success, wealth, and power supplied. Medieval Venice won her way to the mastery of the seas through storms of adversity; and, while changes in the world, over which she had no control, contributed to her decline, her fall was due, more than all else, to the gradual enervation and decay of her moral character, seen in weakness, indecision, and perfidy, the natural products of ease, luxury, and worldly pleasure. Constantinople, last remnant of the ancient Roman power, so nobly won in the bitter school of trial, though the very center of literary refinement, learning and art, fell before the insidious enemies of selfishness and soft indulgence, rather than before the unspoiled vigor of the Osmanli Turk.

It is perhaps not too much to say that the greatest danger that threatens our own country is the ease and luxury, born of worldly prosperity, which we now seem so lavishly to enjoy. Whatever we have become, as a free people, could never have had its origin among conservative wealthy classes with their contented ease, comfortable adjustments to life, and profound sense of self-satisfaction, such as American prosperity is producing; but only among the dispossessed, the unprivileged, and such as felt keenly the painful burdens of oppression. The great danger of our worldly prosperity is not simply that of reproducing over again the outworn social class distinctions of the older countries, but that of making us superficial, worldly, and spiritually deadened to all the true ideals of life.

Nature Emphasizes the Lesson of Adversity.

Nature herself impresses upon man the blessings of adversity, and practices her own teachings. Those races for whom a tropical climate and vegetation have made life easy, have seldom been stirred beyond a state of savagery or barbarism; while those races, beaten by the storms of a more unfriendly clime, where toil and trouble are necessary to meet the demands of life, have been raised to something like civilization. Where nature has been hostile, human nature has become friendly; and where the world has showed itself an enemy to all, men have been driven into the brotherhood of law and mutual friendship.

On a yet grander scale, the whole range of life from amœba to man, the struggle for existence, which is a struggle dominated by pain, has hardened, refined, lifted up, and developed species after species, increasing the intelligence and range of the individual, until man emerges onto the plane of reason and becomes conscious of himself and the process out of which he has come. And strange and unwelcome as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that, in the ascending series, as the individual gains a larger freedom, or becomes more truly an individual, broadens his intelligence, and increases his range of contact with the environment; he becomes not less but more liable to pain, and more sensitive to it. Pain seems to be the necessary concomitant of, and in direct proportion to, the advance made. For man, who has become a free, rational, self-conscious individual, capable of estimating values for himself, pain constitutes the tragedy of his existence, a mysterious, unbidden guest whom he would fain dismiss, yet without whom he could not have become what he is, or have advanced to where he is.

It is, as it were, through travail pains that nature has brought forth man as a physical organism; and as a spiritual being, it is still pain that enlarges his intelligence, refines his feelings, and strengthens his will.

Whether, then, it be the entire range of progressive evolution, a species or a race, a nation or a class, or only an individual, they are all subjected to the pedagogy of pain.

Pain, a Greater Blessing than Pleasure.

It would seem, then, that we should offer our condolences to the man who prospers, as one in misfortune; and should congratulate, as fortunate, the man who suffers all manner of adversity. Strange paradox! that what man seeks, with all the energy of his nature, turns out, when secured, to be his most insidious and inveterate foe—for joy, ease, pleasure, fortune, like perfidious sirens, seem to lure him onto the rocks of destruction; while, on the other hand, what he flees, as implacable enemies—sorrow, distress, suffering—are faithful, though dark-visaged, friends that brace his strength, arouse his energy, and inspire and urge him on to worthy attainment. Life seems to teach us that what we flee, pain, is a beneficent, though severe, friend; and that what we seek, pleasure, is a malevolent, though pleasing, enemy. Fire seems necessary to burn the dross out of man.

We must not, however, allow our already difficult problem to become more difficult by a possible confusion between pain, strictly speaking, and the effort of work. The effort, or the strain, of endeavor by which man advances and secures the goods of life can not be regarded as pain, in the proper sense of the term.

Pain and the Effort of Work.

The normal effort of work is always a pleasure when there is progress toward some desired goal, that is, when the work is fitted to the capacity and arouses the interest of the worker. Men throw themselves with zeal and enthusiasm into all sorts of activity. The artist, the scientist, the inventor, the mechanic, the financier, the statesman, find great joy in their work. There is no truer or greater happiness than the sense of having accomplished some successful or worthy object.

The pleasure of work lies in the very nature of things, for it arises out of the volitional essence of the man himself. It is an assertion of himself, of his power and capacity, and calls forth the inter-play of all the forces of intelligence and emotion in him.

Even what is regarded as the drudgery of manual labor gives pleasure to the right man, working in the right spirit, in the right place. There is no harder worker than the husbandman; but, in health and with a good conscience, he takes joy of his labors.

“How jocund does he drive his team afield;
How bows the wood beneath his sturdy stroke.”

The play of finely tuned muscles and nerves, the simple naturalness of his life under the open sky, and the fruitful response of nature to his co-laboration, make him the freest and happiest of men.

It is only when work goes amiss, fails of its aim, or is not fitted to the strength and capacity of the worker, that work sinks to the pain of toil and drudgery.

*Pain, as the Æsthetic Concomitant of Error and Sin,
Condemns Itself.*

What, then, do we mean by pain? Pain, from the mildest form of malaise to the utmost agony, may be defined as a disturbed or discordant state of feeling, arising out of some abnormal condition of body or mind.

We learned in our study of the Æsthetic Reason (pp. 76-79.) that

pain is the æsthetic protest against falseness in thought and wrongness in volition; which, when we recognize that the body is a projected phenomenal form of the mind, necessarily holds good of the body as well as of the mind. So that we may be sure that wherever pain is, there is an infallible indication that the relation among things has become false and wrong.*

Since, therefore, all disturbed, abnormal, bodily conditions indicate some false thought or wrong volition in the organic idea; and since error and sin are states of consciousness, brought to light as something privative, immature and unreal, pain in general, whether we view it in its physical or in its mental aspects, is the rebuke, in terms of feeling, which Truth and Goodness invariably visit upon the unreality of error and sin, of mistakes in thought and perversities of will.

Hence, the great beneficence of pain is the warning it gives against falsity and wrongness. Its sole message is really a call to its own destruction; it declares of itself that it ought not to be; its blessing is the curse it pronounces upon itself.

Or, more accurately, it imperatively demands the abolition of all those abnormal, negative, and unreal conditions of which it is invariably the sign; in order that man may maintain the normal, the positive, the real, which is a state of accord and happiness, concomitant with knowing the Truth and willing the Good.

The Function of Pain Twofold, a Call and a Warning.

As we only came to understand how error and sin make their appearance in human experience, because of the rational evolution in consciousness toward the freedom and self-realization of Truth and Goodness; so the function of pain, which is the æsthetic concomitant of error and sin, can alone be understood in the light of rational evolution.

As thus seen, it reveals a twofold purpose. It either arouses,

* If the reader is inclined to object that his painful, diseased body has nothing to do with any false thought or wrong volition which he cherishes in mind, he is asked to recall the fact that his thoughts and volitions are not simply those which he knows as conscious, and therefore his own; but are also sub-conscious and unconscious, which therefore he does not recognize as his own (p. 232, note). The body is the form which the mind takes on, in space and time, under the conditions of sense, and is an infinitely complex construct of thoughts and volitions, under the guidance of the organic idea, although the conscious, individual mind, expressed phenomenally in the individual body, knows nothing directly of those organic thoughts and volitions.

incites, inspires to action and urges forward; or it admonishes, warns, deters, drives back, and punishes. It orders man to *take* the upward path, and then *keep* to it. Pause or deflection it alike rebukes. In other words, pain is a *call to higher things* and a *warning from lower things*.

Those who mistake its meaning and sink under its chastisements into despair, indifference, hardness, rebellion, or cold and bitter cynicism, are of all men most miserable. For they have utterly lost their way and can no longer find it; because they have refused the instruction that lies in the pedagogy of pain.

Such a condition of mind is all the more fatal, because it shuts out the light of that instruction which presents itself on every hand as a grand cosmic discipline. Throughout the whole range of sentient nature, wherever pain can be felt, its call and its meaning are heeded.

The plant dare not rest content where it is, or depart from the typical idea appointed it by the Cosmic Will, but must push forward along its true path to higher things, or suffer the penalty. Its appointed destiny is to move steadily toward the kingdom of animals. Much less dare the animal pause or turn aside, at the risk of the severest penalties, which his greater advancement makes him more capable of feeling; for it his appointed destiny to be ever moving toward the kingdom of man.

When, at last out of the throes of the world-evolution, man has been roused from the monistic unity of the cosmic dream to a supra-natural, individual self-consciousness, the pedagogy of pain rises to the sacred value of a Divine Providence, guiding and chastening man on his way to self-realization in the Beauty of Truth and Goodness.

History Guided by the Discipline of Pain.

As already indicated, man's historical progress has always been furthered by the discipline of pain, with its warning and its call. Man is too prone to settle down content with the present and the comfortable. Thus he rests satisfied with some form of government, with its tyrant, its king, its aristocracy, or its constitution, in which men are classified and related, politically, socially, and industrially, so as to meet the current demands of justice and equity. Perhaps he satisfies himself with some philosophy as final, that explains all

mysteries, or explains why all mysteries can not be explained; or, it may be, that he has settled upon some religion and theology which mitigate for him the ills of life and promise future compensation and salvation.

But the unfolding, irresistible, onmoving Cosmic Order of Becoming allows no such pause, no soft dalliance with present satisfactions; but, as it were, rudely seizes man and thrusts him out of his comfortable, contented adjustments, and bids him forward. Up sluggard, it is not permitted to renounce thy destiny, be on thy way to the goal! History treats man very much as the wise pedagogue treats the dull, reluctant boy, who must be forced against his own will to follow his own real interests.

New stars swim into ken, new horizons unfold to his vision; and old gods fall from their shrines and all his philosophies and theologies tumble into inextricable confusion. New and irresistible forces rise from the unknown or neglected depths of the social mass, to demand rights and liberties; and all his kings and councils are swept away in cataclysmic ruins.

Natural it is that the old and conservative ways, so full of ease and comfort, should cling with tenacious hold upon the minds and hearts of men, but the rising floods have no pity and, breaking all bounds, carry away temples and thrones forever.

"The old order changeth, giving place to new,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

But there always rises a new and higher order, which approaches the true ideal of human fellowship, toward which the pedagogy of pain is ever arousing and driving man.

Pain Forbids Man to Stop Short of Himself.

It is, however, in the individual where we most clearly see the value of pain, in forbidding man to pause, and in compelling him to advance. Man's destiny is to attain his real self, by rising from appearance to Reality, from sense to Spirit; and it would be most fatal for him to stop short of his goal.

We should not think of the puling, Corsican infant, in his nurse's arms, as the true Napoleon. We rather think of the great military leader, or the empire builder, as being the real Napoleon. But when we see him brooding over his fate, in the lonely isle, we are convinced with him, that not even the general or the emperor was

the real Napoleon; that indeed, all his military and imperial glory was but a diabolic and feverish dream, woven out of the distorted hallucinations of his own lust, revenge, pride, and titanic ambition for power.

No, all that was not the real Napoleon; it was the perverted, misguided, insane, phantom Napoleon. And that is what he vaguely felt there amid those last hours, on St. Helena, as the deceptive, iridescent gleams of worldly glory faded from his sight and as, within the shadows, he came face to face with the irreversible and changeless judgments of Truth and Righteousness. In that deep humiliation and suffering, he was nearer to Reality, nearer to the realization of his own true greatness, nearer to God, than he had ever been when, triumphant, he blustered and boasted amid the prosperity and splendor of worldly success and power.

In so far as he ever stood for human freedom, just laws, social progress, and the rebuke of presumptuous and superstitious aristocracies, he revealed something of the reality, something of the true greatness within him; in so far as he fed his own ambitions and consented to the persuasions of his own lust and revenge, he was a phantom, a troubled dream, vanishing into the night whence he came, and leaving not a wrack behind.

If we are to find the real Napoleon, we must not look for him in what he *actually* was, but in what he *really* might have become, reflecting in his mighty intelligence and power the truth and the goodness of God. And so it is with every man, though he have not the thousandth part of a tithe of Napoleon's intelligence and power, he *really* is not what he *actually* is, but what he may become in the freedom and full self-realization of his rational evolution. Down there, in the darkness of the cave, chained to sense, and content with shadows, he must be aroused, convicted, freed, and, however reluctant, dragged upward toward the light, and the reality of his own rational being.

How beneficent, then, is that pedagogy of pain, that discipline of suffering, with its sting, its rebuke, its warning, its chastisement, its call, ever pointing out to man, in the discords of pain and suffering, the signs of his subjective errors and sins, his mistakes in thought and perversities of will, which he must flee as he would death, because they are the occasion of death; and ever urging him on to know the Truth and do the Good, which is the Beauty of all worlds, and the

only ground of Reality, Blessedness, and Life. Suffering is no arbitrary imposition upon man, as something fortuitous or accidental, but a rational, purposive discipline or pedagogy, in his progress, warning him against the phantoms of error and sin, and calling him to the realities of Truth and Goodness.

It is when this Pedagogy of Pain is viewed in its positive aspect, and clearly accepted and understood as a Divine Providence, that it attains its noblest, most rational, and indeed its true meaning for us. Pain considered merely as the inseparable concomitant of error and sin, has little or no meaning; because error and sin in themselves have no meaning, since they are unreal nothings; but when pain is recognized as the invariable call and warning of Truth and Goodness, it at once becomes luminous with meaning. For it thus comes to mean the voice of Reality, calling man to be himself, in the fullness of his self-realization.

The Pedagogy of Pain, as a Divine Providence.

The great ethical genius of Israel, which has given to us religion in its highest and ultimate significance, recognized the true meaning of pain, as a chastening discipline, visited upon the nation and the individual alike, by the Infinitely Great and Eternally Righteous God, and consequently as an evidence of the presence and power of the everwatchful Divine Goodness.

In that sublime Deuteronomic Code, the lawgiver, prophet, and priest combine in addressing both nation and individual in these words: "And thou shalt consider in thine heart, that, as a man chastiseth his son, so Yahweh thy God chastiseth thee" (Deu. viii, 5). However right or wrong Eliphaz, the Temanite, may have been in his understanding of Job's particular affliction, he was inerrantly expressing the deepest conviction of his race, in saying: "Behold, happy is the man whom God correcteth: Therefore, despise not thou the chastening of the Almighty" (Job v, 17). In the same vein, the Psalmist exclaims: "Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, O Yahweh, And teachest out of thy law" (Ps. xciv, 12). Therefore, the Wise Man could exhort the sufferer: "My son, despise not thou the chastening (instruction) of the Lord. Neither be weary of his reproof; For whom the Lord loveth he reproveth, Even as a father a son in whom he delighteth" (Prov. iii, 11-12).

Quoting these words, attributed to Solomon, the writer to the Hebrews bids the Christian to rejoice in the chastenings of God who deals with us as with sons. If we have given reverence to our fathers after the flesh, whose well-meant chastenings must always be vitiated by human fallibility, how much more should we be in subjection to the "Father of our spirits" who chastens us "for our profit, that we may be partakers of his holiness." "All chastening seemeth for the present to be not joyous, but grievous; yet afterward it yieldeth peaceable fruit unto them that have been exercised thereby, even the fruit of righteousness" (Heb. xii, 7-11). It is in this same spirit that Paul addresses the Roman Christians: "We rejoice also in our tribulations; knowing that tribulation brings out patient perseverance, and patient perseverance produces a seasoned and matured character, and such a character realizes in itself hope, and it is a hope that does not frustrate or disappoint, because the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost which was given unto us" (Rom. v, 3-5). Therefore, it was that the Apostle could say: "And we know that to them that love God [those who with all their hearts are following the Divine Will] all things work together for good" (Rom. viii, 28), for they fully recognize that, throughout the entire experience of life, nothing escapes the divine, omnipotent, and omnipresent Goodness.

The Mission of Jesus Rebukes Sin.

But, even more clearly in Jesus, is suffering the rebuke of unreality by Reality, in the confrontation of error and sin by Truth and Goodness. St. John says of him: "To this end was the Son of God manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil" (I Jno. iii, 8). And what the nature of this devil is, the same John clearly indicates by telling the opponents of Jesus that their father is the devil whose lusts they make it their will to do, who standeth not in the truth because there is no truth in him, and who "when he speaketh a lie, speaketh of his own, for he is a liar, and the father thereof" (Jno. viii, 44). That is, Jesus had come as the manifestation of Divine Truth and Goodness to rebuke and destroy the illusions of error, and the sins of lust and ill-will that grow out of them.

Therefore, the meaning of his own words becomes evident, when he said: "Think not that I came to send peace on the earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I came to set a man at

variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother . . . and a man's foes shall be they of his own household" (Matt. x, 34-36. See Luke xii, 51-53). Error and sin may rest content in the illusion of their own reality, but Truth and Goodness come to condemn their lying pretences and, though arousing all their venomous hostility, pursues them with the scourges of pain, until they are driven out of the temple of life into their native nothingness, whence they came.

Thus we see that, in the moral consciousness of Israel, the discipline of suffering has a wise moral purpose, and gets its value not from being a result of error or a punishment for sin, as it indeed always is; but rather as being the condemnation of illusion by Reality, or we might say, as indicating the positive interest which, as it were, Truth and Goodness take in freeing man from all his confusing and discordant mistakes in thought and perversities of will.

Ascetic Views of Positive Good in Pain, False.

We are thus enabled to understand the falsity of that ascetic view of pain as something having value in itself, or as a positive good to be cherished, because a mysterious blessing bestowed by God. The very opposite is the truth. Its value lies wholly in its own self-condemnation, or rather in its condemnation of those conditions of unreality which produce it, and in its constant urgency toward reality and happiness. Its entire meaning is to destroy all discord, for the sake of that supreme harmony of Truth and Goodness, which error and sin only disturb in the consciousness of man.

So that when we say that the pedagogy of pain is a Divine Providence, we are not establishing pain as a positive good, as in some mysterious way an integral element in objective Reality, but as a call of Truth and Goodness, the only Realities, and as a perpetual warning against error and sin, which are the only unrealities.

The Real Aim of Suffering.

Hence, we see how, in the consciousness of Israel, pain was always regarded as simply a means to correct the wayward, or cleanse man of his sin, the prolific source, in the first place, of all the trouble. "Purge me with hyssop," cries the penitent Psalmist, "and I shall be clean, wash me and I shall be whiter than snow" (Ps. li, 7). For

he saw that it is only the righteous man, delighting as he does in the Law of the Lord, and meditating therein day and night, who "shall be like a tree planted by the streams of living water, whose leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper" (Ps. i, 3).

So also it is, we find, that the entire burden of the Wise Man, who has urged his son to rejoice in the corrections of the Lord, is the excellence of wisdom as the only reality worthy to be sought out and attained; because that is rebuked by no pain, but, as the supreme good, is the only happiness and life for man.

"Happy is the man [he exclaims] that findeth wisdom,
And the man that getteth understanding.
For the merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver,
And the gain thereof than fine gold.
She is more precious than rubies;
And none of the things that thou canst desire, are to be compared unto her.
Length of days are in her right hand:
In her left hand are riches and honor.
Her ways are ways of pleasantness,
And all her paths are peace.
She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her:
And happy is every one that retaineth her."

(Prov. iii, 13-18).

The wise father, therefore, applies the instruction, the correction, the chastisement, to his beloved son, not for the sake of the pain inflicted, but as the best means of rebuking his folly and urging him to the joy and blessedness of wisdom. Accordingly, it is the wise son that welcomes the correction of his father. It is only the scorner, the fool, the brutish man, who resents reproof or despises the chastisements of wisdom.

And if we could take the time to look into the teachings of the noblest Greeks, from Socrates down to the later Stoics, we should find the same doctrine of the rational meaning of pain as a disciplinary pedagogy.

What we see, then, in the pedagogy of pain, in all the discord, disease, poverty, distress and misery in the world, is not a confused and implacable mystery, but the evidence of a rational, purposive discipline by which Infinite Truth and Eternal Goodness unceasingly point out aberration, wrongness, mistakes in thought, and perversities of will; and unceasingly urge man forward to the only Reality,

which for him is to come to freedom and self-realization in thinking the Cosmic Thought and willing the Cosmic Will.

Therefore, we must regard both Dante and Swedenborg as essentially right in sweeping all the hells of retribution, all the purgatories of chastisement, as well as all the heavens of reward and fruition under the all-enfolding Divine Providence of Eternal Goodness.

The Divine Providence All-Comprehensive.

Hell is a state of consciousness in which a man settles down into the content of mere sensualism; or, having given up all hopes and all ideals, sinks into despair and complaint; or, rebelling against his fate, stubbornly fights on in the battle of cynical egoism. There are all grades of hell, from the phantom happiness of a comfortable worldliness, to the bitterest depths of unsatisfied lust and maniacal ill-will. But all alike center around the self, in self-gratification or self-justification. Those that enjoy, enjoy for themselves; and those that suffer, exonerate themselves by accusing others. Even the despair of self-condemnation is the product of a hidden, subtle egoism, wounded because pride has not attained its ambition.

Purgatory is a release from hell, and is a state of consciousness in which a man recognizes his sufferings to be the just chastisements of his own weaknesses and follies, and therefore rejoices in the purgatorial flames that purify and exalt him. He is like one freed from Egyptian bondage, and is ready to meet the trials of the wilderness on his way to the Promised Land. He has advanced beyond the egoism of self to the second stage of moral development, or to the altruism of justice, and begins to see the true moral ideal of love.

If the man in Purgatory makes the same mistakes and does the same wrongs as the man in hell, he acknowledges his errors and sins, and turns resolutely, with all his mind and heart, toward the Reality of Truth and Goodness; while the man in Hell justifies himself, and thus stubbornly turns his mind and heart away from the Reality of Truth and Goodness.

No Hope in Man Does not Mean no Hope in God.

Nevertheless, Hell is still within the sweep of the Divine Providence. When Dante gloomily read the fatal inscription above the infernal gates:

“Leave all hope behind, ye who enter here,” (Hell, iii, 9.)

he was wrong, with all the Christian world, in supposing that hope no longer existed for those who are lost, so far as God's intent is concerned. It is true, hope no longer exists for those who remain in the hell-consciousness, for it is that state of consciousness that constitutes Hell; but he is not beyond the saving power of God's love which enfolds all. He is not lost to God, God is lost to him. It is not God who is far from him, it is he who, in his thought and will, is far from God. It is he who has left hope behind. There is always hope for him whenever he leaves self behind, and turns toward the hope, that lies in the Divine Will of Love.

His whole attitude is the confused and senseless mood of the child who pouts and sulks in the corner, nursing his sullen vanity and resentment, under the impression that he has been wronged, and that thus he will punish his father by making him feel how unjust and cruel he has been.

Truth and Goodness Im placable.

The earthly father sometimes yields by reason of a weak sentimentality, which he mistakes for love, and spoils his child; but God rationally loves man and never yields to anything less than love. And, as there is nothing more for God to do, because he has already done all, man's continuance in hell depends upon himself, that is, upon the attitude of his own thought and will. He may pout and sulk in his own corner of misery forever if he so chooses, but that will never change God, for there is nothing to change—he has always saved and is always saving man, if man but *thinks* so, and *wills* so.

And because God, who is the Infinite and Eternal Reality of all things, is Truth and Goodness, he never draws back with his scourges of pain, never turns aside or swerves from his pursuit of false thought and wrong will, which strike their hateful cacophonies into the universal harmony, until man be brought into reconciliation with Himself, or into accord with that living harmonious Beauty, which manifests His own Infinite and Eternal Truth and Goodness.

Were God less, he might grow weary, remit his efforts, and become indifferent to man's destiny; but, being what He is, the Father of man, the curse of pain shall not cease to be a blessing, until it shall have revealed to man the hollow, unreal mockeries of error and sin, in the light of Truth and Goodness, and thus have banished them from the human mind and heart.

So that there is no place where man suffers, in the visible or invisible universe, that the Divine Providence does not follow him, the very suffering itself being the call of Truth and Goodness out of error and sin. This was the hope and joy of the Glad Tidings of Jesus, who, as the Divine Son, reflecting in his face the glory of the Divine Father, embodied the all-comprehensive Wisdom and outstreaming Love of God to enlighten and save the world.

The Divine Love in the Gospel Seeks out the Sick and Sinful.

His Gospel reveals God as purposely coming near to the poor, the unfortunate, the sinful. He had no message for the free, the joyous, the rich, the whole, the good; but came to those in prison, those who mourn, those who are in want, those who are sick and those who wander in sin. As the Great Physician, he comes to heal the sick; or as the Good Shepherd, he leaves the ninety and nine who are safe in the fold, to go out after the one, lost sheep. The father is not concerned about his elder son, who already has all his possessions, but devotes his thought and love to the wayward prodigal. God does not hear the righteous Pharisee, who is already good enough, but catches the first faint cry of the penitent sinner. "For I say unto you that there shall be joy in heaven over one sinner that changes his mind and turns back, more than over ninety and nine righteous persons that have no need of changing their minds and turning back" (Luke xv, 7). There is a beautiful expression in the first epistle of Peter which represents Jesus, after his glorification, as having descended even into the underworld and "preached to the spirits in prison" (I Pet. iii, 19).

Let a man, then, find himself in the bitterest despair and suffering, lost to all help and plunged into the darkest gloom of weakness and failure, it is just there and then, where and when, in his own mistaken thought and perverse will, he may be farthest from God, that God, in his saving truth and goodness, is nearest to him. Man's extremity is God's opportunity.

It is just because, in his error, he is far from God's Wisdom, and in his sin, he is far from God's Love that the divine pedagogy of pain is rebuking and scourging him, through the discipline of which the Divine Wisdom and Love are ever pursuing hard after him to save him, not *in* his helpless suffering, but *from* his helpless suffering, by

driving him out of his mistaken thought and perverse will, and drawing him back into atonement with the Thought and the Will of God.

But let no man, at the peril of his soul, *count* on the saving providence of God's Truth and Goodness, in order to justify himself in complacent continuance in error and sin. For he thus destroys the rational possibility within him of turning to Truth and Goodness, and treasures up wrath against the day of wrath. The call and the warning must not only be heard but *obeyed*, if man would enter into the blessings of the Divine Intent.

Therefore, we no longer see in the presence of pain, in human experience, a blind and confused chance, or a destructive and implacable fate, but the universal, rational, and purposive discipline of the Divine Truth and Goodness, arousing and warning man to be up and to keep steadfastly on his way to the goal of his spiritual development, which is the freedom and self-realization of an all-harmonious life, as a son of God.

"And thou shalt remember all the way which the Lord thy God hath led thee these forty years in the wilderness, [of human experience] that he might humble thee, to prove thee, to know what was in thy heart, whether thou wouldst keep his commandments, or no. And he humbled thee, and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna [the real, though unacknowledged sustenance of life], which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know; that he might make thee to know that man doth not live by bread only [the goods of sense], but by every thing that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord [the goods of Spirit] doth man live" (Deu. viii, 3-4).

The Painful Contradictions of Life.

But the thoughtful reader may cry out in bitter protest: This only makes confusion more confounded, for it denies all the observation and experience of mankind. If error and sin only *always really did* meet their fitting and just correction and desert, we should be ready to believe in a rational Divine Providence; but, from time immemorial, have not our poets, our dramatists, our historians, shown us that it is the most intelligent and refined, the noblest and the best, who suffer most, and not the ignorant and crude, the hardened and wicked?

In response to such an objection, we must urge two reflections that are often overlooked by those who bewail the irrational cruelty of

fate. The first is that the most refined and the best do not *always* suffer most, but they are *always capable* of suffering the most, in given circumstances. The second is that the greater capacity of suffering is due to the greater advance in intelligence and moral worth. Hence, in the whole range of human experience, the fact that *some* suffer, undeservedly as we see it, does not necessarily invalidate the Pedagogy of Pain—provided that, for such reasons as we have considered, we find it to be based upon principles, involved in the corrective discipline of a rational evolution for *all*.

Dualism, no Real Explanation for Evil.

The problem of a confused, irrational, and fortuitous apportionment of man's lot in the world, we can no longer indolently shirk by resting in the old, vague dualistic conceptions. There is no real explanation to be found in supposing some mighty spirit of evil, some Arch-Demon, to have crept into the world and vitiated it by his deceits and alluring wiles. For, in that case, the good God has either permitted it, or else acknowledged his lack of power to prevent it. If we take the first alternative, the One Supreme God connives at deception. If we take the second alternative, God ceases to be supreme. In either case, we should have to bow in dumb, helpless submission to the mystery of suffering, with no other recourse than to irrational endurance and resignation.

But to such a conflict of opposite powers and to a fate of irrational suffering, it is impossible for man to submit as final; for his total reason demands the ultimate happiness of a unity that arises out of knowing the Truth and willing the Good.

The Elements of Time, Progressive Refinement, and Solidarity in Evolution.

The only way of escape from our dilemma is to be found in that all-embracing, supreme conception of evolution which has so often been our refuge, and which it has been the glory of our era to bring to light. And we shall find that evolution presents three elements that raise our theoretical view of the pedagogy of pain, as a rational purposive discipline of Divine Providence, into practical demonstration.

Those elements have been constantly involved throughout our entire discussion; and are: time, progressive refinement, and solidarity.

We have said that because the Hebrew, with his steadfast moral

conviction that the Almighty and Everlasting God, the Creator of the ends of the earth, and the Father of man, rules nature and human history by the decrees of Eternal Righteousness, he has given to us the ultimate, rational meaning of the Pedagogy of Pain, as an all-comprehensive Divine Providence of Good. It is therefore to Israel and the history of Israel that we must look for the final evidence of this great doctrine, as standing for the rational order of objective Reality.

*The Good Providences of God Apparently Denied in the
Death of Jesus.*

But we no sooner turn thither for some practical confirmation of the Divine Providence, than we meet with the most bitter disappointment. For although the entire meaning of Israel, summed up in the law and the prophets, to the effect that "the righteous is an everlasting foundation," that they that trust in Yahweh, like Mount Zion, "shall never be removed, but abide forever," or shall be kept from all evil "under the shadow of the Almighty," found its complete culmination and fulfillment in the perfect obedience and moral nobility of Jesus; yet nowhere could we find a more complete disproof of Israel's claim to the Divine Guidance and Protection, than in the ignominious sufferings and death of Jesus. Executed as a criminal, between thieves, he was cut off from the land of the living and no one to declare his generation. The well-beloved son of the Father, as he felt himself to be, obedient to the Divine Will, even to the inmost thought and motive; he is not only deserted by his nearest friends, for whom he was giving his life, but in the darkest moment of gloom and agony, when in greatest need, deserted even by God, whom he had taught men to call Father, and of whose faithful providential goodness in every need he had always given such a glowing account.

Where can we find a deeper irony, a more complete contradiction, a more bitter disaster than in that contrast between the idealistic dreams of Israel, as the chosen and faithful son of God, always under the Divine Protection and Guidance, and the last words of Jesus, wrung from him when he needed God most: My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me! Must Israel, as a whole, or Jesus who is the embodiment of the genius of Israel, after celebrating the changeless providence of God and displaying always the profoundest trust in that providence, be at last compelled to admit that

God is not faithful to his promise, or at any rate is not careful of those that have trusted and sought to obey Him!

Triumph Follows Appointed Defeat.

But this does not bring us to the end of the matter, and we are not yet prepared to reject the faithfulness of God's unchanging providences. For strange, or unfounded, as we may regard the conviction of Jesus's disciples, we must recognize that it took such hold of them that they willingly lived, and suffered, and died by it; the conviction that the same God and Father who had deserted his obedient son, amid the shame of the cross, had now raised him with power from the dead, and exalted him in glory, and given him a name "which is above every name." At any rate, history has thus honored and exalted Jesus for his obedience and goodness; and he who was once despised and rejected of men has become the leader of progressive humanity. The reward for his faithfulness has been great in the providences of history.

Man's Moral Freedom, a Factor in the Divine Providence.

Besides, in dealing with the doctrine of Providence, God is not the only person involved in the problem. There is man! whom God has made great enough, to do as he will, and may exercise that divine right of freedom in doing wrong. So that the humiliation and suffering of Jesus is not necessarily due to the failure of God's providence, for it may be due to the injustice and cruelty of man.

If so, no crime could have been a more heinous sin than the crucifixion of Jesus. For Jesus was not only—to speak negatively—the embodiment of innocence and purity, deserving no penalty, but he was—positively speaking—the fulfilled embodiment of Israel's law and prophets, that is, he was the very essence of Israel's significance for world-history, and the revealed meaning of that divine, saving Providence, of which the Pharisees claimed to be the especial objects and exponents.

The Cross Spans the Gulf Between Heaven and Hell.

The cross of Jesus, therefore, touches the extremities of the moral heavens, from zenith to nadir. His suffering and death, on his side, was the noblest and most luminous expression of condescending, self-sacrificing love for others; while, on the side of his slayers, it

was the darkest and lowest sin possible, of a narrow and bigoted tribalism.

The Jews claimed to be exclusively and especially entrusted with the oracles of the only true God of mankind, whose righteous providences included all; they claimed to guard the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven; but they monopolized that kingdom, and sought to shut it to all but themselves. So that when they denied and slew Jesus, who alone understood and expressed the real and entire meaning for the world of God's providence, as displayed in Israel's history, a providence that meant God's Love and God's Kingdom for all mankind, they did more than execute unjustly the individual Jesus; they denied and slew themselves; they renounced their divine mission to the world, as the chosen and beloved son; and thus sought, in effect, to oppose and hinder the progressive, on-moving, historical world-order of God's beneficent, saving purpose for man.

The Court of Historical Justice.

As wholly unjustified as it may be, from any standpoint of Jesus's example or teachings, the Jews can not complain at that deep, inerradicable instinct of prejudice against them, among nominally Christian peoples; for, after all, it is a profound sense of cosmic justice which their own actions have aroused and called forth. They are being rebuked by history for their own dereliction and apostasy. For when they denied and rejected Jesus, they ceased longer to have any significance for world-history, because they had turned aside from the onward movement, in the Divine Intent, which Christianity took up and carried forward. And so long as the Jewish people as represented in official Rabbinism, reject their own providential call and destiny, as fulfilled in Jesus, they only repeat the sins of their fathers, as a stiff-necked, bigoted, and self-righteous people, who themselves, refusing to enter the kingdom of heaven, would shut the gate on others.

Well, then, about this tragic death of Jesus, which has justly been embodied by the Christian consciousness, in its central doctrine of the Atonement, centers the mystery that lies in the pedagogy of pain. Here, where absolute merit confronts absolute demerit, where the best meets the enmity of the worst, where love braves the malice of hate, and is defeated, there is either the disproof altogether of any wise and good providence, resting upon steady and rational

principles; or else we must look beyond the immediate and the visible data of experience to an outcome in time, through a progressive refinement, both for the individual and for the race.

From the whole course of our thought, it is evident that we must take the second member of this alternative; for the rational evolution of man can have no other meaning than that of a progressive refinement in time not only for the individual but for the race; and what that meaning is can not be fully understood until we view it in the light of its ultimate outcome. Hence, we must seek to understand the meaning of these three elements in the evolutionary process, and then discover, if we can, their bearing upon the Atonement effected in Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER VII.

TIME, PROGRESSIVE REFINEMENT, AND SOLIDARITY.

THE early naive confidence of Hebrew piety, which saw the righteous like a tree planted by streams of living water, while the wicked were like the chaff of the summer threshing floor, gave way later, under the painful enlightenment of a wider experience, to many a questioning complaint and doubt which, while it never sunk to unbelief, left the pious soul amazed and troubled before the scoffing pride and oppression, continued success and abounding prosperity of the ungodly.

The sense of confusion and bafflement at the reversal of what ought to be a great principle of retribution, becomes almost starless gloom in the pessimist of Ecclesiastes. That happy optimism of the Proverbs, which found in Wisdom the supreme good, conferring every material blessing upon man, yields to the disillusionment of the Preacher who, although he clings to the old conviction, left over from his early faith, that it is still best to be good, nevertheless sinks again and again into a well-nigh hopeless agnosticism.

The Wise Meets the Same Fate as the Fool.

With the widest opportunity for observation, the Preacher searched out all devices and labors of man under the sun, and the only conclusion he could reach was that all is vanity and a feeding on wind. All strivings, all endeavors are futile. "That which is crooked can not be made straight; and that which is wanting can not be numbered" (Ecc. i, 15).

If the wise man, who at any rate has eyes in his head, had some clear advantage over the fool, who walketh in darkness, it would give a reasonable aspect to life. But, as a matter of fact, there is no real advantage in the end. "As it happeneth to the fool, so will it happen to me; and why was I then more wise? . . . And how doth the wise man die? even as the fool!" (Ecc. ii, 15-16.)

Nor is there any real satisfaction in the fact that God judges the righteous and the wicked, for it only shows the sons of men "that

they themselves are but as beasts." "For that which befalleth the sons of man befalleth beasts: even one thing befalleth them; as one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; and man hath no preeminence above the beasts; for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man, whether it goeth upward, and the spirit of beast, whether it goeth downward to the earth?" (iii, 19-20.) "Wherefore, I praised the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive: yea, better than them both did I esteem him which hath not yet been born, who hath not yet seen the evil work that is done under the sun" (iv, 2-3).

Here the Hebrew moral genius has sunk to its nadir, and though the Preacher does not doubt the existence of God, and insists on man's duty to fear God and keep his commandments, yet he can no longer see anywhere in the world a moral principle of compensation. The old joyous faith in an invariable connection between wisdom and happiness, folly and misery, is gone; and he has no longer the heart to try to arouse in us a passionate devotion to wisdom or goodness, which was the especial characteristic of the Hebrew mind.

The Patient Resignation of Job.

A much more calm and pious attitude is taken by Job; perhaps because he is not merely a pessimistic, theoretical observer of evil, but himself the actual sufferer. His experience gives us, in the Sacred Canon, the classical refutation of the old orthodox Hebrew belief that inner character and outer fortune are always accordant.

In vain, did the friends of the sufferer seek to convince him that he had committed some secret sin against God, to account for his misfortunes. Job held firmly to his integrity, and challenged the most searching insight of his Maker. The only solution the poet could reach, in the end, was that of unquestioning submission to the will of God, and patient resignation before the inexplicable mystery.*

But must we leave the problem here, and reverse our former conclusion that truth and goodness are the only reality and inevitably lead to happiness, while error and sin are unreality and invariably lead to misery?

* The subsequent restoration of Job, as related in the epilogue, looks very much like an artificial attempt to reassert the old doctrine.

We must say that if the true thought and the right will in man may involve him in sorrow as well as bring him joy, then we can not cherish the hope of compensation in a future world; for why should not sorrow be just as good there as here, provided it belongs to the real objective order of things? No, we must find some reason of universal scope, as valid for the present as for the future, upon which this painful and irrational discrepancy in experience rests. And we can do no better than to look further in the teachings of Israel; for the Preacher of pessimism and the Poet of resigned sorrow have by no means expressed all that the Hebrew genius has to say on the significance of undeserved pain; because they did not recognize—what we afterwards find in the sacred writers—those elements of time, progressive refinement, and solidarity of which we have spoken.

The Psalmist Consoled by the Arbitrament of Time.

The Psalmist (Ps. lxxiii) had got into the same difficulties of doubt as the Preacher and the author of Job, yet he did not fall into the hopeless pessimism of the one, or into the unenlightened resignation of the other—though he confessed with consternation that he had almost done so. "My feet were almost gone; My steps had well-nigh slipped," he exclaims, as he recognizes his momentary forgetfulness of the one great, unchanging principle of righteousness as the guide of life, to which he penitently and joyously comes back. "Surely God is good to Israel; Even to such as are pure in heart" (v, 1).

What misled the Psalmist, for the moment, was the prosperity of the wicked. There were no pangs in their death, their strength was firm, they had no trouble as other men; pride, like a chain, adorned their necks; violence covered them as with a garment; their eyes stood out with fatness; they had more than heart could wish; they were arrogant and supercilious; they even defied heaven and their boastings filled the earth. They sneered: How doth God know? Is there knowledge in the Most High? And yet being always at ease, they prospered and increased in riches (vv, 3-12).

When the Psalmist saw all this, he was envious, he tells us, at the arrogant (v, 3). What is the use, he thought, of trying to be good. "Surely in vain have I cleansed my heart, and washed my hands in innocency; For all the day long have I been plagued, And chastened every morning" (vv, 13-14).

But he soon recognized his mistake and frankly admitted: "If

I had said; I will speak thus, Behold I had dealt treacherously with the generation of thy children" (v, 15). And so deep was his penitence that he could not enough condemn himself: "So brutish was I, and ignorant: I was as a beast before thee" (v, 22).

Now what brought him back to the great underlying truth that righteousness is the only condition of life and happiness, was *time*. He had envied the wicked in their prosperity and had fallen into complaint and despair of goodness, "Until," as he says, "I went into the sanctuary of God, And considered their end" (v, 17). Until, that is, he had carried the whole problem forward to the ultimate outcome, confronted the actual and passing experiences of life with the reality of the ideal and viewed them under the aspect of eternity. Here all was changed. Here he saw the so-seeming prosperous wicked set in slippery places, and their prosperity go down to destruction (v, 18); they have become a desolation, and are utterly consumed with terrors (v, 19).

Therefore, the Psalmist, in spite of all appearances, can turn again to God with joy and confidence:

"Thou hast holden me with thy right hand.
Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel,
And afterward receive me with glory.
Whom have I in heaven but thee?
And there is none on earth that I desire beside thee.
My flesh and my heart faileth:
But God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever."
(vv. 23-26)

It is this willingness to let time try out the whole problem that gives to Hebrew piety its strength and its patient hope, amid the passing contradictions and adversities of life.

"Fret not thyself because of evil doers,
Neither be thou envious against them that work unrighteousness.
For they shall soon be cut down like the grass,
And wither as the green herb" (Ps. xxxvii, 1-2).

As for you, there is only one way:

"Trust in the Lord and do good" (v. 3).
* * * * *
"Delight thyself also in the Lord;
And he shall give thee the desires of thine heart" (v. 4).
* * * * *

"Rest in the Lord, and wait patiently for him" (v. 7).

* * * * *

"I have seen the wicked in great power,
And spreading himself like a green tree in its native soil.
Yet he passed away, and, lo, he was not:

* * * * *

Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright;
For him, there is a future of prosperity and peace"
(vv. 35-36).

With this confidence in the faithfulness of God, the Psalmist can, without fear or concern, meet all the vicissitudes of worldly fortune.

The Law and the Prophets Look forward to the Outcome in Time.

The very nature of Israel's racial genius demanded time for the attainment of that moral ideal, expressed in the law, toward which the prophets were ever pointing. It was the *entelechy* of the Kantian categorical imperative. The whole drama of world-history, to the Hebrew mind, was necessarily an unfoldment of events, looking forward to the outcome, which is a final settlement of all relations on the basis of the righteous law.

Indeed, time, which is involved in evolution, is constituted by that evolution which forbids decision before we know the purposed end. In other words, we can not know the real meaning of a man's experiences or of history, the experience of the race, until we lift it beyond the phenomenal, temporal order, into the light of a real and permanent order of rational thought, or Spirit. And this was what the Hebrew prophet was constantly doing, by submitting all men and events to the test of God's righteous will, which in time would be fully brought to vindication and fulfillment.

So that, if we have sound reasons, upon other grounds, for the conviction that Truth and Goodness, by their essential nature, mean Beauty, or that knowing the true and willing the good are the only conditions of happiness and life; and that, on the contrary, error and sin, mistakes in thought and perversities of will, are the invariable sources of misery and death, we shall not be disturbed if, here and there, now and then, the ignorant and the evil enjoy prosperity, while the enlightened and good suffer adversity; for we shall be content, patiently, to wait for the instructions of time to show us all things in the light of the Ultimate Reality.

Such a consideration, however, gives us only a negative satisfaction, by simply enabling us to suspend judgment on the empirical discrepancies in our principle of compensation and retribution. But what we want is some positive, rational grounds for such a discrepancy; and these grounds we find in those further evolutionary elements—progressive refinement and solidarity

Progressive Refinement Increases the Possibility of Suffering.

Our review of evolution made clear to us the responsibilities and risks which progress involves. With unfolding life, the increase in complexity and refinement is necessarily accompanied by the increasing possibility of pleasure and consequently of pain. In man, who rises into supra-natural, rational individuality, pleasure and pain advance from mere physical to mental significance. And as the individual develops his intelligence, refines his feelings, and deepens his moral nature, he is giving hostages to my lady of sorrows. If he wishes at all to rise in the scale of life above the brute, he must assume the risks and responsibilities of his adventure. His very advance in happiness and life carries within it the possibilities of suffering and death.*

So long as he advances, he becomes increasingly aware of the discrepancy between what he actually is and what he is destined to be, and more and more poignantly conscious of the hinderances and barriers, both within himself and in his surroundings, that check his progress toward the true and the good.

The contented peasant, with a brain as horny as his hands, is happy, and has no inkling of the inner questionings, the difficult problems, and the toilsome searchings of the scientist, whose destiny drives him to find some clear way out to the Truth.

The dull non-moral man lives in a paradise, "a smooth life, dead at heart, untroubled by a spark," compared with the saint whose duties

* The conditions of moral freedom that make it possible for him to attain heaven, make it possible for him also to sink to hell. There is a form of superficial sentimentality that seems to enjoy charging man at times with sinking below the level of the brute. But it overlooks the fact that the brute has not sense enough to sink anywhere, even if there were anything for him to sink to. Man's degradation is a proof of his greatness, for his degradation is but a vivid presentation of the contrast between what he *actually* is and what he *really* is. Actually, he may have been willing to sink in the scale, to the level of the brute, or perhaps has never risen much above it: really, he is a man. It is the painful discrepancy, between the potential and the real, that fills us with such a sense of condemnation and repulsion.

and ideals give him no rest, and whose eye is ever fixed on the mark for the prize of his high calling. Those omissions and commissions which would be but a convenience or a pleasure for the first, would bring the bitterest sorrow to the second.

Pain and Struggle, Incidental to Progress.

One of the solemn maxims of an otiose aristocracy, and its parvenu imitators, is: "Do not educate the lower classes, for it will only make them discontented and unhappy." A maxim perfectly true as to fact, but perfectly false in its intention; because every man, as a man, is entitled to that rational development which, if normal, compels him to rise from the dull lethargy and contentment of sense, through the struggles and pains of logic, to the intuition of Truth: and from the naive self-assertion of egoism, through the struggles and pains of law and justice, to the practice of a universal Goodness, in order that he may attain for himself freedom and self-realization, or the full stature of a man, which is the end of his rational evolution.

And we have seen how the pedagogy of pain does not permit him to rest content below himself, but constantly calls him forward to the goal, or rebukes him for turning from the upward path. The only way for him to escape the possibility of these *growing* pains, is to refuse to progress, or to remain asleep on the level of the brute.

But even so, we have not yet reached any explanation for those flagrant discrepancies between inner merit and outer fortune which experience so often reveals; because any pain, involved in a progressive refinement, so far as we now can see, is a private, individual matter and follows an exact rational law, justified by results.

Solidarity Defined.

What troubles us is the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the doctrine of a rational Divine Providence in the world, which every consideration of reason compels us to think, and to want to think, and the practical experiences of life which show the prosperity and happiness of the false and the evil, and the adversity and suffering of the true and the good. We shall only begin to see light upon the subject, when we take into consideration that third element in evolution, of which we have spoken, viz.: solidarity.

By solidarity, taken in a broad sense, we mean that all-pervasive, all-inclusive relatedness among things which we designate as rational

unity. Nothing is isolated and stands apart by itself; everything is so related to every other thing, according to exact, universal, and changeless rational laws, as to form one grand Cosmic Order.

So far as Reality manifests itself in the phenomenal world of space and time, we may designate this cosmic solidarity as both spatial and temporal. But while we may apply the notion of solidarity, with complete accuracy, to the material aspects of the world, its more specific meaning is that of a community of interests among intelligent beings. It is thus we speak of the solidarity of man, meaning the mutual relation of all human beings, in the totality of their intellectual, moral, and æsthetic interests.

Temporal Aspects of Solidarity: Heredity.

If we recall how it is that man resumes in himself the entire range of natural evolution that preceded him, we shall find this to be even more palpably true of rational or historical evolution. Man is truly said to be the inheritor of all time. He has both benefited and suffered by the past. Just as he is little aware of the mechanical, chemical, vital, and animal forces that have entered into his physical being, so he is often unaware that the thoughts, ideas, and rational tendencies, which control his conscious life, have come down to him from sources in the past of which he directly knows nothing.

Thus, the primary teacher, in our great school system, has perhaps never heard more than the names of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Herbart, or Rousseau; and it is a question whether she would take any real interest in them, or understand them, even if she tried: and yet her whole education was formed by such men, and she is guided in her work by their ideas, which have percolated down to her through successive educational strata.

Or, the bright young attorney, who superintends the Sunday School of the fashionable Avenue Church, knows really very little, if anything, about St. Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Calvin, Grotius, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Lessing, Herder, Schleiermacher, and yet their thoughts may confusedly determine all his glib theological lucubrations.

Indeed, it is a question whether the average college president could tell just how the curricula, which he prescribes, came to take form in the first place; or whether the average bishop could trace back his orthodox convictions to their real sources.

The case is the same when considered spatially. As we know how the individual is in constant inter-relation with his natural environment, even to the utmost limits of the physical universe, so is he, as a rational being, intimately and constantly influenced by the thoughts, sentiments, emotions, and activities, be they true or false, right or wrong, noble or ignoble, that encompass him on every hand, like an all-enfolding atmosphere, in which he lives and moves and has his being.

Spatial Aspect of Solidarity: Environment.

The sum total of the convictions, motives, and even unexpressed, half-formed and nascent ideas, that prevail in his social, religious, educational, financial, and political environment, form and inform him whether he will or no. An epidemic of religious doubt, disillusionment, resulting in sceptical, world-weary pessimism, it may be; perhaps it is a gay and frivolous, or cynical, *fin de siècle* Epicureanism that engulfs him. Some national, financial fear, or some industrial enthusiasm will seize and sweep him along on its currents of disaster or prosperity. A spirit of reform, a novelty of fashion, a social fad, or a religious epidemic will take possession of and control him.

Nor will these influences end with his city or state or nation. In these days of electricity and steam, the ends of the earth are brought together. China lies next to Peru, and the Antipodes are neighbors. A mob in Pekin or San Francisco disturbs three continents, or a great psychic storm of war in Manchuria sends its vibrations to the uttermost parts of the earth.

So intimately and constantly are men related and inter-related in this spatial solidarity, that all affects each and each all. The individual may be wholly unconscious of the concealed and subtle influences of human ideas, emotions, and actions continually at play upon and around him, but they nevertheless reverberate through the communal mass and produce their effect upon him at some point.

Thus, every man is related to every other man—and to nature as well—in a solidarity which, as temporal, we call heredity, and, as spatial, we call environment. It is, therefore, evident that the individual bears not only the results of his own thoughts, true or false, and actions, good or bad; but also the results of the community's thoughts and actions, past as well as present. It is a rational law of inter-related and inter-acting fellowship; and if it redounds to his good,

may also redound to his ill. If he enjoys the inheritance of a noble heredity and the happiness of a prosperous environment, he must, by the same law, endure the baleful effects of a vicious heredity or the misfortune of an unhappy environment. He is so interwoven, physically and mentally, with the entire unitary, unfolding cosmos that, for weal or woe, he must influence all and be influenced by all.

It is this which constitutes what we call fate, but it is not fatalistic; for the great law of solidarity perpetually shows each man that, since the evil-doing of others injures him, it is the greatest wisdom for him to injure none; and since the right-doing of others benefits him, it is his greatest wisdom not only to do right to all others, but to oppose all evil-doing and encourage all right-doing among them. It is not simply his isolated interest, to cease to do evil and learn to do well for himself, but to use every rational means in his power to get others to cease to do evil and learn to do well; for, until then, he is not really secure and free from danger.

The Sacred Integrity of the Individual.

But, however intimately related he may be to all, he is at the same time an individual in his own rights, whose integrity no other individual *can*, and God, who has established his individuality, *won't* invade. As much as he may be irremovably imbedded in this solidarity of things and thoughts, behind him and around him, the rational individual has an inalienable integrity and independence of self-worth all his own, into the sacred precincts of which no foreign element dare intrude.

The self-conscious ego stands absolutely alone before the entire universe, in his intellectual greatness and moral integrity, and must, in the end, determine what shall enter into and what shall be shut out of the holy places of his unapproachable and impregnable selfhood. Whatever may be the past or the present of all things and of all men, he too has a past and a present which he has derived from no man and which he can transfer to no man. And here he can stand, if he will, and defy all heredities and all environments in the freedom of himself. If there is any truth to be known or good to be done, there is for him no substitute, no thinking it by proxy or willing it by proxy; he alone must think it and will it for himself. And if he so elects, no man can force him to think or to do, if he wills not so to think or to do.

It is natural that the Hebrew, whose peculiar merit was to recog-

nize fully, at one and the same time, the irresistible and almighty providence of God, and to feel profoundly the inalienable sacredness of his own moral responsibility, should always emphasize this mysterious antithesis. St. Paul graphically sets it forth in saying to the Philippians: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling: for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure" (Phil. ii, 12-13).

Solidarity Accounts for Undeserved Suffering.

It is this absolute independence of and yet absolute relatedness to the whole, that enables us to begin to see how it is that, in the temporal course of his rational unfoldment, the pedagogy of pain not only brings to man deserts, not his own, but imposes upon him the more suffering, the truer he is and the better he is; thus establishing his most sacred obligation as a true man and a good man, for his own as well as for others' sake, to oppose all error and sin, and to further the spread of truth and goodness.

It seems inevitable that *any* departure from the current social, scientific, and religious customs, laws, convictions, beliefs and doctrines, whether that departure be above or below the general communal level, will arouse scorn, contempt, ridicule, and open hostility.

We are very well content when such opposition is expressed toward the aberrant and wrong, as a merited rebuke. But what so deeply afflicts and humiliates us is that the truest and best, who have always gone forward on behalf of their fellow men, have been made to suffer the most. The page of history, much to man's shame, tells us how often the men who have done most to advance the interests of humanity, the great prophets and reformers, saints and scientists, have not only suffered cruel neglect, but have been beaten, stoned, crucified, by those whom they would benefit.

Yet the fact is not a fortuitous accident, but an incident in that great law of rational evolution, by which the progressive refinement of each, in time, is to end in the freedom and self-realization of all.

It is inevitable that, when by his own advancement, the individual rises intellectually or morally above his environment, the discrepancy should make itself painfully felt in opposition or persecution. His advanced truth and goodness, which in themselves bring him only contentment, strength and joy, rebuke the low average of those

about him, and so arouse resentment and hostility, as to result for him in suffering.

Therefore, while a hasty and superficial view of experience seems wholly to invalidate anything like a rational law of retribution and compensation—a great steady providence of good in the world, by which truth and goodness always bring happiness, and error and sin always bring misery; when we look deeper and take into view the order of a rational evolution in time, moving toward a great end that includes all, we begin to see a deep, fundamental, cosmic significance in the pedagogy of pain, which always indicates not only the *rebuke* of error and sin *by* Truth and Goodness, but also the consequent bitter *hostility* of error and sin *to* Truth and Goodness.

We can no longer be confused, then, if the true man or the good man suffers undeserved pain, for we know it is because he is both more sensitive to pain, and more subject to the hostility of those who still cherish error and sin. His truth and goodness give him joy and only joy; in fact, it is because of them alone that he has the courage and strength to face all opposition and suffering, which arise solely as the result of the error and sin of others.

Socrates and Jesus Meet the Opposition of Error and Sin.

The classical examples for all time are Socrates and Jesus. The rigorous Socratic searching out of error, the humiliation of shallow self-conceit, the refutation of opinion—the wealth of which, Bacon tells us, is a poverty of store—in order to find out the knowledge of Truth, will inevitably make the world wiser and happier; and if we would have the saving strength and joy of Truth, we must renounce our narrow prejudices, superficial opinions, and blinding conceits, and follow Socrates.

But then—as it does still—the implacable Truth cut into the quick of cherished error, overthrew the vanities of self-conceit, and stirred the powers of ignorance and darkness to the bottom. And that is what caused the imprisonment and death of Socrates.

And so it was with Jesus. His faithfulness to his appointed mission, his flawless purity, his law of universal love, must inevitably turn all the discords of human society into the harmonious fellowship of the Kingdom of God. And if we would have the strength and joy of his goodness, we must renounce the lust and ill-will which all too widely influence human action, and follow him.

But then—as it does still—his implacable goodness perpetually rebuked the crude sins of impurity and the still deeper and more subtle sins of ill-will, and thus aroused to the bottom all the powers of evil. And that is what caused the arrest and crucifixion of Jesus.*

Man Can not Be Deterred from Seeking Truth and Goodness.

As already suggested, there is only one way in which the man of truth and of goodness can avoid suffering; and that is to sink back to the popular level, compromise his convictions, accept the current opinion as true, or follow the current morality as good. Such a procedure is what is called prudence, or worldly wisdom. But such a course would give the true and good man the deepest inner sorrow, compared with which the outer misfortune of his fellow men's hostility is as nothing. He can not help going forward, he has come to see that the rational nature of man must go on to the freedom and self-realization of knowing the true and willing the good.

He Who Knows Truth Must Share it with Others.

Thus, the man who has once come to know the truth, must share it with others. To possess it alone has no lasting interest for him. For he finds that as he imparts his knowledge to others, he is so much the more enriched by its possession. It gives him the utmost pleasure to find another whom he can persuade to think as he thinks. His joy and strength is thus increased tenfold!

We have a glimpse of this in Plato's cave-story, where the liberated man no sooner sees the light, than he must descend to those who live among the shadows and try to free and enlighten them.

The Good Man Must Make Goodness Prevail.

But it is more especially in the good man that we find the necessity of going forward against all odds. The universal will of good within, streaming out to benefit or please others, makes him include all. He must spread goodness. He can not feel himself saved, until all are saved. His moral nature can be satisfied with nothing less.

* We are here again brought to see the falsity of all those forms of asceticism, which indulge in self-inflicted suffering, as something positively meritorious, or cherish sorrow as a real good, sent by God. To cherish pain as a good, is to stultify reason and deny the whole meaning of life. As we have seen, pain is a good when it is recognized as a condemnation of those conditions that produced it, and a call to their destruction.

Hence, no opposition or suffering can deter him, for this opposition and suffering is all the more reason why he should spread that goodness which destroys, in man's lust and ill-will, all causes of opposition and suffering.

The Rational Meaning of the Atonement Appears.

We approach here a possible understanding of the Atonement, which, showing us the best suffering the most, seems to deny anything like a Divine Providence of Good.

Israel, in his deepest consciousness, always recognized himself as the chosen of God, not for himself alone, but that, through him, all the nations of the earth might be blest. The world-mission of Israel reached final embodiment in Jesus, the Divine Son, who, reflecting in himself the love of the Divine Father, came to give his life for the world. In Paul's beautiful phrase, God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself (II Cor. v, 19).

Or, we might express it in an abstract way by saying, that the Atonement is a concrete manifestation, in the phenomenal world, of the Eternal Causal Reality, revealing itself as including all in its purposes of redeeming Goodness.

The historical Jesus, therefore, who bears this Idea, as the Divine Son, doing the work of the Divine Father, is at once the incarnation of the Ideal Man, or the Christ, and the concrete expression, in human form, of the Eternal Cosmic Will of Goodness, whose love creates, sustains, and enfolds all; and, as such, willingly bears the suffering which the contradiction and hostility of error and sin, because of his perfect truth and goodness, impose upon him, in order to overcome that contradiction and hostility, by overcoming error and sin; and thus, by showing man what he really is, lead him to the freedom of self-realization, or to at-onement with God, the Eternal Cosmic Will of Good, in whom, through whom, and unto whom are all things.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ATONEMENT OF CHRIST.

IN considering the Atonement—the great central doctrine of the Christian consciousness—two general considerations must be borne in mind. The first is the necessity of distinguishing between its substance and its form, its spirit and its letter; the one being eternal and changeless, the other being temporal and variable. Unfortunately, the confusion of these two has misled many, in estimating the value of great ideas that, in the course of historical evolution, have come down to us from the past. Identifying the form with the substance, both strict orthodoxy and radical liberalism have fallen into needless conflict. The one, regarding that the Truth has been infallibly stated, once for all, opposes all inquiry, all change, all advance, all restatement of the outer form of expression; the other, recognizing the natural rights of rational inquiry and, in the irresistible progress of thought, the necessity of restatement, seems, at times, to take for granted that, with a new interpretation, the substance has been essentially changed or even destroyed.

Whereas, what really happens is that the same changeless, underlying Truth, in coming to take on a new outer form of expression, gets but a larger and deeper interpretation, which brings out the old Truth into a clearer, more rational, and more universally convincing light.

The Atonement Has a Cosmic Meaning.

We are thus brought to our second consideration; that is, by avoiding the confusion between substance and form, and penetrating below the letter to the spirit of the Atonement, we come to see its cosmic character, or find its ground in the very objective nature of things. It is not an isolated fact which has meaning only for our little world, but is the manifestation of a great universal principle applying to all worlds, wherever moral beings render their service of love to others.

That Christ is the Lamb, slain from the foundation of the world, is not the mere fancy of a converted Hebrew Christian, nor is it the

fugitive speculation of a Christianized Greek, but a cosmic truth, as deep and as wide as the outstreaming, eternal Love of God. Indeed, we are here dealing with Moral Reason itself, in its fundamental Reality which, as the Creative Cause of the Universe, is the ground, as we have learned, of both the Theoretical and the Æsthetic Reason.

The demand of the æsthetic reason for an objective Reality that presents the Unity of harmonious Beauty, is covered by the demand of the theoretical reason for an objective Truth of logical coherence, which is but the manifestation of the Moral Reason, as the Creative, Causal Will of Eternal Goodness. That is, the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth gets its existence and meaning from the Eternal Love of God.

This is what gives to goodness its preeminence in the life of man, and to sin the depth of its depravity. To be good, means to fall in with the Causal Will of the Universe; and the culpability of sin is not its stubborn resistance to a law of stern justice, but its rejection of an outstreaming, saving love. It is a stubborn opposition of that self-will which would break the world up into an irrational, confused, incoherent chaos, to that Absolute Will of Eternal Goodness, which creates and maintains the World as a rational, harmonious Cosmos.

Now, it is this outstreaming Love of God that makes up the sum and substance, the core and center, of the Atonement of Christ. And because Israel, as no other race, had a passion for God and a passion for goodness, it is no accident of history that this great doctrine, in its essential features, has come down to us through the unfolding history of the Chosen People.

The germs of it were planted far back in the law and the prophets, so that in the fullness of time, God might, in the Person of his Son, who was "the effulgence of his glory and the very image of his substance" (Heb. i, 3), reveal the deep mystery of his purpose of love toward man.

The Suffering Servant of Yahweh.

In that remarkable fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, which the Christian Church has always justly regarded as a foreshadowing of Christ, the prophet, though perhaps earlier than the author of Job, has reached a view of undeserved suffering, far in advance of that contained in the great dramatic poem of sorrow.

To the author of Job, as we have seen, the suffering of the good man in the world is a profound and inexplicable mystery, before which the sufferer can only bow in patient, submissive agony.

To the Younger Isaiah, however, the suffering of the good rests upon a rational principle, interwoven with the sum of things; rests, indeed, upon a progressive refinement in time, and the solidarity of human interests.

Although the servant of God, be it Israel as a whole, or some saintly martyr, knows and does the will of God, he nevertheless suffers beyond measure. He does not suffer, however, because of, or out of relation to, that knowledge and obedience, as though he was receiving a favor from God, or subjected to a meaningless fate; but because of the ignorance, or rather disobedience, of the ungodly.

Of course, when, in our narrowness of view and in the haste of our generalizations, we saw him despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, saw him as one from whom men hid their faces, because he had no form or comeliness; we straightway esteemed him not, and at once drew the facile conclusion, so flattering to our penetrating wisdom and self-righteousness, that he was stricken, smitten of God and afflicted.

The Sufferings of the Righteous Save the Wicked.

But alas, for our penetrating wisdom and self-righteousness! when all is summed up, it turns out to be *our* griefs, and not his own, which he has borne, it is *our* sorrow which he has carried. "He was wounded for *our* transgressions, he was bruised for *our* iniquities, the chastisement of *our* peace was upon *him*, and with *his* stripes *we* are healed."

But why this obviously unjust substitution? Because he was good enough to care; no matter what the popular waywardness, or the self-willed perversity of the multitude might be, he kept steadily to the path of righteousness, he would do no violence, and no deceit could be found in his mouth. But we did not care, for like dumb and senseless sheep, "that cherish the dull life in the brain," we had all gone astray, we had turned everyone to his own way, so that upon his noble heart of faithfulness and love the iniquities of us all were laid.

But is it an incoherent and irrational fate, is it an inexplicable mystery of cosmic injustice? No, it belongs to the whole plan of Yahweh, the Infinite and Eternal Creator and Ruler of the world: for nothing escapes the all-enfolding, righteous providence of God. And

if, in that providence, it pleased Yahweh that the innocent should be bruised or put to grief and made an offering for sin, there is in it an all-inclusive, rational purpose of good. There is in it the purpose that the good shall, in the end, save the bad.

Goodness Triumphs over Evil.

He who, we thought, was cut off out of the land of the living without issue, shall see his seed and prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord, which is the salvation of all, shall prosper in his hand. He shall see the travail of his soul, which expresses the redemptive purpose of God, and be satisfied; and by his knowledge and unswerving faithfulness to the will of God, amid all opposition, he shall lead many to righteousness.

Therefore, he whom we despised as *uncomely* and *insignificant*, will divide his portion with the *great*; and he whom we regarded as *voiceless* and *weak*, before his oppressors, shall divide the spoil with the *strong*; because, in his immutable integrity of obedience to God, and in his self-sacrificing love for others, he poured out his soul, even unto death, and was willing, without complaint, to bear the ignominy of being numbered with the transgressors, for whom he thereby made intercession.

And because of his love for others and his final success in leading them to righteousness, he will be the first to rejoice in and the last to complain at the providences of God, whose servant he is, and whose saving purposes he fulfils, no matter at what cost to himself.

Thus, the great unknown prophet, penetrating the mystery of suffering and shame, teaches us that the pedagogy of pain is a rational principle at the heart of things. Error and sin, which are pure illusions of unreality, are the only sources of disorder and misery, while truth and goodness, the only reality, are the sole sources of harmony and beauty.

But in the unfolding human consciousness toward the true and the good, the law of progressive refinement and of solidarity may leave the false and the wicked on the lower levels of worldly prosperity and happiness, and raise the true and good into misfortune and suffering. But in standing for truth and goodness, they are the noble and exalted teachers and leaders of men, and alone can enlighten and save the narrow-minded and ignorant, the self-righteous and wicked, who resist and persecute them.

Foreshadowing of Christ.

What the prophet so graphically portrayed, as the suffering and redeeming Servant of Yahweh, came to a complete historical embodiment in the life and death of Jesus; and, indeed, sets forth the true doctrine of his vicarious sacrifice for man.

We can never too deeply impress upon our minds the fact that the Atonement, with all its allied ideas, is a natural product of the moral reason itself. As in time the moral consciousness of Israel became more refined, or the moral ideal more lofty, man began to feel more deeply the heinousness of sin and his own ability to expiate it. And while Psalmist and Prophet comforted the Chosen People by celebrating the mercy of God, who on repentance, forgiveth all iniquity, yet, sin was felt to be so deep and culpable an offence against God, that not simply penitence but penalty as well was required.

Hence, long before the coming of Jesus, there was a growing conviction among the Jews that the glorious Messiah of God would not come and set up the Kingdom of Righteousness on the earth, until the people not only repented of their sins but, as that was not sufficient to settle the score of transgression, some one great enough and good enough should take upon himself the penalty which others, less worthy, could not bear.

This general conviction, that only the righteous was good enough to atone for the sins of the people fell in perfectly with the needs of the early disciples of Jesus, who were compelled to explain the ignominy and shame of their great Master's death.

The Apology of the Disciples for the Humiliation of Christ.

At any rate, the early disciples of Jesus seized upon this idea and, together with the expiatory meaning in the ceremonial symbols, turned it into an apology for the shameful death on the cross.

They could thus remove the embarrassment under which their claim for the Messiahship of Jesus lay. Nobody would believe that the glorious Messiah of God should suffer such humiliation as that of the crucifixion. But now it could be contended that, while the earthly career of Jesus was not Messianic in the true sense of the term, yet it was the necessary, preliminary humiliation and sacrifice required for sin, in the Divine Providential Plan, which must first be effected

before the resurrected and glorified Messiah could come in all his splendor and triumph to rule over the earth.

The disciples could thus claim to prove that the shame of the cross was not only the fulfillment of the ceremonial law, as the one last and great sacrificial offering for sin, made once for all; but also the fulfillment of the prophet's prediction, as representing the suffering Servant of Yahweh, who was great enough and good enough to bear the sins of his people.

The Church's Dualistic Interpretation of the Atonement.

The development of these ideas in the Church, under the then prevailing dualistic views of the world, naturally took on a dualistic, arbitrary form. God, the Father, as the austere, moral Governor of the Universe, could not, if he would, remit the penalty of sin, on the mere penitence of the sinner, without invalidating his moral government; and, since the just penalty for sin is death, there was no hope for sinful man. Fortunately, the compassion and love of God, the Son, was aroused; in virtue of which, he condescended to be born of woman, assume the frailties and vicissitudes of human life, and then, in fulfillment of his great mission, take upon himself, in the cruel death of the cross, the penalty of man's sin.

He thus, by his work of mercy, removed the barrier to man's pardon in the mind of Divine Justice, and enabled God to maintain the integrity of his righteous government, while, at the same time, justifying him that believed in Jesus (see Rom. iii, 21-26). Moreover, the conclusion was not hard to draw that, since Christ took upon himself the demerit of our sins, we could take upon ourselves the merit of his righteousness (see II Cor. v, 21). In this way, the vicarious work of Christ presents two inseparably related aspects. To him, is imputed our disobedience and he becomes sin for us; while to us, is imputed his perfect obedience, and we are thus made righteous before God in him.

While this doctrine of the expiatory Atonement may *nominally* be charged with the responsibility for antinomianism, or the belief that, since the infinite suffering of Christ has paid the penalty of all guilt, past, present, and future, therefore, man may now sin with impunity; in reality, it can bear no such meaning, and, indeed, throughout the history of the Church has never borne such a meaning; but has always exercised, when truly accepted, a powerful influence for good.

For, aside from its dramatic features, which are not without a certain impressive and sublime beauty, and the moral influence it would naturally exercise on the heart, its meaning has always been that the forgiven sinner is no longer his own to do as he pleases, but, having been bought with a price, even the precious blood of Christ, is now obligated to render to his new Master the most devoted service. The only antinomianism that the Atonement can ever justify, in the mind of the Church, is that of St. Paul, who felt himself lifted above the slavish servitude of the law, into the free service of abounding love.

The Spirit of the Atonement is God's Help, Meeting Man's Need.

Our complaint against the old doctrine is not that it is antinomian, but that its dualistic, arbitrary form obscures its real substance. So that, in seeking to reinterpret the Atonement, in the light of our modern Monistic Idealism, with its process of evolution in time, revealing always a progressive refinement in the totality of a unitary whole, we will not permit the old forms of expression to obscure our understanding of, or divert our attention from, the inner spirit of it.

And at the beginning, we must rest upon the fundamental conception, growing out of the moral reason itself, that, because of man's sin and his need of rescue, the Atonement is something done for man, as a manifestation of the Divine Love, through Christ, to save man, because he is incapable of saving himself. But, at the same time, man's moral freedom and dignity is such that the entire responsibility of his salvation rests upon himself, so that however much God may have done *for* him, it entirely rests with man to determine what shall be done *in* him.

If, now, we look for the real elements of the Atonement, as it is emphasized in the New Testament, and set forth in the various doctrines of the Church, we shall find them, in the main, to be describable as sympathetic, expiatory, vicarious, exemplary, and forensic or intercessory.

The Atonement as Sympathetic.

The ultimate ground upon which the Atonement rests, we have said, is the outstreaming Love of God, manifested to save man from his sins. It springs from a divine sympathy for man in his need. It is not, however, like that shallow sympathy which approves, supports, or

encourages the sufferer in his errors and sins; but like the sympathy of the father who pities his children, and who, while he disapproves and condemns their waywardness and folly, exhausts all the resources of his love, to save them from the consequences of that waywardness and folly.

It was such divine sympathy as this, which is expressed in the Johannine saying: God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish. That is, the divine compassion for man, in his need, is so great that, rather than see him perish, it sacrifices its most precious treasure.

And this is what Jesus expressed throughout his entire career as the Divine Son, who reflected and manifested the Love of the Divine Father for all men. "My Father worketh even until now," he said, "and I work." "I seek not mine own will but the will of him that sent me" (Jno. v, 17, 30). And this will was to go about doing good, healing the sick, forgiving the sinner, setting them at liberty that were bound, and proclaiming the acceptable year of the Lord; it was, in the darkness and danger of night, to seek out and bring back the lost, and to guard the fold from all intrusion, even unto death. Nothing strikes us as more characteristic of the mission of Jesus than his profound compassion, revealed in all his words and actions, which were for the poor, the mourner, the prisoner, the sinful. In a word, there was always displayed a compassionate love, coming to meet a great need.

St. Paul's Compassion Was an Imitation of Christ.

That which is most conspicuous, in the ceaseless activities of St. Paul, is his love for others, his desire to do all and be all that he might save them. So consuming was his zeal to lead men to reconciliation with God, that he counted it an honor and a joy to suffer in this redeeming work of Christ, to bear in his body the marks of the Lord Jesus.

But why should he care for these strange men? what were they to him, these vacillating, perfidious Galatians, or these contentious, vice-loving, ungrateful Corinthians? He makes his motive clear enough. It was simple imitation of what Christ had done for us all, in loving us and giving himself for us. There shone, for him, in the face of Jesus Christ, the exhaustless love of God, who spared not his own son but freely delivered him up for us all. It was the very God,

stooping to save us. Therefore, he could account for his own zeal by saying: "The love of Christ constraineth us" (II Cor. v, 14).

Indeed, his own life of sacrifice and devotion was no other than the very life of Christ in him, "who loved me and gave himself for me" (Gal. ii, 20). This same motive he urges on the Philippians: "Have this mind in you," he writes them, "which was also in Christ Jesus; who being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men; and being found in the fashion of a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, yea, the death of the cross" (Phil. ii, 2-8).

And in exhorting the Corinthians to Christian liberality, he could only remind them of the abounding liberality of Christ toward them: "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might become rich" (II Cor. viii, 9).

It is the depth of man's need which reveals to the Apostle's mind the condescending, all-bestowing, self-sacrificing compassion and love of Christ for sinful men. "For while we were yet weak," he exclaims, "in due season Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man would one die: peradventure for the good man, some would even dare to die. But God commendeth his own love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us" (Rom. v, 6-8).

It was because of all this, that the Apostle refused to glory in aught else but the cross of Christ (Gal. vi, 14); and counted all things to be loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ (Phil. iii, 8). And it is this same recognition of the compassionate, self-sacrificing love of Christ for man in his need, which has made the cross the most sacred emblem of Christian faith; and which is so beautifully expressed in Watt's well-known hymn.

"When I survey the wondrous cross
On which the Prince of Glory died,
My richest gain, I count but loss
And pour contempt on all my pride."

The Sympathy of Love Bears the Sins of Others.

It is the nature of love to suffer with others, to stand, as it were, in their place and take upon itself their sorrows and griefs; to burn with shame at their sins, as a mother feels the suffering or is humiliated

by the wrong-doing of her child. And the compassionate goodness of God is the more eminent, because it is manifested to save the sinner—not merely the unfortunate one, but the willful rebel against the divine government.

St. Paul uses a beautiful expression, in his letter to the Galatians, setting forth the sympathy of love. "Bear ye one another's burdens," he urges, "and so fulfil the law of Christ" (Gal. vi, 2). The Apostle does not mean here simply the mutual bearing of the common adversities and afflictions of life; much less, the assistance of the weak by the strong. He means all that, to be sure, but he means very much more, for he penetrates to the essential motive of the sympathetic helpfulness of Christ, as he clearly indicates in what precedes.

"Brethren" he says, "even if a man be overtaken in any trespass, ye which are spiritual restore such an one, in the spirit of meekness; looking to thyself, lest thou also be tempted" (vi, 1). Every man is your brother, and though, for various reasons you may be stronger or more spiritual than he, *his* weaknesses and sins are, by that fine sympathetic understanding which love gives, *your* sins and weaknesses. Therefore, instead of congratulating yourself upon your superiority, even while you help him; rather, in meekness, take upon yourself his burden, as if it were your burden. Thus you fulfil the law of Christ's atoning love, who became sin for us.

After the same manner, the Apostle says to the Romans: "Now we that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves. . . . For Christ also pleased not himself: but, as it is written, The reproaches of them that reproached thee fell upon me" (Rom. xv, 1-3).

This is what every true mother does for her son. She takes upon herself his reproaches, she bears his faults as her own; or, as nobody else, seeks to protect, defend, and excuse him against his accusers. Whereas we make out the worst case *against* him, her love makes out the best case *for* him. And her sympathizing love is but a symbol of that all-atoning love of God in Christ, whose law it is our highest privilege to fulfil.

Besides, the Apostle adds, so far as you are concerned, if you have any inclination to boast about your strength and spirituality in being so good as to help the weak: "Look to thyself, lest thou also be tempted" (Gal. vi, 1). Yonder drunkard or harlot is the possibility of any one of us, in other times and places. We may pride our-

selves on being too fine and self-contained to descend to such coarse brutal sins; but there are sins, if the estimates of Christ are true, of pride, hardness, insincerity, selfish ambition, and self-righteousness, which under forms of conventional respectability, are very much more culpable and deep.

Moreover, when inclined to thank God that we are better than other men, it is as well to remember that most of our virtues are due to an absence of temptation, or to natural endowments for which we are entitled to no personal credit.

Sympathy Increases the Understanding and the Power to Help.

So it was that the strong and faithful Son of God was made sin for us, though he knew no sin. "Wherefore, it behooved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted" (Heb. ii, 17-18). "For we have not a high priest that can not be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but one that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. iv, 15).

It is this feeling *with* us, springing out of a love *for* us, that runs throughout all the words of Christ and his apostles; and we shall find that the great expansive epochs of the Church were inspired by that same compassionate love of Christ, which streams out to save the sinful and to help all those in need. Indeed, we may say that it is out of the Atonement, as revealing the compassionate love of God in Christ, that the Atonement, as *expiatory* and *vicarious*, naturally proceeds.

The Atonement as Expiatory.

Liberal theology, in our day, has strongly condemned the notion of expiation in the Atonement, but in so doing has destroyed the wheat with the tares. That God, in order to maintain his righteous government, should be satisfied to exact the penalty for sin from the innocent instead of from the guilty, offends, it is true, every moral sense, destroys moral responsibility, and makes God out to be simply an indifferent tyrant, rather than the just ruler of the world. It opposes

the teachings of both the Old and New Testaments, and is but a crude dualistic anthropomorphism.

But expiation, in its true meaning, is an essential expression of the moral reason, and is an assertion of the changeless integrity of the moral law, as the Eternal Will of the Cosmos. No man can offend against that law and escape. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die" (Ez. xviii, 4). "The wages of sin is death" (Rom. vi, 23). "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Gal. vi, 7).

If I have wronged any man, I have disturbed the moral balance of the universe, which I alone can restore. This sacred integrity of the moral law is expressed in the Church's imposition of penance—not the ascetic penance, meant to scourge and subdue the flesh—but the penance that meets the demands of penitence.

The Culpability of Sin, a Universal Conviction.

That sin deserves a punishment that must be met, is a universal conviction. How often we hear a man regret some past wrong-doing by saying: "I shall never forgive myself," indicating that his inner moral nature has passed sentence which must be met.

This moral sense was found in ancient Egypt, Assyria, and Greece, where some sort of future was conceived which no man could escape and which determined his fate, according to the law of right and wrong. It is found in the great Hindu doctrine of Karma. It is the sting of remorse. It is the declaration of the enlightened moral nature in every man. No man above mere animalism, wants or will permit another to bear the penalty of his wrong-doing—that would be another sin. To be a man and maintain his own moral integrity, he demands to settle the score for himself.

And no one can escape the penalty. For the moral law, like God whom it expresses, is omnipotent and omnipresent. Or, like an all-pervasive gravitation, it is equally present in every place and equally operative. Ascend into heaven, descend into hell, take the wings of the morning and fly to the uttermost parts of the sea, and the moral law is there. No change of time and place can remove a man from his sin.

Two errors have confused our view of the inescapable and compelling power of the moral law. First, it has been thought that a man's sin is so great and infinitely culpable that he himself can not atone for it, but must look for some infinite substitute. Whereas

the same moral freedom that has made it possible for him to sin, makes it possible for him to expiate his sin.

Expiation is Moral Transformation.

In the second place, expiation is mistaken for what it is not. Expiation is thought to be simply bearing a penalty, so that when the penalty is borne there is release and justification. Whereas the penalty as we have seen, is the result of a perverse will, and is not an end in itself, but a pedagogy that drives a man to the will of good.

To will wrong, is to strike discord into the real harmonious order of things; to will right, which is the only means of overcoming the discord, is the end aimed at by the penalty, and is the only true expiation. "Cease to do evil, and learn to do well," says the Prophet (Is. i, 17). "Repent" says Jesus, μετανοεῖτε, change your mind and go in the other direction; that is, turn from the will of self, to the will of God (Mk. i, 15). "Be transformed," says Paul, "by the renewing of your mind, so that ye may know what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God" (Rom. xii, 2). This is the only real expiation, for it is the only thing that can possibly restore the moral balance, which sin has destroyed; make old wrongs right; meet squarely the penalty and cancel it; restore and atone. For this alone can bring man back into harmony with the Cosmic Will, and thus destroy sin, the perpetual occasion of the penalty.

The Penalty of Sin Individual, the Results Communal.

Now, if this individual expiation covered the whole problem, there would be no meaning in the expiatory Atonement of Christ. But the fact that our moral actions, especially, bring us into relation with all other moral beings, gives to the penalty for sin more than an individual bearing.

The weight of moral responsibility is an expression of the fact that the penalty of my sin falls upon others as well as upon myself. Or, it is more accurate to distinguish by saying that, while the results fall upon others, the penalty, which I alone can pay, is my own. In any case, my sin is not a private matter; the solidarity of human interests makes its effects extend on every hand. It vitiates and poisons all the currents of life, or scatters tares over every fruitful field.

It is in this sense, we may say, that every man who sins imposes his penalty upon others, and, in his measure, bears the penalty of others.

So that the suffering of the cross was the weight of others' sins imposed upon the innocent victim. There was nothing in Jesus to justify punishment. His perfect obedience called for no pedagogical retribution. It was our error and sin that inflicted upon him the burden of sorrow.

And so long as our sin lasts, the Christ makes expiation. Whenever and wherever men sin, they "crucify the Son of God afresh and put him to open shame" (Heb. vi, 6). Or abstractly speaking, they attack and defy, in their self-willed illusions, the whole moral order of Reality and thus intrude into what is harmony a perpetual source of discord. So that every lie, every impure impulse and motive, every stubborn prejudice, every calculation of hypocrisy, every thought of malice or perfidy, goes over beyond the individual sinner and lays its baneful penalty of suffering upon the innocent victim, always represented in the expiating Christ; drives the nail into the outstretched hands of the sufferer; thrusts deeper the spear into his bleeding side; and crushes the thorns more cruelly upon his sacred head.

That is, in general, the solidarity of all human interests is so intimate and complete that the penalty of wrong-doing always has been and always will be carried over into the expiatory suffering of others. And for the same reason, it must be remarked, the converse is true, viz.: that the reward of right-doing is carried over to the welfare of others.

The bearing of this upon the suffering of Jesus, as an expiatory Atonement, is clearly seen, when we go back to the sympathetic aspect of the Atonement, which represents the mission of Jesus as a manifestation of the all-enfolding Love of God, streaming out to save man in his direst need.

Thus, reflecting the Love of the Father, Jesus first, in his compassion, suffers *with* men, whom he, therefore, comes to rescue; and then, in order to do so, must meet the conditions of his saving work and suffer *because* of men, that is, though innocent, share the results of their wrong-doing.

The Atonement as Vicarious.

But this brings us a step forward to the vicarious aspect of the Atonement, in which we may say, is expressed its deepest significance.

In his divine compassion, Jesus endures the penalty of our wrong-doing, because he is willing to suffer *for* us. That is, he does for us,

at a great cost to himself, that which we can not do for ourselves, and which makes possible our reconciliation with God. It is an Atonement *for* us, in order that the Atonement may be effected *in* us; it is the Cosmic Reason, as the Eternal Outstreaming Love of God, reflected in the Divine Son, which thus reveals its own redeeming nature, and which alone is able to accomplish the saving work.

Now, the especial point of emphasis, is that the supreme value of the Atonement is the specific work which Christ did for us, and not the suffering which that work involved. The suffering is a direct condemnation of the conditions from which we had to be rescued; and, at the same time, reveals not only the priceless value of the work done, but the exalted nobility of him who wrought it.

The Great Need; and Difficulty of the Work to be Done.

To understand the greatness of the work thus done for us, both in its difficulty and in the suffering it necessarily involved, we must try to present to ourselves the contrast between the Redeemer and those whom he would redeem.

We must picture this exalted, moral personality, fully conscious of what God is; what therefore, his immanent providence in the world is; what man is; and what the true order of human fellowship is—all seen in their reality, and not obscured by illusory appearances, misunderstandings, and perversities.

Then, we must picture the actual world into which he came, its ignorance about God and his providences, its inveterate prejudices about man and his social relations, its vanities and self-conceits, its lust for worldly pleasure and power, its self-assertion, self-righteousness, and ill-will. Finally, we must picture this noble and enlightened, moral personality as voluntarily taking upon himself the responsibility of lifting this whole mass of deep-seated ignorance and wrong from the life of man; or of undertaking the great redemptive mission of proclaiming the Truth, which is the Good Tidings of freedom from error, of release from sin; or which is a call to the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, where no longer the confusing lust and discordant ill-will of man, but the enlightening purity and harmonious good-will of God prevails, and where men become the children of the Divine Father, and the world the place of his loving providences:—and we have all the elements of a painful struggle, and the bitter tragedy of suffering and the cross.

Enlightenment and Rescue.

We are thus presented with the picture of one who himself lives in the world of Reality, with its Truth and Goodness, and its consequent harmonious Beauty and happiness, descending, as it were, from the light of day into the dark cave, where men live among the shadows and illusions of their mistakes in thought and perversities of will, with all the consequent discord, strife, ugliness, wandering, confusion, disease, pain, and death, in order that he might strike off their chains and lead them upward to the light.

Thus it was that Jesus took upon himself the weight of our errors and sins, felt them more deeply than we ourselves, and patiently bore the bitter resentment, which truth and goodness always arouses in the self-conceit of error and the self-will of sin; and did so *for* us that he might rescue us from unreality, and lure us upward toward the Reality of freedom and self-realization.

The necessity of his work for us, lay in our own weakness and incapacity. If, at times, a sense of our own misery and degradation came upon us, or we caught glimpses of a higher and better world, we knew no way of escape, nor, if we did, had no power to follow it. He therefore descended with his glad and luminous Evangel of joyous freedom, to raise us from the worldly dreams and dark fantastic illusions of our ignorance, false conceptions, impure impulses, and ill-will, in order that he might bear us upward to the world of Light and Reality.

Opposed by Those He Would Save, He Did not Turn Back.

His insight into our need and his solicitude for our welfare were such that he would not pause, in his redemptive mission, in spite of the misunderstanding, and bitter opposition of those he would rescue, even though they resented and opposed him, charged his motives to Satan, and attributed his affliction, imposed by themselves, to the just hand of God.

Enchanted and bewitched, as it were, by their own chains and blindness, they were unwilling to be released, to be roused from the lethargy and comfort of their error, or from the ease and pleasure of their sin. But he would bate no jot in the faithful discharge of his divine vocation, until his great saving work for others was done, though they met him with contempt, slander, ridicule, persecution, and the ignomy of the gibbet. Great God! What if he had renounced his

heaven-inspired mission! What if he had deserted and failed us! What, if in the bitter darkness of trial, when all, even God it seemed for a moment, had deserted and failed *him*, he had flinched, drawn back, compromised, sunk down in the face of danger and suffering to the level of common-place, conventional prudence and comfort, which we regard ourselves so very shrewd and wise, if by our little, pettifogging chicaneries of selfish egoism and self-assertion, we can secure!

But he did not fail: he did not turn back! Unblenched, he stood firm against the wild beasts of passion and selfishness that raved about him; against the fierce storms of wounded pride, ignorance, prejudice, and self-righteousness that furiously beat upon him. He did not yield to flattery, he was not spoiled by popularity, he would not compromise, he would not be amiable and prudential, he rejected the comfort and complacency of averages, and the allurements of worldly success.

The awful, tragic moment of decision for the fate of a world had come. Shall error, sin, and death rule man; or Truth, Goodness, and Life: shall Satan, with his lying illusions of lust and ill-will; or God, with his realities of holiness and love triumph, in human history? By the arbitrament of that hour, man was saved. The faithful Shepherd of his people stood firm, and stands firm; and the gates of hell—the illusions of error and sin—shall not prevail against him.

What a light, what a saving strength of hope and joy, would be destroyed out of the life of man, if the work of Jesus for us were abolished from the earth! Plato, with his noble words about the beauty of Truth, could not save us. The Stoics, with their amiable theories about humanity and their stern submission to divine providence, could not save us. Buddhism, with its blissful ecstasies of Nirvana, can not save us; the Vedanta, with its blissful ecstasies of Brahman, can not save us.

Buddhism loses God in man; Vedantism loses man in God, and both lose the world as an illusion. Plato and the Stoics tremblingly speculate about God and man, and turn from the irredeemable world of nature and of history, with vague hopes to a still more vague future.

But Jesus, as the Divine Son, reflecting the Truth and Love of the Divine Father, saves man in the Kingdom of God, which reveals the luminous Beauty of the world of nature, and the purpose of a rational, regenerating law of goodness in the world of history. His

prayer sets forth the ultimate and objective goal of all rational evolution:

“Our Father which art in heaven,
Hallowed be thy name.
Thy kingdom come.
Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.”

Had Jesus not sacrificed all for us, in order to open the way to Reality, and to make our atonement possible with the Truth, the Goodness, and the Beauty of God, then the great mission must needs have been laid upon some other of like moral nobility, rational insight, faithfulness and power. Else we should have remained dead in trespasses and sins, should have continued the unequal struggle between appearance and Reality, between what is and what ought to be; or should have been left to wander at will in the fathomless abyss of the void and inane Infinite.

But what we could not do for ourselves, he did for us by bringing to full expression in himself the moral reason, or the Love of God, as the supreme, creative energy of the Truth, by which he was able to fight the battle against the combined powers of error and sin, and, overcoming, open the way for us into the harmonious Beauty of the World of Reality and of God.

The Atonement as Exemplary.

We are thus brought directly to what we have called the exemplary phase of the Atonement. Emerson has well said that the real significance of Jesus is that he showed man, for the first time, what he really is, in his inherent greatness. He thus rendered man the greatest service, because, as Goethe would say, he, more than all others, enhanced the meaning and value of life.

Israel, under the law and the prophets, recognized himself as the chosen servant of Yahweh; but in the fullness of time, with a progressive moral refinement, that conception unfolded to its full meaning in the consciousness of Jesus, who brought in the Dispensation of the Divine Son.

This is everywhere the burden of his teachings. He himself the well-beloved son, reveals to men that they too are the sons of God. Hence there was no incongruity in his saying to his disciples: “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.”

If he would reassure them in the midst of their doubts and fears, he reminded them that God, as their Heavenly Father, kept watch

over all their needs; even if they wandered into sin, the Father was ever looking for their return; and always they were to realize who they were, the children of God, and act worthy of such a high origin. He calls them no longer servants but friends, and he would establish a fellowship of brethren, actuated by the one, universal law of goodness, which is the supreme law of the one universal Heavenly Father of all men.

Man Is Called to be like Christ.

Consequently, as the Divine Son, he is man's perfect exemplar, and so had the authority to say: I am the way, the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father but by me. Believe in me; follow me. The greatest of the Apostles got this meaning. He writes to the Roman Christians: "If any man hath not the spirit of Christ, he is none of his" (viii, 9). His ideal for the Ephesians was that they might become full grown men and attain "unto the stature of the fulness of Christ" (iv, 13). He explains the transformation that had gone on in himself by saying that "it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me" (Gal. ii, 20). And, in contrasting the dispensation of Moses, as the obedient servant, and Christ, as the begotten son, the Apostle explains that, since the veil which obscured the face of Moses is now taken away, in the revelation of Christ, there is set before us the high ideal of becoming like him: "For we all, with unveiled faces, reflecting as in a mirror, the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as from the Lord, the Spirit" (II Cor. iii, 15).

In the same way, St. John recognizes that it is man's inherent right to be like Christ. As he loved us, we must love each other. As he died for us, we should be willing to die for the brethren. And we have a very simple means of knowing whether or not we have this new life of the Sonship abiding in us. "He that saith he abideth in him, ought himself also to walk, even as he walked" (I Jno. ii, 6), for, "as he is, even so are we in this world" (iv, 17). And the power which he gave us all to become the sons of God (Jno. i, 12), shall be manifested when, seeing him as he is, we shall be like him (I Jno. iii, 1-2).

Christ, the Typical Man.

Nothing is more evident in the Gospels and Epistles than that Jesus, the Christ, is the true man, the typical man, as the son of God, created

or begotten in the divine likeness and image, and reflecting the divine Beauty of Truth, manifesting Goodness; and that the mission of Jesus is to reveal this real life to man, and call him to freedom and self-realization as a son of God.

This is the central significance of the incarnation. God becoming man, or man becoming the Son of God, in human form. Jesus thus lives through the life of man, as his exemplar, to show him what he really is, and what he is to think and do.

The Church has always taught, but always obscured this exemplary aspect of the Atonement: first, by raising Jesus to an exalted, qualitative difference of nature above man, who, therefore, can not imitate him; and, secondly, by regarding the true Christian life as possible only after death in the supernatural, spiritual world.

Whereas, with the utmost simplicity and directness, Jesus calls his disciples to follow him in doing even the mighty works he does, in subduing and controlling the forces of nature. He overcomes death and vanishes before their eyes into the spiritual world, promising them that where he is there they are to be also. That is, he lives before the eyes of man, for the first time, as the true son of God, at home in God's world, and therefore, by the bestowal of God, master of it; and the whole weight of his Glad Tidings is the message to man: Be as I am, free and at home in the Father's House.

The Atonement as Forensic.

While, however, it may be generally admitted that the Atonement, as (1) sympathetic, (2) expiatory, (3) vicarious, and (4) exemplary, sets forth how Christ suffered *with* us, *because of* us, and *for* us, in order that the Atonement might be affected *in* us; it is possible that objection may be made to regarding the Atonement also as *forensic*, or intercessory, that is, to regarding Christ as a Daysman, before the Court of Divine Justice, or as an Advocate with God the Father.

The supercilious critic may treat with contempt the pious rhymes, as a gross anthropomorphism:

"He ever lives above for me to intercede:
His own redeeming blood, his precious blood to plead."

But, nevertheless, it contains a profound truth for those who have need. For those who are already good enough—in their own estimation—the Divine Love has nothing to offer; and indeed, for them, is superfluous, since they are able—as they suppose—to save them-

selves. But for the wayward and sinful, who have become painfully conscious of how lost and helpless they are, without the divine compassion and love, how deep their need and how culpable their sin, there is always needed an assurance that the way for their return and forgiveness has been authoritatively opened. They are all too deeply conscious of having no deserts in themselves, no power of redemption, and would sink into utter despair, could they not see where the "blood of Christ streams in the firmament," at once the deepest condemnation of their sins, and their only hope—a perpetual assurance that the work of Divine Saving Love has been done once for all, and is always done for the penitent and needy soul.

"He ever lives above, for me to intercede,
His own redeeming blood, his precious blood to plead.
With confidence, I now draw nigh,
And Father, Abba Father cry:—"

is only a vivid dramatic way of saying that the work of Jesus in human history is an accomplished, objective fact, and forever guarantees the forgiving, saving Love of God, which it reveals.

Jesus Has Won the Honors Men Have Paid Him.

It is not strange that his fellow men should have raised Jesus to the throne of God, and paid him divine honors; or that they should have followed him, with joyous and unquestioning devotion, through toil, tribulation, and adversity, even unto death. Aside from any metaphysical conceptions as to his pre-existent nature or his post mortem glory, he has fully deserved all the devotion and honor which he has received at their hands. For, no matter what theories we may form about him, his concrete, actual service in history for man, is of indispensable and ultimate value. Wandering in the deserts of the earthly life, man's one supreme need is to know the way back to God; to find reconciliation, atonement, which is indeed the ultimate aim toward which the whole creation groans and travails in pain, in its natural and rational evolution, struggling toward its great end.

Jesus opened that way; he lived that way; he was that way. For he was an embodiment of what man really is, a son of God. And, reflecting the Love of the Father, he had compassion on men, and *because of* them and *for* them, willingly took upon himself the burden of their errors and sins, that he might lead them into the kingdom of the children of God.

The Atonement Deepened and Widened by Reinterpretation.

In thus reinterpreting the Atonement of Christ, we bring its essential meaning more intimately into relation with our entire rational life, by discovering its ground in the whole, objective order of things. It is not an arbitrary and supernatural invasion of the world, by which God is to win back what has always been his own; but is rather an expression of the Creative, Cosmic Energy, or the Eternal Will of God, which, as changeless justice, inflicting without favor the penalty of sin, is the very guarantee that that justice is but love distributed, including all and saving all. That terrible, resistless on-marching law, upon which the pedagogy of pain rests, is the expression of the absolute Cosmic, Moral Reason which, as Eternal Goodness, is therefore at the same time the compassionate, enduring, healing power that alone saves and redeems man.

Others besides Jesus Atone for the Errors and Sins of the World.

When we get this view of the cosmic nature of the Atonement, we see that it is not confined to the work of Jesus. Everywhere that men suffer to render a real service to their fellow men, there is a vicarious work done. The scientist and inventor, the hardy explorer and pioneer, solve problems, meet difficulties, overcome dangers, or remove barriers for us who come after.

Some Dalton or Chevreul, in their chemical researches, run a thousand personal risks to make possible for us what we now deem indispensable conveniences. Some Lockyear starves himself and family, while toiling his entire life to turn a useless, viscid gum into an article of widespread and daily use. Or perhaps it is some Columbus who has to endure contradiction, and stand firm against bitter jealousies, ridicule, and stupid prejudice, before he can give us a new world. Such men have stood in our place, relieved us of labors we should otherwise have had to do, have saved us from hardships and deprivations we should have had to bear, and have handed on all the comforts and amenities of life which we enjoy, often, to our shame, without thought of gratitude for what they have done.

But more especially is it the patriot, the statesman, the reformer, that save us by their vicarious suffering; for while the scientist, inventor, or explorer may labor only for personal advantage or for fame, these

are morally conscious of making sacrifices for the welfare of their fellow men. It is our Luthers, our Hampdens, and Cromwells, our Washingtons and Lincolns who faced danger and personal loss, in order to make our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness secure. These men lifted the yoke of oppression and wrong from our shoulders and bore it for us. Meet it is that they should be first in the memories and hearts of their countrymen.

The Atonement of Christ, the Universal Type.

In the light of such self-sacrificing effort, there is revealed that which distinguishes the vicarious work of Jesus for man above that of all others, and makes it the unique event it is in human history. It stands as the typical or representative atonement, because Jesus himself was fully conscious of what it meant, viz.: his entire devotion to the Kingdom of God with the purpose of leading erring, sinful man forward to the enjoyments and privileges of that kingdom, at no matter what cost to himself. And what gave efficacy and dynamic power to this his self-chosen mission was that it revealed the outstreaming love of God to all men. "My father worketh until now and I work." "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (John v, 17 and xiv, 9).

It was for this reason that Paul could say: "Seeing it is God that said, Light shall shine out of darkness, who shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ" (II Cor. iv, 6). Or again: "In whom we have our redemption, the forgiveness of sins; who is the image of the invisible God" (Col. i, 15). And the writer to the Hebrews, who sees the progressive purpose of Divine Goodness unfolding through the past, sees that purpose culminate in the word spoken unto us, at the end of these days, in his son, who is "the effulgence of his glory, the very image of his substance" (Heb. i, 3).

It is not a code of morality that constitutes the Glad Tidings of Jesus—although that is necessarily involved—nor is it a new social order—although that must necessarily follow—but it is the revelation, reflection, or embodiment in Jesus of the ever-present, redeeming Love to God to man. It is this fundamental centrality of the Love of God, as the eternal, creative, outstreaming Cosmic Will of Good, in the life and death of Jesus, that transforms his gibbet, a sign of worldly ignominy and shame, into the Cross, the sign of his glory; and makes

his Sacrificial Atonement for mankind the turning point in the history of the world.

As thus representing the Cosmic Will, it comes to have a quintessential meaning for our scientific era in that "the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed," as the Unknowable of sciences, is revealed, in the Atonement of Christ, as the Infinite and Eternal Love of the Divine Father of man. To it, is all sacrificing service for others related as beams to the central sun, whether that service be only the fluttering solicitude of the little wren, brooding over her helpless fledglings, the reckless fury of the she-bear in protecting her cub; or the toil of the scientist for the truth, the devotion of the patriot to his country, and the martyrdom of the saint for righteousness. All service, all good-will, the entire cosmic purpose of the Divine Love, are typically summed up, represented, and expressed in the Atonement of Christ.

The Historic Jesus is the Christ.

But the modern critic may perhaps object that all this is not really in Jesus, but is only an ideal built up around him by his devoted followers. Suppose the objection is granted, so far as an artificial conception of him has been formed out of a discursive logic or an abstract metaphysics. We still have to go back to the sources and ask: How is it that the ideal got built up about *him*? How are we to account for the enthusiasm and devotion of a Peter, a John, or a Paul, who consciously carried back their inspiration to the actual, living, crucified, and risen Jesus? In the glowing words of the Gospels and Epistles, we are not dealing with discursive argument or abstraction, but with the higher poetic imagination, in which lies the rational intuition that beholds the truth; and here we are always dealing with a specific, historical person, in whom was the power and potency of the Ideal.

The historic Jesus was the supreme, dynamic force that aroused or called forth the full expression of the moral reason in all those spiritual geniuses of the early Christian community, who saw the moral reason embodied not only in man but in nature, as an integral part of Reality; and who saw that, while in itself the Cosmic Moral Reason is independent of all temporal accidents or historical personalities, it must nevertheless, in order to be known, find definite embodiment in individual

men, and did, in the purpose of God, find full embodiment in the person of Jesus.

If Jesus was not all that he is traditionally supposed to be, he it was, at any rate, who has made possible the thought of man's ultimate freedom and self-realization. He opened the way to the true interpretation of God, and hence, of man and of nature; and, in so doing, gave to science and art their only worthy and real significance, as a knowing of God's Thought and an imitation of God's Work. He gave to the Hellenic world of Truth and Beauty its ultimate meaning and ground in the Hebrew revelation of the Creative, Eternal Goodness.

He released, expressed, and centered in himself all those evolving, progressive tendencies and forces at work in the past of Israel, moving toward a great end; and he made possible the subsequent mergence of the confluent streams of Hebrew and Hellenic history into a new history of universal man, which is the progressive coming of the Kingdom of God on earth, wherein the will of good is the universal law of human fellowship, as the only condition of man's knowledge and possession of the world.

His Gospel was the dawn of a new era; he himself was the first born among many brethren, the anointed Christ, revealing the dispensation of the Eternal Son. And in proportion as human consciousness unfolds to an understanding of and obedience to that Gospel, it comes more and more to be seen that, as in Adam, the old order of mistaken thought and perverse will, all die; so, in Christ, the new order of Truth and Goodness, all shall be made alive (I Cor. xv, 22).

The Pedagogy of Pain Reaches its Logical Terminus in the Atonement.

In the sacrificial Atonement of Christ, the pedagogy of pain is brought to its logical termination. In that he who least deserved to suffer, suffered most, error and sin are condemned and destroyed as the only sources of discord and suffering, and hence as unreal; while Truth and Goodness are revealed as the only ground of Beauty and harmonious Life, and hence as the ultimate Reality.

As our past progress has been inspired and guided by the ideals of Christ, so whatever may be the future of human history, it must turn upon a true, rational interpretation of the work of Jesus for man. And that work is nothing less than a reconciliation of the Hellenic

understanding of Truth and the Hebrew willing of Goodness; or, in more abstract terms, the unveiling of the indissoluble Unity of Thought and Will in the objective Cosmic Order. For when the Atonement is viewed in its entire meaning for man, it is seen, on the one hand, to uncover and rebuke the unreality and culpability of the material errors of sense, out of which rise the egoistic sins of self, as the source of all loss, confusion, discord, and misery, and the cause of all injustice, oppression, innocent failure and guilty success; and, on the other hand, to reveal the alluring, harmonious Beauty of Truth and Goodness, as the only Reality which, as Eternal Life, it is the end of man's rational evolution to realize in himself, as a son of God, in the Kingdom of God.

The Final Question of Purpose.

But a final question forces itself upon us. Suppose we do find in the pedagogy of pain a rational providence, rebuking the unreality of error and sin, and calling to the Reality of Truth and Goodness, what meaning can there be in a discipline of pain that only ends in the condemnation and destruction of itself? Or, if Truth and Goodness are the only Reality, whence has its origin that dispensation of error and sin through which man wanders, ever chastised by the pedagogy of pain?

The reader who has followed the present course of thought thus far will doubtless anticipate that our answer, once more, will be found in the conception of a rational, purposive evolution; and to the light which that fertile conception may throw upon the possibility of error and sin, as something unreal, in a Real World of Truth and Goodness, we must now turn.

CHAPTER IX.

ERROR AND SIN, SUBSERVIENT TO TRUTH AND GOODNESS.

WE have now reached the final and most difficult problem that confronts Reason: the existence of unreality in a world of Reality. It is simply axiomatic to say that the Substance of Reality is the objective existence of Infinite Truth, and that the Truth constitutes an absolute perfection of Cosmic Beauty, because it is the manifestation of the Cause of Reality, as the Eternal Will of Goodness.

It is just as axiomatic to say that so long as man does not think the Cosmic Thought (Truth) and will the Cosmic Will (Goodness) he is simply wandering in an unreal world of his own subjective illusions, made up of his mistakes in thought and his perversities of will; and consequently, fails to enter into the happiness and life of the Cosmic Beauty (Unity of Rational Order).

And since man's only real life is to know the True and will the Good, which together constitute the Beauty of his rational freedom and self-realization, as an intelligent, moral, and æsthetic being, it is also axiomatic that a pedagogy of pain, which unswervingly warns him against error and sin and calls him to Truth and Goodness, is an indispensable and beneficent, rational providence.

The Paradox of Unreality in a World of Reality.

But it seems like an utter paradox, a blank contradiction, an insoluble mystery, that in a world of Reality, which is alone the Beauty of Truth and Goodness, there could ever exist, or should ever arise, the deceptive and illusory unrealities of error and sin, with the consequent need for a discipline of pain. How did error and sin get a start, to begin with? How did man ever come to regard the material world as real, when the only Reality is Mind; and consequently begin to lust after it and fall into the sins of ill-will, over the endeavor to possess it?*

*This question, it will be observed, goes deeper than that regarding the *genesis* of error and sin, which has already been discussed (Cap. IV) and which rests upon the fact of man's rational development; for we are not satisfied with the fact, but demand to know the *reason* for the fact. We no longer ask *what* and *how*, but *why*.

To throw the responsibility off on some Ahriman, or evil principle, as a rival to some Ormuzd, or good principle—or upon some Satan, bent on marring God's creation—is only a weak and superficial evasion. For Ahriman or Satan must have got a start in a real world of Truth and Goodness, and that start is what constitutes the problem. Besides, we have learned that the Universe is One, or an Absolute Reality, that includes all; and it is repugnant to reason and, indeed, impossible for it to think of a second reality, coming in to interfere with, or disturb the first reality.

And, although we are approaching light when we say that error and sin are, after all, only subjective illusions, wholly confined to human consciousness, that is, have no origin and existence in Objective Reality; yet they are here in all their stubborn actuality, with their consequent confusion and pain, and, therefore, must be accounted for as something belonging to the one, all-inclusive order of things.

Well, Reason has not shirked this problem, and we must always believe with Hegel, that since all the confusions and contradictions in life arise *in* Reason, they must be capable of solution *by* Reason.

The Aryan and Hebrew Solutions.

Before, however, seeking an explanation in the light of our modern forms of thought, it may be well to glance at the solutions offered by the great past. We have spoken of the Aryan theoretical genius and the Hebrew ethical genius as both seeking salvation from the ills of life, the one regarding salvation as the ideal of science, or knowing the Truth; the other, regarding it as the ideal of ethics, or willing Goodness; and each finding therein, according to his own way, the complete happiness of freedom and self-realization.

Since the Aryan looked upon error, and the Hebrew looked upon sin, as the source of all evil and the barrier to be removed from his path to the goal, both regarded the pedagogy of pain as a rational discipline, to warn against error or sin, and to call to Truth or Goodness.

Plato Sees no Reason in the Fall.

We may say that, in attempting the solution of this problem, the Greek Aryan genius reached its loftiest expression in Plato who, finding this sensible world in which we live wholly phenomenal, if not

quite illusory, suffered from that spiritual nostalgia or longing for his spiritual home in the world of Reality, whence he felt himself exiled and whither he would return, to gaze enraptured upon the ineffable Beauty of Truth.

Plato was clear enough as to how the soul came to fall from its original happy perfection. It was because of that fiery, untamed, ugly steed, Sense, yoked with Reason, which, impatient of the bit, blindly plunging and tearing at the rein, finally dragged the charioteer down to the enjoyments and entanglements of the flesh, with all its insane pleasures, confusions, and sufferings.

But Plato was not so clear as to any rational value to be gained by this wandering in the world of sense. It was so dark, oppressive, irrational, illusive, meaningless, as to arouse in him only the desire to escape and get back to whence he had come.

The Hindu Seeks Spiritual Reality.

When, however, we turn to the Hindu Aryan, we not only find him as earnest and determined to get back to Reality, out of his errors and illusions, but we find him carrying his explanation of life so far as to give some meaning and value to the wandering itself. It is not wholly irrational, but fits into the whole plan and, as it were, prepares the way of salvation to the great end of knowing the Truth, or of attaining Reality.

In search for the objective Truth, it became evident to the Hindu that the objects of material sense were uncertain, transient, deceptive, and illusory, failing not only to furnish reliable knowledge, but to afford, what all men seek, happiness, or that state of the soul which, as being not only harmonious but lasting, might be called real.

Where, then, could Reality be found, a Reality the objective truth of which is guaranteed by its consistency, permanence, and consequent power to happyfy or give the assurance of real life? Only in the Soul itself, in the Mind, the inner Self. Here all the conditions of Reality are met; an abiding rest, amid all change, and a serene, undisturbed happiness, amid all sorrow. This is the objective Truth, all else is error and illusion. But nevertheless, the error and illusion are here; they are something that must be dealt with and explained; they are not simply nothing.

There are two leading schools of thought in India which have

dealt with the problem, in something like a satisfactory, philosophical way, the Sankhya and the Vedanta.

Value of Error.

The Sankhya whose foundations were laid, according to tradition, by Kapila, a generation before Gotama, is a rationalistic dualism, giving to the world of error and illusion something like an objective place along side of Reality. The Vedanta is a spiritual monism which, while it asserts the sole Reality of Brahman, the Absolute One, as Mind, Spirit, Truth, forever dwelling unmoved and serene in its perfect knowledge and perfect bliss, nevertheless, gives to the phenomenal world a sort of objective reality as a transient emanation, through millions of years, from and a retraction, through other millions of years, into Brahman.

Since, therefore, in both these great wisdom-religions, the world of experience, though error and illusion, has some sort of ground in reality, it must be found to subserve some rational use. And, indeed, in both it does subserve the same use. That is, strange as it may seem, error and illusion serve as a means to rescue the soul out of error and illusion, and to develop it toward its ultimate state of salvation in objective Truth. Error, by its own inner contradictions, necessarily destroys itself, by awaking in man the sense of Truth, or by bringing it to light in his consciousness:

The Sankhya Dualism.

The two Realities, according to the Sankhya, are an infinite number of Souls, or Parushas, considered as constituting one reality; and Matter, or Pra-kriti, the primal world-stuff.*

The souls have become, through *ignorance*, entangled in *pra-kriti*, so that salvation is to destroy this ignorance through *knowledge*, which is the only means of rescuing the souls from their entanglements in the illusions and sufferings of material existence.

The supreme problem, then, for every soul is a scientific one, and the method of salvation is that of concentrated meditation. The soul must come to see that, in reality, it is not and never was entangled in matter; it only *seems* to be so, under the illusions of material error.

* Not matter in our sense of an extended, lifeless stuff in space; but rather a threefold unity of three inter-blended psychic elements, viz.: goodness or joy, passion or suffering, and darkness or apathy, which, in their various relations make up the entire material world.

It is really unfallen, pure, and free; and always was so, though it does not *know* it. Its sole business, therefore, is to overcome this ignorance of its unsullied separateness from matter, or this illusion of conjunction with matter, by *discriminating clearly* between itself, as already unfallen, pure, and free, and matter, in which it erroneously believes itself to be entangled, but in which it has, in objective fact, no real part. Once this discrimination is clearly made, or the soul comes to *know* what it really is, and salvation is attained.

But to attain such an exalted state of consciousness is no easy matter; for the illusions of error are stubborn, and it may take thousands of rebirths, in accordance with the inescapable *karma*, or unsettled balance of error, in the weary *samsara*, or round of ever-recurring earthly existence.

And yet this illusory entanglement of the soul in matter and all its wanderings in error has great value, for it serves the indispensable purpose of waking the soul, as it were, to the clear and full knowledge of itself, as in reality always unfallen, pure, and free. Indeed, it is only through ignorance and illusion that the soul can really come to understand and appreciate its full self-realization. And the goal is well worth the price.

The Vedanta: Maya and the World of Reality.

In the Vedanta, the same value is attached to error and illusion; but we shall find a much nobler and more satisfactory philosophy, and a higher goal. The Vedanta is entirely under the sway of the principle of unity. There can be only One Reality; and that is Brahman, the Highest Self, or Paramatman, who is perfect knowledge and perfect bliss. Therefore, it is not in some second reality, such as matter, that we are to look for the sense-world of illusion, but in Brahman himself, or rather itself.

Out of some deep hidden desire, or out of a sense of sport, Brahman (neuter) the Only, the Undisturbed, the Changeless, the Ever-resting, emits from Itself, and then retracts into Itself, the whole cosmic order of things. The Infinite Personal God, Brahman (masculine) of popular belief—who creates and sustains the world—is not Brahman (n) but only the first and highest emanation of Brahman (n) and belongs, with the rest, to the phenomenal world of illusion, or Maya. All save Brahman (n) is Maya—the deceiver—for it gives itself out as real, when it is only the appearance of Reality.

Now, it is in this phenomenal, illusory realm of Maya that the whole drama of man's life plays itself off, and where the problem of salvation must be met and solved. So long as he takes the phenomenal world and its creator, the masculine Brahman, to be real, man is under the sway of Maya, is in *avidya*, not-knowing, ignorance. He must penetrate beyond this Maya, this illusion, to Reality, to Brahman (n); and, to do so, he must put off *avidya* for *vidya*, which is knowledge, science, truth; whereupon he finds himself one with Brahman (n). He has thus put off all illusion, has escaped all pain and death; he has lived out, or through, his *karma*, settled all balances, made all expiations, and is released from the endless *samsara* of rebirth, to return no more; he has reached the shores of light; he has reached the shores of light, where there is no more darkness, wandering and pain.*

Science, the Path to Reality.

Here release and salvation is not, as in the Sankhya, the clear discrimination between the soul and matter, for there is no such thing as a second reality, matter; but is the clear knowledge, *vidya*, that the soul, the inner self, the *atman*, has no real part in the transient world of phenomena, illusion, Maya; for, in its eternal essence, it is one, or rather identical, with Brahman (n), Paramatman, the Highest Self, in its perfect knowledge and perfect bliss.

But just as in the Sankhya, error helped to bring out the soul to a discernment of itself as distinct from matter, and thus to free it from its illusory entanglements in matter; so in the Vedanta, the whole phenomenal world of illusion, or Maya, serves to raise the personal, individual self from its limitations, and drive it toward its true realization, as the universal Highest Self, Paramatman, Brahman.

Salvation for the Theoretical Reason.

Thus, in both the Sankhya and Vedanta, while error is an illusion and simply nothing, so far as Reality is concerned, it has a rational meaning and a place, as subservient or contributory to the attain-

* This is the Vedanta: "And God shall wipe all tears from off all faces, and there shall be no more death, for the former things have passed away." Only the Christian felicity is based on a sense of moral fellowship with God, to whose love he owes his salvation; while the Vedanta felicity is self-earned, and rests on the consciousness of intellectual identity, and not moral fellowship with God.

ment of Reality. And we must admit that so far as salvation for the theoretical reason is concerned, we have reached ultimate ground.

If thought in man is to unfold to a clear appreciative knowledge of the Truth, it must be free; but if it is free, it necessarily involves the possibility of error, above which it constantly raises itself, in order to attain the Truth, toward which it as constantly moves.

Thus, while the error is an experience *in* thought, it is not a reality *of* thought, which alone is Truth. Since thought, already possessed of the *implicit* Truth, moves through its various stages of development toward consciousness of the *explicit* Truth; error, on the one hand, brings out the Truth as that which is always objectively real; while, on the other hand, Truth, in being thus brought out, reveals the hollow illusions of error and, thus revealing, destroys them. All along, error has not been a reality, but an incident in the thought experience of the unfolding mind, in its approach to the knowledge of Reality.

Hence, we may say: it is not error *as such* that has any value in bringing out the Truth, but the *experience* of error; or still more accurately, it is the *condition of a free, rational development* toward the Truth, in which the possibility of error is involved.

Evolution as a Cycle.

But while both the Sankhya and the Vedanta thus find a value in the error that must needs be, in the unfolding experience of the Self, neither of them can give a clear, rational account of *why* it should be so. For, as both of them spring out of meeting the interests of the theoretical and æsthetic reason merely, they must interpret Reality in terms of pure intelligence and pure feeling, and hence give no account of an inner, dynamic purpose of causal activity. Reality is either the unfallen, pure, free souls, or the changeless, ever-resting Brahman of perfect knowledge and perfect bliss.

Why then should these absolutely perfect souls ever become entangled and enslaved in the impure and debased matter, only to come back, after long wanderings, to the state from which they set out? Or why should the absolutely knowing and blissful Brahman emit from Itself the illusory world of Maya, only to retract it into Itself, and be as before, perfect knowledge and perfect bliss?

Hindu thought, it is true, everywhere presents an evolution, but it can give no real reason for an evolution which makes no advance.

It is an evolution that simply moves in a circle and so returns to the point whence it began.

Evolution an Advance.

The reason for this dilemma is not hard to find. Evolution means a progressive, advancing unfoldment toward some end, and as such involves the dynamic purpose of rational will. But the Hindu genius is entirely restricted to the interests of the theoretical and æsthetic reason. It presents a static resting in the enjoyment of changeless Truth. The soul, in its reality, is either pure intellection, as it is in the Sankhya; or it is identical with Brahman, in the Vedanta, which is perfect knowledge and perfect bliss.

But reason, as we have again and again seen, is not simply *thought* and *feeling*, it is also *will*; and, therefore, Reality must present itself to reason not only as Substance, in its harmonious Unity, but as Cause, also, in its Unity with Substance, or, to use the old expression, as Becoming as well as Being.

Hindu Thought Makes no Ethical Interpretation of Reality.

Hence, the ethical aspect of Reason which represents Reality as going forth in a causal purpose of good, is entirely wanting in the highest and most characteristic forms of Hindu thought.*

It is true, the supporters of Vedantism may claim that it transcends and includes ethics, and point to the pure and lofty character of Hindu saints, who are free from moral spot and wrinkle. But this is a failure to see the point at issue. The Vedantin saint does not transcend and *include* ethics; he *leaps entirely over* ethics, because his theoretical genius finds no special interest there. He has interpreted Reality as ever-resting, changeless, Infinite Thought that emits and retracts, as a logical process, an illusory world. He is predominantly under the Eleatic demand for the unity of Being, and does not make the further Heraclitic demand upon Reality that it shall also be the ever-active, ever-becoming Eternal Will, that purposively creates and sustains the world.

* There is no intention of denying here the presence in India of philosophical religions that approach what we understand by Theism, in recognizing God as Eternal Love, but the claim is that when we take the Hindu mind at its highest and best, when it is peculiarly itself, as in Vedantism, which has won the great majority of learned India, we do not find Reality interpreted as the Will of Good, but solely as the Thought of Truth, with the consequent feeling of happiness.

The entire interest in salvation, therefore, centers, for the Hindu, about that happiness which can be attained alone by knowing the Truth. The one barrier to be overcome is error, with its painful results. There is no supreme passion to obey the Will of Reality, to love God; and sin is not a primal source of disturbance.

Hence, where in a world of error and illusion, there is nothing to desire and no one to envy, and the one aim is, therefore, to withdraw entirely from the world, close the eyes to all earthly things and retire into the self, the *atman*, in order to become identical with the Paramatman, the whole of ethics is swept from the field of view or, at most, is only an incident in the attainment of higher ends.

Men are good because they absolutely vacate the realm where goodness comes into practice. And this is no more clearly seen than in the relation which Vedantism has taken toward nature and history. To develop nature, to know it and master it in the sciences is idle trifling, for it is only Maya; and to develop human society, as a social organism of sacred, morally inter-related individuals, is vain, for in reality there are no sacred, moral individuals, they too are Maya, illusion. Brahman is all, and there is nothing else. Each man, therefore, seeks to withdraw into and to become Brahman.

Hence, we are not unjustified in calling Vedantism an egoistic eudæmonism of the absolute theoretical and æsthetical Reason. It is non-moral rather than moral. Its ethics is in appearance only, and arises from the fact that it teaches every man, not to love every other man, but to leave every other man *to himself*.

Must Supplement the Aryan Theoretical by the Hebrew Ethical Reason.

While Vedantism is eminently true as far as it goes, it is not true enough, because it does not go far enough. Its one great radical defect—as the defect of all Aryan thinking, Greek as well as Hindu—is its omission of the ethical interpretation of Reality. For, in the end, Will, as Eternal Cause, is the fundamental ground of Reality, as Infinite Substance in its absolute, harmonious Unity. Will is the reason *why* Thought *is*, as the existent objective Reality, and why it is as it is.

So that it is only when, in our interpretation of the One Ultimate World-Ground or Absolute Reality, we add to the Hindu doctrine of Substantial Existent Thought the Hebrew doctrine of Causal

Creative Will, that we meet the total demands of Reason and have anything like an adequate notion of God.

The Hebrew Ethical Interpretation of Reality.

Men, it is true, have always had to think of God as accounting in some sense for the world, but it is only in the Semitic Hebrew mind, with its genius for ethics, that the full meaning of the concept of creation has come to anything like a complete rational expression. Here, the whole weight of thought and action has rested upon the Eternal, Creative, Sustaining Will, or upon the order of immutable Righteousness, as the only Cause of Nature, and the only Providence in History.

The supreme value of the Bible to us is not that it gives certain specific moral teachings. Valuable as these are, they are only the necessarily deduced implications of a fundamental ethical Principle. The supreme importance of the Bible is that it gives to us an ethical interpretation of Reality. God is not only *Substance*, Being, Thought, Mind, Spirit, *Truth*; He is also *Cause*, Becoming, Will, Creative Energy and Power, *Goodness*. If we might adapt Mr. Spencer's very excellent, abstract formula for Reality, and say: Reality is that Infinite and Eternal Will of Goodness from which all things proceed, we should have an admirably adequate philosophical summation of the whole spirit and meaning of the Hebrew ethical genius, as expressed in the Bible. In fact, we might leave Mr. Spencer's formula stand just as it is, if we could rid ourselves of his irrational agnosticism and see clearly that "Infinite and Eternal Energy" in a harmonious, rational cosmos must mean, if it means anything, Infinite and Eternal Goodness.

It is in this fundamental Hebrew ethical interpretation of Reality, as the Causal Will of Eternal Goodness, that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has its ultimate rational ground, for thought. God, the Eternal Will of Goodness, must needs beget Man, his son, as the object of his love; and create the World, or speak the Word, through which that love is manifested.

At once, evolution comes to have its sacred meaning. It is no longer a simple cycle ending where it began, but is a progressive advance by which man is brought to birth, through Nature, and then brought to maturity, through History, in attaining the goal of his rational development. While there can be no evolution in God,

the Ultimate Reality, who forever rests in his infinite and eternal perfections of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, there is an evolution in man, or of man who, through his experiences in the world, is thus brought to the freedom and self-realization of a son of God.

The Contradiction of Sin in a World of Goodness.

But this Hebrew ethical conception of Reality plunges us into deeper difficulties than ever. With some satisfaction we could accept the Hindu explanation of error as being an incidental means, involved in bringing man to a sense of the Truth; but how can we think of sin as included in the entire plan of Eternal Goodness, as a means subordinate or subservient to man's ethical development? Shall man sin, as Paul asks, that grace may abound? Or must he be wicked in order to be good? Shall we teach our children impurity, lying, stealing, in order that they may be pure, truthful, and honest? To all such questions, we must reply with the Apostle's "God forbid," for to commit sin consciously is as rationally contradictory as to put one's eyes out in order to see better. But, nevertheless, here is sin, interwoven in the whole scheme of things, and we must make the best of it.

The Hebrew Recognizes Sin as a Part of the Divine Plan.

The Hebrew genius deals in no half measures. God is the One Almighty Creator and Ruler of the world, and there is none else; and nothing can escape his permission or control. If man sins, it is because he has been endowed by his Creator with the dignity and worth of a free moral responsibility, which involves the possibility of sin, and which God does not invalidate.

And yet the Hebrew does not stop here with the fact of moral responsibility, for, on the other hand, he regards God's control so complete over the works of his hand that, if it lies in his purpose, he causes man to sin. He hardens Pharaoh's heart (Ex. vii, 3), he puts a lying spirit into the prophets (I Kings, xxii, 22), he fills the inhabitants of Jerusalem with drunkenness and, without compassion, dashes them one against another (Jer. xiii, 13-14). "I am Yahweh and there is none else, I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil: I am Yahweh that doeth all these things" (Is. xlv, 7). "Go tell this people: Hear ye, indeed, but understand not, and see ye, indeed, but perceive not. Make

the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes, lest they see with their eyes, and understand with their hearts and turn again and be healed" (Is. vi, 9-10).

Perhaps we may regard such expressions as due to an immature moral development in the consciousness of Israel; but Jesus, whose universal love for men can not be doubted, employs these last words from Isaiah, with the same motive (Matt. xiii, 14-15). To the chosen few, who are within and capable, is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, while to those without, who are incapable because they are made so, these blessings are denied.

In his intercessory prayer, the Johannine author makes Jesus say: "I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me (xvii, 9) . . . and I guarded them and not one of them perished, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled" (v, 12). Elsewhere he speaks of a certain necessity in sin. "Woe unto the world because of occasions of stumbling! for it must needs be that the occasions come; but woe to that man through whom the occasion cometh!" (Matt. xviii, 7.) "The Son of man goeth, even as it is written of him; but woe unto that man through whom the Son of man is betrayed! good were it for that man had he not been born" (Matt. xxvi, 24). Here is nothing less than a divinely appointed destiny, which means for the victim a lasting curse.

In the earliest and most reliable Gospel, Jesus is represented as saying that for those who stumble there is an eternal Gehenna "where their worm dieth not and their fire is not quenched" (Mark ix, 48). And the saying is substantially repeated as the sentence of the Righteous Judge at the end of the world: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. xxv, 41).

There is thus not only provided an eternal realm of misery in the whole scheme of the Divine Providence for the wicked and unrepentant, but there is even a sin which precludes all pardon. "All their sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and their blasphemies wherewith soever they blaspheme: but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness but is guilty of an eternal sin (Mark iii, 28). . . it shall not be forgiven him neither in this world, nor in that which is to come" (Matt. xii, 32; see Luke xii, 10).

So that Dante was justified, according to the Sacred Writings,

in saying of those terrible gates of Hell, behind which men dwelt in hopeless despair:

“Justice the founder of my fabric mov’d:
To rear me was the task of power divine,
Supremest wisdom, and primeval love.”

(Canto iii, 4-6: Cary.)

So it is that, wherever we look in the Bible, we find that the Hebrew mind is imbued with the thought of the all-pervasive presence of the Eternal Creative Will, and that everything, the evil as well as the good, is brought directly under the control of God. The Divine Sovereignty is conceived to be so sovereign that it may without question harden the heart of the sinner, destine a man to perdition, or choose and exalt whom it will to honor and everlasting felicity.

The Fundamental Truth Involved.

Without accepting unmodified the sayings just quoted, it must be seen that the thought underlying them all is substantially and fundamentally true. Given one great law of righteous will in the universe, the immutability of which is the guarantee of goodness, or the welfare of all, and it is evident that, if men are to be dignified with moral freedom, they must bear the responsibility of transgressing that law, however that transgression is brought about. The results that follow, either obedience or disobedience, come within the whole sweep of that law, and in that sense must be attributed to the sovereign will of the Absolute Law-Giver.

The Defect of Calvinism.

The conception of the all-inclusive, almighty sovereignty of God is the most characteristic note of Calvinism, drawn not only from Scripture, but also from rational reflection. Nobody is more soundly scriptural and consistently logical than Calvin. It is both his strength and his weakness. The strength lies in the truth of the all-inclusive conception of God's sovereignty. The weakness lies in the narrowness and immaturity with which the purpose of that sovereignty is conceived.

What gives to the predestination to evil, both in Scripture and in Calvinism, its unacceptable harshness and tone of cruel injustice is its naive, anthropomorphic, unmediated directness, and its theoretical and ethical narrowness and immaturity of view. In the

first place, God is represented as acting immediately upon man and events, without taking into account the complex inter-actions of morally responsible persons under the sway of a great general law, the maintenance of which means, in the end, the ultimate good of all. Finality is prematurely pronounced before the whole scope and bearing of that law is fully considered. Then, it is ethically narrow and immature to recognize certain fortunate individuals, as especially chosen, to the neglect or rejection of others, as the exclusive objects of the divine favor. Goodness ceases to be goodness when it permits or compels men to be sinners, in order to subserve the glorification of the righteous elect.

In Spite of Sin, Hebraism Means the Salvation of All.

And yet, in the unfolding Hebrew consciousness, we find again and again the doctrine of God's all-inclusive, righteous will, forcing the expression of its natural logical conclusion as the divine, universal Goodness for all.

The election of the Chosen People not only involved a greater moral responsibility, but meant the world-mission of bringing God's mercy and saving power to all the peoples of the earth. At the very beginning of the race, there was given to its founder, Abram, the promise that "in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (Gen. xii, 3).

Indeed, it was inevitable that the peculiarly unique doctrine of Israel, an uncompromising ethical Monotheism, should in time unfold its *entelechy*, or its inevitable rational consequence, which is the salvation of mankind. The book of Jonah is a conspicuous example of this catholic view. And the greater prophets, imbued with a sense of the sacredness of Israel's universal mission, could confidently look forward to the coming of the Lord's Anointed, who should not only save his people from their sins, but should ultimately gather all nations, and kindreds, and tribes, with singing and everlasting joy, to Zion, the Holy City of God.

Israel Gives no Theoretical Explanations.

But if Israel brings all history, including the evil as well as the good, completely under the sway of the Divine Providence, it is wholly foreign to the Hebrew genius to *explain*, or to give a satisfactory account of the whole process to the theoretical reason.

The Hebrew simply oracularly declares. The law-givers and the prophets asserted and commanded: "Thus saith Yahweh, Thou shalt and thou shalt not," in accordance with which all destiny, individual and national, was to be determined. Whatever explanations were given were simple and direct deductions from the uttered truth. Jesus, in like manner, simply declared: "Verily I say unto you," and deduced therefrom the consequent conclusions.*

St. Paul Makes Concessions to the Theoretical Reason.

But when we come to St. Paul, there enters a distinctly new element into the Hebrew manner. Here we have a touch of the Hellenic philosophic spirit, joined to the deep, prophetic Hebrew spirit. The Apostle would explain. He is not satisfied simply to declare the providence of God in the world, but would meet the demands of intelligence, by giving a reason for the faith that is in him.

The Divine Goodness has lying within it a rational world-order which may be brought clearly to the minds of men. By means of his philosophy of history, the Apostle would clear away what he can of the mysterious and arbitrary, and appeal to the whole mind, in its intellectual capacity to understand, as well as in its moral capacity to obey. And thus, if possible he would show how the Divine Goodness proceeds along the path of the Divine Truth, in the accomplishment of its great purpose of redeeming man.

Paul Unites the Hebrew and the Hellenic Minds.

Nothing can exceed the rationality, fitness, and significance of this procedure. The greatest of all the Apostles, grasping more clearly than they all the universal bearing of the Glad Tidings of Jesus, and breaking down the narrow Judaistic tribalism of the early disciples, boldly confronts the Greek theoretical mind with the Hebrew ethical mind; and thus opens the way to their union in that larger world of thought in the Christian consciousness, which includes both the righteous Jew and the learned Greek.

It is no accident that Paul was called to be an Apostle, from his

* Perhaps there is something in the directness of ethical intuitions which represents all discursive, analytical attempts of the theoretical reason at explanation, as so much superfluous intrusion, when the truth is already known; or as so much sacrilegious presumption, since the truth is already divinely revealed.

mother's womb, to proclaim the unsearchable riches of Christ to the Gentile world. Born and reared at Tarsus, a brilliant center of Greek culture with which his alert mind would become necessarily more or less imbued; a free Roman citizen, of the distinguished advantages of which he was fully conscious; and yet to the heart's core a Hebrew of the Hebrews, with a supreme passion for goodness and for God, he was well fitted by every providential means, to give the Gospel, the revelation of God's love to man, a world-wide significance, in the light of universal thought.

His Great Service in Making the Gospel Doctrinal.

St. Paul is sometimes charged with having imposed the restrictions of dogma upon the inner, expanding life of religion. But this is a grave mistake. Dogma is doctrine fixed in an infallible and, therefore, ultimate and changeless form. Whereas Paul was ruthless in breaking up old dogmas, in order that he might give a larger interpretation to the old order, in the light of the new.

In so doing, he recognized the theoretical interests of reason, by introducing rational explanation into the religious life of man, and thus laid down a principle for all time which would save rational doctrine from dogmatic fixity.

Nothing could have been more significant; for it was the beginning of that inevitable and necessary union, based upon the unity of reason itself, between the theoretical and the ethical interpretation of Reality. The moral reason is not sufficient unto itself, but must be understood in the light of the theoretical reason. Much less can the theoretical reason stand alone; it thus remains barren and unfruitful, until it finds its ground in the moral reason.

We must again and again rid ourselves of the tendency to that rational tribalism which supposes either that the Hebrew moral genius, if left alone, or that the Greek theoretical genius, if left alone, might have by itself worked out the salvation of the world. Ethics, good-will, alone can not save man. Science, true thought, alone can not save man. Simply because man is a rational being whose reason is an æsthetic unity which demands a mutual, indissoluble, and all-inclusive relation between the Truth of science and the Goodness of ethics.

So that it is one of Paul's most distinguished services to the Church that he made the Gospel doctrinal. He was great enough to feel not

only the intense Hebrew passion for goodness, but also the equally intense Hellenic passion for truth, or for an intelligent understanding of Reality. He saw that we must think through our experiences and give them some sort of rational explanation, satisfactory to the theoretical reason.

Therefore, it was that he could bear the Gospel to the Gentiles, not simply because it was a message of Divine Love to be accepted, but a message of Divine Truth to be understood. He was, so to speak, a mediator between the ethics of the Jew and the science of the Greek; and made it possible for the Hebrew ethical world and the Græco-Roman intellectual world to find their common interest in the Universal Reason.*

Moral Evolution in History Rises in Three Stages.

It is Paul's recognition of the necessity of true doctrine which gives him so much significance for us at the present moment. For in his rational interpretation of life, he neither withdraws from the absolute sovereignty of God, nor from the presence of sin, or rebellion against God, as belonging to the whole divine order of things.

We have already seen (pp. 546-50) what he did with the individual experience by bringing it under a progressive development, or spiritual unfoldment, from naive egoism, through the law of right action, to the moral freedom of the universal will of good. It will not be surprising if we should find in his conception of God's all-inclusive providences in history, the same sort of unfoldment from a primitive state of sinful naiveté, followed by the logic of law, to culmination in the intuition of spirit, in which a universal love is conceived as including and saving all.

He saw Israel as the Chosen of God, in its law of righteousness, far above the primitive morality or unmorality of the Gentile world. But he also saw, in the Gospel, universal man, rising far above the Chosen People, as the object of the Divine Love. And he saw the whole history of the race, including sin and death, swept under the rational Providence of Eternal Goodness.

St. Paul was the first great evolutionist; and that, too, in the most fundamental sense of the term. For evolution to his mind was the

* In giving to the Church the principle of doctrinal form, it is to be hoped that Paul is not supposed to have given also to the Church the fixity of its infallible dogmatic creeds. The two must always be most carefully distinguished.

unfolding of a moral purpose toward a great end—a conception which alone gives to evolution any ground or real meaning. Though implied in the law and prophets, and in the teachings of Jesus, Paul first clearly stated it as a doctrine of universal history.

Paul Squarely Faces the Problem of Sin.

It is in this thoroughly Hebrew conviction of God's absolute guidance of history that the paradox of sin in the world makes itself painfully felt. But Paul in no way shrinks from the paradox, and unequivocally asserts that God, by his sovereign decrees, chooses whom he will and rejects whom he will. His great letter to the Romans affords us the largest expression of his views.

In his picture of the Gentile world, sunk in its nameless degradation and sin (i, 28-31), he was a pure Jew, and expressed the detestation which the pious Hebrew felt for all unrighteousness. But could this give the Jew any cause for self-righteous complacency or self-satisfied contentment? Alas no! For the Chosen People, because of their refusal to accept the Gospel, the divine fulfillment of their own law and prophets, were, in spite of the promise and the call, and in virtue of the Divine Intent, rejected and cast away (xi, 8-10). Here Paul rises above his tribal Hebraism and becomes universal man.

If the Jew was inclined to boast of his superiority over the Gentile, because he has the law, the Apostle reminds him that *having* the law profits nothing, for it is *keeping* the law that secures the approval of God. And it is notorious, he tells his fellow Jews, that because of their failure to keep the law, the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles (ii, 17-29).

Jews and Gentiles Alike Fall Short of the Moral Ideal.

So that the situation of the world is even darker than it would at first appear; for not only are the Gentiles, in their instinctive, egoistic sensuality, far below the demands of the moral law, as given by Moses to Israel; but also the Jews themselves, with their moral law, fall far below the ideal of the Moral Reason, as revealed in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Accordingly, although the Jew has the advantage over the Gentile in knowing what the law is—the commandment of the ever-living God—nevertheless when it comes to meeting the requirements of God's true righteousness, neither one nor the other can claim superiority; for God has "laid to the charge both of Jews

and Greeks, that they are all under sin; as it is written, 'There is none righteous, no, not one' (iii, 9-10) . . . there is no distinction; for all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God" (iii, 23).

It would be impossible to deny the truth of the Apostle's characterization of these two moral stages of consciousness, as they are illustrated in the ancient or in the modern world. For what he is saying is that the Gospel has revealed the ideal of the Moral Reason, as the free, spontaneous outstreaming of the heart in love to God and love to man; and, therefore, that man, either in his naive egoism of instinctive selfishness, or in his altruistic moral endeavor to keep the law of justice, and thus, so to speak, earn salvation by his own merit, fails to attain moral freedom and self-realization, that is, fails to secure the justifying approval of God.

God Has Shut up All Things Under Sin.

But it is painfully startling to be assured by the Apostle that sin is not only an inevitable fact of universal experience, but that, in the whole providential history of the human race, it was intended to be so, by the irresistible and sovereign decree of God (see xi, 8-10). Not only does the righteous law convict the Gentile of his instinctive sins, and the Gospel convict the righteous Jew of his legal sins, "that all the world might be brought under the judgment of God" (iii, 19), but "God hath *shut up all unto disobedience*;" or, as stated even more frankly in Galatians, "the scripture hath *shut up all things under sin*" (Gal. iii, 22), where it would seem that not only *man*, but the *entire created world* also is subjected to the weakness and wandering of sin.

Indeed, Paul will not permit us to misunderstand him. For he tells us in the clearest and most unambiguous terms why "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain with us until now" (viii, 22). It is because "the creation *was subjected to vanity* [the vanity of sin to the Hebrew mind is what the illusion of error is to the Hindu mind] *not of its own will* [that man is capable of sinning is not a matter of his own appointment] but by *reason of him* who subjected it" (viii, 21).

Paul's Apparent Self-Contradiction.

What supreme injustice is the Apostle here declaring? How is it that he who recognizes sin as the certain and only cause of death, and

the object of God's implacable wrath, can boldly assert that God hath shut up all men, even all things, under sin? Or what flagrant contradiction is the Apostle here committing? Since his whole mind was constantly absorbed and dominated by the thought of God's infinite goodness and mercy revealed in Jesus Christ, whose redemption was as wide as the need of man's sin; how was it that God, who hates sin as rebellion against his own divine government and who, in order to abolish sin freely gave his own son for us all, should, at the same time, be conceived by the Apostle as not only permitting sin, but as actually including it in his entire providential plan for the race? How could God be thought of as hardening men's hearts, blinding their eyes, and creating vessels of dishonor and wrath, filled unto destruction? (ix, 22.)

The Apostle's Wonderful Spiritual Experience.

We can not extricate ourselves from this difficulty, unless we first make clear to ourselves the wonderful spiritual experiences through which the Apostle passed. First, he was a Hebrew of the Hebrews, priding himself in the righteousness of the Holy Law; and, as such, condemning and despising the whole Gentile world in its ignorance of God, and, in its naive sins of sensuality, under the wrath of God.

Then, finding himself a slave to the law, incapable of meeting its demands, but compelled to bear its yoke, he becomes a Christian; whereupon the servitude of the law passes away and he rises to the service of a willing love, because the central fact of his life has become the Divine Grace, or the Beauty of the divine, outstreaming Goodness. The great transformation through which he had passed in coming to know Christ, was a fundamental change in his thought of God. God is no longer merely the Holy Giver of the Righteous Law, revealing his wrath from heaven against all ungodliness, but pure Infinite and Eternal Love, streaming out to save all sinners. And it is out of this new and higher interpretation of Reality that we must find his explanations to grow. He is going to become a philosopher and explain the course of events, but his philosophy is always going to rest upon the ultimate ground of the Divine Love.

The Saving Love of God in Christ, Paul's Central Theme.

This great thought of the Eternal Love of God so penetrated and possessed the consciousness of the Apostle that it became the one,

living inspiration of his entire being. It was the love aroused in his own heart that enabled him to see the love in the heart of God. A poor tent-maker, supporting himself with his own hands, weak from disease, and unprepossessing in appearance! but consumed with such love for his fellow men and such zeal to bear to them the unsearchable riches of Christ, that to imitate his Divine Master and show his devotion, he rejoiced in tribulation and counted it an honor to suffer. He fought with wild beasts, bore with patience stripes and prison, endured the opposition of false friends and the contradiction of sinners, became all things to all men that he might win not theirs but them, and at last went gladly to his martyrdom with a song of triumph upon his lips. He was paid in no coin that the world possessed or could appreciate, but found his inspiration in the constraining love of Christ, and his reward in the joy of reconciling men to God.

The young Christian converts, he addressed as his longed for, his heart's joy, his crown, and, as it were, the very children of his travail pains. How can we account for this so extraordinary, over-human order of love for others in the great Apostle, except in his own way, as the love of God, shed abroad in his heart, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit which was given unto him, or as the devoted imitation of his crucified and exalted Master who, though he was rich, yet for our sakes became poor that we, through his poverty, might be made rich?

If then we are to understand how St. Paul emerges from his painful dilemma of the divinely appointed curse of sin in a world whose sole reality rests upon the Holy Law of Goodness, we must keep clear of non-essential details and follow the main current of his ideas; must view his doctrines of the immutable rightness of God's sovereign rulership in the world, man's inalienable dignity as a free responsible moral being, and the consequent exceeding sinfulness of sin, in the light of the more inclusive and more fundamental doctrine of God's Eternal Love.

The Just Shall Live by Faith.

After the necessary introduction, in his letter to the Romans, he announces his central theme to be: "The just shall live by faith" (i, 17). No one could possibly suppose that St. Paul here means by faith, an intellectual assent to any or all of the church creeds, belief

in which is supposed to be necessary to the forgiveness of sin and to the attainment of heaven after death. He means by faith, a living act of the whole mind which is such a direct and simple understanding of the Divine Goodness, as to arouse absolute confidence in it and a grateful acceptance of pardon and justification, as the free gift of God's love; by which faith the whole life is transformed, renewed, and lifted up into a willing and joyous obedience. This faith, it is evident, is no other than the third and last stage of moral development, wherein spiritual intuition reveals Universal Love, as the all-enfolding Principle of Life.

But it was just such faith as this that the self-righteous Jew, resting in his law, would not accept, although the Apostle pointed out that, in God's dispensations, such faith had really preceded the law, as seen in the obedience of faithful Abraham.

St. Paul's Denial of the Law, an Offence to the Jew.

He agreed with the Jew that men certainly can not please God by following their selfish instincts; but he deeply offended the Jew when he insisted that, by the slavish discharge of duty, or by works of the law, no man could win his way to God's favor.

Yet, it must be admitted, the legal state of mind is far in advance of the instinctive state of mind; and, in the Divine Providence of history, the sacred oracles of the law were entrusted to the Jew, to serve as a pedagogue in leading man over from his instinctive moral state, through the legal stage, to the intuition of love.

The law stops every mouth, in its self-justification, for through it "cometh the knowledge of sin." "*But now, apart from the law*, a righteousness of God hath been manifested, being witnessed [implied in and foreshadowed] by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ unto all them that believe" (understand and rest confidently upon the Goodness of God: iii, 19-23).

But—to adopt Balzac's way of stating it—unfortunately the Jews' abstractive state, or their proud, self-righteous boasting in the law, was a curse to them, because it shut them out from that intuitive specialism which was revealed in the Gospel of free grace. It offended their pride that, higher than their law, there was a salvation of God which let in the whole world to the privileges of the Divine Love.

Hence, with contempt they rejected the Gospel, which was in very truth their own divinely appointed historical destiny, and the inevitable product of their own law and prophets. This was their great blindness and sin. They had rejected God, and God rejected them.

Paul Rises above Law to the Intuition of Love.

Therefore, the Apostle turned to the Gentiles, where he found a joyous and obedient acceptance of the Divine Grace. The Jew would live—to use the Kantian term—on the abstractive plane of the categorical imperative. Paul would raise them to the intuitive plane of love, as revealed in the Gospel for all men. They have no occasion for boasting. For if the Gentile fell into the sins of instinctive lust, the Jew fell into the deeper sin of a self-righteous attempt to earn his own salvation by his own goodness.

Whereas the whole point of view must be changed to see that salvation is entirely a free gift of God's love to all men, and so can not be earned by any human effort, no matter how meritorious, but is to be received directly from God with joyous and absolutely confident faith.

We are, therefore, now freely justified—forgiven and approved of God—by faith, in which we alone come to have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom also we have had access, by the confident understanding of faith, into this love of God (grace) wherein we stand, for which we may indeed rejoice in hope of the glory of God (v, 1-2). Not only is the base and degrading servitude of the carnal mind, which the law could only uncover and emphasize, now broken; but the bondage of the law, as a burden of laborious duty, is overcome in the confident acceptance of the infinite, outstreaming Goodness of God revealed in Christ.

The Greatness of the Divine Salvation.

Conscious of this Divine Love, which has now become the center of all his thoughts and actions, the Christian can rejoice in the beauty and power of his new life of grace. "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, for the law of the Spirit of life hath made me free from the law of sin and death" (viii, 1-2). He is no longer under the spirit of bondage to fear, but has received the spirit of adoption, whereby he cries, Abba Father (viii, 15).

Even the afflictions and sufferings which beset us in our earthly course, are counted as insignificant, when compared with the glory which shall be revealed to us-ward (viii, 18). For our lives now are swept into the whole divine plan; we have come into accord with the ongoing Cosmic Will, so that "all things work together for good to them that love God" (viii, 28).

Unbelief and fear now become nothing less than sins against God, for "if God is for us, who is against us?" What hesitation or doubt dare we cherish even in thought, much less utter? "He that spared not his own son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not also with him freely give us all things?" (viii, 31-32). If God did so much for us in the gift of his Son, has he not thus shown his willingness, as it were, to put his infinite resources at our disposal? —*provided only*, that in the simple, child-like confidence of sons, we obediently and gratefully accept the divine bounty!

With what assured confidence then should we approach God, what a joyous, obedient response should be ours, and to what a new and higher plane of spiritual life should it raise us, when we no longer stumble in disobedience and fear, but walk in the absolute certainty of possessing the divine love and favor? "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? [the love we receive from Christ and the love we give to Christ, as his joint-heirs to the divine sonship] shall tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Even as it is written:

‘For thy sake we are killed all the day long;
We are accounted as sheep for the slaughter!’

Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors, through him that loved us. For I am persuaded that neither life, nor death, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord" (viii, 35-39).

Here, then, is Paul, once the intensely bigoted Pharisee, who saw no hope for man except through the Jewish law, now the zealous Apostle of Christ to the whole world, not only proclaiming the Gospel of Jesus as doing away with the law—because it reveals man's redemption as a free gift of the outstreaming Eternal Love; but proving it to be the very goal of the divine providential development

of human history, through the pedagogy of the law, given by Moses, to the free gift of Divine Grace in Jesus Christ.

To *understand* all this (true doctrine) and to rest down upon it confidently *with all the heart* (right life), is what Paul means by saying: "The just shall live by faith."

The Saving Purpose of Divine Love Can not Be Thwarted.

Now, it is the entire meaning of the Eternal Love, in the providences of history, nay, even also in the creation of the world, to lead man up to this glorious state of intuitive, moral self-realization; and in the end the Divine Purpose can not be thwarted.

If the Jews rejected the Love of God in Christ—the deepest and bitterest sorrow of the Apostle's life (ix, 23)—"they did not stumble that they might fall," but that, in the divine plan, by their fall salvation might come unto the Gentiles, to provoke them to jealousy (xi, 11).

And yet the Apostle does not leave his own people here, because his heart too fully reflects the all-enfolding love of God, which not only includes their fall, for a purpose, but their restoration. "Now if their *fall* is the riches of the world and their *loss* the riches of the Gentiles; *how much more their fullness!* (xi, 12). . . . For if the *casting away* of them is the *reconciliation* of the world, what shall the *receiving of them* be but *life from the dead?*" (xi, 15.)

In God's Plan, the Jew Saves the Gentile and the Gentile Saves the Jew.

Therefore, if at the beginning of the letter St. Paul had warned the Jews against boasting, because they possessed the law, over the degraded sins of the Gentiles—for all alike fell short of the divine requirement—so now the Gentiles are warned against boasting, because they have obtained grace, over the casting away of Israel; for, after all, they have received the Gospel from Israel and, like branches, have been grafted into the olive of God's planting. Besides, if they, as wild branches, have been grafted in, how much more may the natural branches—broken off for their sakes—be restored again.

Indeed, Israel will again be grafted in, for his rejection is, in the divine plan, but the means of saving the Gentile; while the mercy thus obtained by the Gentile is meant to restore Israel. The

Apostle now rises to the supreme reaches of his thought—a thought which could have been inspired alone by the heart of God.

“For,” he exclaims, “I would not, brethren, have you ignorant of this mystery, lest ye be wise in your own conceits, that a hardening in part hath befallen Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in: *and so all Israel shall be saved*; even as it is written.

“‘There shall come out of Zion the Deliverer;
He shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob;
And this is my covenant unto them,
When I shall take away their sins!’

As touching the Gospel, they are enemies for your sakes; but as touching the election [the original promise of God to his people] they are beloved for the father’s sake. For the gifts of the calling of God are without repentance [God’s covenant with Israel can never fail, his purpose of redeeming goodness has gone forth, his word has been uttered and it shall not return unto him void, but accomplish that whereunto he sent it]. For as ye in time past were disobedient to God, but now have obtained mercy by their disobedience, even so have these also now been disobedient, that *by the mercy shown to you they also may now obtain mercy*” (xi, 25-31)

In thus recognizing that in the whole divine plan of human history, the Jew first saves the Gentile and then the Gentile saves the Jew, the Apostle reveals the profoundest spiritual insight. For he is telling us that the Hebrew ethical genius, which rests upon the ultimate ground of Reality, the Eternal Goodness, must first give life and meaning to the theoretical genius of the Greek; and then the theoretical genius of the Greek, represented in the rational interests of science and philosophy, compensates for the gift, by giving a clear and reasoned understanding of the Eternal Goodness, revealed everywhere in Nature and in History. Life vitalizes doctrine, and doctrine explains life.

But aside from this great philosophical aspect of the Apostle’s thought, there is a practical aspect which the Gentile world has too much neglected. And yet, as deeply as we may regret that the Gentile world, in its treatment of the Chosen People has not followed the thought of this Prince of the Apostle—much less the example of the Divine Master—we can nevertheless see dimly that his prophecy is more and more coming to be fulfilled. For the Jew is coming more and more to share in the blessings of that onward, progressive

evolution in history, which is the supreme characteristic of the Christian consciousness.

All Have Sinned That All Might Be Saved.

But now, in drawing his letter to a close, the great Apostle lifts his vision to the last daring height of speculation, in his moral philosophy of human history; and is overwhelmed by it. He now sees that the reason why, in the sovereign, irresistible purpose of God, the whole creation, not of its own will, was subjected to vanity. It was "in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (viii, 21).

It does not, however, remain merely a hope; it becomes a certainty in the Apostle's mind. "For," he concludes with triumphant joy, "God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that *he might have mercy upon all*.* O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God; how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past tracing out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and unto him are all things" (xi, 32-36).†

Thus the purpose of Eternal Love, in human experience and history, while it includes the actuality of sin, because of man's moral freedom, can not be thwarted; and will, in the end, bring man to his full spiritual stature as a son of God. This is St. Paul's doctrine of predestination. He does not teach that *some will be saved*, but that under the Divine Sovereignty of the Eternal Love, *all shall be saved*. He anticipated our modern poet eighteen centuries in declaring,

"That nothing walks with aimless feet;
That not one life shall be destroyed,
Or cast as rubbish to the void,
When God hath made the pile complete."
(In Memoriam, liv.)

Wherein Aryan and Hebrew Agree.

Well then, just as we have in the highest expression of the Aryan theoretical genius the recognition of error, as subordinate and sub-

*"For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive" (I Cor. xv, 22).

†See Acts xvii, 28; "for in him we live, and move, and have our being."

servient to the intellectually free individual's attainment of Truth; so also we have in the highest expression of the Hebrew ethical genius the recognition of sin, as included in the rational plan of the morally free individual's development toward the ideal of Goodness.

We might say that, as in the one case, the theoretical reason is subjected to the possibility of error, in order that it may come to know what is true; so, in the other, the ethical reason is subjected to the possibility of sin, that it may come to do what is good. Neither error nor sin has any objective reality. Not only are they of no value to man, but they are the source of all his sufferings; but the *experience* of error and sin, or rather the *condition of freedom*, intellectual and moral, that makes error and sin possible, makes it appear that error and sin, as incidental to man's rational evolution, contribute to his attainment of the objectively Real Beauty of Truth and Goodness.

Divine Providence, the Cunning of Reason.

That a rational providence of Truth and Goodness is thus set over us, which, while it forever condemns error and sin, nevertheless provides for them and subordinates them to its own ends, is presented by Hegel in a remarkable passage in his "Logic." It is a philosophical statement of the Psalmist's utterance that, "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee" (Ps. lxxvi, 10).

In discussing Final Cause, which, as the Rational Idea, subordinates and controls, for the sake of its higher ends, the lower mechanical and chemical forces of nature, Hegel says: "Thus the Subjective End, which is the power ruling in these processes, in which the objective things wear themselves out on one another [error and sin are self-destructive] continues to keep itself free from them, and to preserve itself in them. Doing so, it appears as the Cunning of Reason. . . . Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie in the inter-mediative action which, while it permits the objects to follow their own bent and act upon one another until they waste away, and does not itself directly appear in the process, is nevertheless only working out its own aims.

With this explanation, Divine Providence may be said to stand to the world and its process in the capacity of absolute cunning. God lets men do as they please, with their particular passions and interests; but the result is the accomplishment of—not their plans but His;

and these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those whom he employs."*

With greater simplicity and beauty of utterance, Browning, expresses the same noble doctrine, when he makes the inspired musician say:

"There shall never be one lost good. What was shall live as before:
The evil is null, is naught; is silence, implying sound;
What was good, shall be good, with, for evil, so much good the more;
On the earth the broken arcs: in the heaven, the perfect round."
(Abt Vogler.)

The Apostle, the Philosopher, and the Poet have all alike refused to narrow their vision to the seen and the present, but have viewed the whole range of life under the invisible aspects of eternity.

It is in the light of such a comprehensive view that we must finally ask: What is the purpose of that entire range of evolution, natural and rational, by which man is brought first to self-consciousness in Nature, and then to the maturity of self-realization in History?

* "Logic" § 209, p. 351. Wallace's Trans.

NOTE:—On the Sankhya, the reader can find nothing better than Richard Garbe's "The Philosophy of Sankhya." For the Vedanta, he should first consult "Sacred Books of the East," (ed. by Max Mueller) Vols. I, and XV, where may be found the canonical Upanishads (trans. by Max Mueller). Most of all, he should consult Vols. XXXIV, and XXXVIII, in the same series, giving the Vedanta Sutras with commentary by Sankaracharya (trans. by George Thibaut). A. E. Gough's "The Philosophy of the Upanishads" is very useful, but must be corrected by the more sympathetic interpretation of Paul Deussen's "The System of Vedanta."

CHAPTER X.

THE FLIGHT AND THE RETURN.

At the beginning of our present interpretation, evolution was defined as the unfolding of a Rational Idea, from its implicit to its explicit form, toward some great end. What that great end may be, we are now in a fair position to understand.

But a moment ago, we had occasion to point out (p. 637) the difference between the Aryan and the Hebrew way of conceiving evolution, and cast some discredit upon the Aryan to the advantage of the Hebrew conception. And we did so because the Aryan, leaving the element of will out of his interpretation of Reality, could find no rational purpose in an evolution that wandered out from an original perfection, through the realms of imperfection, only to come back to perfection again; while the Hebrew, basing Reality upon the will, found a rational purpose in an evolution which rises from implicit beginnings, through progressive unfoldment, to the full explicit outcome.*

Man's Original Perfection and Fall.

We must now lift that discredit from the Aryan view of evolution, by recognizing the fundamental truth which underlies it and which, together with the Hebrew view, constitutes the entire concept of evolution.

The Aryan mind, as we have seen, conceives man's life in the world of experience to be a going out from an original spiritual perfection, either as a pure, unfallen soul, or as the Infinite Brahman itself, and a coming back to the point of its departure; that is, it is represented simply as a flight and a return. The profound truth

* "The path of the righteous is as the light of dawn, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day" (Prov. iv, 18). "First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" (Mark iv, 28). "For we know in part and prophesy in part: but when that which is perfect is come then that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child: now that I am become a man, I have put away childish things" (I Cor. xiii, 9-11). "That is not first which is spiritual but that which is natural; then that which is spiritual" (I Cor. xv, 46).

herein expressed, is that universally found in religious and philosophical beliefs, viz.: that man was originally perfect and dwelt in happiness in some Eden, or Golden Age, or even in some higher sphere with the immortal gods, but that by reason of his own self-chosen errors and perversities, had fallen into this present miserable state of servitude to sorrow and pain, whence he must secure release and restoration to his first estate of blessedness.

In other words, it sets forth the truth that man is conscious of being greater and higher than the phenomenal world in which he is forced to live; that, in himself, he belongs not to the actual but to the real order of existence; and that he will never be satisfied until he has overcome the actual and attained the real. It is an assertion of the reality of the Ideal, and is a perpetual condemnation of that extremely unintelligent and superficial view of evolution which represents man as having his origin in the dust, or as being a mere product of phenomenal elements of nature in complex relations. It proclaims that man has his origin in God, and therefore, that, recognizing himself in the world of sense as away from God, will never be satisfied until he returns to God.

Flight and Return through Progressive Advance.

But, on the other hand, man's experience in the world is not *simply* a flight and return, for we can see no rational end attained in a mere going out from and a coming back to the state of original perfection. Evolution must also present itself as a progressive unfoldment, by which man rises stage by stage until he attains the goal of his rational evolution, or comes to freedom and self-realization. And this phase of evolution we find in the Hebrew thought that conceives Reality or God as the Eternal Will who, with a purpose, creates the world and sets man therein to know and master it.

There is a flight—a fall—because man, being made in the divine image and likeness or having his origin in God, does not fully express himself in the world of experience; but the flight is far more than an incident in the return, for it conceals the dynamic purpose of a progressive advance toward that ideal which, although forever existent in God, lies at the beginning only implicitly potential in man, and is therefore to be brought out into explicit expression in the return. So that, while evolution does not express anything *in* God, it reveals a *purpose of God for man*, that through his experiences of wander-

ing in the phenomenal world, he may not only come back, but forward, to realize himself in that Spiritual Reality to which, in virtue of his rational nature, he belongs.

Significance of the Trinity for Evolution.

This conception of evolution essentially rests upon that interpretation of Ultimate Reality which has taken form in the doctrine of the Trinity, and which distinguishes Christian philosophy from all other philosophies.*

The peculiarity of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is that it equally emphasizes the Divine Unity. God is one, not as a formal, but as a rational unity; and in that unity are three distinct realities, mutually related and inseparable—so much so that it is not possible to see how one could exist without the other. There is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit which manifests the Father to the Son, and leads the Son to the Father.

God, the Supreme Reason, in the totality of Feeling, Thought, and Will, as the Absolute Unity of Infinite Substantial Truth and Eternal Causal Goodness, is the Father, he from whom all things proceed; the World, created by Him to manifest his Goodness in the Beauty of Truth, is the Holy Spirit, or the Divine Logos; and Man, who reflects in his total reason the Beauty of the Divine Truth and the Divine Goodness, is the begotten Son.

This gives to nature and to history, as phenomenal manifestations of Reality in space and time, their meaning as standing for a rational process of purposive evolution, by which man, the begotten son, is brought to rational maturity.

The Emerging Individual Forms.

When the course of evolution was traced, we first saw how the apparently incoherent and formless star-mists slowly evolved, under the guidance of rational laws, into a cosmic order of great beauty and power. Then the monistic harmony was broken by the seeming rebellion of individual forms, dimly foreshadowed in the crystals and fully expressed in the living cells. These little organisms, rising above the inorganic world-order, gave the impression of asserting themselves as free individuals in the great cosmos.

*There may be found the idea of a trinity in other religions, but it represents merely the arbitrary conjunction of three deities discharging three different functions, and in no way stands for a rational unity.

But, as if fearing for their independence thus won, they formed communal groups which resulted in the still higher individual, organic forms of the plant world, in all its complexity and variety. Finally, above the plant rose the animal world in still greater complexity and variety, at the summit of which at last man appeared, wholly detached from the natural world-order, as a fully self-conscious, rational individual.

The two most striking features about this progressive advance in individual, organic forms were its psychology, and the paradox of individualization. Its psychology, having to do with the intelligential relation between the individual subject and its object, was a progressive, qualitative advance from the mere sleeping sensitiveness of the plant, through the dreaming consciousness of the animal, to the awakened self-consciousness of man, where the monistic cosmic dream is broken and where man appears in the full dignity and worth of his individuality, as an *other* in the cosmos, rising above the natural order, out of which he emerged, into the supra-natural or rational world of self-conscious thought, feeling, and will.

Self-assertion and Self-submission.

The paradox of individualization lay in the fact that the individual organism, no matter how simple or how complex, seemed to bend its whole effort to a self-assertion of its freedom from the cosmic order, as if that were the best means of maintaining its independent existence in the world; but, at the same time, as eagerly bent every effort to a self-submission to the grand order, as the only way of coming to its full self-realization. Its self-assertion, which was a flight from the cosmic order, seemed to secure its individuality, while its self-submission, which was a return to the cosmic order, had no other purpose than the perfecting of that individuality.

And all this grew out of the fact that the psychic advance was an expanding relationship between subject and object by which, while the subject gained a larger, freer, and more independent psychic life, he became, in that proportion, more and more fully dependent upon the harmonious adjustment of himself to the object. So that while his self-asserted freedom from the object gave him individuality, his entire security and welfare lay in coming to a complete understanding with the object.

Man's Flight and Return on the Rational Plane Is a Progressive Advance.

But while, in the natural order, the whole process was carried forward on the plane of an *instinctive* psychology of *sensitiveness* and *consciousness*; when we reached man, although we found him also in a struggle between self-assertion and self-submission, he had become conscious of *himself* as a *free individual*, over against the entire objective world, choosing his own ends and pursuing them as best he could. And these ends were always his own welfare and happiness.

But, as among the plants and animals below him, he soon discovered that, if his self-assertion or flight was to end in his real happiness, he must submit himself or return to the cosmic order. Only his self-submission is no longer *natural* and *instinctive*, but *supra-natural* and *rational*, or a process in the free choice of his own thought and will. In a word, he must think the Cosmic Thought and will the Cosmic Will, if he would enter into the harmonious Cosmic Unity, in which alone he can come to freedom and self-realization as a true rational individual.

We saw further that this lofty attainment was not to be reached by a mere quantitative, but by a qualitative advance, which rises through three stages of rational development. His thought must rise from the knowledge of sense, through logic, to the intuition of Spirit; his will, from the egoism of self, through the altruism of law and justice, to the universalism of love; while feeling, or the capacity in him to estimate values, follows concomitantly, by passing from sensation to emotion and from emotion to happiness.

The Purpose of Evolution in Nature and in History.

The purpose of the entire phenomenal cosmic evolution in space and time is then, as we now see it, to bring man to birth—as it were, immaculately conceived by the Divine Spirit and born of the Virgin Nature; and then to bring him to full self-realization, through the progressive, unfolding order of history. He first becomes conscious, as an individual, of HIS self, and then, guided and steadied by the pedagogy of pain, advances to the full realization of his SELF, as a son of God.

For history is but the unfolding of Man's consciousness, individual and communal, by which the phenomenal is transformed into the real world-order, or which is the coming of the Kingdom and the Will of God on earth as it is in heaven. Man's great problem of knowing the Thought of God in nature and enjoying its values for himself, is wholly conditioned by his entire willingness to share nature with all others, according to the law of universal love, or the Will of God.

So that, by his self-assertion and flight, man is to become fully conscious of the dignity and worth of His self, but by his self-submission and return, he is to attain his true Self, in the harmonious rational Beauty of reflecting in himself the Thought and the Will of God.

A simple illustration or two may aid us in understanding the significance of that purposive cosmic evolution by which the individual goes out to assert himself and then, in order to realize himself, comes back to submit himself to the Grand Cosmic Unity.

How the Individual Planet Finds Its True Path.

As we observe the emergence of the satellites from the undifferentiated general mass, in the formation of some solar system, we can fancy how the individual planet might at first be hurled off from its central sun along a parabolic path, with seemingly no prospect of return. But, nevertheless, we should see it being held in check, though apparently not, by the central source whence it sprang. The force with which it is thrown off might seem to it, if it were endowed with consciousness, as the self-assertion of its own individuality, establishing the law of its own path.

But the central force, by which it is held back, combines with the force of flight, and the resulting path is an ellipse, in which the planet is at once itself and at the same time brought into harmonious unity with its sun. Flight and return come to be balanced in an orbit of distinct individual activity. Both the power of flight, which establishes its individuality, and the power of return, which secures its unity, are from the sun, which in the beginning and in the end is all and in all. Sad would be the fate of that orb which should, unhindered, follow its own individual way through the illimitable heavens; happy, when its path is determined for it by the irresistible power of its primal source.

It becomes evident how analogous this flight and return of the planet, in its birth and development, is to the natural history of man, as it has been traced in the cosmic evolution. He is thrown off, as it were, from the Supreme Reason, to attain individual otherness in himself as a self-conscious, rational being. He seems to be pursuing independently his own path, thinking and doing what he will, but the Divine Providence is ever drawing him back.

His departure is not on a straight line but on a curve which, while it leads away from, ultimately sweeps into a return to God. His outward flight at last arouses him, through the pedagogy of pain, to a sense of his mistakes in thought and perversities of will, which arise from his stubborn self-assertion, whereupon he feels the Divine Reason drawing him back to Itself as his Source.

Man Goes out from and Returns to the Supreme Central Reason.

Even when he is at the aphelion of his errors and sins, he is on the way to his return. His flight from God continues so long as, in his independence and self-assertion, he is wise and good in his own eyes, and not until that bitter-happy moment when he knows himself to be ignorant and sinful, when he discovers that the only truth for him, is God's Truth and the only goodness, God's Goodness, does he begin his return. That is an auspicious moment when, in humiliation and repentance, he comes to himself, sees what he really is, and then, renouncing his self-conceit and self-righteousness, returns, disciplined, enriched, and developed by the darkness, the cold, and the hunger of his illusions and sorrows, to God.

The departure has no meaning in itself, for it does not end in itself; but it has its value so far as through it man comes to himself, and is made aware of the Infinite and Eternal Truth and Goodness, drawing him back to self-realization. Without the flight, there had been no free, self-conscious, rational individuality, no self-hood; without the return, there could be no self-realization in the conscious reconciliation with the harmonious Beauty of Truth and Goodness. The flight, then, is that man may come to know himself as *other* than God; the return, that he may come to realize himself *in* God.

But, having won this individuality and having attained this self-realization, man does not lose himself by sinking back into God; for to this end was he sent forth that he might find himself as a son of

God who, sustained in his individuality and maintained in the cosmic unity by the Divine Power, might circle forever around the central Sun of his spiritual existence.

The analogy which we have been drawing, it will have been readily observed, fails at one essential point, and that is where man reveals his unique distinction, as a self-conscious rational being, above all other orders of creation.

The whole destiny of the planet is played off on a material plane, and so is determined in its development by a mechanical law of necessitated action and reaction; while man self-consciously moves freely on the plane of spiritual reality, according to intellectual and moral law.

The one moves by unconscious necessity and is *possessed by* the cosmic order; the other moves by conscious freedom and is intended to make himself a *possessor of* the cosmic order, by reflecting in himself the Unity of its Thought and Will. This freedom, however, does not mean that man can ultimately move away from the controlling power and law of his Principle, the Supreme Reason of the Cosmos, for he can no more do that than the planet can detach itself from its sun.

The Meaning of Rational Freedom.

Man's freedom rather means, first, his being *conscious* of thinking and doing in and for himself what he wants to think and do; and, secondly, the removal of all arbitrary, unnatural, artificial, or extraneous constraint, so that he is able to think and do what the inner necessities of his rational nature demands he should think and do.

Hence, ultimately, freedom is not the power to think and do as one pleases—the mere exercise of arbitrary volition without valid reason; but the conscious awakening of the mind to the Divine Truth, as the only Truth, and to the Divine Goodness, as the only Goodness, in the conscious reflection of which the rational self alone finds the Beauty and Life of its own freedom and self-realization. While with God, the absolute necessity of his being what he is, is absolute freedom; with man, his freedom is the conscious recognition of, and obedience to, the necessary laws of his own nature in God. To be free is to become conscious of self-realization in thinking the Thought, willing the Will, and thus participating in the harmonious Unity and Life of the Cosmos.

Viewed thus, as a free, progressive unfoldment in Reason, man's flight and return rises above anything like the mechanical necessity of nature, and must find its illustration on the plane of moral freedom, where he freely and consciously chooses his own career and develops, under its various experiences, to his full rational maturity.

Parable of the Prodigal Son: Its Wide Bearing.

Such an illustration may be found in that incomparable Parable of the Prodigal Son which, for breadth of meaning and moral beauty, may indeed be regarded as the noblest and most illuminating expression that ever fell from human lips.

We can not understand its deep meaning and wide scope, if we regard it in the usual conventional way as the description of a willful young man who leaves home to plunge into sensual pleasures. It has a far wider bearing than that. It is one of those universal utterances that contain within itself the whole philosophy of man's wandering and return, not only as an individual but as a race, and is even an allegory, as it were, of the Cosmos.

We have set before us first, the primitive happiness in the things of sense and self, where all the world is real and all impulses and desires good. Then comes disillusionment—pain, conflict amid uncertainty and illusion, where all desires fail, where confidence is lost not only in others but in self; finally, in the last extremity, comes the awakenment to the real Self, as the son of the Highest, and the return to Reality and to God.

Without this departure, there had been no knowledge of the real Self, no enlightenment and no enrichment of experience, there had been no joy of home-coming and reconciliation, no sense of the true life and affluence in the Father's house.

The Prodigal's Joyous Departure Followed by Disappointment and Sorrow.

When the Prodigal left his home, he was a happy youth, full of hope and self-reliance. The world was before him to conquer and enjoy. All about him was real. Sense and self were his guides. He drank of every cup and sat at every feast. His resources of abounding strength, hope, and ambition he spent with lavish hand. He had the charm of wit, learning and artistic accomplishment that made him a welcome guest at every board. His friends were legion, and it was

with a profound satisfaction that he plunged into what he considered the realities of life.

But, in time, there was a change came over the spirit of his dreams; his hopes began to be dashed with somber shadows of disappointment; his strength and self-reliance gave way to discouragement; things lost their taste; and at last, all his fine resources utterly failed to give him that satisfaction which he had anticipated. His friends found their interest in him waning, and, one by one, became phantoms and faded away. He had nothing more to spend on them, and they had no more appreciation for him.

So impoverished, lonely, and humiliated had he become that, with mean submission, he allowed himself to be sent into the fields to feed the swine. And then he reached the depth of his sordid squalor and degradation. He got so low, he so far forgot all self-respect, that he would have taken anything to satisfy his craving for happiness; he would fain have filled his belly with the husks which the swine did eat—but no man gave him so much even as the husks.

His Humiliation Aroused Him to Himself.

But this his deepest misery and wretchedness at last proved to be that illuminating pedagogy of pain, which revealed to him the truth as he had never seen it before. He *came to himself*; all the illusions of sense and self were stripped off, and he awoke to see what he really was. In his self-conceit and self-will he had thought all along that he was at home with himself; but now he saw that he was indeed in a far country and a wanderer from his Father's house. Fool that he was to crave husks, the food of swine, when in his Father's house there was bread and to spare!

Therefore, *confession*, which was the clear intellectual insight into Reality; and *repentance*, which was, not the trembling fear of consequences, but the total ethical change of the will, the turning about and going the other way.

His Penitent Return and Joyous Restoration.

In that moment, the penitent, wandering sinner was near to the Father's heart; for, in his recognition of his helplessness and poverty, away from the affluence and love of home, he was ready to turn to that love which, without his being aware of it, was ever following after him.

As the beautiful story goes, the Father must have been ever watching with patient solicitude for his son's return. A thousand times daily he opens the portal and looks this way and that along the dusty paths of life, if haply he may catch sight of the wanderer coming back. And we are told, he did catch sight of him, while as yet he was a *great way off*; and then, with the precipitancy of a father's love, he ran to meet him, and fell on his neck, and kissed him, as if his outstreaming love and solicitude were even more ready and willing to save his son than his son was ready and willing to be saved.

But we must not overlook the fact that with all the enlightenment, which error and sin had given him, and with all the sense of his abasement, the Prodigal could not forget his origin, and who he really was. He was still fully conscious of whence he came. So that when he wept out his confession and penitence before his Father: "I have sinned against heaven and in thy sight," he cried, "No more worthy to be *called* thy son, make me *as* one of thy hired servants." Even in his shame and humiliation, he could not forget the dignity and worth of his native inheritance. The feasting and joy were the Father's forgiveness and answer.

The Enlightenment of Experience.

As we review this history, it becomes evident that the son came to know himself and his father through his departure and wanderings—a knowledge which the self-righteous elder brother did not gain. In fact, to judge by his words and actions on the Prodigal's return, his understanding of life and his affections were obscured and quite dried up, nourished as they had been on the conventional proprieties of thought and action.

It must be admitted that the elder brother was a fair sort of a man, who did no flagrant harm. He was true to his traditional creed, and estimated the value of other men by its formulas. He was a leading deacon in the church, and supported all movements of reform and moral betterment. He could talk with some intelligence on questions of theology, and had a distinct theory of the atonement—was, indeed, regarded, all in all, as a very respectable and valued member of the community. He was, in a word, the Pharisee who gave tithes of all he possessed, prayed daily in the synagogue, and was especially grateful that he, a righteous man, was not like this sinner, his younger brother.

But he seemed to have missed the real lessons of life which experience affords. That there should be more joy over the return of this sinner than over such a just person as himself, astonished and shocked him, and then aroused his severe condemnation. The simple fact that the lost was found, that the dead was alive again, which filled the father's heart with so much joy, had no weight with him, in view of his sense of justice and in his conventional scheme of things.

Now, while we can not commend the Prodigal's wanderings, in so far as they led him away from his Father's home; nevertheless, it was through those wanderings, with their pedagogy of pain, that he had learned far more than his elder brother. For he had learned the great value of life, he had found himself, he had discovered how great and good his Father was, and had come to joyous reconciliation with him.

So that we conclude, as we began, by saying that the flight does not end in itself and has no meaning by itself, but only has a meaning when it ends in leading to the return. There is no price too great for the son to pay, in order to find himself and his way back to his Father.

Man's Need Reveals the Love of God.

But the greatness of this parable does not lie simply in showing how the son is brought, by his flight and return, to the full realization of himself, but in its revelation of the love of God. In the Father's solicitude for the welfare of his son, we have the quintessential meaning of the Gospel. The outstreaming love of God is nearest to the sorrowing, the poor, the sick, the sinful. Or rather, the sorrowing, the poor, the sick, the sinful are nearest to an acceptance of the all-enfolding, ever-ready, saving power and goodness of God, which, in that very moment of deepest extremity, is brought to manifestation. How much less man would be, were he not saved from his errors and sins! How much less God would be, unless he saved man from his errors and sins! Through his errors and sins man finds how great he is; and through the divine salvation from his errors and sins, he finds how great God is.

Again we must guard ourselves against the self-deception of supposing that error and sin mean only crude ignorance and debasing sensuality. The scientist and the saint know best how man, in his

self-conceited knowledge and self-righteous goodness, is helpless and afar from the Truth and Love of God.

The Prodigal Wanderings of the Theoretical Reason.

How broad and general in its meaning this great parable is, may well be seen in its application to the history of that great modern, scientific movement, rising out of the theoretical reason, by which man has sought to know the objective Truth.

For the intellect, as such, Truth is the only home, where there is complete rational satisfaction—as it were, bread and to spare. If the theoretical reason does not find the objective Truth, it is like one who wanders in a far country, and will ultimately perish unless it turns back to that rational Reality, whence its impulses to know the Truth had their origin.

Man, becoming dissatisfied with the naive knowledge of common-sense, where everything has hitherto been so real, so easy, and where his mind has been so full of content, is seized with an irrepressible rational *Wanderlust*, and, asserting himself, fares forth into the great wide world of logic. Conscious of his inner rational strength and proud of his new found powers, he is determined, in the broad fields of science, to know and master a new world of knowledge for himself. He investigates, analyzes, compares, classifies, until he reaches general conclusions which are to be the laws of this new world he would dominate. So encouraged is he by his successes that he is going to construct a new ethics, and even a new religion.

Thus he happily journeys on, adding fact to fact, induction to induction, law to law, until the whole world seems to be one vast skeleton network of logical abstractions, and he becomes actually weary of his scientific accumulations.

The Knower Discovers that He Does not Know.

Then he wakes at last to a sense of deep pain and disillusionment. He of all men, the scientist, the knower, whose only reason for being and hope of salvation is in knowing the Truth, finds that all his accumulated treasures are not real, but only phenomenal—mere appearances of Reality! He is after all dealing only with phantoms! He himself is but a phantom, with only this inner gnawing hunger for objective Truth that is real.

And thus far, in our day, science with all its bold, positivistic assurances of knowledge, with its confident promises of giving us a new and higher manner of life, a new society, a new morality, and a new religion, has led us—away from God, away from Reality; and has given us instead the unknown and the unknowable, so that we must be content with phantoms that rest upon our eternal ignorance. We may *believe* anything we please; but that would be only the conjecture of an idle philosophy, for all that we can know is the phenomenal world of sense, rationalized by logic.

Reason Refuses to Accept Scientific Knowledge of Phenomena as Truth.

But we refuse to stop here, for Reason, like the voice of God, is calling us out of our wilderness wanderings to an abiding rest in the Promised Land of Reality and Truth. We will have no dispute with science as a rational discipline, as a logical method, rising out of the deeper and wider needs of reason, which it does not, because it can not, adequately express, but upon which, nevertheless, it rests; or we will accept it as a means to a larger end beyond itself. But we must utterly renounce it as a final organon of Truth, the more so because, after boldly promising so much, it refuses altogether, with the brazen effrontry of a wanton, to tell us anything about real cause or real substance or real unity, and mocks us with the offer of logical relations among appearances—relations which, after all, have no known foundation, and which are only “applicable to adjacent cases, with a reasonable degree of certainty.”

But Reason, which has once caught sight of those divine ideals of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, absolutely refuses to be put off with a beauty which is but the outer show of sensuous things; with a truth which is but an appearance; and with a goodness which is but a calculated prudence. For Reason, itself being real, can find its freedom and self-realization nowhere else than in a Reality, which reveals the Absolute Beauty of an Infinite (substantial) Truth, revealing Eternal (causal) Goodness.

If all that modern science can give us is a world of sense phantoms, rationalized by a hypothetical logic, then, with all its boasted advances and accomplishments, it has no message for man that for real value, in any sense, compares with the simple joyous outburst of the Psalmist's heart:

"The earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof;
The world and they that dwell therein" (xxiv, 1).

"The heavens declare the glory of God;
And the firmament sheweth his handywork" (xix, 1).

"The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul;
The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple"
(xix, 7).

"Great peace have they that love thy law;
And they have none occasion of stumbling" (cxix, 165).

The Collapse of Science.

This collapse of science, this failure to touch Reality, Hermann Lotze felt deeply, and clearly set forth a generation ago. With all the "vigor and rigor" of a true modern German scientist, he first reduced the world and man to a complete, self-inclosed mechanism, under the control of irrefragable law, and then woke to the consciousness that this was writing Hamlet with Hamlet left out; and, while he did not cease to be a scientist, he became a philosopher. He saw that his science only gave him facts and laws, whereas, the essential meaning of Reality, as indicated by the theoretical, æsthetical, and ethical reason within us, lies in *values*, the values of Beauty which have their ground in Truth and Goodness. And he made some progress in showing that facts and laws are subordinated to values, as modes of manifestation; that, indeed, facts and laws have no meaning in themselves—not even for the theoretical reason—except in so far as they rest upon and express the objective Reality of Truth; that the objective Reality of Truth finds its meaning in the values of Beauty; and that the values of Beauty have their objective guarantee in the immutability of Eternal Goodness.

Eminent as are the services of science in describing sensuous facts and deducing the laws of their orderly relations, in clearing away innumerable errors, in revealing modes in which Reality manifests itself in the world of phenomena, it nevertheless, first fails as an organon of Reality, or as a pathway to objective Truth, and then, with its dogmatic agnosticism, becomes an insurmountable barrier thereto. That the logic of science is vastly superior to the vague deductions of a naive common-sense, but that, at the same time, it may become a hinderance to the higher intuitional knowledge of Truth, it will be remembered, Balzac sets forth under the title of *abstractive* knowledge (p. 339).

And yet this whole scientific movement is a necessary stage in the unfolding history of Reason. It represents the self-assertion of the intellect (the theoretical reason) freeing itself and going forth, strong in its hopes and expectations, to make its own fortune in the world. But the farther science goes outward, peering up into the star-mists or down into the atoms, the farther she gets away from the Truth of Reality, the farther from God, the farther from the very Reason that inspired her flight. In vain she seeks to satisfy her hunger with the husks of phenomenalism.

The Necessary Function of Science in the Unfoldment of Reason.

But in that moment of deepest agnostic poverty and want, repentance and salvation is near; for the logic of science has aroused in Reason its highest and noblest endowment, rational intuition, by which it comes to see that the Truth of Reality is not to be found by going outward, amid the transience and change, the action and reaction of passing phenomena, but by looking inward toward the changeless, substantial, causal Unity of Mind.

This lesson, from the outward wanderings of the theoretical reason in the fields of natural science, has been indelibly fixed in thought, viz.: that the world of nature has no meaning as mere rationalized phenomena of sense, but only as the manifold manifestation, in space and time, of the One Absolute Reason, which human reason is capable of interpreting as the Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause of all things.

Here we become clearly aware of the twofold character of rational evolution, which is not only a flight and a return, but a progressive advance, through that flight and return, to a great end.

Just at that point where science comes to herself amid phenomena and turns back to Mind, she rises to philosophy, and her penitence and return, out of the wanderings of the logical understanding, leads to the rest and affluence of the Divine Reason. So that this outgoing of the theoretical reason in science, searching after Reality, is not an irrational accident, or a willful mistake, but a rational and necessary procedure in the Cosmic Purpose, in order that the human mind, in its self-assertion, might come to know itself, and then return to realize itself by self-submission to, and consequently by a harmonious reconciliation with, the Eternal Divine Mind, or Ultimate Reality.

The scientific prodigal does not come back simply to the point of departure but returns enlightened, enriched, and ennobled, to enter into his divine inheritance, as a son of God.

*The Relation of Science and Philosophy in the Realms of
Phenomena and Reality.*

The contempt which empirical science, amid her obvious and superficial successes, has, during the past century, heaped upon philosophy belongs to the development of the whole drama. It was but the self-assurance and crudity of raw youth, conscious of its strength, impatient of restraint, and determined to have its fling. Time and experience have been the wisest teachers. As much now as in the days of Plato and Aristotle, philosophy deals with the ultimate intuitions of Reason, and, including our total rational interests, seeks to discover the ground of things in Reality; while science, as such, deals only with sense and logic, and touches but the phenomenal surface of things.

It is absurd to suppose that man, himself conscious of some sort of reality within, should ever be satisfied with phenomena without. If this whole beautiful earth and the splendored furniture of heaven are but appearances and that is all we can know, then it were better to withdraw with Diogenes, into his earthenware tub, and seek to get some glimpse of Reality within the mind itself.

But to such sorry issues we are not reduced, for a true philosophy, drawing back science to herself, confers upon science her real dignity and worth, as the handmaiden of Truth in the royal abode of Eternal Reason. It is not science that can give us anything like a true philosophy; it is a true philosophy that can alone give us science. So long as men rest simply on the work of science, which is but the reduction of sense data to logical relations, they can never build up a coherent body of thought, such as we may justly designate by the term philosophy, which meets the demands of reason in its totality. Short of that, we have no philosophy. Those who suppose that natural science will ever satisfy the demand of Reason for objective Truth are like the men of old who sought to reach heaven by building a tower of brick and stone. Heaven can never be reached thus, for it does not lie in that direction.

On the other hand, it is only when philosophy, which is in command of the ultimate intuitions of Reason, establishes science on a sound

logic and furnishes it forth with its rational methods, that science will be rendered the servitor of Truth.

All of which is the same as saying that never can we come to know Reality through phenomena, but that we can know and understand phenomena when they become, for thought, the rational and conditioned manifestations of Reality, as it appears to sense in space and time. And the recognition of this true order of relation, the prodigal wanderings of natural science, during the past century, has convincingly brought home to our business and bosoms. The immense value of this lesson can not be overestimated, for the difference between a science, wandering independent and isolated amid its empty phenomenalism, and a science, resting upon its true philosophical ground in Reality, is the difference between a barren wilderness waste and a land flowing with milk and honey.*

The Unfolding History of Science, Art, and Ethics, One.

This story of science in its departure from common-sense and its ultimate return, through the wanderings of discursive logic, to the intuitions of a true philosophy, the reader will become aware, necessarily grows out of the unfolding nature of reason itself, and follows the same course of development as do ethics and art, in a progressive advance through flight and return, to their final outcome.

The naive contentment in the pleasures of sense and self give way in time to that middle stage of rational evolution, where the discursive wanderings of logic and law bring to man all the painful uncertainties, doubts, unbeliefs, disillusionments, bitter struggles, failures, despairs, contradictions, irrationalities, errors, sins and sufferings of this his phenomenal, earthly career. To him it often becomes the meaningless chaos of fortuitous circumstance or the appointment of a cruel fate, and he gives utterance to his sad convictions in his realistic art or in his pessimistic philosophy.

But it all comes within the Divine Intent for man's instruction and

*The reader will doubtless recall that this entire movement was anticipated and described by those two great philosophers, Kant and Hegel. Kant made it plain that the whole region in which natural science moves is phenomenal. Unfortunately, he regarded the scientific knowledge of phenomena as our only possible knowledge, and therefore as the truth. Fortunately, however, Hegel appeared and showed that the lofty and sacred name of Truth can not be applied to a knowledge of phenomena. Such knowledge may be regarded as accurate or correct, but, in any real sense, it can not be called true; for the holy name of Truth belongs only to Reality, and Reality has its ground in the all-enfolding Eternal Reason, Mind, or Spirit.

rational development. For logic is to lead thought over from the knowledge of sense to the knowledge of intuition, and thus raise it from the superficial appearance of things in nature, to the ultimate Reality of things in Spirit; and law is to lead will over from a narrow egoism to the universal will of good, and thus raise it from the love of self to the love of God. Whereupon, Reason returns to the primitive contentment it first enjoyed in the Eden of sense and self; but it is no longer a contentment in the pleasures of sense and self, but the profound and undisturbed happiness of sharing in a Beauty which is the form of Truth, manifesting the Goodness of Ultimate Reality.

The necessity laid upon Reason of thus pushing forward, through its middle stages of logic and law, to the highest reaches of its divine endowments in intuition and love, lies in its own inner æsthetic demand for Unity. And it is only when Reason attains this third and final stage of its development that it enters into the æsthetic Unity of its theoretical interests of Thought and ethical interests of Will, or, in other words, beholds Ultimate Reality as the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness.

The Whole Meaning of Rational Evolution.

The whole meaning, therefore, of evolution for man is a progressive unfoldment of his self-consciousness, in the conditioned, phenomenal world of space and time, toward that rational freedom and self-realization which is knowing the Cosmic Truth, willing the Cosmic Goodness, and, in consequence, participating in the Cosmic Beauty. His outward flight and self-assertion is the divinely appointed means to make him conscious of His self, in all the dignity and worth of a free rational intelligence; his return and self-submission is an upward path toward the realization of his Self, in the bosom of Reality.

In this entire unfolding process, his errors and sins are revealed not as objective realities in his experience, but as privations and immaturities of sense and self, which the pedagogy of pain rebukes, that he may destroy them out of his subjective consciousness by reflecting in his objective consciousness the Truth and Goodness of God.

In this flight and return, the great arch-error of sense is the natural but false belief in the reality of phenomena, an error which necessarily results in lust for what are regarded as real pleasures. Whereupon the egoism of self seizes upon these supposed values of sense and, in bitter struggle with others for their possession and in defiance

of the all-harmonious cosmic will of good, falls into the discordant sins of ill-will. But, all the time, the ever-blessed pedagogy of pain is driving sense to logic and logic to intuition, and is leading self to justice and justice to love; in concomitance with which advance, the pleasures and pains of sensation rise to the higher pleasures and pains of emotion, until at last the pleasures and pains of emotion come to be transformed into the undisturbed pleasures of a pure happiness, which is the conscious enjoyment of that supreme Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth manifesting Eternal Goodness.

It must have been some such conception as this which gave the great Apostle to the Gentiles, who saw the whole creation groaning and travailing in pain together with us until now, his unswerving forward look of unconquerable hope and assured triumph. "For I reckon," he exclaims, "that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed to us-ward. For the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption [transience of the phenomenal] into the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (Rom. viii, 18-21).

The Method of Interpretation, a Return to Mind.

Since, then, we do not find Truth, Goodness, and Beauty on the levels of sense, self, and sensation; nor even on the much higher levels of logic, law, and emotion; but only on the highest levels of intuition, love, and happiness; our method of interpreting Reality has been, from the beginning, determined for us.

Never by searching outward, through the phenomenal world, can we ever come to understand Reality, but only when we understand Reality, as seen within Reason itself in the unity of its substance and cause as Mind, can we understand and evaluate phenomena. Never can we find the Truth of God in nature, but we can only know the truth of nature, when we find it in God, as the Beauty of Truth manifesting Goodness.

In like manner, we can never attain the universal will of good, or find the objectively real relation to our fellow men by any outward efforts of volition, but only by a return to the self and a total transformation of the inner motive of will. By no possible external

regulations, laws, constitutions, or governments whatever can human society ever be saved, or men be brought into harmonious social and economic unity; but only by an outstreaming of the moral reason in a universal will of good.

And in consequence, of necessity, that pure happiness, which is the ultimate and supreme demonstration of the Beauty of Life, can never be found in all the sensations and emotions arising out of the enjoyment of sense objects and their logical relations in the external universe, but only in the True Thought and Right Will within the Unity of Reason itself.

For, in general, the Unity of Reason is alone attained when rational intelligence, rising to the intuition of objective Reality, beholds the Beauty of Truth as the manifestation of Goodness, or when Thought and Will become One in the Unity of Life.

Ethical and Practical Realization to Be Sought.

The attainment of this lofty goal, however, is not to be found in a mere theoretical thinking it to be what it is, or as it is; but, since Reality is the Unity of Thought and Will, must be sought also in an ethical and practical *realization* of life. So that, as God, the Ultimate Reality in his Eternal Creative Love, manifests himself in the Absolute Beauty of his Infinite Truth, to man; man's supreme vocation is ever to seek the freedom of his self-realization in interpreting or reflecting in his æsthetic, intellectual, and moral nature, the Beauty, Truth and Goodness of God.

The Ultimate Purpose of Rational Evolution.

And if, in order to reach this rational freedom and self-realization, the life of man must needs unfold, amid the vicissitudes and discipline of the phenomenal world, by passing through the discursive experiences of logic and law, with their pedagogy of pain, from matter to Mind, from appearance to Reality, from nature to Spirit; the only rational purpose we can see in the entire world-drama of progressive unfoldment, of wandering forth and coming back, of flight and return, is that the Divine Son, begotten in the image and likeness of God, may hear and understand the Divine Word, and hearing and understanding, come to know and to love the Divine Father, and thus enter into the harmonious Beauty of his Life forever.

What then to him are all the mistakes in thought and perversities

of will, all the errors and sins, and all the bitter pedagogy of pain! They vanish into nothing, or are washed away in the lethal streams of forgetfulness, before the effulgent Beauty of the Divine Truth and Love which is all and in all.

The Transformation of Man's Consciousness Reveals a New Heaven and a New Earth.

Thus it is that in proportion as, amid the experiences of nature and history, the rational self-consciousness unfolds, in proportion as man realizes himself, rises above the conditions of space and time or the limitations of phenomena, overcomes his errors, sins, and consequent sufferings; he enters into the ever-existent regions of Reality, where, reflecting in himself the Divine Beauty of Truth and Goodness, he beholds the Kingdom of God and the Will of God coming on earth as it is in heaven.

But this coming of the Divine Kingdom upon earth is nothing other than the glorious transformation of man's rational consciousness, by which the world of nature and of history is seen under the aspect of its heavenly image, forever dwelling in the Eternal Mind. Then shall come to pass the saying that is written:


"And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth are passed away; and the sea is no more. And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, made ready as a bride adorned for her husband.

"And I heard a great voice out of the throne saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he shall dwell with them, and they shall be his peoples, and God himself shall be with them, their God: and he shall wipe away every tear from their eyes; and death shall be no more; neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain, any more: the first things are passed away . . . Behold I make all things new" (Rev. xxi, 1-5).

"O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past tracing out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor? or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and unto him are all things. To whom be the glory unto the ages" (Rom. xv, 33-36).



BOOK VI.
REALIZATION.



CHAPTER I.

THE RETURN TO REALITY IN CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.

WHEN man once learns, from the painful experiences of his intellectual and moral wanderings in the world, what he really is, his supreme concern henceforth must become the attainment of his rational maturity, or his entrance into the full enjoyment of that spiritual harmony of life, which is thinking the Cosmic Thought and willing the Cosmic Will. All the mistakes he has made, the wrongs he has done, the adversities he has met, the failures he has suffered, the afflictions he has borne; are but incidents in that discipline of experience, the sole purpose of which is his own rational development and return to the Supreme Reason whence he came. Man lives in and through nature and history in order that, as a rational being, he may, by the self-conscious exercise of his own thought and the free choice of his own will, come to *know*, to *love*, and to *enjoy* God.

This fundamental Christian doctrine of a divine, providential pedagogy in the world of experience, by which man is to be brought to freedom and self-realization, has received a new statement in the teachings of Christian Science, set forth, during the past generation, with so much fidelity, fervor, and inspiring power by Mary Baker G. Eddy.

Mrs. Eddy's Main Emphasis Laid upon the Return.

As this new statement of Christianity lays great stress upon the dynamic efficiency of simply *understanding* true doctrine, the impression is at first gained of a one-sided extreme, in exclusively insisting on the *subjective attitude* of mind alone, and of a one-sided defect in entirely disregarding *objective experience*, in nature and in history, as a rational means of instruction and development.

This impression, however, is superficial, for a deeper reading will reveal that Mrs. Eddy is fully alive to the value of nature and of history as means of a pedagogical discipline (36, 4-9; 66, 3-16; 240, 27; 241, 4; 296, 4-9);* but, since the only value of such instruction is

* The citations refer to page and line of "Science and Health, with Key to the Scriptures," by Mary Baker G. Eddy, edition of 1907.

to arouse man to himself and drive him forward to his rational goal, she lays her entire emphasis upon the ideal realization (265, 22-266, 18).

Once learn, by means of his outward flight, through the world of experience, what he really is, a son of the Highest, and from now on man's one supreme aim is to return to God, that he may come to freedom and self-realization in reflecting the Divine Thought and Will.

Understanding now that his own real life lies in the intelligible world of Spirit, what rational purpose can longer be subserved in the outward searching for Reality in the phenomenal world of sense and self, where the only lesson which that flight is meant to convey is that the Ultimate Reality to be sought is the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Love?

Science Brings the Fact Back to the Idea.

This message of Jesus: Return from your wanderings to your Father's house, is essentially the message of natural science. The outward investigation among separate facts has the sole purpose of finding some great rational principle underlying the facts. Then it is that, once having this principle, science, so to speak, calls back the scattered and seemingly unrelated facts to a rational unity under the principle. And in this way science secures two great ends. It first comes to understand the meaning of the facts in the light of the principle, and then, because of this understanding of the facts *in* the principle, is able to rule among and subordinate the facts to rational ends.

It is precisely this method that Mrs. Eddy employs. Once possessed of the objective Truth of Reality, the Ground Principle of all principles, and then understand it so clearly as to bring all the thoughts and volitions of daily experience back to it. Make the Idea dominate the facts.

Christian Science Subordinates Fact to Idea.

So that, as might seem at first, this centering of thought upon an understanding of Reality does not reduce Christian Science to a purely theoretical idealism with its entire ascetic withdrawal from the world of experience, as in Neo-Platonism or in Vedantism; for, instead of withdrawing from the outer world, it claims to set forth the only true condition on which that world of nature and of history can be dominated and brought into complete accord with Reality, and therefore

lays its whole emphasis upon the practical necessity of *demonstrating* the power of Reality over phenomena.

It will not, however, remain the world of nature as presented to sense or to the abstract logic of natural science; nor the world of history as ruled by egoism, or by the abstract laws of a balanced justice; but it will become nature, reinterpreted in the light of Spiritual Truth, as the revelation of God; and history, transformed by the law of love, into the kingdom of God.

Understanding, which as such is always a theoretical state of mind, Mrs. Eddy is constantly distinguishing not only from belief, or persuaded conviction, but also from mere intellectual conception. By understanding she always means such a clear and efficient envisagement of objective Reality as to overpower feeling and result in action. That is, real *thinking* the Truth means in effect *willing* the Truth, or making it real to consciousness. All true knowledge, or knowledge of Reality, necessarily ends in obedience. And the same efficient understanding of Truth involves the understanding of its opposite, error, as pure illusion; and, hence, the only means of its destruction, in the denial of its reality.

Understanding of Truth and Error in Christian Science.

What that understanding is, upon which Christian Science insists, has already been stated in the current of this volume, and may be briefly summed up here. In the first place that which is most important is to get a true philosophical view of the universe, and this Mrs. Eddy everywhere makes clear is Theistic Idealism. The One, Ultimate Reality, or God, as the Infinite Substance and Eternal Cause of all things, is Absolute Mind and, while forever distinguished from the world and man, is forever one with them as His creation, and His reflection. For God forever creates and sustains the world, in order to manifest his Love, in the Beauty of Truth, to man whom He has begotten in his own likeness and image (240 1-17). Or, in other words, the world and man coexist with God as constituting a triune Reality, in which the Eternal Father reveals, through the Logos or Eternal World-Order, his Love, in the Beauty of Truth, to the Eternal Son (303, 25-304, 2; 331, 26-332, 3; 477, 26-478, 2; 502, 28-503, 5).

This One, Ultimate Reality, Mrs. Eddy variously designates as Mind or Immortal Mind, Spirit, Soul, or the Ego, that is, the Divine Spiritual Individual, or Principle, which must never be thought of

otherwise than, as the Absolute Unity of Life, Truth, and Love; and, although forever *transcendent to*, nevertheless forever *immanent in* the phenomenal world of nature and of history (249, 31-32; 250, 6-13; 331, 18-25).

The phenomenal world, or the world of mortal mind, which is the limited aspect of Reality as presented to sense or the logic of sense, under the conditions of space and time, is the divinely appointed place where man is to experience the pedagogy of his spiritual unfoldment to freedom and self-realization in Immortal Mind; and is the only scene of error and sin which, being the subjective mistakes and perversities of mortal mind, are pure illusion, and therefore have no place in the Immortal World of Reality.

Man, in his finite or mortal limitations, first looks upon the phenomenal world of sense as real and, when he sees that it is pleasant to the eye and good for food, he takes and eats thereof. Whereupon his eyes are opened to the knowledge of good *and evil*, supposing that he is now like God, knowing good *and evil*.

Here enters, according to Mrs. Eddy, the understanding of error, the opposite of Truth, and consequently the possibility of its destruction. Man's supposition that his knowledge of good *and evil* makes him like God, who knows good *and evil*, is a pure anthropomorphism, having its origin solely in the limited, finite, mortal mind. God does not know good *and evil* (as an existent reality) for evil is an illusion. God knows only Reality, as ever-existent. The knowledge of good is Science, and concerns only objective Reality; the knowledge of evil is nescience, and concerns only subjective illusion, having no existence except in mortal mind. But in mortal mind it has existence, because man, erroneously taking the world of sense to be real, falls into all the sins of self in a bitter struggle with his fellows for its possession.

The result is that he objectifies and projects a whole world of illusion which he superimposes upon Reality, as if it were real, and which he finds to be vitiated by all the evils of disease, misfortune, suffering and death.

As this entire superimposition of illusion has to do alone with the phenomenal world, and in no way touches Reality, the understanding of error ceases to be a mere theory and becomes a direct practical means to its destruction, just as the understanding of Truth is not a mere intellectual conception but the dynamic power of its realization.

So that to prepare, and garnish the mind, as it were, for its real guest, the everlasting Truth, the knowledge which the world of sense, or mortal mind, gives out as real and which leads to all error, lust, and ill-will, must be entirely reversed and utterly denied. Reversed, because Spirit, and not sense, gives us real knowledge; and denied, because the knowledge of Spirit, having within it no error, leaves no place for the evils of our experience which are pure illusions, resting upon the errors of sense and the consequent sins of self, though always taken by mortal mind to be real.

Hence, that submissive spirit of piety, which bows uncomplainingly before the afflictive dispensations of a Divine Providence, grows out of a misunderstanding of, and really means a dishonor to, God and his creation. All the ills of life—hunger and cold, poverty and distress, the brutal wrongs of selfish indifference, oppression, and injustice—are not of God but of man; and are solely the product of human ignorance, lust, and ill-will. To attribute them to God, is, instead of being a true, pious reverence, a misinformed and unintelligent irreverence.

It is an unscientific confusion and an unethical lethargy which would shift the baneful results of man's errors and sins upon the Divine Government of the world. Therefore, the scientific understanding of life destroys the sacredness of suffering, as the intent of God's will, by showing it to be the product of human limitations, mistakes and perversities, which are to be overcome and remedied; and thus opens up for man a new and higher principle of progress, whereby he is called to destroy the power of evil, by denying and renouncing its illusory sources in error and sin for the understanding and practice of Truth and Goodness, which constitute the harmonious Beauty of God's divine creation.

The Return to Reality, Man's Supreme Calling.

Now, with such an understanding of life, it is plain what man's supreme calling is. It is to return to Reality, or by understanding the objective Truth, it is to translate the world of phenomena back into terms of Reality, and thus free it from the evils with which the errors of sense and the sins of self have vitiated it. In other words, it is to bring the world of mortal mind into complete subordination to and harmony with the Immortal Mind (209, 17-24).

To attain this understanding of Truth and to *realize* it as the Beauty

of God, manifesting Eternal Love, is to realize the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, and reveals the one great purpose of man's sojourn in the phenomenal world of nature and of history. But, it must be remembered, this great realization transforms the phenomenal world of sense into its Spiritual Reality as seen under the aspect of eternity, no longer subject to the conditions of space and time. For "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." . . . For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. But when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory" (I Cor. xv, 50, 53-54).

This glorious transformation and victory over death, "the last enemy to be abolished," because it is the type and sum of all human evils—which exactly coincides, in the Apostle's mind, with the ultimate subjugation of all things to God who is all in all (xv, 28)—is freed by Mrs. Eddy, from its dualistic supernatural form and given a rational interpretation, consonant with our scientific views of the world; in virtue of which, man's consciousness unfolds, according to a great spiritual, though natural, law, toward freedom and self-realization (xi, 6-18).

Herein, man's intellectual and moral greatness is revealed. Although wholly dependent upon and an integral element in Reality, he is nevertheless not a mere passive recipient but, as it were, must show what is in him by actively winning his way to the goal of his self-realization. He need not look to God for supernatural aid, for God, being the omnipresent and omnipotent Reality, has already done and is always doing his share—"for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure"—so that the weight of the whole problem is thrown upon him to work out his own salvation, let it be, if it will, with fear and trembling. Man reveals his divine origin in being able to create a world of his own, and though it be a poor one, painfully distorted by his errors and sins, yet he can learn through his mistakes and perversities what the Master's Work is and how to imitate it.

Meaning of the Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus.

Mrs. Eddy finds the entire drama of man's experience in the world symbolized and exemplified in the life and death, resurrection and

ascension of Jesus. Understanding the omnipresent and omnipotent Reality as the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Love, Jesus mastered the world of nature by healing all diseases, and lived in the kingdom of God on earth as the realization of history. His crucifixion, physical death, and entombment were the last mighty struggle; and the resurrection was the triumphant demonstration of power of Truth over all error, in which he brought the phenomenal world of sense into complete subordination to and harmony with the Real World of Spirit. He then finished his divine work of Atonement with God by entirely transforming the phenomenal order of sense into the real order of Spirit, through his ascension into the world of Spiritual Reality (35, 14-18; 44, 5-12; 46, 20-29; 292, 31-293, 2; 313, 23-314, 7; 334, 10-20).

The Phenomenal Must Be Transformed into the Real.

Man's one great problem, then, is to raise the phenomenal world of sense and transform it into its spiritual meaning; and this can alone be done by the true attitude of thought and the right attitude of will, viewed both negatively and positively. Negatively, thought must deny the reality of all sense knowledge as the arch-error; and, positively, assert Spiritual Reality as the only objective Truth. In consequence, negatively, will must renounce all the motives of self, rising out of sense pleasures, as the arch-sin; and, positively, choose the motive of Love, as standing for the only objective order of Goodness, or as the only Real Causal Power of the universe.

In so far as man is ruled by mortal mind, that is *thinks* the phenomenal knowledge of sense to be the truth, and consequently *wills* to take the pleasures of sense as the motives of his will, he suffers the inevitable results in disease and death. In so far, on the other hand, as he is ruled by Immortal Mind, that is, views the phenomenal world of sense in the light of Spiritual Reality, he escapes the errors of sense, rises above the sins of self, and in that proportion is freed from disease and death, and enters into the Real World of Life, Truth, and Love (299, 26-32).

Therefore, the problem of man's salvation is not really furthered by "works" (the "divine service" of ritual, or external charities), or by "faith" (intellectual belief in a creed), or by death (as a final and painful escape to the celestial world); but is rationally solved alone by an intimate and individual *understanding* of Reality as the only

true faith, resulting in the only *real works* or *demonstration*, in virtue of which, according to a scientific, rational, and natural law, he transforms his mind from its mortal state in the world of material phenomena, where error, sin, and death prevail, to its immortal state in the world of Spiritual Reality, where Truth, Love, and Life alone exist.

Inconsistent Views of Death.

It is here that we begin to see the source of so much misunderstanding concerning Mrs. Eddy's teachings about death. The prevailing, orthodox belief on the subject is that death is a separation of the soul from the body; whereupon the soul, according to its faith or lack of faith in the historical atonement of Christ, either rises to heaven or sinks to hell. In the first case, death should be hailed by the departed as an incalculable gain, and should be regarded with profound satisfaction by the bereft. In the second case, it could be looked upon only as an irretrievable disaster both to the departed and by his friends.

As a matter of fact, such beliefs are not sincerely held; for, in the first case, the Christian man, generally speaking, however good, shrinks from death, as if he were not too desirous of God's company, and his friends mourn him, when he is gone, as if he had not really arrived there. While in the second case, again speaking generally, the Christian does not earnestly enough warn his friend against dying unregenerate, nor does his mourning for him, when gone, do justice to so serious a situation.

But, as the last consideration indicates, what is coming more and more to be believed by the Christian world is that death is not an event that settles man's eternal fate, and that no matter what he has been, his soul when released from the body will somehow, sooner or later, find its way to the saving mercy of God. In such a case, death would come to have little or no significance, except as a happy release from unbearable conditions of disease or misfortune; and even he who should take Seneca's open door of escape could not be justifiably condemned for adventuring upon an estate which could not well be worse than the one he so impatiently quitted.

But, except in normal old age, when tired nature falls gently asleep upon the nourishing bosom of Mother Earth, death is looked upon quite universally as a disaster, and rightly so, because it is the result of an irrational state of disease, an irrational accident, or an irra-

tional act. To avoid such an irrational result, both science and ethics always have lavished, and still continue to lavish, all their resources—even in attempting to prolong normal old age.

Death, a Symbol of Defeat, to Be Overcome.

It is this view which Mrs. Eddy wholly shares; but she differs widely from the general conviction as to the way of overcoming death, and as to its meaning. To begin with, death must always be understood as a disaster, as the summation of all human ills, and the destruction of all human hopes. It is a defeat, because it is the inevitable result and penalty of error and sin, and therefore a standing proof of man's failure, as yet, to have settled his specific problem of true thinking and right willing. In other words, it is a constant declaration that the spiritual man has as yet failed to win his divine right of dominion over all things, necessarily included in which is the subordination and control of the natural man.

So that death, the sum and symbol of all natural misfortunes, is, as it were, the last enemy to be overcome, because the winning of such a victory means the attainment of that triumph over all natural conditions which is necessarily involved in man's rational self-realization, as a spiritual being. Or, more broadly speaking, victory over death is the supreme goal of science, which more and more reveals man's power, through knowledge and obedience, to subordinate and control nature for his ultimate welfare.

Science and Religion Opposed.

But the problem of overcoming death, can, on the one hand, in no way be settled by simply dealing with the outer, material man; for that fails to reach the causes of those discords, resulting in death, which really lie in false thinking (error) and wrong willing (sin). Nor is it settled by a confident faith in the immortality of the soul; for that entirely neglects the problem, except in so far as faith looks forward to the resurrection of the transformed and glorified body by a supernatural act of God.

Thus we have science and religion opposed, while seeking the same end; one resting upon a natural, and the other upon a supernatural solution. Science would combat death and save the body in the natural world; while religion would evade or mitigate the problem, by laying emphasis upon the transcendent destiny of the soul after death in the supernatural world, to which the body is super-

naturally and ultimately raised. Reason, however, resents this opposition and demands unity; for it shares the aim of science to overcome death by saving the body, and equally shares the aim of religion which looks forward to a victory over death that means far more than the mere salvation of the body in the natural world.

Mrs. Eddy Reconciles Them in Mind.

Imbued wholly, both with the spirit of science, which would combat and overcome death, by understanding (true thought) and practicing (right will) the law of life, and with the spirit of religion which insists upon the transcendent value of soul, Mrs. Eddy aims to bring these two supreme interests into a complete reconciliation.

And this consummation, so devoutly to be wished, she attains by penetrating to the center of the whole problem in mind. That is to say, the substantial and causal ground of death is error (false thought) and sin (wrong will), which in their nature are unrealities; while the substantial and causal ground of life is Truth and Goodness, the only real thought and real will for man, as a rational being. Hence, the problem is solely one of a change of mind, a transformation of the entire consciousness, in virtue of which the unreality of error and sin is denied and renounced, while the reality of Truth and Goodness is understood and willed.

So long, therefore, as error and sin remain in human consciousness as realities, obscuring the realities of Truth and Goodness, the seeds of death remain. And the attempts hitherto at solution have defaulted. The natural scientist does not really attack the problem, because he is dealing simply with phenomenal substances and causes which do not go to the heart of the difficulty; the believing Christian supposes he has solved the problem by his triumphant faith, when in fact he has only left it behind; while he who destroys himself solves nothing and, by deserting all science and all religion, but adds a rash and willful act to the already heavy problem which he still has to work out.

But here and everywhere, now and always, the problem remains of transforming the sensible into the intelligible, the material into the mental, or the natural into the spiritual consciousness, in order to attain that rational self-realization which constitutes the real man who has overcome death, because he no longer thinks or wills its sources in the errors and sins of material existence.

Here then, we have the very essence of science with its demand for

an intelligible and practicable law of life, unfolding toward some great end; and the very essence of religion with its demand that rational evolution shall transcend the material world by carrying us forward into the realms of spiritual Reality. So that death is overcome, neither by preventing physical dissolution, nor by making it the door of immortality; but by a scientific solution of the problem in rational consciousness which, through the understanding and practice of the law of life, unfolds from its natural state in the world of sensible phenomena to its spiritual state in the world of intelligible Reality.

The Natural Transformed into the Spiritual.

By this victory over death, therefore, it will be evident, Mrs. Eddy does not mean that man is to discover some fountain of youth in the material world by which he is to live on perpetually in the present, natural condition of things. Her meaning rather is that man is first to win that mastery over his material surroundings which Jesus won at his resurrection, and then to go on to the transformation of the natural world, by the transformation of his consciousness, into that spiritual world which Jesus entered, on his ascension.

This position is not wholly unlike that of Leibnitz who represents the unfolding consciousness as reaching such a point of advance that the material, visible world disappears from view, because the material world is only the aspect of things which is presented to consciousness at its primitive stages of development. At any rate, Mrs. Eddy regards death as a scientific and ethical problem for rational consciousness which is endued with the power of attaining a new heaven and a new earth: negatively considered, by denying error and renouncing sin, as unrealities; and, positively considered, by thinking and willing the Truth and the Goodness of God as man's only Reality and Life.

Mrs. Eddy Makes of Theistic Idealism a Practice.

Thus Mrs. Eddy raises Theistic Idealism, the only true world-view and the noblest product in time of the theoretical reason, from being a mere philosophical doctrine into a practical, efficient means of transforming human life into its true spiritual significance. And in doing so, she has accomplished for the Christian consciousness what the great Hindu philosophical teachers have accomplished for the Aryan consciousness; that is, she has given to a true philosophy the

meaning and practical power of a real religion. Our believing the true doctrine is no longer a *faith* that simply *accepts* or *intellectually thinks* the Truth, but is such an efficient and clear *understanding* of the Truth as to *demonstrate* or *realize* in practice its truthfulness, as the harmonious Beauty of Life.

The doctrine of Theistic Idealism, as generally held, is accepted as true, *theoretically*; but is obscured and vitiated by a *practical belief* in the substantial, causal reality of the phenomenal world, or a belief that the phenomenal world has laws of its own, independent of or insubordinate to the Real World, and hence incorrigible by man, at any rate in a large measure, for his highest good. Whereas the Real World, if it is to be the Real World, must demonstrate its entire control over the phenomenal world, which is entirely fluent and corrigible to the ultimate welfare of man.

That men admit, in thought, the One Reality of Mind and its manifestations, and yet, *in practice*, compromise with the admitted reality of a phenomenal world is a flagrant inconsistency, rational weakness, and vacillation which Mrs. Eddy justly denounces as idolatry. There is only One God, and He is Immortal Mind; to bow in worship or fear before any reality of substance or power of cause in the material or phenomenal world is the sin of serving other gods, so uncompromisingly condemned by the holy prophets of old. And even worse, for in view of the true doctrine of Mind, it clearly becomes a sin of the theoretical reason, as well as of the moral will.

Just as Mrs. Eddy says to the Christian theologian, who claims to have faith in the all-enfolding Goodness of God, show your faith by your works (201, 1-3; 241, 17-18); she says to the Theistic Idealist, we have had theories enough, we must now have practice, in actual demonstration (241, 17-18). It is quite time that the fine theories of Idealism should *do* something. If Mind is all, then Mind must control all, and the irrational dependence upon phenomenal substances and causes must give way to entire dependence upon the One Real Substance and Cause, Immortal "Mind, in banishing all belief in matter, evil, disease, and death" (116, 13-19).

Three Stages of Advance.

But to realize the true theory in right practice, or to demonstrate the Reality of Truth, is not the facile work of a passing moment. And Mrs. Eddy points out, in general, three stages in man's evolution

by which he finally attains freedom and self-realization in Immortal Mind, corresponding to what has already been described as sense, logic, and intuition for the intellect; egoism, law, and love for the moral will; and sensation, emotion, and happiness for the feelings (pp. 95-102). She names these three progressive stages, physical, moral, and spiritual.

The first is characterized by wholly false beliefs in thought (errors of sense) depraved impulses in the will (sins of lust and ill-will) and the consequent pain and discord in feeling (disease and death). This is the animal-man.

At the second stage, the false beliefs are disappearing from thought, and the will is being pervaded by motives of honesty and affection, while the feelings are suffused with the strong emotions of courage and hope. This is the human-man.

The third stage marks the full understanding of Spiritual Reality for thought, perfect love for the will, and the consequent harmonious power and beauty of health and holiness for the entire man. This is the divine-man, or Man, in his reality (115, 21-116, 3).

Christian Science, as a Method and an End.

In order to reach this supreme end, Christian Science is to be viewed under two aspects, viz.: as a method to that end and as the end itself. As a method, Christian Science is the practice of displacing error by Truth, sin by Goodness, and the ugliness and discord of disease and death by the Beauty of harmonious Life. As an end, Christian Science stands for the whole order of objective Infinite Truth in its omnipresent, omnipotent Beauty, as manifesting Eternal Goodness (134, 21-26).

As the attainment of this end by this method is the purpose of man's providential experience in the world, Mrs. Eddy sees the gradual unfolding of human consciousness by the discipline of suffering or the enlightenment of Science, until he comes to freedom and self-realization (296, 4-13).

To understand Christian Science in its finality, in her sense of understanding, would take eternity, but to understand it, as a goal and as a method, is possible now for every man, and the call to a practical demonstration of its truth, is the insistent meaning of her mission. "To understand God is the work of eternity," she says, "and demands absolute consecration of thought and energy" (3, 12-16).

But the beginning must be made, no matter how small or how slow the progress (219, 29-32; 323, 6-18; 384, 13-15). The slowness with which mortals apprehend the Thought of God, as the Absolute Principle of all things (39, 27-30) may rise out of enslavement to convention or fear of ridicule (68, 2-4), or out of a love of sin (95, 32-96, 3; 254, 12-13). But, at any rate, it is a fact of experience that all spiritual progress is slow (233, 8-15); so that there may be, after all, not only a necessity but a certain natural wisdom in gently emerging into spiritual conceptions of life, much as infancy develops into the full maturity of manhood (370, 24-32; 371, 20-25; 485, 14-17).

But no error could be more fatal than to refuse to take the first infant steps because the work of maturity can not at once be done. Indeed, if those first infant steps are not taken, maturity can never be attained (371, 20-32).

An Ideal not yet Attained but still Pursued.

In view of such considerations, therefore, we are not justified in condemning Christian Science because it does not offer an immediate attainment of the ideal goal, any more than we should condemn the reformer, the scientist, the inventor, the educator, the statesman, or anyone else who is trying to accomplish some great work, because he did not at once bring to realization the principle that guided his action. It is solely the objective rationality, or the truth of the inner principle at work, which must always be made the criterion of value.

In like manner, the merits of Christian Science can not be justly invalidated by the inconsequence, misunderstanding, exaggeration, or inconsistency of any of its adherents; for, besides the fact that it involves for the most intelligent and earnest the very difficult problem of bringing to practical demonstration a lofty and noble conception of life, there may be many superficial and non-serious persons attracted to Christian Science, who take it to be an easy means of securing worldly welfare or a facile means of escape from the trouble involved in doing right or from the consequences of doing wrong; and who are a very grievous burden upon the intelligent and earnest, in their full appreciation of the real difficulties to be met and overcome.

Inadequate Form Does not Invalidate Substance.

Furthermore, even if we look for the theory and practice of Christian Science, as found in the teachings and life of Mrs. Eddy herself,

about whose leadership the entire movement has gathered, we must be on our guard against any confusion between the essential and the non-essential, the substance and the form, the inner spirit and the outer letter.

Thus it would be the gravest injustice to demand of Mrs. Eddy what can not be demanded of any human being who has ever essayed to teach his fellow men, and what she herself does not claim, viz.: either an adequate and perfect fulfillment of the ideal of Truth, or an adequate and perfect rhetorical and logical expression of that ideal Truth. "We have," as the Apostle reminds us, "this treasure in earthen vessels" (II Cor. iv, 7).

From the time when she caught the first glimpses of the Truth, which so transformed her life and gave to her a mission of such wide import, she traces her steps with evergrowing firmness until she walks with power and authority (460, 24-32). But even yet she recognizes that the full understanding of the Truth is an infinite ideal, and frankly confesses herself, "though rejoicing in some progress," to be "still a willing disciple at the heavenly gate, waiting for the Mind of Christ" (viii, 24; ix, 19). In fact, she everywhere presents Christian Science as the revelation of an Ideal, to her as to all, which begins a new era of progressive development in the life of man, and which can not end until man has demonstrated for himself, or brought to realization, the objective Reality of that Ideal.

The Mortal Person and the Spiritual Individual.

Hence, there are always two phases in Mrs. Eddy's life—as indeed in all our lives—which are to be borne in mind, viz.: her human personality, with its mortal limitations, and her spiritual individuality which is ever seeking to express itself through the human form. It is Mrs. Eddy as the spiritual individual who is delivering the message of Christian Science, and who is speaking with oracular authority, because she is uttering that Truth which is for no one's personal aggrandizement, but equally for the blessing of all. In the mortal aspects of her existence, she has been and is equally concerned with all in bringing the Spiritual Ideal to a demonstrated realization.

And it is her preternatural insight, her wisdom, her undaunted courage, her unflagging devotion, and her larger success in making her demonstration over the mortal plane that give to her the personal preeminence of being the discoverer and founder of Christian Science.

There are three important observations to be made about (1) the form of Mrs. Eddy's presentation, (2) the plane of thought on which she moves, and (3) the rationality of her method in general, before attempting to estimate the objective value of her teachings.

The Form of Mrs. Eddy's Presentation.

The first reading of her chief work, "Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures," leaves the impression, in spite of much that is strikingly beautiful and true, that there is a prevailing tone of incoherence, contradiction, illogicality, and arbitrary, dictatorial assertion, with no regard for evident fact either in the realm of objective nature or of history. But, aside from elements of this kind, which a hostile criticism can always find in all writings, the suspicion will creep in that, perhaps, what seems so plainly contradictory and illogical could not have escaped the author's own notice and, therefore, must have some different meaning than lies on the surface, or is to be interpreted by a wider connection. That is, Coleridge's rule must be applied. Before we condemn a writer's misunderstanding, we must be sure that we understand his misunderstanding.

Examined in this spirit, it will be found that while Mrs. Eddy's writings are non-sequacious and non-logical, they are not incoherent and illogical; and that below the surface there runs, from beginning to end, a rigorous consistency based upon the highest kind of logic. She is not writing a scientific, discursive treatise as upon such a subject as physics or chemistry, dealing inductively with the logical relations of phenomena, but a scientifically intuitional treatise, dealing with certain primal ideas on the nature of Reality, quite generally accepted as true, from which the conclusions are drawn with deductive certainty.

Thus, in the first place, it is rigorously scientific to look for substance and cause in Reality alone. In the second place, given Reality as Mind, then whatever is or occurs, is or occurs in either the divine Immortal Mind, or in the mortal, human mind. In the third place, given the One, Absolute, Divine Mind, and its manifestations, as alone Truth, Love, and Life, and there can be found no room for error and sin, and their consequent suffering and death, as real. Finally, so far as error, sin, and their consequent suffering and death appear in experience, they must be in the nature of objective illusions of mortal mind, and, therefore, to be destroyed by denial and renun-

ciation; or banished by the assertion, in thought, of Truth and the acceptance of Love, in the will.

Get Mrs. Eddy's master concern, the main current of her thought, the end she is aiming at, and it will be found that she is more logical and more comprehensive than an Aristotle or a Hegel. Then it will be found that the form of her expression is strikingly appropriate for the conveyance of her thought, where contradiction does not lie in the expression, but in the opposition of Reality to illusion; and there will be discovered in her logic a cogency impossible to escape.

Below the surface of expression, there is a deeper unity and interrelation of parts than could have been secured by a mere formally logical development, for her work presents itself not in the form of a conscious labored, intellectual effort of discursive reasoning, but rather with all the inevitableness of an unconscious product of art.

The Plane on Which She Moves.

This general fact, it is to be observed in the second place, has its origin on the plane where her thought constantly moves. That is, she is not moving on the plane of the discursive understanding, but on that of rational intuition. She is Woman, as such, reasoning; and her thought inhabits the highest regions of spiritual insight, where the interest of reason is no longer to *reason*, but directly to *see* and to *declare*. Mrs. Eddy is what Balzac would call a *specialist*, or one whose intuitions penetrate to the roots of things. And not until the reader lifts his mind to this plane of rational activity will he, in any adequate way, get the comprehensive truth and beauty of her meaning.

Her Rationality.

Here, in the third place, reveals itself one of the most striking characteristics of Mrs. Eddy's presentation, viz.: rationality. Although she moves in the regions of spiritual intuition, she always remains purely rational. She sees no visions, and offers no revelations of how the invisible world looks in terms of sense imagination—nor encourages any one else to expect such visions or revelations. She hears no heavenly voices calling her to deliver supernatural messages. She makes no prophecies of world disasters or cataclysmic terrestrial revolutions. She indeed has one grand prophecy, and that is that Truth, no matter how bitterly opposed will triumphantly banish all error, that Love will in its time overcome all hate, and that Life will

at last master death. But with imaginative portrayals of the invisible and with eschatologies she will have nothing to do.

Her thought from beginning to end is confined to pure rational intuition, and, taking the whole scope of it in its comprehension of our intellectual, moral, and æsthetic interests, her message is the most *purely rational* that has been delivered to man; and, in its essence, is an appeal to no authority but to that of pure reason alone. Indeed, it purports to be scientific—scientific in the highest sense—and declares that a new heaven and a new earth will dawn upon man in proportion as he drops from his consciousness the illusions of his errors and sins, his mistakes in thought and perversities of will, and reflects in himself the absolutely rational Beauty of Truth and Goodness.

Our Deepest Interests are Beauty, Truth, and Goodness.

It is evident that as rational beings, we have no real concern about some possible sensuous heaven or hell beyond physical death, or about some possible, dramatic, disastrous end of the world; for the modern scientific consciousness has robbed that of all further interest for us. What, however, we are deeply interested in is to secure the realization of those lofty ideals of Beauty, Truth, and Love that forever haunt the abysmal depths of the inner, hidden self, by consciously entering into the Life, the Thought, and the Will of the Glorious Cosmos in which we live and move and have our being.

And this is the supremely rational message which Mrs. Eddy delivers to all, that to think the Thought of God, and to will the Will of God, is Life Eternal, because this is the full and complete meaning of that Reason which lies within us all, as children of God.

CHAPTER II.

CHRISTIANITY AS SCIENCE IS AN ULTIMATE PHILOSOPHY.

THE final test of all truth is its objective rationality, which means that it has a place, as an integral part, in such a coherent system of thought as meets the entire demands of Reason in its totality. We can not, therefore, rely in the end upon the outer evidence of phenomenal experience which, in its incoherence, may be made to mean almost anything; but, although it ultimately does confirm the Truth as its outer manifestation, sign, or proof, our final appeal must always be to Reason, which dwells in the regions of Reality, and sees what it sees in its own light. Then Truth goes forth, conquering and to conquer, through all the chaos of outer experience, to give it order and harmony.

To such a test Christian Science must be subjected, and to win our approval, must meet certain conditions which are necessary to support its claims to objective rationality. It must consistently justify its own designation, by proving itself to be both (1) Christian and (2) scientific; and, in thus presenting Christianity as a Science, it must reveal (3) the unity of a comprehensive, final philosophy which can meet all the demands of Reason. Then, finally, to justify its claim to a place in the real experience of man, it must prove itself to be (4) the historical outcome of the past, as an integral part of the evolving world-order.

Meaning of the Christian Consciousness.

If then we first ask whether Christian Science is really Christian, we must be clear in our minds as to what we mean by being Christian. We have already had occasion to define the content of the Christian consciousness (p. 480) as being a state of mind which combines both the Hebrew conception of God, as the Eternal Creative Goodness, to which man owes the absolute obedience of his *will*; and the Hellenic conception of God as the objective, cosmic order of Infinite Truth, which man must make the possession of his *thought*.

And it was because Christianity united these two supreme elements

of reason, that it opened up a new era of progress to mankind; and, by offering to the moral nature its ideal in the Divine Goodness—the only real motive of the will—and to the intellectual nature its ideal in the Divine Truth—the only object of thought—could satisfy the æsthetic nature in its demand for the Divine Beauty, which affords the only meaning of Life in its Reality.

Now if we ask to what extent the various forms of Christianity express the full meaning of the Christian consciousness, we shall find that, while they all *theoretically* insist upon the necessity of thinking the Divine Thought (hold the true doctrine) and of willing the Divine Will (lead the right life), if man would be saved or enter into the Divine Life, they *practically* differ widely, as to how that end shall be attained.

In the main, there are two great branches of the Church, distinguished by their points of emphasis. The one lays its chief stress upon the efficacy of ritual, taken in both its ceremonial and sacramental meaning; the other upon the saving power of belief in the true dogma.

The Church of Ritual with its Ceremony and Authority.

The Ritualistic Church contents itself with the externalism of rites, which are designated as “divine service.” Prayers, fasts, penance, confession, and sacraments, faithfully observed, win the favor of God, and at last gain admission to heaven. While the rite may symbolize some backlying reality, it comes in the end to be, practically, an easy talisman or charm, having no essential connection with real goodness, and either entirely obscuring or taking the place of the pure heart and right will. It is true, many ritualistic Christians have been eminent for their real goodness, but it has been in spite and not because of ritual. Taking its total effect, ritualistic Christianity does not touch the demand of the Christian consciousness for real goodness, which is something very difficult of attainment, and leaves its devotees in an undeveloped state of moral immaturity. It could not be otherwise, for God “prefers before all temples the upright heart and pure.”

In perfect consonance with this ceremonial externalism, is the authority, in matters of faith, which the Ritualistic Church exercises. True doctrine is highly enough prized, but whatever may be the truth to be thought, the thinking of it is to be done by a superior, official, priestly class whose authority determines what the people

as a whole are to think. So that having their thinking done for them, they are kept also in a state of intellectual immaturity. However superior the thinking of the specially prepared priest may be over that of the layman, it is evident that every man, as a rational individual, is entitled to the privilege of making his own way, through his own mistakes, to his own rational conquest, which no man can effect for him and which no man ought to take from him.

Ritualistic Christianity, then, does not express adequately the demand of the Christian consciousness that man must think the Thought and will the Will of God.

The Church of Dogma with its Creed and Rational Freedom.

The second great branch of the Church takes the forward step of discarding ritual, as external and inefficient, and of proclaiming the freedom of every rational individual to know and practice religion according to the dictates of his own reason.

But no sooner is this principle of freedom announced than a new form of servitude declares itself, that of creed, which is a survival, from the Ritualistic Church, of authority in matters of faith. As it was before said that ritual has meaning, provided it is regarded merely as the outer symbol of some backlying reality, so we must now say that the creed has value so long as it is a rational doctrine, expressing the backlying truth. But unfortunately it becomes a fixed, authoritative and infallible dogma which forever binds thought in the inadequate forms of the past.

In consequence, we have, in Dogmatic Christianity, the strange contradiction of a fundamental principle, calling man to the freedom of thinking the Truth of God for himself, in the dignity and worth of his own rational individuality, and yet compelling him to accept without question the ancient dogma. That is, the rational principle involved has not yet come to full expression; for the only permissible freedom of thought about the dogma is that of acting as an advocate and summoning every intellectual resource to support and defend it.

Reason Demands the Ground of Authority.

This attitude of the Dogmatic Church reveals its own inner irrationality. For, aside from the embarrassment of having to deal with the contending claims of various dogmas, it becomes evident that if we once grant the great principle of individual rational free-

dom, the question must arise: What authority has the ancient dogma? And it is soon discovered that the dogma is originally but a human interpretation, under prevailing conceptions of life, placed upon the universally accepted authority of an infallibly inspired Scripture, and, therefore, may be freely challenged to show its validity by showing its harmony with the Sacred Authority.

But the principle of rational freedom, having been admitted, we can not stop here, for it must be asked: What guarantee have we that the Scripture itself is an inerrant, final authority? And, under the growing light of the new scientific spirit, that cares for nothing but the objective truth, it comes to be seen that the Bible itself is a slow development in time of human experience and thought, in which there is the endeavor to express certain great truths; so that, discarding its letter or outward form, the whole problem is at last thrown back upon Reason to determine whether those truths are really true.

Painful Embarrassments.

The result is embarrassing, for the security of dogma. If we are resolved to hold to the dogma of our choice, we must do so as being something above reason and consequently untouched by any scientific investigation. But so far as the dogma involves views of the objective world, it can not withdraw from rational criticism; and so far as it is accepted at all, it can not escape the challenge of reason to show the reason of its acceptance.

Or we may hold the dogma, for various reasons of intellectual confusion or moral sophistication, alongside of the new scientific views of life, which really dominate our daily thought and action, without permitting the two to come into contact. This, however, is a rational subterfuge which seeks to deceive both religion and science.

Or, impatient of our painful embarrassment and admitting our inability of substantiating the dogma to the satisfaction of reason, we may conclude that, after all, the one important concern is not so much to think the Thought of God, but to will the Will of God. Let us drop the dogma, we cry, and get back to the simplicity of the Gospel!

Necessity of Having a True Doctrine.

But we can not shake off the suspicion that this is rational weakness. Are we content to admit that history in general, and the

Church in particular, has made no advances over the simplicity of the Gospel? Did not Jesus himself teach his disciples that they were to learn more and more? Did he not promise to send the *paraclete*, whose advocacy and guidance as the Spirit of Truth, should lead them in the way of all Truth? Can we regard all the centuries as having gone for nothing?

Besides, the inescapable demand of Reason compels us to recognize the Thought of God, as being as essential as the Will of God. The one is but the expression of the other. They are not two different things, separable one from the other, but two aspects of the same Divine Nature, viewed in one case as the Omnipresent Substance, and in the other as the Omnipotent Cause, of Reality.

As man's freedom and self-realization is the harmony of his thought and will with the Thought and Will of God, it is as incumbent upon him to know the Truth as it is to do the Good. For, in the end, as we have seen, he can not really will the Will of God, unless he thinks the Thought of God, as he can not really think the Thought of God unless he wills the Will of God. His science and ethics, or the interests of his theoretical and ethical reason must be made one, in the æsthetic unity of life.

Rational Freedom Advances to the Intuition of Truth.

So that Dogmatic Christianity, although it has passed beyond the externalism of ritual and asserted the principle of an inner rational freedom, also fails to express adequately the full meaning of the Christian consciousness, because its dogmas come either to fall outside of any practical connection with life, or fail altogether.

But the principle of rational freedom has not failed, and the outposts of the Dogmatic Church, during the past generation, have demonstrated the great meaning of the Reformation, in setting man free to think for himself. Out of their historical and critical investigations, it is coming to be seen that below the surface of dogma and literal Scripture, certain great spiritual truths emerge, which are to become the ultimate doctrines of the Church. And it is coming to be seen that the real truth of the Bible and of dogma does not have its ground in any dualistic supernaturalism or abstract logic of discursive reasoning, but in the direct spiritual intuitions of reason itself.

Now this transformation or reinterpretation, not as a conscious, labored effort but as an inevitable and natural outcome of world-

tendencies, has already been effected in Christian Science, which thus takes the third and final step of the Christian consciousness, beyond dogmatic, into Spiritual Christianity.

Christian Science, the Spiritual Church.

While beneath the outer form of the Ritualistic Church, and giving it whatever power it has, there are to be found both the rational dogma, to be accepted freely by every man, and the deep spiritual life, which the dogma is supposed to explain and the ritual symbolize; nevertheless, both remain obscured or hidden by the more imposing and characteristic ceremony. And, while within the Dogmatic Church, as its real living energy, there is necessarily to be found the true spiritual life, it is nevertheless hindered and stunted by the bonds of an inadequate doctrinal expression in the traditional dogma. But in the Spiritual Church, the Christian consciousness entirely frees itself from both ritualistic and dogmatic trammels and enters upon a new and higher development of life.

There is no longer any attempt to identify outer ceremonial forms with "divine service," for every true thought and every right act is a divine service of love to God and to man. Nor is there any attempt to seek salvation in *believing* a dogma, for now the Truth is directly *understood* to be the manifested Love of God; and in the very act of *really understanding* the Divine Thought, the Divine Will is obeyed, as in the very act of *really* obeying the Divine Will, the Divine Thought is understood.

Religion thus ceases to involve any burden of "works" laid upon the reluctant moral will, or "mystery of reason," inscrutable to the troubled intelligence, and becomes a glad and joyous service; because all real life is *understood* to be a reflection of that Divine Truth which is the Beauty of Divine Love.

This entire unity of Reason, or this complete expression of the Christian consciousness, is attained in Christian Science, because there is no attempt made to approach Reality or God through sense and outer works, as in the Ritualistic Church, nor through discursive logic and belief in dogma, as in the Dogmatic Church, but through rational intuition, in the light of which all things are judged; while, at the same time, the true meaning of ritual and dogma is recognized as preliminary and progressive stages in the unfoldment of the Christian consciousness toward its full spiritual realization,

wherein dogma becomes the Truth, and ritual the Beauty of its outward manifestations.*

Criticism and Devotion Combined.

The attainment of Christian Science to the plane of spiritual intuition, the third and final stage of the Christian consciousness, accounts for one of the most winsome features in Mrs. Eddy's teachings, in which is revealed her comprehensive catholicity of spirit. No scientific historian or higher critic could treat the character of Jesus and the belief in the literal infallibility of the Bible with a greater unaffected naturalness and rational freedom than she; and yet, what can not be found in either the scientific historian or higher critic, there is in her every word a fervid devotion to Jesus and his great atoning work, and a profound reverence for every letter of the Sacred Book such as no medieval saint could exceed.

How does she effect this unusual double result of uniting the critical spirit of science and the fervor of devotion? When, on the one hand, our historian or critic finishes his investigation of God and the Bible, we are left with a certain sense of tragic loss, much as we find in Mr. Browning's Goettingen professor who tried to make himself believe he was riding a real horse, though he secretly knew all the time that he only bestrode an abstract hobby of his own manufacture. ("Christmas-Eve," xviii.) On the other hand, our saint dwells in an upper realm of supernaturalism, far removed from our every day rational convictions, and therefore can not touch our real interests. While Mrs. Eddy, everywhere appealing to reason, inspires faith, arouses hope, and offers satisfaction to the deepest immediate needs of daily life.

Mrs. Eddy Seeks the Spiritual Meaning of the Bible.

The explanation is not far to seek. Mrs. Eddy is not dealing with questions of discursive reasoning, as is the higher criticism, but into the light of rational intuition, she brings the *highest* criticism; and, consequently, her primary interest does not lie in the relative age and

* It is to be hoped the reader will not suppose these to be private opinions drawn from fugitive observations of the Christian Church. The same essential course of progressive development in the religious consciousness, within the limits of the theoretical reason, from sense to logic and from logic to intuition (priestly ceremony, abstract philosophy, and spiritual science, *vidya*), is traced out fully in the great Brahmanistic system of Vedantism. The whole movement is the natural history of the unfolding reason itself.

merits of J. and E. and P.; in the origin of the Psalter; in the authorship of the Younger Isaiah; in the Synoptic or Johannine problems; in the mediation of Petrine and Pauline tendencies in the early Church; in the Jewish and Christian elements of the Apocalypse; nor even in the preexistence of Jesus and his exalted heavenly estate; but simply in the spiritual meaning of the Bible and the message and work of Jesus for the salvation of man. That spiritual meaning, running everywhere through the Bible, she finds to be that the One, Infinite, Eternal God, Substance and Cause of all things, Creator of the world and Father of man, is Absolute Mind or Spirit, and, as such, is Life itself, Truth itself, and Love itself; and that man, created in the divine likeness and image, can attain his only life by reflecting, in thought and will, the Divine Truth and Love. And she finds that the message and work of Jesus reveal and exemplify the way in which man is to realize his destiny, by transforming his life of material thought and will into the forms of Spiritual Reality. Salvation is not in the performance of a ceremony, or in the acceptance of a metaphysical dogma, but in the actual attainment of the whole reason, by which the human consciousness is transformed, according to a rational, progressive law, into the divine consciousness of Life, Truth, and Love.

If then we look for the fullest expression of the Christian consciousness in its demand for the Unity of the Divine Thought and Will, as foreshadowed from the beginning, we shall find it, not in the Ritualistic Church of outer forms, or in the Dogmatic Church of abstract beliefs, but in the Spiritual Church of living attainment, or in Christian Science.

Science Means the Knowledge of and Mastery over Nature.

When now we turn to ask whether or not Christian Science is scientific, we must again first make clear what we mean by science. Obviously, the primary meaning of science is knowledge, which is always to be distinguished from believing, or supposing, or imagining. But then it is not *any* knowing, however certain. I may know the lie which Cleon told his neighbor, but such knowledge could not be dignified with the name of science. Science is knowing the objective Truth, and its peculiar merit lies in passing back behind all seeming and misleading illusions on the surface, to see things and their relations as they really are. So that science sets aside all the

contradictions and confusions of ignorance, all the superficialities of appearance, to penetrate down to the underlying Truth of objective Reality. Short of this, we can not say that we have science.

But our science would have little or no meaning for us if it ended here, for we are æsthetical and practical, as well as theoretical beings, and we always evaluate the object known and then seek to appropriate it practically for some rational end. So it comes to pass that, if we look for the meaning of that great movement in modern times which we call scientific, we shall find that it is just this getting down to the underlying truth of things, and its appreciation and appropriation for rational benefit; or, more specifically, it is not only the knowledge of, but also the mastery over nature.

Taking for granted that the world constitutes one great orderly system of things, inter-acting according to rational and so intelligible laws, science, since the days of the Renaissance, has met with a success little short of the miraculous, proving again and again that knowledge is indeed power, or the wing wherewith we fly to heaven.

Obedience the Condition of Mastery.

But the secret of this power of mastery over nature does not lie simply in *knowing*, but in *obeying* nature. And it has been just in proportion as we have entered into nature's thought and showed our *willingness to obey her will*, that we have not only been freed from innumerable evils, which men had hitherto supposed to be the visitations of a divine providence and so remediless, but have been led into marvelous secrets of power for our pleasure and profit, such as men had never dreamed of before.

That is, when once we take the true theoretical and the right ethical attitude toward nature, for the first time the ancient promise seems about to be realized, that God made man to have dominion over the works of his hands and has put all things under his feet. For the first time, man seems to see how great he is, how far above nature, how supra-natural.

Science Presses beyond Phenomena to Reality in Mind.

But in that very moment, he is overcome with a still deeper sense of his helplessness and insignificance. For try as he will to know nature, he finds that, after all, he knows it only in *appearance*, and not in its reality. All the substances and causes he is dealing with are not real but phenomenal, and his science is not really science but

docetics. He is deeply enough convinced that all things go back to some one real substance and cause, some Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed, but to know it and his own relations to it, he has, he confesses or professes, absolutely no means. Yet, the entire reason within him refuses to regard any knowledge of appearance as real knowledge, and demands the knowledge of Reality as being the only true Science.

Consequently, the inner spirit of science has kept pressing back toward a knowledge of real substance and real cause in their unity. And his efforts have not been without deep suggestiveness, if not crowned with complete success.

All that our scientist first saw of objective being was four or five crude material substances, variously mixed, in order to make up the world. Then, after ages, he discovered the substances to be the far more subtle and inconceivably small material atoms, variously composed to make up the world. But he keeps driving back this process of refinement until at last he arrives at the ion, so infinitesimal and subtle in its forms, as to suggest to his imagination that it has ceased to be material substance altogether and become cause, or a mere center of force.

In like manner, our scientist finds himself following the same process of refinement with his causes. At first, besides his own muscular efforts and those of his domestic animals, the only causes he could discover and lay hold of were the rush of the wind and the fall of the water. After ages had passed, he discovered the subtle expansive power of heat as a cause, willing to do for him more than he had ever supposed was possible. Then he finds the still more subtle chemical attractions and repulsions of the atoms, which not only sweep away the crudities of his spear, his shield, and his tower, but enable him to destroy innumerable enemies, human, animal and vegetal, create numberless objects of value for his use and enjoyment, and even give, he is at times startled to surmise, vague inklings of the origin of life. Finally, as the subtlest and most refined of all, he comes upon a certain causal energy in electricity which seems to promise to do all things for him, and which appears to coalesce with the substance of the ion as one.

All of which is but a scientific prophecy, fulfilled in the idealistic truth that the one real substance is thought, and the one real cause is will, which find their unity in self-conscious mind.

Reality Revealed as the Beauty of Truth Manifesting Love.

Here Christian Science enters as the rational outcome of natural science. For it declares that knowledge of and mastery over nature, or the subordination of the outer world of phenomena to the higher spiritual interests of man, can alone be secured by a knowledge of the Thought of God, as the only real Substance, and by an obedience to the Will of God, as the only real Cause of all things. The unity of the substantial thought and the causal will of the universe is the Divine Truth and the Divine Goodness, in the Beauty of the Divine Life. And this progressive advance is but the natural unfoldment of reason.

The knowledge of common-sense proves to be altogether too crude and contradictory to satisfy the natural demands of intelligence for rational coherence, so that logic takes it up and rationalizes it into the various forms of natural science. But this rationalized knowledge of sense-phenomena remains wholly meaningless, until, through rational intuition, its ground is discovered in the One, Infinite and Eternal Reality, Mind, which manifests itself to sense, under the conditions of space and time, in the phenomenal world.

Resting upon this ultimate, substantial, causal Reality of Mind, Christian Science seeks to *know* its laws *in thought*, *obey* them *in the will*, and thus enter into the harmonious *unity* of its life. And, as being thus the science of rational intuition, it fully expresses the meaning of the scientific consciousness, and is therefore the only real Science.

It takes only common-sense to see that the grass is green and the sky is blue. It however requires logic, or natural science, to understand that the grass is green and the sky is blue, in accordance with a great permanent rational law of ethereal vibration, which consciousness interprets in its own forms. But it requires rational intuition, or Christian Science, to know that all laws, in the phenomenal world and all true appearances, go back to and rest upon the One, Absolute Order of Cosmic Beauty which is Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness.

Mutual Relation between Christian and Natural Science.

There is, therefore, no real conflict but only mutual inter-action between Christian and natural Science, when seen in their true light; and we can get a view of what that relation is by the relation of natural science to common-sense. Common-sense will have nothing to do

with a great law of ethereal vibration and the response of consciousness in its own terms, for that is too recondite, too invisible and impalpable for its comprehension. Everything stands out there in its simple and fixed objectivity, as it appears to sense; and, consequently, common-sense can never win any of those advantages which science wins by coming to know and obey the subtly invisible and impalpable rational laws of nature.

In like manner, natural science will have nothing to do with going beyond the orderly laws of phenomena, to which it confines itself, and hence can reap none of those eminent benefits which Christian Science begins to reap, by penetrating to the still more subtly invisible and impalpable regions of substantial, causal Reality. But, unlike common-sense, natural science is enlightened to know, at any rate, *that* Reality lies beyond, though it does not seek to profit by the lesson.

When, therefore, natural science lays claim either to dealing with real substances and real causes, or acts as if it were; or, recognizing the phenomenal nature of all its knowledge, denies the possibility of Reason's going beyond, Christian Science enters with an absolute injunction. Natural science, confining itself to its own field of phenomena, can neither give us knowledge of Reality, nor can it prevent our gaining such knowledge.

But if natural science may not stand in the way of Christian Science, neither, on the other hand, does Christian Science, it is evident, usurp or deny the rational function of natural science. With all those patient logical investigations in the outer phenomenal order, Christian Science has nothing directly to do. Her function is first to give to natural science the laws of rational unity by which it works, and then to interpret the results, through spiritual intuition, in the light of Reality. So that the relation between the two is mutual and complementary, whereby Christian Science, dealing with ultimate realities of Reason, subordinates and gives meaning to the phenomenal knowledge of natural science.

Mortal and Immortal Mind: Transcendence by Subordination.

Mrs. Eddy sets forth this relation under the terms, Immortal Mind and mortal mind, meaning in general the world of Reality and the world of phenomena. So long as the mortal mind in its self-conceit and self-will seeks to exist in and for itself, it is filled with the confu-

sions and sufferings of error and sin; and in so far is a bitter illusion. Now recognize the entire dependence of the mortal upon the Immortal Mind, that is, the phenomenal upon the Real, and in so doing bring it into complete subordination to and harmony therewith; let self-conceit give way to an unbiased acceptance of the universal Cosmic Thought, as the Truth of God, and let self-will yield unreserved obedience to the universal Cosmic Will, as the Love of God, and the illusions of error and sin, with all their resultant suffering and death, disappear, the kingdom of heaven descends upon earth, and the mortal is being transformed for the ascent to its spiritual form in the Infinitude and Eternity of Immortal Mind. And this transformation is to be effected not only for the individual mortal man but for the entire race of mortal men.

This scientific relation of transcendence by subordination, which Immortal Mind sustains to mortal mind, is most clearly brought out at that point where Christian Science arouses the most unenlightened opposition, viz.: in the healing of disease. Since the body is that part of the objective phenomenal order of nature, most directly and intimately connected with the individual man, it is of the first importance to him to understand and master it, if possible, for his welfare. And in claiming to teach this understanding and mastery, Christian Science reveals in what sense it is truly scientific.

Physical Healing Secondary to Spiritualization of Life.

While physical healing is not primary in Mrs. Eddy's intent (150, 8-17), it is nevertheless a characteristic sign, an indication, a demonstrated result, or a type of her master concern, which is the *spiritualization of the entire life of man*, or his translation back into terms of Spiritual Reality, where Science reveals the harmonious Beauty of Truth and Goodness (264, 20-265, 15).

To attain this great end, it is futile either, on the one hand, to seek for Reality among material phenomena (as Kant and, following him, natural science make perfectly clear), or, on the other hand, to regard phenomenal knowledge as science or truth (as Kant and, following him, natural science try to do). We must rather begin with the ultimate Reality of Mind, not only as the ground of all Truth, but as the only Truth (with Hegel, Plato, Vedantism); and thence, outward, seek to understand and subordinate phenomena; or, in other words, discover the relation and meaning of the facts in the Idea (the

real meaning, unconsciously implied in natural science, as indicated by Hegel and Aristotle).

In order to understand what relation this transcendence of the Idea, in subordinating the facts, has to physical healing, we must make ourselves acquainted with Mrs. Eddy's simple idealistic psychology, which in short follows the singularly venerable and tenacious trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit (477, 13-18), which is the Apostle's well-known *sarks*, *psyche*, and *pneuma*; or the animal-man (the carnal mind), the human-man (the rational soul), and the divine-man (the mind of the spirit).

The Unconscious, Self-conscious, and Supra-conscious Mind.

Man's consciousness exists in three distinct, but intimately related, strata. The lowest stratum is the organic body, a whole rational, cosmic order of inter-actions, conducted and brought into unity under the constructive guidance of the one central mind. This Mrs. Eddy calls the *unconscious substratum* of the mortal mind, known as the material body (293, 6-10; 371, 3-5).

Above this rises the stage of ordinary *personal self-consciousness*, where the man lives in all his thoughts, feelings, and volitions. Here he comes to know himself and the world about him, thinks, argues, enjoys, suffers, plans, constructs. It stands for the whole range of the self-conscious, conditioned life in the phenomenal world. This is the mortal mind, in which the errors of sense and the sins of self have their origin. It is the mind that builds up and controls the unconscious substratum, the body, though it does not know it and has lost its control (160, 9-29; 374, 18-26). It is the mind to which Mrs. Eddy constantly appeals, and is to be saved not only from its conscious errors and sins, but also from the suffering, disease, and death which its errors and sins have imposed upon the unconscious mind (80, 25-27; 243, 16-24; 408, 28-409, 18).

Finally, rising above the self-conscious, is the *supra-conscious mind*, deep-hidden, often wholly obscured; and yet always present, and again and again flashing out in the unexpected splendor of worlds unrealized. It is the source of all ideals: eden-dreams of childhood (Wordsworth's immortal Ode), visions of the poet and the saint (Browning's Saul and St. John's Holy City), far-off hopes of the prophet (Isaiah's portrayal of Zion, in her future glory, cap. 60) and even the spiritual revealings of romantic love (Dante's Vita

Nuova). This is what Mrs. Eddy calls the real man, in his spiritual individuality, unfallen, pure, and free, forever dwelling in the bosom of Reality, the image, likeness, idea, reflection, or son of God (250, 11-13; 258, 25-30; 557, 18-21).*

Ultimate Control to be Found in the Supra-conscious Mind.

Now, these three phases of mind in man, though distinct and often so antagonistic as to seem unrelated, constitute, nevertheless, an intimate unity. The body is a phenomenal manifestation, on the plane of sense, of the self-conscious mortal mind (150, 31-151, 4); and the self-conscious mortal mind is a phenomenal manifestation, on the plane of logic, of the supra-conscious mind, which dwells forever on the plane of rational intuition, in the realms of Spiritual Reality. To bring these three to unity, in the freedom of complete self-realization, is the entire meaning of the disciplinary experience of the self-conscious mortal mind, in the phenomenal world of nature and of history.

Hence, the whole problem devolves upon the self-conscious mortal mind which, as a logical middle-term, extends downward through its unconscious sense-substratum and upward to its supra-conscious intuitional reality. But the problem can never be solved so long as the real man is taken to be the mortal mind (that is, the personal self-conscious ego) much less its unconscious substratum, the body. The end can be attained only when the mortal mind self-consciously submits itself to the Immortal Mind, in which alone it comes to have any true life and meaning; only from the standpoint of man, as the idea or reflection of Immortal Mind, can the body be brought under the perfect control of self-conscious mind, and the self-conscious mind be lifted to its full self-realization, as the real spiritual man, created

* It may be well to observe here that modern psychology, in its treatment of that realm, both above and below the usual range of ordinary consciousness, sometimes designated by the term, subliminal, fails to distinguish clearly among the unconscious, the sub-conscious, and the supra-conscious. The unconscious constitutes all the organic activities of the body, digestive, vascular, and metabolic; and never comes into consciousness except as a pervasive sense of well-being, or as a painful indication of disorder. The sub-conscious constitutes that vast store of latent memory which deals so treacherously with us, either when we invite or resent its service. The supra-conscious constitutes the lofty and ultimate data of rational intuition which are always making their power felt, though we may not know it, in the conscious and sub-conscious realms. The term, sub-conscious, has been previously used, in the present work, as a convenient, general designation for all psychical states, not immediately in self-consciousness.

in the image and likeness of God, unfallen, pure, and free (151, 31-152, 9). This is man, as Mrs. Eddy would have it, who has changed the carnal for the spiritual mind, who has put off the Adam-consciousness and put on Christ (371, 2-4; 409, 16-26).

This Control, though Obscured, always Felt.

In fact, this relation of subordination by transcendence is always declaring itself, though greatly obscured by the mistakes and perversities of the self-conscious mortal mind. Thus, the supra-conscious mind gives to the self-conscious mind all its ideals and rational laws of unity, which it only very inadequately acknowledges and obeys. So too the self-conscious mind is constructively in control of the unconscious mind, though it loses its real control through its own mistakes and perversities, and in consequence is bound by unconscious chains which it can not break.

Hence, the absolute necessity of that Science by which we may come to understand the sources of control in Reality, and how the entire man may be raised to a harmonious self-realization, as the reflected idea of Immortal Mind, his Divine Principle.

Cumulative Effects on Individual and Communal Mind.

The problem begins when the pedagogy of pain arouses mortal mind to seek escape from suffering, and moves toward solution when the lesson is learned that all suffering is the result of error and the punishment for sin. Error and sin end in death, which is the ultimate disaster of mortal mind, and the last enemy to be overcome.

Misled by sense, mortal mind looks for the causes of its suffering, disease and death among outer phenomenal or material events, whereas they are always to be found in its own errors and sins. Thus from infancy to old age, all men, in their self-conscious state, grow up amid false conceptions of life and wrong motives for action. In childhood or in maturity, there is constantly streaming in upon their minds, from a thousand sources in the home, the school, the church, the state, erroneous—as well as true—ideas about all things, with their concomitant storms of contending sensations and emotions; innumerable forms of vice confront the mind, and a whole world of evil impulses, vanities, hatreds, chicaneries and lies invade consciousness, and produce inevitable results.

In a word, the mistaken thoughts and perverted volitions, or the

errors of sense and the sins of self, in both the individual and the entire community, come in time, by a cumulative effect of infinitesimal causes, to be precipitated as fixed habits of thought and action, in the unconscious individual and communal mind (371, 5-19; 373, 14-21; 374, 6-25; 375, 26-376, 5; 376, 17-377, 25).

Causes of Disease, Individual or Communal, in the Mind.

While we can often directly trace to specific ignorance, error, or moral obliquity, specific cases of disease, misfortune, poverty, and such evils, we most generally look for some external cause and hence seek for external remedies. That is, we look for the cause of disease in the body and administer medicine, or practice surgery as means of cure. Or we regard poverty as some sort of external misfortune which may be relieved by the gifts of philanthropy. Whereas, all the misfortunes of disease and poverty are either the outer forms of reaction that have become habitual in the unconscious mind of the individual and the community; or the direct results, as we plainly see, of mistakes and perversities in the personal and social self-conscious mind.

When, then, we attribute to an evil heredity and environment, as external causes, all the deformities, abnormalities, defects, depravities, mental and moral weaknesses, not only in individuals but in human society as a whole, we are superficial and unscientific; for the evil heredity and environment are, in the first instance, effects or outer symptoms which must be carried back to their original causes in false thinking and wrong doing, in the ignorance, error, lust and ill-will of mortal mind. When heredity and environment are cleared of these disturbing and pernicious subjective causes in mortal mind, then they become beneficent dynamic elements, in the development of man, that are objectively true and good.

The cumulative power of all the false thinking and wrong doing in the individual and the community, streaming out like a pernicious effluence to mislead and pervert, Mrs. Eddy very aptly names *animal magnetism*, indicating thereby not only its hidden, subtle energy, but its source in the carnal elements of human nature. Consonant with the breadth of her view, she describes it as both *ignorant* and *malicious*. Ignorant animal magnetism is a product of *error*, and is the total influence of all those thoughtless and stupid lusts, impulses and proclivities which men reveal in their greedy pursuit of worldly

pleasure and power; malicious animal magnetism is a product of *ill-will*, and is the total influence of all those hatreds, envies, jealousies, perfidies, self-conceited vanities, which men reveal when opposed, in their pursuit of worldly pleasure and power (102, 16-23; 103, 18-28; 484, 21-24).

All remedies, therefore, which do not go to the original sources of the disturbance, that is, to the mistakes and perversities in the self-conscious mind, are but superficial palliatives that may relieve for the moment, but offer no real or lasting cure. If we are seriously set on healing either the ills of the individual or of society, we must learn, sooner or later, that we are only driving the problem around from one place to another and not settling it, by dealing with secondary causes, and trying to smother one effect in another effect, as we are always doing in applying external remedies.

Healing to be Found alone in the Ever-present Truth.

But if the cause of disease is in the mortal mind, its cure is not to be found there. For if the mortal mind, by its own thought and will, could abolish the natural result of its own errors and punishment of its own sins, the most fatal consequences would follow. Men, with impunity, would do as they pleased, and human society would be an impossibility.

The only part the self-conscious mind can play is steadily to deny, in thought, the error as substantial (that is, as a reality) and renounce, in will, the sin as causal (that is, as a real motive for action); and, by so doing, make way for the realization of the ever-present reality of the supra-conscious mind, as the perfect and complete idea or reflection of Immortal Mind, in which there are no discords of error and sin, but only the Beauty of Truth and Goodness.

This is what Mrs. Eddy means by constantly insisting upon the impossibility of healing disease by the effort of mere personal thought and will (144, 14-22; 206, 4-14; 445, 15-24). That which heals is the ever-present and ever-existent Truth, as the divine Reality, in which man has his complete freedom and self-realization. The whole problem of the personal self-conscious mind is, by recognizing the unreality of its errors and sins, not only thus to abolish the one, and renounce the other, but to know, understand, or realize itself in its supra-conscious reality, as ever-existent in Immortal Mind. This is reconciliation with God, is atonement, is freedom and self-realiza-

tion, is the outcome of rational evolution, is the attainment of the mind of Christ (9, 17-24; 252, 4-253, 9).

It is only thus that the true relation of subordination by transcendence can be secured. By a progressive unfoldment of consciousness, the unconscious mind (body) is brought into harmonious subordination to the self-conscious mind, and the self-conscious mind is brought into harmonious subordination to the supra-conscious mind; or the entire man is brought to realization as a son of God. And it is in this consummation that the unconscious mind (body) is transformed into its spiritual reality; and death, not as an evanishment of the physical, mortal existence, but as a culminating disaster of pain and sorrow, is swallowed up victoriously (252, 7-14).

Christian Science Gives the Fervor of Religion to Science.

This is Mrs. Eddy's Christ-Science of Mind-healing; and in it she effects two great ends. She gives to science the fervor of religion, and she brings to æsthetic unity the theoretical and the ethical interests of reason.

Man is not left alone in the weakness and misery of his diseases and misfortunes, suffering and death. By virtue of his own real, divine nature, as a child of God, he is entitled to triumph over them all. The all-harmonious Beauty of Truth, which is the only Reality, rests forever upon the Eternal Will of Love. The only shadows cast across that Reality are the illusions of mortal mind, which builds up and projects its subjective errors of sense and sins of self, as an objective, real world. Unable to rescue himself, the omnipresent and omnipotent Reality of Divine Truth and Divine Love rescues him, and always has rescued him.

But it boots him little, if he does not know or understand it, for as long as he moves among his illusions, as if they were real, he is like a man in a troubled dream who takes his baseless hallucinations for painful realities (250, 6-27; 491, 28-492, 6; 494, 11-24). So that, although man's salvation is already divinely secured, the whole responsibility of securing it rests upon him alone. He must, by his own free effort, come to *understand*, and *will* the Truth, by accepting it in his consciousness as the only Reality.

Prayer Leads Science and Ethics to the Ideals of Art.

And this understanding, realizing, accepting the Truth is true prayer—prayer not as a personal petition for a personal favor, but

as an act of the whole mind, intellectual and moral, by which it seeks to realize itself in the light and meaning of God. Prayer is communion with God who is Life, Truth, and Love; it is harmonizing the self with God; it is the progressive unfoldment of consciousness toward freedom and self-realization in God. It is the supreme function of all science and ethics, following after the perfections of art. It is the ardent pursuit of the Ideal; and we have confidence that all the true prayers we have ever uttered or can utter, have already been answered, because the answer lies forever in the bosom of the ever-existent Truth, which is ours whenever we meet the conditions to receive it (9, 15-10, 2; 15, 14-24).

But most of our prayers are offered on our own conditions; whereas true prayer must be offered on God's conditions. We wish to summon the infinite resources of Spirit to gratify our material whims, and would reduce Reality to terms of phenomena. But the real aim of prayer is to subordinate the material to the transcendent Spiritual, the phenomenal to the Real, the mortal to the Immortal.

Thus prayer is not an arbitrary approach of man, as a natural being, to God, as a supernatural Being, but the rational scientific means by which man attains to his natural self-realization as a son of God. It is, therefore, not only subjective, in its effect on man, but also objective, in bringing to light the ever-existent Reality.

In this interpretation of prayer, Mrs. Eddy has brought into the Christian conception of religion the whole force and meaning of the Aryan conception of religion, wherein man's ultimate salvation is conceived as being secured by a scientific unfoldment of consciousness toward self-realization in the all-enfolding, Infinite Truth.

Theoretical and Ethical Reason United in Christian Healing.

It becomes evident how the healing of Christian Science brings to unity our theoretical and ethical interests. All our diseases and disasters spring out of the errors of sense and the sins of self. And, since the errors of sense and the sins of self are so inter-related that the one leads to the other, we can never overcome our diseases and disasters until we both deny error and renounce sin. Not until we arouse ourselves from the illusions of our mistakes in thought and perversities of will, in order to think the Cosmic Thought and will the Cosmic Will, can we hope to behold the supernal Beauty of Truth, manifesting the Love of God.

Surgery Does not Solve Problem of Healing.

Now suppose we contrast with this scientific method of healing all disease, by going down to its causes, in the error and sin of the individual and communal mortal mind, and up to its sovereign remedy in the Immortal Mind, the ordinary medical and surgical practice in healing our physical ills.

To begin with, we must set aside surgery as wholly irrelevant, so far as healing disease is concerned. Surgery is rather a confession of failure, or an arbitrary evasion of the whole problem. It is a crude and primitive device to remove a passing difficulty. To cut into the living human organism and remove any of its parts, is entirely irrational and, at best, only a provisional attempt at meeting an unsolved problem.

The popular boast that surgery is an exact science, as contrasted with medicine, is a popular superstition, based upon an entire misunderstanding of what the science of healing really is. Healing is the *restoration* of the disordered organism to its normal activity. Surgery is a more or less skillful artisanship, based upon a more or less accurate knowledge of anatomy, and has no more rational or scientific connection with the real healing of disease than the trimming of a hedge. That men recover from surgery is saying no more than that they recover from accidents—for surgery is but an accident skillfully conducted—because the body has a marvelous recuperative power, and can survive innumerable impositions and abuses.

In saying that surgery is crude, irrational, and arbitrary, however, it is not meant that we can peremptorily dispense with its services, for it may be the best we can do at present in removing some obstruction, otherwise for the moment unremovable, which seriously hinders the normal activities of the body; but it is nevertheless a confession of gross ignorance and incapacity, and shows us how we still wander amid flitting shadows, at the bottom of our dark cave. What we must avoid is the mistake of supposing that in surgery we have anything like a final or rational method in approaching the problem of healing disease. If we would be serious and penetrate below the surface, we must look beyond.

Practice of Medicine, Admittedly not a Science.

Turning to the practice of medicine, we have a distinctly announced method of healing, which does not evade the problem but seeks to

restore the disturbed organism to its wonted activities. What is the merit of this practice?

In the first place, the medical men themselves renounce any claim of being scientific in their practice, based as it is simply upon empiricism, no matter however widely extended. The skill acquired is often very eminent, but it remains non-scientific and is an externalism that plays about the empirical reactions of the subtle physical organism, in response to substances, foreign and unnatural to it.

The history of medicine from Galen down confirms this statement. For, first, we find disease triumphantly "healed" in the past by remedies which we regard now as preposterous and absurd in the extreme. At the time, those remedies were regarded as highly efficient, rational and necessary, because they were approved by the learning and skill of the day. Secondly, we find the same diseases as triumphantly healed by other and newer remedies which, in turn like the fashions, give place to still newer ones, and so on, each for the time being, serving its purpose and then giving way to the later discovery. In the third place, the most striking progress of medicine has been the diminution of medicine, and then the tendency to drop it altogether for favorable conditions in the objective environment.

In fact, during the past half-century, physicians have been more and more inclined to say frankly that medicine does not heal at all; but only assists nature, which has within herself a certain *vis medicatrix nature* that heals and restores. Just as the old superstition that balms and ointments healed wounds has died out, the superstition that medicine imparts some healing virtue to the body is slowly dying out.

But just as the balm serves the useful purpose of keeping the wound clean, so that nature, unhindered, may complete her restorative work, so perhaps medicine, while it does not heal, may serve some useful purpose in assisting nature in her curative efforts.

Medicine, an External Appeal to the Unconscious Mind.

Suppose then that medicine assists nature, what can the nature of this assistance be? It can not assist by getting back to the cause of the disease, for the causes with which the physician deals are phenomenal, and in reality are only effects on the surface, or symptoms of causes further back. The cause of disease is not to be found in the organ, not in the cell—the disordered organ or cell is a result,

not a cause—but in the abnormal condition of the *vis medicatrix naturæ*, or unconscious mind, which builds up the body in the first place, maintains it in its harmonious normality, or permits it to sink into discord and decay.

Whatever else the medicine does, then, good or bad, it any rate makes an appeal to this unconscious mind, which as we know invariably responds to every appeal (155, 6-14; 370, 11-18; 401, 22-26). Be it only a breath of air, a draught of water, a taste of food, a blow on the head, a virulent poison, the subtle organism responds, according to its own state, and the laws of its own reaction.

Now, among a vast number of substances which experience has tried, a few in every age have always been selected which have an average effect in producing the desired reactions. Some are found uniformly to stimulate and excite, others as uniformly to depress and retard, and by skillfully playing upon the organism with these, certain fairly uniform and, for the time being, favorable results can be secured. But whatever healing or recuperation there may be is the work, all the time, of the *vis medicatrix naturæ*, or unconscious mind, which, having been disturbed in its normal activities, is slowly coming back to its wonted vigor and harmony, urged it may be to special action by the appeal of the drug.

The nature of the medical assistance, therefore, we may describe as being like that which an eccentric watchmaker would employ who, instead of opening up the watch and getting at the main root of the difficulty, should pride himself on his skill, acquired by long and painstaking experimentation, of jarring the disturbed internal mechanism into order again, by a series of very subtle tappings on the cover.

The unskillful administration of medicine is a plain injury, but the skillful administration of it, at its best, is the administration of a series of subtle jars, shocks, tappings on the outside of the organism, which seem often to arouse the unconscious mind to a sense of its duty and induces it to resume its normal activities.

Nature of the Appeal.

We have a very brilliant example in inoculation, of how the organism reacts intelligently, in its own interests, against invasion by an enemy. A mild form of disease is directly introduced into the blood. As if angered by this hostile intrusion, the unconscious mind sum-

mons its forces, mobilizes its army, so to speak, and after a petty engagement drives out the intruder. And, as if taught a lesson by its past negligence, it now throws up its fortifications, mounts its guns, deploys its battallions and stands ready for any future attack, and immune, at any rate, against that particular enemy.

Just what the effect of medicine is does not stand out so clearly, but it seems to be in the main, either like a break put upon the organism when for some reason it gets running too wild, or like a goad, more or less severe, to arouse it from its unwonted indolence and lethargy.

Confidence in the Physician, the Best Medicine.

But the actual effect of the medicine is a far less influential element in whatever success the physician meets, as he well knows, than the faith of his patient.* His greatest asset is the complete confidence which the sick man, weakened by his pain and disturbed by his fear, imposes in him. There his rescuer stands, hopeful and confident in aspect, laughing at his fears and making light of his pains; and, with all the mysterious subtlety of his knowledge, experience, and skill, is ready to administer those magic potions which have the power of healing and life for him. If the physician could really arouse such a state of confident expectancy, it would not be too much to say that his success would be brilliant by simply looking wise and administering bread and water, made to taste variously unpleasant by some harmless drugs. Indeed it is probable that many physicians put very little or no confidence at all in drugs, but administer them to satisfy the old superstitions in the minds of their patients.

The possibility, under the growing refinements of chemistry, of discovering remedies to produce striking and favorable effects upon the unconscious mind is almost infinite. But the scientific principle remains the same, viz.: that medicine, as medicine, does not really heal disease, because not reaching the cause of disease, either in the unconscious or conscious mind, it only produces a superficial reaction, not related directly to the real cure.

Provisional Value of Medical Practice.

This, however, does not justify a peremptory abolition of medical practice for, on the one hand, it is through this outer experience that

* See Osler on *Medicine*, in "Progress of the Century."

man must finally come to learn that the cure of disease is alone in the mind; and, on the other hand, the human consciousness, at a certain stage of development, can trust to nothing else. Just as some men would have no religion at all, if they did not find it in the outward forms of ritual, or could put their faith in some reasoned dogma, so some men would find no healing at all, unless they had the outer signs of having something visible or tangible being done for them.

Mrs. Eddy frankly admits the favorable results secured at times by medical practice, and recognizes its service, when faith in it is still unshaken. At any rate, it is better to trust wholly to the honest and competent medical practitioner than to a halting and uncertain belief in Christian Science; and it is very much better to do so than to rely on a mental practice that wants understanding, moral devotion, and sincerity (365, 25-366, 2; 368, 32-369, 4; 410, 23-29; 459, 12-23; 460, 18-23).

But she wholly denies the possibility of finding the cause of disease in the physical symptoms of the body, and hence denies the possibility of finding a real therapeutic principle in the application of material remedies. And she uncompromisingly asserts the pernicious, misleading, and unscientific nature of all medical practice *in relying* upon material remedies, as if disease were a material or phenomenal problem, to be solved by material or phenomenal means. Such a course only fixes more deeply the old superstition of substantial, causal reality in matter, and fastens false habits of reaction in the unconscious mind which Mind alone can eradicate (161, 24-162, 3; 197, 30-198, 28).

Men may forever search outward among the phenomena of anatomy and physiology, but they will always be dealing with effects and not with causes. We need to go inward, to search in the anatomy and physiology of the mind where alone the causes of disorder, as well as of order, in the entire corporeal anatomy and physiology are at last to be found (462, 20-463, 4).

The Case of Hygiene and Exercise.

The same general considerations apply to all manner of hygienic remedies. Pure air, pure water, pure food, are, to be sure, natural necessities of the physical organism; but, in case of disease, they can exercise no restorative effect, because the seat of the difficulty is not in the environment but in the subject, where the real cause of the

disorder must be sought and cast out. In fact, even in case of impure air, impure water, impure food, which are due to those terrible hobgoblins of the modern mind, the microbes, the man who is normal and sound within stands immune. It is he whose vitality is already lowered by some internal abnormality, disorder, or cringing fear who finds the microbes an enemy which he can not overcome. If all that has been said by the most eminent natural scientists, during the past generation, about these diabolical foes of man in objective nature, were really true, it is impossible to see how any of us should have survived to tell the tale, or should have been able to draw a breath without contracting some loathsome disease. It is only the all-enfolding Goodness of God that still preserves us, in spite of our gross superstitions and ignorant fears.

In the same way, we must regard exercise. While exercise is a normal and necessary activity in the acquirement of some desired skill, or in furnishing a natural and pleasurable recreation for the mind; as *mere exercise*, the laborious thrusting of the arms and legs this way and that, meant to heal disease—it is all very futile. All true exercise is the natural, outer expression of the sound mind, pursuing its normal ends of either work or play, to which all are entitled. Even then it is not the exercise, as such, that produces the skill or affords the recreation; it is the mind. When the mind is intensely interested and directs the work, the acquirement of skill is very rapid. And it is only when the mind incites and guides the play that the recreation becomes refreshing and wholesome. But to think that exercise can be turned back to restore a disordered mind, is the superstition of putting effect for cause.

In like manner, those diseases of society at large, such as vice and poverty, which are like painful eruptions on the body politic, are to be healed by no external constabulary or philanthropic remedies. The police only drive the eruptions of vice from one spot to another, they do not heal it; and philanthropy only relieves a temporary distress and does not cure the evil of poverty.

Indeed, so far as philanthropy is concerned, it tends to aggravate poverty, first, by pauperizing the recipients of its beneficence, and secondly, by a self-approval of its own virtue and power, often gained by the flagrant infraction of that universal law of goodness, the real application of which would heal society of all its diseases of poverty and vice.

All Real Healing, the Work of the Divine Mind.

So that, just as, on the one hand, not only those superficial diseases, obviously due to depression, long continued grief, fear, remorse, lust, or ill-will, in the conscious mind, are mental, but also all those deeper and more inveterate organic diseases and deformities, wholly unrelated in appearance to conscious thought, are in the mind, as fixed habits of unconscious reaction, due to the accumulated, infinitesimal effects of ignorance, error, and sin, in either the individual or communal mind or both; so, on the other hand, in all cases of recovery, with or without any treatment whatsoever, it is always the inner vital force of the unconscious mind, supported by courage, hope, or intelligent activity and reform in the conscious mind, which really effects the result of healing or restoration.

But while, without treatment, the patient attributes the recovery to his own individual strength, or, if he is pious, regards it as a supernatural answer to prayer; or, if he has had material treatment, he looks upon it as the effects of medicine and medical skill, Christian Science invariably regards all real healing as alone due to that one, divine Principle, Spirit, or Mind, in whom we live and move and have our being, and who, creating and sustaining the universe, according to exact rational laws, is the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. Whether men know and understand it or not, it is this Absolute Mind that ever works in and through them; and to this Mind alone Christian Science appeals, in seeking to know the Divine Thought, as the only Substance, and the Divine Will, as the only Cause of all things, in order to find healing for all human ills.

Whatever real function, therefore, the medical practitioner—or the constable and philanthropist as well—has, comes to be clearly defined as that of a natural scientist, dealing wholly with the outer phenomenal conditions which are favorable or unfavorable to the maintenance or restoration of health in the individual or in the community.

But as to disease and health, as such, the only scientific pathology, according to Christian Science, must be based upon psychology, or the anatomy and physiology of mortal mind; and the only scientific therapeutic—and prophylactic as well—must be based upon theology, that is, upon an understanding of the Divine Beauty of Infinite Truth, revealing Eternal Goodness (145, 16-146, 17; 369, 23-370, 10).

Necessity of Making the Truth Real.

From what has been said, it would obviously be a fatal misunderstanding of Mrs. Eddy's meaning, if she is supposed to advise doing nothing but to change the superficial thought in the conscious mind, or imagine a cure, or even depend upon a concentrated effort of personal will. All this may produce a temporary relief or mood of hopeful courage, or banish imaginary ills; but, as actual disease is a false or perverted habit of reaction in the unconscious mind, deep, inveterate, and sometimes as hard as adamant (460, 14-18; 242, 15-20), it can be dissolved only by the ever-present Truth of harmonious Being (188, 4-10; 204, 30-205, 6; 208, 25-209, 4; 270, 24-30).

This Truth must penetrate and suffuse the entire consciousness; it must, so to speak, soak down to the very roots of being. And the only means of securing this result is through the self-conscious mind which does not simply think or theoretically know the Truth, but *understands* or *makes real* the Truth, by feeling it, and throwing the whole force of the will upon it. Mrs. Eddy would say to every man: You are well now, if you *really knew* it; but you can know it, only in so far as you realize your true life to be a reflection of Immortal Mind, in the Reality of Life, Truth, and Love; and think, feel, and act accordingly (216, 11-21; 302, 19-26; 322, 3-13; 368, 10-19; 409, 9-26; 469, 13-24).

Comprehensive Nature of Christian Science Healing.

The comprehensive character of this demand, it will be evident, lies in the fact that the healer, instead of concerning himself solely with the health of the body, must make the fundamental condition of his success the health of the entire man, intellectual and moral (210, 11-18; 404, 26-405, 21; 369, 30-370, 9). It were better to leave a man sick than to heal him without his having learned the lesson of his disease, namely, the necessity of spiritualizing his life, in order to become entirely whole (5, 3-28; 405, 22-32).

The pedagogy of pain teaches us that suffering is a blessing, until it proves itself to be a curse, as the result and punishment of error and sin, and so can be overcome by destroying its cause in error and sin. Even the saintly, whose deepest concern is to do the will of God, must learn to deny the arch-error of material reality and assert the only objective divine Truth of Spiritual Reality. For it is their belief in the substantial and causal nature of material things that fastens their diseases upon them (373, 1-5).

In general, then, disease as such, whether it be but a disturbed condition in the physical organism of the individual, or a state of oppression, poverty, and wrong in the social body, while it may be palliated, for the moment, by external remedies and reforms, can, in the end, never be really healed until the one supreme condition of universal good-will, or Divine Love, is first fully met; for it is only then that man will be entitled to, and can be safely entrusted with, the mighty beneficence and power of Truth; it is only then that he can be enlightened to see all things under the spiritual aspect of Reality, as forever the harmonious Beauty of God. It is only when man seeks first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness that all these things shall be added.

Christianity, as Scientific, an Ultimate Philosophy.

Well, then, in conclusion, if we find Christian Science to express most truly the Christian consciousness, in bringing the Thought of God (true doctrine, science) and the Will of God (right practice, ethics) into the Unity of Life (salvation, atonement, Eternal Life): and most rationally expresses science because, not content with mere phenomena, it seeks to penetrate to the substantial, causal Reality of nature, in order that in knowledge and obedience it may attain the scientific ideal of entering into the living Power of the Cosmos, by reflecting the Cosmic Thought and the Cosmic Will, we are not far from understanding how it becomes an ultimate philosophy, in meeting the total demands of Reason, by presenting Reality in its comprehensive Unity.

A true philosophy, as we have learned, can be content with no rational tribalism, but must satisfy the æsthetical and moral nature as well as the intellect. Nor will it rest at any stage of rational immaturity, in thought, will, or feeling. For the intellect, its aim is only reached when the mind rises from the perceptions of common-sense to the logic of natural science, and from the logic of natural science to the intuitions of reason. For the moral will, it compels action to rise from motives of egoism, to the law of justice, and from the law of justice to a universal love; and for the æsthetic nature, it refines the feelings from sensation to emotion, and from emotion to happiness. It is thus alone that Reason can come to itself in discovering, in the light of its own intuitions, the unity of thought and will.

And this is precisely the philosophy of Christian Science. Truth,

as the object of thought, is not to be found either in sense or in sense rationalized by logic, but in Reality alone, understood as the Infinite Immortal Mind. Goodness, as the ultimate motive of the will, is to be found neither in selfishness, nor in law which is only a logically rationalized selfishness, but in Love alone, as the Eternal Causal Will of Reality. Beauty, as the unitary ideal of the feelings, can be found neither in sensation, nor in emotion, that is, rationalized sensation, but in happiness alone, which is the absolute Life of the entire Reason, in thinking the True and willing the Good.

There is and can be no other philosophy, for, permitting no rational tribalism of exclusive devotion to science, or to ethics, or to art; and, forbidding all rational immaturity, in pausing within the regions of the visible and phenomenal, short of the intelligible spiritual Realities of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, it completes and fulfils the Absolute Idea of Reason; and beyond that there is nothing.

Christian Science Makes a Universal Appeal.

Christianity, in general, presents itself as a universal religion, because it offers to meet the entire demands which arise out of the triune unity of the threefold Reason; but it would be difficult to conceive how the Ritualistic Church, or any of the forms of the Dogmatic Church could make a successful rational appeal, such as would win even the whole of Christendom, much less all the various races of men in the world.

And yet such an appeal must be made; for, as widely as men differ in temperament or racial character, in rational nature they are one. The rule of three and the decalogue are, intellectually and morally, as necessary and imperative in China as in Peru; and those fundamental convictions and laws of conduct, that constitute the ground of universal religion, are necessarily as valid for the most primitive as for the most highly developed peoples. And those convictions and laws of conduct constitute the simple religious philosophy of the Spiritual Church, or Christian Science. All men, of every nation and tribe on all the face of the earth, are brothers, because they are, in common, the children of the One, Infinite, Eternal Divine Father, whose bounteous goodness, revealed in the harmonious Beauty of the world, they should share, according to the law of universal love. To *know* this and *do* this, in *reality*, is the entire meaning of Christian Science.

CHAPTER III.

IN THE FULLNESS OF TIME, IT CAME TO PASS.

ANY and every event that occurs as a fact, can not, on account of its mere occurrence, be regarded as historical. In tracing the natural history of any given animal organism, from beginning to end, we follow only those normal activities of the natural unfoldment which contribute to or form an integral part of, the typical idea that will come to full expression at maturity. A fortuitous or accidental departure from this course, an abnormality or an excrescent growth, we do not regard as belonging to the natural history of the animal.

So in human history, not every or any event that happens, but those events only which form an integral part of the progressive order and contribute to its fulfillment, we regard as historical. Thus the Gordon riots of 1780, in London, for example, happened as a fact and for a time produced great disturbances, but they had no essential or vital connection with social progress in Great Britain; they were a mere fortuitous swirl in the general current of things, and so can not be said to be historical in any real sense.

But the passage of the Reform Bill in 1832, likewise occurring as an event and producing great disturbances, was truly historical, because it was the reasoned outcome of certain well-defined tendencies in the past, and expressed a principle of progress for the future development of political institutions.

The Three Churches of Swedenborg.

It is in this sense, that we wish to ask whether or not Christian Science is historical. Is it the emergence into clear expression of progressive forces in the past, and therefore, at the same time, the bearer of a principle of advance for the future? If so, its coming was inevitable and its progress can not be resisted.

We have already seen how Christian Science brings to full expression the Christian consciousness, by lifting the Dogmatic Church of a rationalized faith, to spiritual understanding; as, before it, the Dogmatic Church had raised the Ritualistic Church of ceremonial

works and priestly authority, to a rational faith within the free individual.

The great meaning and historical inevitability of this movement was seen and described by the inerrant prophetic genius of Emanuel Swedenborg, a century and a half ago. To Swedenborg, history presented itself as an unfolding divine plan, in a series of epochs, which he called churches, each preceding one yielding to its successor, in which it was fulfilled and brought to an end. A series of such historical epochs or churches, in the ancient world, prepared the way for the coming of Christ, and then Christian history, pursuing the same divine plan, took on the form of three successive churches, each rising higher in significance, until the full meaning of the Kingdom of God on earth comes to realization.

The first of these churches was the Ritualistic Church which, in time, gave way to the Dogmatic Church. Finally, in spiritual vision, Swedenborg saw the last judgment, the end of the world, and the descent of the New Jerusalem from God out of heaven, to be with men, which constitutes the final Church of human history. He meant by all this, as already pointed out (p. 379), the transformations in men's ideas, their unfolding thoughts and views of life, and the great social and political changes going on in the world of history.

The New Jerusalem, a Spiritual Church.

The distinguishing character of this descending New Jerusalem Church, as he explained it, is its spirituality. Religion now is no longer a matter of external ritual, nor of rational faith in a dogma; it is *life*, and "the life of religion is to do good," or to obey perfectly the Will of God, based upon an understanding of the Divine Truth. To be saved, it is futile to perform rites, or repeat creeds. Since God, in his very essence, is Love itself, and in his very existent manifestation, is Wisdom (Truth) itself; and since man, made in the divine image, is endowed with the power of understanding and of will, his only salvation and life is to turn to God, who is ever like a sun, in the spiritual heavens, changelessly pouring out the light of Wisdom and the warmth of Love, and reflect in his understanding the Wisdom of God, and in his will the Love of God.

There is nothing mysterious, or recondite, or mystic about this, for it is the simple presentation of objective Reality, in its ultimate aspects of Thought and Will, together with the great law of rational

unfoldment, by which that Reality may be realized in the mind and heart of man. It was the first time in the Christian Church that the unity of the true doctrine and the right practice was seen and stated, on the plane of rational intuition, as the unity of thought and will in the unity of Reason.

Why Swedenborg Sought no Outer Embodiment.

Now it is precisely this New Jerusalem Church, which Swedenborg, in prophetic vision, saw descending from God out of heaven, that has come to practical embodiment in Christian Science. But while Swedenborg saw that the final form of the Christian consciousness must rise above belief in an abstract dogma, to the spiritual intuition of Reality, which is to be reflected in the understanding as the Divine Truth, and in the will as the Divine Love, according to a great rational law of spiritual progress, he was not concerned in giving his ideas an objective embodiment, but was content with letting them spread in the world by their own force, or with simply describing his marvelous visions.

His indifference to any definite outer expression in a living, active, objective church was natural and inevitable, at the time, because the world-consciousness was not yet ready for such a realization. In other words, the great modern spirit of science had not yet fully worked out its conception of the one grand, cosmic order of intelligible, rational laws, to know and obey which would enable man to subdue and control nature for his welfare and happiness.

But this is just what is involved, as a necessary consequence of the word science, in Christian Science; that is, such an understanding of objective Reality as that, by thinking the Truth and willing the Good, the world of sense, or of mortal mind, may be brought into complete subordination to and harmony with the world of Spirit or Immortal Mind. In the words of Jesus, it is the coming of the Kingdom of God and the Will of God on earth as it is in heaven.

Hebrew, Aryan, and Christian Attitude toward Life.

It is evident that one of the problems Jesus set up for man in history is that which modern science undertakes to meet, that is, the knowledge of and mastery over nature, for man's welfare and happiness.

We have seen how the Aryan genius with its exclusive theoretical interests, conceived salvation to be an entire withdrawal from the

world, as an impure and worthless illusion, to the realms of a pure spirituality—a conception which has, through Hellenic influence, obtained a wide acceptance in the Christian Church, as the attainment of heaven, after death has released the pure spirit from the trammels and assailments of the earthly life.

But the Hebrew ethical genius, always conceiving the world to be the creation of the Divine Will, could not regard it as an impure illusion; and therefore, explaining all the evils of our earthly existence, which are summed up in the final disaster of death, as the result of sin, looked forward, in the Messianic purpose of God, to the destruction of sin, and the consequent triumph over death in the resurrection of the body and the restoration of the world to its pristine beauty, as it originally came from the hand of its Divine Creator.

While, however, the Hebrew thought of the resurrection and restoration of all things bore a purely material sense, the Christian consciousness, which assimilated it, raised the doctrine to the idea of a spiritual transformation. The world is not to be deserted or destroyed because it is evil in itself, but changed into its spiritual form. The mortal must put on immortality. And thus the Aryan demand for a spiritualization of life, by the banishment of material error, was completely united with the Hebrew demand for the restoration of life, by the destruction of sin. And, at the same time, the Aryan theoretical conception of spirituality was deepened and refined by the Hebrew ethical interpretation of Reality.

Jesus to be Followed in Transforming Life.

This Christian doctrine, though not entirely freed from dualistic conceptions, is clearly set forth in St. Paul's famous chapter on the resurrection, in his first letter to the Corinthians. But it is in Jesus where the whole meaning of it is taught and practically embodied. His perfect obedience to God met the one condition of introducing the Hebrew Messianic kingdom, and his ascent to heaven met the Aryan demand for a higher and more spiritual existence than could be found in a restored material world. Jesus, as the son of God, is always living in the world of Reality, and is therefore reflecting, in his life, the divine Truth and Love. In virtue of this fact, he is a complete master of nature. He heals all the ills of life, triumphantly overcomes the last great enemy, death, and then ascends above the phenomenal world of sense into the Real World of Spirit.

Now, although he had a preeminence, as the first born among many brethren, to be shared by no one else, nevertheless, that preeminence was *among many brethren*; and his mission of atonement was to show man the way to the same triumphant mastery. Ye are the children of God; follow me; do my works; where I am shall ye be also.

Jesus Addressed both the Understanding and the Will.

What was the secret of his power? Preeminently his obedience to the Cosmic Will. He loved the Father supremely and did his Father's works. In so far, he was a pure Hebrew. But that which we are constantly overlooking, in his teachings, is that which he himself is always emphasizing, viz.: his *understanding* of the Cosmic Thought, wherein he reveals the intellectual genius of a pure Greek. He is both saint and scientist; and, as a perfect man, he meets the demands of science as well as of ethics.

He is always giving his disciples the *reasons why* they should not serve Mammon, or find profit in the flesh, or labor for the meat that perisheth, or fear the ills of material existence, or worry about earthly cares. The world in which they live is the beautiful harmonious creation of God, where all their wants are supplied; and they are the children of the Heavenly Father, who is more willing to hear and bestow than they are to ask and receive.

But they must meet the condition of asking and receiving: they must have faith. "Believe the Good Tidings of freedom and life; only have faith, and the mountains will move before you." And this faith is an absolute, joyous confidence, based on an understanding of God, the world, and man, as they really are, and not as they appear to the eye of sense, blurred by the motives of self.

The Faith of Jesus Explained in Christian Science.

But further than this Jesus gave no specific theoretical explanation—at least his disciples have not handed it on—of how this faith is to secure the results. It is this faith which has justly given to dogma in the Christian Church, its tenacity as a fundamentally necessary condition of salvation; but, instead of being, as with Jesus, such a dynamic understanding of objective Reality as to transform the life of man and nature, it has always been only belief in an abstract doctrine *about* Reality.

Now, the necessity for a rational explanation of this essential,

living religion of Jesus, is what Mrs. Eddy most deeply felt (147, 24-31); and it is the result of the Hellenic element of science (philosophy) in the Christian consciousness, culminating through all the centuries of development in its highest form, as Theistic Idealism, which she has succeeded in completely assimilating to the Gospel, as its scientific explanation; and, by so doing, is justified in announcing Christianity as scientific.

For, by showing how all the evils of life are unreal, because they are but objectified projections of mortal man's subjective errors and sins, she can not only bring to a clear understanding the sole Reality of Truth and Goodness, as the Beauty of the world, but, at the same time, definitely point out both how it is that the evils of life may be destroyed, by denying error and renouncing sin; and how it is that man is to be brought to the harmonious Beauty of freedom and self-realization, by reflecting in himself the Truth and the Goodness of God.

The entire spiritual life is now seen to be governed by great rational laws, as exact, as steady, and as reliable as those found in nature; and, by understanding and applying them, man can not only attack and overcome the evils that beset him, but can make his way, with the sure steps of knowledge, toward his destined goal, in the World of Reality. He now knows that the one great error to be denied, as the lie which obscures the face of Truth, is the belief in material reality, with its consequent pursuit of material pleasures; and that the one great sin to be renounced, as the malicious adversary to his highest good, is self-will, arising out of the belief in material reality, with its consequent bitter struggle with others for material pleasures.

He now knows that not until, in his supra-conscious reality as a son of God, he denies the errors and renounces the sins of the self-conscious mortal mind, and reflects the Truth and Goodness of Immortal Mind, will he overcome the ills of life, and win that rightful dominion over the world which has been his from the beginning. He sees that the most luminous lesson, running through all history, is that progress means the slow unfolding of human consciousness to an understanding of the Cosmic Thought, and an obedience to the Cosmic Will.

Thus Christian Science fulfills Christianity by making it scientific, or a doctrine of Truth, not simply to be *believed*, but *understood* and *practiced*.

Reinterpretation of Dogma Moves toward Christian Science.

How necessary this advance is, the more progressive elements in the Dogmatic Church have long been painfully aware. The stubborn holding of outward beliefs, product of an ancient dualistic view of the world, as something supernatural and super-rational, in the face of an irresistible scientific progress, is a rational impossibility. The official adherence to beliefs, not believed, and the insincere suppression of beliefs, believed, is rational weakness. And indifference to all beliefs, in view of the sufficiency of a good life, degenerates into a vague and non-rational humanitarian sentimentality.

Hence, the old doctrines must be rewritten in the light of the modern scientific consciousness; but they must not be rewritten as abstract dogmas to be believed, but presented as the living, dynamic truths of objective Reality, which are to be understood and scientifically demonstrated.

But this historic task has already been accomplished in Christian Science, which unites the scientific Hellenic elements and the ethical Hebrew elements of the Christian consciousness, in the rational unity of life. Christian Science is the *entelechy* of the Christian consciousness, or the inevitable and irresistible logical outcome of Christianity, in time. And just as the early Church took up into itself and transformed the law and the prophets into the forms of its own higher consciousness, as their historical outcome; so Christian Science takes up into itself and transforms the works of ritual and the beliefs of dogma into their spiritual meaning, as their fulfillment in Christian history.

Science Moves toward Idealism.

Can we say, in like manner, that Christian Science is the historical fulfilment of science? We have seen that, from the days of the Renaissance, the steadily growing significance of science has been the knowledge of and mastery over nature. The world is no longer an incorrigible mystery to be forsaken as worthless, but a rational order of things to be understood and subordinated to the welfare of man.

But so long as science confines itself to the inter-relation of phenomena, its mission to know and obey the Truth remains immature and unfulfilled. An apparent knowledge of and an apparent mastery over an apparent nature is, in the end, an illusion. Science, to

attain real knowledge, must go back of the logical principles which it employs to the one Ground-Principle in Absolute Reason. The widespread tendency of the nineteenth century to seek an explanation for all things in abstract logical formulas, inductively drawn from the empirical observation of the outer phenomenal world, must give way to a search for that concrete Reality upon which all phenomena depend, and in which alone they have any rational meaning.

And toward this end, science is always pressing; for, in driving back its conception of substance and cause, as matter and motion, to more subtle and refined forms, it approaches the realms of Mind, where matter and motion become thought and will, in the unity of mind.

This movement is most clearly seen in that intimate and inescapable relation which, especially during the past generation, physiology and psychology have assumed. There has not only been revealed the parallelism between the physiology of the brain and the corresponding psychology of consciousness; but, at the same time, the dominance of mind over matter. Indeed, matter and motion, as independent substance and cause, with their own being and laws, disappear altogether, and the world becomes an activity in Mind.

Dominance of Mind over Matter in Mental Suggestion.

Nor has this been merely a universally accepted scientific theory; it has come to a reasonably clear and practical application. From the time that Mesmer (1733-1815) anew called the attention of the European world to those peculiar psychological phenomena—known from time immemorial, in all parts of the world, and at every stage of culture—which at first took his name, science, with some fluctuations, has been interested in the possibility of reaching disease by other than material remedies.

It was Braid, the Manchester surgeon, who made the fruitful discovery (1842)—and who first gave the name of neurohypnotism or hypnotism to the induced mesmeric sleep—that the patient responds to suggestion, and in a measure is subject to its control. But it was not until such men as Liébault and Bernheim, of Nancy, developed a clearly defined theory of mental suggestion, that the possibility was opened for a psychological therapeutic, which has since come to a fairly definite application.

It has been learned that, during the induced sleep of the self-conscious mind, the unconscious mind remains awake—indeed, is always

awake in the infinitely complex activities of the physical organism—and can be addressed. The suggestions which it receives it immediately carries out, within certain limitations, not only in a great variety of superficial activities, but in profound changes in the depths of the physical organism.

It is not strange that the therapeutic value of this fact should have been seized and developed into a method of practice which, in capable and responsible hands, has resulted in various cures. But while the enthusiasts have celebrated hypnosis, as a universal means of healing all diseases, they have overlooked its very necessary limitations, within the demands of the ethical reason.

A power of mental suggestion, such as would be great enough to heal all diseases, which one man, awake, might exercise over another man, asleep, would not only abolish entirely the sleeping man's intellectual and moral integrity, as a self-conscious rational being, but would put into the hands of the unscrupulous waking man an irresponsible power that would threaten the very existence of human society. Fortunately, nature itself restricts such power to comparatively narrow limits, as an experience in the unfolding scientific consciousness.

Hypnosis Shows Body to be Unconscious Mind.

The real significance of hypnosis is twofold. First, it teaches clearly that the body is unconscious mind and that if rational ideas, from the self-conscious region, can be insinuated into that mind, they become dynamic to produce very definite and calculable results. Secondly, it gives a scientific explanation to a vast rout of psychic phenomena, in the past and present, otherwise confusing and meaningless.

The supercilious eighteenth century Enlightenment swept all such events into the tophet of ignorance and superstition, without any serious attempt to explain them. The nineteenth century, however, more profound and comprehensive, as well as more serious in its search for natural causes, brought all these varied psychic events under the rational law of mental suggestion, such as we see at work, within the limited specific conditions of hypnosis.

Various Psychic Means of Healing Disease.

The psychic phenomena in question concern, more particularly, the healing of disease, by a variety of means which have no visible or

natural connection with the cure. The pious Protestant claims to have been healed supernaturally through prayer, and regards his explanation as quite rational and satisfactory. But the pious Catholic, Latin or Greek, will recount innumerable cases of the same kind of healing, effected at the shrines of his saints, especially that of the Holy Virgin, whose tenderness and sympathy for suffering humanity have always made her a favorite object of reverence and adoration among the faithful. And all through the Middle and Dark Ages, back to the very origin of Christianity, the Church has the most circumstantial records of such healing. In fact, the claim is made that the Church has always possessed that power since the days of the Apostles. Perhaps the tolerant Protestant will admit that all such cases, after all, are really supernatural answers to prayer, through faith in Christ.

But our comparative view must take us back beyond the Christian era into the Pagan world; and here we shall find numberless cases of healing at the shrines of heathen deities, with the grateful, votive offerings brought, just as they are brought by the pious Christian. Such cases certainly exclude faith in God, or in Christ, or in the Virgin, as the cause of cure; so that some other explanation must be sought.

But still further, we find the healing of disease effected by the talismans and incantations of the medicine men among the crudest and most primitive tribes. And it is not so far back among civilized peoples when the king's touch, or some old witch's charm was potent in preventing or in healing disease.

Natural Science Does not Furnish Law of Mental Suggestion.

With the clue furnished by hypnosis, the modern psychologist comes to see not only how all such varied instances may be swept under one general law of mental suggestion, but also how there is a possibility, through an understanding of that law, of bringing the outer, physiological order under the complete control of the inner, psychological order.

This, it will be seen, is an approach, from the side of empirical science, to the old idealistic doctrine of philosophy that mind and not matter is the substantial, causal power in the world. And why, it is impossible not to ask, if the self-conscious mind can directly control certain, superficial activities of the body, and bring about

certain, superficial changes in the surrounding, natural environment, can it not also, when the true law of mental suggestion is understood, go still further and control completely the body and nature, which together constitute the entire phenomenal object, down to their minutest details?

But while we have here come upon a general law of mental suggestion, there are two things absolutely necessary before the application of such a law can be made rational and beneficent for the healing of disease. First, hypnotism must be eliminated as inimical to the highest moral aims. To subject one personality to helplessness under the almost complete control of another, not only makes possible dangerous forms of malpractice, but is always humiliating to the patient, and at best ambiguous. Persons are not irresponsible things. Besides, if there is any power in suggestion to the sub-conscious or unconscious mind, it ought to be raised into the free, rational, self-conscious control of the individual whose immediate welfare is concerned. In the second place, there is needed the great word of suggestion that will have in it the dynamic power of displacing discordant errors for the efficient and harmonizing truth.

Progressive Refinement in Therapeutic Methods.

These two conditions have been urged in a very striking way by Frederic William Henry Myers who, it is not too much to say, has, during the past generation, done the most important work for modern psychology in its subliminal aspects, and has shown the conditions and possibilities of a mental therapeutic.

In a remarkable paper on "Mind Cure, Faith Cure, and the Miracles of Lourdes,"* Mr. Myers, assisted by his brother, Dr. A. T. Myers, brings together a great variety of authentic mental cures, under the one category of psycho-therapeutics.

In every case, he finds evident some sort of action by the mind on the body, apart from any miraculous or supernatural agency; he is therefore led to cherish the hope that this realm of efficient possibilities may be reduced to some practical principle; and indeed expresses the belief that in this particular we are on the eve of a great step forward. On reviewing the history of therapeutics, he finds that, as a rule, the tendency is from local to general treatment, with a greater subtlety and refinement in the remedies employed. That is, first,

* "Proc. Lon. Soc. Psyc. Research," Vol. IX. pp. 160-209.

there was *affusion*, or the external application of remedies to the diseased parts; then there followed *ingestion*, or the attempt to reach the difficulty through the digestive system; finally, there came *infusion* or the injection of the remedy directly into the blood. Now the possibility appears of *suggestion* or the introduction of curative ideas into the mind.

Mr. Myers Seeks a Religion of Science.

In a word, he discovers, as a therapeutic principle, that "faith will heal." But his "difficulty is to find something in which to have faith. For the patient must in some way picture to himself the agency which is to effect his cure" (Ib., p. 207). And he adds this significant question, as if almost within sight of the promised land: "Can any new faith, as absolute, as reverent as the old, guide its votaries, like the old, to healing of body as well as soul?"

He sees that, in pressing forward along this line of scientific therapeutics, there must be no appeal to *chance*, or to *uncertain favor*, but to *inflexible law*. Attaining such a result, we should have a scientific faith; and this clever investigator grasps with unerring clearness what this would imply. As if prophesying a great outcome to which his investigations point, he concludes: "Then, perhaps, the most scientific man would be the most confident, and it would be the sign of wisdom to seek self-healing with the directness of a child. Or, is it possible that something beyond mere logical conviction may be needed for the profounder cure; that the self-healing must needs be felt to depend ultimately on something behind or above the self? It may be that the inmost effort must still be a religious one, and that to change man deeply it needs to touch upon that mainspring deep in man. What then, for such a purpose must the religion of science mean? It must mean at least the ancient acceptance of the Universe as good, and the ancient sense of the individual effort as co-operant with a vaster power. If science can regain this sense for man, she may do with him what she will. For she will have united with the wonder-solving analysis the wonder-working faith, and with the wisdom of the children of this world the wisdom of the children of light" (Ib., p. 209).

A Forerunner of Christian Science.

Had Mr. Myers, after examining all the scattered, incoherent, seemingly unrelated facts of psycho-therapeutics, and after reviewing the

developments of modern psychology on the subject, sought, like some John the Baptist, to prepare the way for a new evangel of healing, and had written a definite program for Christian Science to fill, he could not have succeeded better than he has in the words just quoted.*

The one central theme, running throughout Mrs. Eddy's teachings and upon which she lays her entire emphasis, is that the Universe is Good, and that consequently the individual's only hope is to recognize himself as co-operant with that vaster power; for thus alone can he, by willing the Cosmic Will, as the divine creative and sustaining Power of Eternal Goodness, come to think the Cosmic Truth, and so enter into the enjoyment of the Cosmic Beauty.

The Religion of Science Attained in Christian Science.

The Scientific Faith, so much desired, has been set forth in Christian Science, in which the philosophical doctrine of Idealism, as the final outcome of scientific investigation and thought, ceases to be a mere theory, with a possible, or empirically uncertain and narrow application, and becomes a practice of universal valence. Since thought and will are the only substantial, causal realities, the objective Truth, as the Supreme Thought, is the only real mental suggestion of universal potency, because it is at the same time Love, as the Supreme Will, ruling throughout the Cosmos (16, 30-17, 3; 150, 4-17; 162, 4-11; 275, 9-24).

Therefore, we are led to see not only how it is, on the one hand, that mistakes in thought and perversities of will in mortal mind, are the prolific sources of all the evil in the world of nature and of man, such as natural disasters, misfortunes, poverty, disease, and the final catastrophe, death; but also how it is, on the other hand, that the omnipresent and omnipotent Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness in Immortal Mind, is the one only Substance and Cause of all that really is. Hence, there is but one condition on which man can come to know and master nature, including his own body, and that is to bring his thought and will into complete harmony with the Cosmic Thought and Will, as the Absolute Power and Reality of the world (149, 26-31; 302, 17-26).

*Strange as it may seem, although Mr. Myers has read "Science and Health," he takes Christian Science to mean just what it particularly condemns, and quite fails to see in it exactly what he is looking for—as in his "Human Personality" Vol. I, p. 473.

The Supreme Suggestion is the Truth of Reality.

This is the one, supreme, all-potent Mental Suggestion which Mrs. Eddy makes. So that the only real practice of Science that cures all human ills, heals all diseases, and at last, overcoming death, transforms and spiritualizes the phenomenal order of sense into the Real Order of Spirit, is to reflect in thought the Truth of God, and in will the Love of God, in order to enter into the harmonious Beauty and Life of God. Or, in other words, the Order of Spirit is ever-existent, ever-present, to be understood and realized, while the only barrier is the arch-error of mortal mind which, accepting the phenomenal world of sense as real, lures the will into all the sins of self, and so covers the Beauty of the world with the irrational and unsightly hallucinations of its troublous dreams. Now break this dream-spell, by denying sense and renouncing self; and, beholding all things in the light of Spiritual Reality, enter into the knowledge of and mastery over life (204, 30-205, 6; 243, 26-244, 7; 280, 1-8).

It becomes evident that this great Mental Suggestion does not gain potency when a man is asleep under the control of another will than his own; but, on the contrary, exercises its dynamic power in waking him up to a rational self-realization, in which for the first time he comes into complete control of himself. Moreover, it does not present objective Reality simply as the *substantial existence* of Truth, but also as the *causal power* of Goodness in the unity of harmonious Beauty. Hence, understanding and appropriating the suggestion is not a mere theoretical cognizing of Truth in thought, but also its appreciation as Beauty in feeling, because it is the manifestation of Goodness, as the only motive of will. The *thought* must sink down so deep into consciousness as to be *felt* as the Beauty of objective Truth, and consequently result in the *will* of good.

In view of this Divine Science, Mrs. Eddy takes her attitude toward all forms of hypnotic treatment, which is the same as she takes toward all medical treatment. While hypnosis may at times serve to secure desirable, empirical results, it always remains only empirical, and hence not scientific; because, even at its best, it is only dealing with secondary causes, and displacing the minor error of disease by the still greater error of supposing that the real cause of healing lies in the finite, mortal mind (101, 26-32; 145, 25-30). Not until man understands that all power is of God, who is Life, Truth, and

Love, can he be said to be on his way to the acquirement of a true rational Science, which means a real knowledge and a real mastery, in his own freedom and self-realization (106, 6-11).

Thus, in Christian Science, natural science is brought to its rational fulfilment in becoming Christian. For now the unknown "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed" of science, becomes the Infinite and Eternal Truth and Love of God, by which the worlds were framed, of religion. The Cosmic Science and the Cosmic Ethics are one, in the harmonious Beauty of the Cosmic Art; and man's only vocation in the world is to come to know, to love, and to enjoy God forever. If the old catechism declares that the chief end of man is to know God and enjoy him forever, the new catechism of Christian Science rationally explains to the understanding how that, to know God, necessarily means to love and enjoy God, as the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness.

Science and Socialism, two Great Programs for the Future.

But if Christian Science is thus the fulfilment of the historical past, it likewise establishes the great, rational principles for the historical future. From what has been said heretofore, we may define history as *the unfolding of the human consciousness in time, toward that rational maturity, wherein man comes freely to share with his fellow-man all the values of nature, discovered by science (Truth) and appropriated by art (Beauty), according to the will of universal goodness (Love)*. Outside of this, we can think of history as having no meaning, or as being but a chaotic chronology of meaningless events among vegetative, human animals, aiming at nothing and arriving nowhere.

Now, there are two great programs for the attainment of this Ideal of history, furnished us by the Renaissance and the Reformation, as integral parts of the Christian consciousness, which dominate our modern world, viz.: *science*, which would know and master nature, and *socialism*, which would justly apportion the values of nature among men; and these two are more and more seen to be indissolubly joined. For the more closely we examine the course of history in our modern world, we find that, with the growth of civil liberty and the establishment of free government on the simple principle of manhood, there has gone on, *pari passu*, our knowledge of and our control over nature—as if nature waited for our moral

improvement, before she was willing to entrust us with her beneficence and power; as if she would demand that we first seek the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, before these other things should be added.

Science and Socialism Do not Master their Inherent Ideas.

But, although science and socialism are each dominated by a great idea, neither of them is a master of that idea. While the idea of science is the knowledge of objective Truth, which gives the mastery over life; in its actuality, as we have seen, it only claims to give us apparent knowledge and apparent mastery, and does not attain real knowledge and consequently real mastery. The best that science can do for us, is to give us material blessings and increase their quantity.

The idea of socialism is the Kingdom of God on earth, in which men live in mutual service, according to the great law of universal goodness. By socialism, we do not here mean any particular, current socialistic program, but that general conviction, growing more and more throughout the Christian world, that political freedom, smothered under an economic feudalism of fierce individualistic competition, must rationally unfold into economic freedom, in which the mutual service of all results in the general good of all. In other words, it is coming clearly to be seen that, in a free government, based upon individual worth, the accumulation of vast hordes of wealth, which is always the product of communal effort upon the resources of nature, in the hands of economically irresponsible individuals, is wholly inconsistent with the spirit of democracy, is a threat to the general good, and a moral absurdity.

But, taking socialism in its various concrete programs, it is found as yet to be vitiated by either one or both of two defects. It neglects or *depreciates* the *individual*, in his inalienable dignity and worth, to the advantage of an *abstract theory* of a perfect social organism; or it lays predominant stress upon the just distribution of *material goods*. That is, in general, it presents a state of balanced justice, securing worldly comfortableness, among mediocre individuals.

These Ideas Attained in Intuition.

The manner in which the ideas inherent in science and socialism may be brought to complete realization, has already been indicated. Science culminates in philosophy, the third and last stage of theoret-

ical evolution, where rational intuition deals no longer with phenomena but with Reality; and, centering our thought and will upon spiritual rather than upon material values, reveals to us how Reality not only subordinates and harmonizes the phenomenal world, but gives to it its only true meaning.

Socialism culminates in the Kingdom of God on earth, the third and final stage of ethical evolution, where the individual in his supreme love to God, and equal love to his neighbor, is not brought down by statute to the common level, but raised to his full dignity and worth, by freely including within his own interests the interests of all. No state can be anything but an arbitrary product of fancy which overlooks the divine rights of the individual, who must be brought, on the one hand, to his fullest freedom and self-realization, but, on the other hand, must be brought to recognize that his freedom and self-realization just depends upon the freedom and self-realization of all, in the mutual service of a universal will of good.

These Ideas Set Forth in Christian Science.

It is in Christian Science that these two ideas of science and socialism finally come to full expression in a rational unity, which merges them into one comprehensive program of history that secures the blessings of nature for all, by understanding the Truth of Reality to be the harmonious Beauty of the world, resting upon the creative Will of Eternal Goodness; and by meeting the condition of willing the universal law of Goodness, in order to be entrusted with the Power and Beauty of the Truth. Just as men can never find the Truth by seeking for it in the outer phenomenal world of sense, so they can never attain Goodness in human society by seeking to distribute justly the values of that phenomenal world of sense. It is only when the world and man are seen in their spiritual Reality in God, that the world will come into the possession of man, to be shared by his fellow-man, according to the law of love (340, 15-29).

The program of Christian Science for man's future development in the world of nature and of history, is not the result of human reasoning or contrivance; but the emergence into human consciousness, through the evolving centuries, of the Cosmic Thought and the Cosmic Will, in their Absolute Unity. It is the coming of the Kingdom of God, though not with observation; it is the return of Christ upon the clouds of heaven, or amid the phenomena of the visible

world, with all the holy angels, or the beautiful ideas of God's all-harmonious creation.

Primary Condition of Progress Lies in the Individual.

The primary condition by which this great consummation can be furthered and secured, as Mrs. Eddy clearly indicates, is by the development of the individual *in*, rather than *by* society. Instead of endeavoring, first, to fix things on the outside, the individual must begin at the sources of all substantial and causal reality within himself. No real mastery of nature can be won, and no real state can be established, except as each individual finds the center and ground of his thought and will in God, who is the Unity of the Cosmic Thought and Will.

As the Absolute Beauty of Infinite Truth, manifesting Eternal Goodness, God is the only Real and Ultimate Principle of man and of nature. If, therefore, man would know and master nature, and if he would come into mutual service and peace with his fellow-man, in sharing the values of nature, there is only one way open to this end, and that is to find his true relation to his Divine Principle; and, in harmony with this his Divine Principle, he must think and will, if he would attain freedom and self-realization, as a son of God in the Kingdom of God.

However potent, in its influence upon the individual for good or ill the objective environment, natural and social, may be, the entire problem of determining what that environment shall be rests, in the first instance, with men as individuals. Nature and society do not ultimately change the individual—they solely offer the objective conditions that make such change possible; it is the individual who ultimately changes nature and society. Whatever we have learned of nature, and whatever advance we have made in human society has been first due to certain great, outstanding individuals, and then to the proportion in which other individuals have profited by their lesson and example.

So it happens that when the individual gets right within himself, thinks the Truth, and wills the Good, in all his relations to God, the world, and his fellow-man, then the world and his fellow-man will come right, because God, upon whom all depends, is always right. In other words, the social Idea, or Kingdom of God on earth, is not to be realized by first making outer changes in human society, but by first realizing that Idea within the individual.

History Ends in Reconciling Hebraism and Hellenism.

Thus, in the fulness of time, there comes to historical realization that which prophets have foretold and philosophers have divined, wherein the Hebrew ethical element and the Greek scientific element, in the Christian consciousness, at first arbitrarily joined in the ritual and dogmas of the Church, and then driven apart by the Reformation and Renaissance, have at last been brought to complete, rational unity in Christian Science.

Rising above faith in the abstract, logically constructed dogma to rational intuition, Christian Science opens the understanding to Reality as Immortal Mind, in which the world, in its spiritual Truth, is seen in its flawless Beauty, as the revelation of Eternal Love; and, at the same time, points out that, in proportion as each individual man denies his subjective errors and renounces his subjective sins, in order to bring to realization, or to reflect in himself, the objective Beauty of Truth and Goodness, he enters into a new heaven and a new earth.

The Nineteenth Century Makes Christian Science Possible.

At no other time than the closing half of the nineteenth century, and in no other country than in free America could Christian Science have emerged as the fulfilment of all the past evolving tendencies of Christian history, and as the program for all future progress.

For the first time in the annals of the race, man had attained a true monistic view of the Cosmos, as resting upon the Ultimate Reality of the One, Absolute, Infinite and Eternal Mind, manifesting itself to sense, under the conditions of space and time, in the phenomenal world-order of nature and history, which unfolds to human consciousness, according to rational, intelligible laws, toward some great end. At no time had man so fully gained such insight into the ever-present, all-pervasive Truth, immanent in nature; and, by his knowledge and obedience, so fully entered into the enjoyment of its life and power.

At no time had man so fully caught the meaning of history, as an unfolding order of human society, looking toward the freedom and welfare of all, in mutually sharing the material blessings of life.

Or, in general, we might say that for the first time in history, man was really coming to think the Cosmic Thought and will the Cosmic Will. The logic of time made it inevitable that the unknown God of

Infinite and Eternal Energy, whom the Hellenic spirit of science ignorantly worshipped, should become known as, or identified with, the Living God of Infinite and Eternal Truth and Love, whom the Hebrew ethical spirit of the Gospel revealed as he who "giveth to all life, and breath, and all things, and hath made of one every nation of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, having determined their appointed seasons, and the bounds of their habitations; that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from each one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being," as even certain of the Greek poets had said, "For we are also his offspring" (Acts xvii, 26-28).

The old order was passing away, giving place to new. The ritualistic, ecclesiastical form of the Christian consciousness, product of the ancient Greek and Latin worlds, had gone; and the abstract, dogmatic form of the Christian consciousness, product of the mediæval Germanic world was going; because both were based upon a philosophical dualism which divided the unity of Reason into two irreconcilable and even hostile interests. The modern monistic world-view had come, and there was imperative a reinterpretation of the Christian consciousness in its light, by which it could be seen how the Hebrew element of Goodness in the Eternal Reason, as the law of the will, was one with the Greek element of Truth, as the object of thought.

The Gospel Looks Forward to the Freedom of America.

And this reinterpretation, which has come to full conscious expression in Christian Science—Christian, because it meets the demands of the ethical reason, and science, because it meets the demands of the theoretical reason—was alone possible in America, where history had prepared those conditions out of which it might issue.

From the time the leaven of the Gospel was planted in the ancient world, all the evolving tendencies of history pointed toward the freedom and fellowship of man as found in our new western world. The Glad Tidings revealed that men are the free children of God, and that the law of their fellowship, in the Kingdom of God, is the law of universal good-will. And the entire significance of history has been to bring the idea of that kingdom, through the struggling centuries, to practical realization.

At last, upon these virgin shores, uncontaminated by the super-

stitutions and wrongs of the past, there was proclaimed liberty to all peoples. There should be a government among men, of the people, by the people, and for the people, based upon the dignity and worth of the individual man, as man.

America; the Birth of Time.

This idea, we must understand, was not created by the Declaration, or the Constitution, nor can it be regarded as an original product of the American people, for it had been growing through the centuries; but it came to a clear historical embodiment for the first time in America, while the European world was politically still living in the past.

The closely succeeding French Revolution was but the beginning of an uncertain struggle that did not come to a close for three quarters of a century; and England, from whom we inherited so much of our love of freedom and its ideals, did not begin to throw off its medieval swaddling bands until the Reform of 1832. It was the possibility of a constitutional government of freemen, already set up in America, that gave courage and inspiration to all those progressive forces in the old world which have advanced, and still advance, the cause of civil freedom throughout the earth. And in this way, the younger world has been able to repay, in some measure, the immense debt she owes, in intellectual, moral, and artistic culture, to the older mother world.

America Does not Mean Bigness.

It is this meaning of America, as a government of free men, based upon the individual rights of manhood, which must be kept in mind, if we would avoid the superficial views about America which are too prevalent, not only abroad but even in our own country. When Emerson said that America is another name for opportunity, he never meant what too many so-called Americans mean—commercial and industrial opportunity, the opportunity of developing material resources and gaining material wealth. He meant opportunity of developing free men, in their intelligence and character.

The vast resources and enormous accumulation of wealth in America, is not essential to the American Idea. It only makes America *big*, not *great*; but it is the portentous opportunity in which America must show her true greatness, and the dynamic power of her inherent Idea, in a new and higher form of economic equity.

Unfortunately, this financial bigness which impresses so many American minds as greatness, also impresses many European minds, as the most characteristic feature of American civilization. But, instead of regarding it as greatness, they put it down as the littleness of superficial, vulgar minds which, in their undeveloped crudity, mistake the show of things for their substance.

Crudities in America.

Though America may possess wealth and afford the opportunity for wealth, neither wealth nor the opportunity to gain wealth, is the real meaning of America for the world. We can not boast of superiority in any of the forms of intellectual and artistic culture. For, if we are inclined to feel proud of our learning and art, we shall find higher learning and better art across the seas. And, even where we pride ourselves most, namely, in more advanced political institutions, it were wise to be humble and learn of those that can teach. We certainly can not claim to have purer politicians, wiser statesmen, more incorruptible judges, or juster administration of law than are to be found in the older world. In all these things, America is much like a great overgrown boy, unconscious of the real sources of his strength but proud of it as his own, and always naively boastful of his accomplishments, which he does not know others rate lower than he does himself.

Freedom in France and England not Fully Attained.

What then is the significance of America, as the outcome of historical development? In a word, *the dignity and worth of man, as man, in a free fellowship of mutual service, where the only law is that of universal good-will.* It is true, France is free, and England is free. But the freedom of France has no organic relation to her past, which still persists, in the great majority of her people, as the monarchical medieval Church. Most of her citizens either have no religion at all, and would found a state upon the human inventions of a eudæmonistic and prudential morality; or have too much religion, and would chain the state to the dead body of the ecclesiastical past.

The political freedom of England, is in principle, historically organic and complete, but is overshadowed by an omnipotent social system of caste that is purely medieval, and that vitiates the true sense of manhood. The British colonies, dominated by the principles

of Democratic England, and almost free from social caste, more nearly approach the American spirit than they do that of the Mother Country.

Freedom in America Free from Heredity and Privilege.

But in America, the spirit of freedom has entirely broken away from the superstitions of prescriptive right and hereditary privilege, and sets every man upon his feet, as a man, having equal rights and privileges with all. He can think and do as he will, win and hold as he can, in proportion to his intelligence, character, and capacity, according to the law of universal good-will, as in no other quarter of the globe. More nearly embodied in America than ever before in the history of the world, is the dynamic idea in Jesus's conception of the Kingdom and the Will of God on earth. Freed from the unjust and irrational trammels of the past—the whole enslavement of political and religious heredity; released from the mean and truckling spirit of servility, and the still more debasing mood of self-contempt, men unfold to something like a sense of manhood, dignity, and self-respect such as they have never known before.

And the miracle of transformation is being wrought every day. Great heterogeneous masses of the most heterogeneous peoples are pouring upon our shores. So far as they come from the Protestant countries of the north, they are readily assimilated to the American Idea, because the American Idea, born of the Mother Country, England, is a child of the Reformation; and even those who come from the countries under the sway of Rome, which in its very genius always has been and still is inimical to our free institutions, absorb in time the American spirit. Men begin to feel that they can stand up straight and look with some sense of self-worth, into the eyes of their fellow men, whom they recognize to be as worthy and free as themselves. Human nature, under these conditions, becomes more simple, direct, unaffected, fair, and kind. Free man from the chains of traditional ignorance and ancient wrongs which make him unnatural, give him his rightful opportunity of expanding the native powers within him, and it will invariably be found that it is natural for him to become intelligent, capable, and good.

In America, every man is politically a king by divine right, who makes his own laws and interprets and administers them. Religiously he is a priest, who erects his own altar before God, and brings his own

oblations. There is a tendency in certain quarters, to make light of the idealistic doctrines of the Declaration and the Constitution, but it is just these idealistic doctrines that give to those immortal documents their claim to our reverence as a sacred revelation. For they are the outcome in time, of that elder revelation, which has been brought to light, through the centuries of history, by the guiding Spirit of all Truth.

The Ideal not Attained in America, but Pursued.

That the spirit of individual freedom, in a universal fellowship of good-will, has attained anything like its ideal in America, can not be supposed for one moment; and no man is more painfully aware of this than the true American himself. America has just begun; but it has *begun*, and there is every indication, historical and rational, that the free government of the people, by the people, and for the people, under God, shall not perish from off the earth.

There are snobs, and parasites, and toadies, and political tricksters, and superficial blatherskites in America, but so there are the world over. These reveal the defects of human nature in general, and are not peculiar to America. But what is peculiar to America is that spirit of individual freedom that, while it permits men to be fools, if they will, essentially means to encourage them all to be wise: there shall be an open field and fair play for every man, simply because he is a man.

America not to be Judged by the Defects of Her Virtues.

America can not be judged by the defects of her virtues. From the most cultivated and virtuous down through the entire body politic, to the most ignorant and vicious, the spirit of individual freedom and self-worth, claimed for the self and as freely granted to all, runs. In such a condition of public sentiment, it is not strange that men should at times abuse their freedom, and others be complacently lenient at such abuse. The wonder is not that men are so bad, but that they are not worse. And yet not a wonder, for in reality, it is natural for man to be free; and although, when first liberated from the bonds of ancient political and social wrong, he reveals his crudities, it is only then that all his inner capacities can expand and come to the full expression of his manhood.

Whatever defects and failures may stand to the account of America,

as the results of human weakness, America demonstrates that freedom among men, in a fellowship of mutual service, according to a law of universal good-will, however imperfectly realized, affords the best and highest conditions for the development of human society. Here all service is noble, and labor is an honor. The chief magistrate of the nation is not the ruler but the servant of the people; and the only ribands and stars that can really decorate a man are his intelligence, his character, and his capacity. Men begin to penetrate below all externalism to the inner reality, and a man is no longer estimated by any outer insignia of position and power, or by title and wealth, hereditary or acquired, but by what he *really is as a man*. It must be said that never before, and nowhere else than in America, has the Scottish bard's dream, however inadequately, nevertheless, so fully been realized:

"That man to man, the world o'er,
Shall brothers be, and a' that."

New England bears the American Idea.

But if we thus speak of America, in general, we must speak of New England in particular, as having embodied, during the middle of the nineteenth century, more perfectly than elsewhere in America, its true spirit. The American Golden Age was the New England of Channing, Parker, and Freeman Clarke; of Longfellow, Lowell, and Emerson; of Webster and Sumner, and a score of others, only less noble in their spirit and power of expression.

Here, if anywhere, what America means and what a true American is, found utterance and embodiment. Here, if anywhere, man was freed not only politically and socially, but intellectually from the ancient bonds of divine rights, hereditary privilege, and dogmatic superstition; and man, set upon his feet as a man, was called out to the enjoyment of a freedom to which he was entitled, and in which alone he could come to his highest development.

Meaning of the Puritans.

We may, if we will, divert ourselves at the expense of those hardy old Puritans of 1620, who were as rigorous and stern as the wintry shores they settled; but it was their profound faith in God, sense of individual dignity, and courage of conviction that laid the foundations for the only true society among free men; a society based upon

the immovable foundations of Eternal Righteousness, and the inalienable worth of individual manhood.

We may deplore their narrow bigotry, or excuse it because it was a general characteristic of the age, but the spirit of their labor had in it the destruction of all narrowness and bigotry; and their fidelity to what they really believed severely condemns our so-called tolerance, which is often but a fine sounding name to gloze over our intellectual confusion or moral cowardice. Too often, we are not serious enough, or clear-headed enough, to have any convictions at all; or, if by chance we have any, we are too timid to live by them and die by them, as were the Fathers.

Man Free to Attain His Best.

At any rate, it was out of that same early New England that the New England of our poets developed. There was the same profound faith in God, the same sense of man's individual worth as man, and the same assertion of freedom for all, working together with all, on the basis of the universal will of good.

Every man was encouraged to make his noblest endeavor; the humblest service to others was accounted an honor, and the simple aspiration to be a man, in the fullest sense of the word, was considered the highest ambition. Each for all and all for each, was a principle of action where each and all alike were regarded as children of God. In the phrase of an idealistic friend, human fellowship was to be not only a government of the people, for the people and by the people, but also *in* the people.

By all the means of instruction and inspiration in church and school, every man was to be brought to his best, because he is individually entitled to it, and because the integrity and development of the state depend upon it. Never before did the ideal of the millennial time come more nearly to concrete expression and actual realization; and, if we, in our grossly materialistic generation, wish to know what America really means, what it is, and what it stands for, we must turn back to listen to "those melodious bursts that filled the spacious times" of our New England poets "with sounds that echo still."

Mrs. Eddy, a Product of New England, Interprets its Spirit.

It was in this New England that Mary Baker Eddy lived and moved and had her being, and it was here that Christian Science

could, and must needs, come to utterance, as inevitably as the dawn steals upon the eastern sky.

The idealism of a Channing and the transcendentalism of an Emerson must be forced to some practical issue. The intelligence and enlightenment of a liberated theology must not lose the power and fervor of evangelical orthodoxy; and the lofty speculations of philosophy must be saved from a brahmanistical seclusion and aloofness from the work-a-day world; while all the ideals, which the poets had dreamed, of man's freedom and greatness, must be made possible of realization, upon the basis of a Spiritual Science which is as natural to the real man, as it is universal.

All of this Mrs. Eddy has gathered up and expressed in Christian Science, not as a fragmentary compilation of detached ideas, but as one living, organic Idea, which inaugurates a new era of progress for man, who can now begin to see the possibility of bringing his scientific ideals of Truth into complete æsthetic harmony with his ethical ideals of Goodness.

Striking Features in Mrs. Eddy's Teachings.

It is out of these conditions that there arise certain features, in Mrs. Eddy's teachings, which are highly characteristic and unequivocal in meaning.

She first becomes deeply conscious of a call to her great mission, for which, through the painful experiences of life, God had been preparing her (xi, 19-21; 107, 1-6), from which she never turns, and about which she never wavers.

That mission is nothing less than the restoration of the Gospel of Jesus to its original power of healing man both of his diseases and his sins; but rationally explained to the understanding, in the light of the modern scientific spirit (147, 24-31).

If Christianity is thus made scientific, Science is made Christian; so that those who, as representatives of science, would heal man of disease, are called to be, in reality scientific, by making their science *Christian*; and those who, as representatives of Christianity, would save man from his sin are called to be, in reality Christian, by making their Christianity *scientific*.

The leading note of Mrs. Eddy's mission is a sense of joyous freedom, in the rational understanding of life. Men have shaken off the shakels of physical bondage, let them now break that deeper and

more oppressive intellectual and moral servitude that enslaves their minds (224, 28; 227, 29).

The Gospel, in its scientific meaning, explains the secret of that bondage, and opens the way to freedom. Belief in material reality and in the value of material pleasures, weaves out of a tissue of subjective errors and sins, a dream-world which, with its hallucinations of suffering and death, obscures the Real World. And, therefore, man is called to arouse himself from this troubled dream of his material illusions, and return to the Spiritual Reality of Life, Truth, and Love, where he enters upon the enjoyment of that dominion of freedom and self-realization for which he is divinely endowed, and to which he is divinely entitled (170, 14-172, 2).

We have here an uncompromising pessimism that condemns, without qualification, the hollow mockery of material existence (272, 19-27), united with a triumphant optimism that celebrates the inevitable victory of Truth over error, Love over sin, and Life over death (43, 27-44, 4; 231, 20-232, 2).*

We have here the free intelligence of the most liberal and advanced theology, combined with the fervid devotion of the most earnest evangelical Christianity.

We have here the reconciliation of Plato, who would desert the real, as worthless, for the Ideal, and Aristotle, who would lower the Ideal to the real; because, following in the footsteps of Jesus, Mrs. Eddy would make the Ideal dominate the real, by lifting the real to the Ideal. In like manner, we have the mediation of the Kantian transcendence, that would confine man to the real, by exalting the Ideal beyond knowledge, and the Hegelian immanence, that would over-value the real, by tending to assimilate it to the Ideal; because Mrs. Eddy presents the transcendence of the loftiest, supernatural idealism, intelligible to man's thought, as being in harmony with the most natural, realistic immanence, when *subordinated, through rational law*, to the Ideal.

We have here the unconditioned protest of Idealism and of the Christian consciousness against the new materialism of the nineteenth century that, with its superficial doctrines of evolution, would reduce mind to matter, or seek to explain empirically the inner

*The citations from "Science and Health" are only suggestive, and by no means exhaust the wealth of utterances collateral to the subjects treated.

world of Spiritual Reality by the outer world of phenomenal appearance.

And what gives to the whole movement its great practical significance is that we have in Mrs. Eddy's own life and teachings the illuminated devotion and intrepid courage that brooks no traditional prejudice or superstitious fear, and demands that the Ideal shall be made to demonstrate its reality in the daily experiences of life.

Most Significant and Comprehensive Interpretation of Life.

For breadth and depth of meaning, Christian Science is the most significant and comprehensive interpretation which has yet been put upon life, because it meets the demands of the æsthetic reason for unity, by uniting the demands of both the theoretical reason for Truth, and the ethical reason for Goodness; and thus brings into harmony the Aryan genius, with its ideals of Truth and Beauty, and the Hebrew genius, with its ideals of Goodness and Eternal Life.

To be a Christian, it is now no longer sufficient to be *ethical*, or will the Good; it is necessary also to be *scientific*, or understand the Truth, as the manifested Beauty of the Good. And to be a Scientist, it is now no longer sufficient to know the Truth; it is necessary also to be *ethical*, or will the Good, as manifested in the Beauty of Truth. To be a Christian, is to be a Scientist, as to be a Scientist, is to be a Christian; and to be both, is to be a Man whose destiny, as a son of God, is to realize in himself the Beauty of Truth, manifesting Goodness.

If the Greek and Latin world of antiquity interpreted Christianity for us in the Ritualistic Church; and the medieval, Germanic world interpreted Christianity for us in the Dogmatic Church; the new American world, where the nations are gathered and where the modern spirit of liberty and of science have free play, has, in these last times, interpreted Christianity for us in the Spiritual Church of Christian Science.

As America is the greatest contribution of the Protestant Reformation, so Christian Science is the greatest contribution of America, to the progress of the world; and is distinctly the spiritual meaning of America for the world.

It is of no little significance that Christian Science is the utterance

of a woman—woman, as such, interpreting life from the depths of her spiritual intuitions; or is the genius of woman, revealing the elemental fervor within her, by the devotion of her mind and heart to the spiritual realities of Life, Truth, and Love. In our world of men, with all their loud and confusing strifes, it is well worth the day that the gentle and persuasive voice of woman should be heard, who in the sweet reasonableness of her tender compassion and love, delivers to us a higher message about man and God, and his beauteous creation, than we have heard before.

But is a woman capable of anything so comprehensive and great? There are only two answers possible, and they are simply facts. First, *America*: where a universal freedom, based upon a genuine faith in God and in man, has rendered to woman her highest honors, and given the freest play to the development of all the noblest elements within her. And secondly, *genius*: which can never be logically *explained*, but simply *occurs*, when the fullness of time has come.

It is out of American womanhood that Mrs. Eddy has risen, as one of the greatest spiritual geniuses in the history of the race, with whom, for the value of her teachings, but few can be compared. That she does not represent the official schools of the Church, or the learning of the Academy, is the condition of her untrammelled freedom and originality; and only places her with those who have inaugurated the widest and most beneficent movements of advance among their fellow men.

And yet what she has said is not new, for it is as old as the world; nor is it old, for it is as young as the present moment, because Truth is always what it is; but, in her thought and experience, she has given organic, concrete, living form and unity to the Idea, which Time had been waiting to bring forth.

Christian Science must Be Spiritually Discerned.

Christian Science is at the beginning of its career in the world. Just what outer forms it will take on or what embodiment it will assume, no man can say; but it grows apace, like the oak sending its roots down to the depths of the everlasting hills. It is not the fugitive utterance of a sentimental or idealistic woman, but the rational voice of the Cosmic Order, making itself heard in the unfolding con-

sciousness of man; it is the Divine Logos, enlightening man and leading him in the way of all Truth; it is the revelation of God.

He who would know whether or not Christian Science is true, can never determine it by the measure of a discursive logic or an academic criticism. But, giving himself up to his deepest intellectual insight and highest ethical volitions, he must *think* it, *feel* it, and *will* it; and then he will find himself dropping the illusions of his material existence, and entering into the Spiritual Realities of a New Heaven and a New Earth.



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
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